THE STORY OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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KING EDWARD AND HIS COURT (Second Edition)

SOCIETY IN THE COUNTRY HOUSE (Second Edition)

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PREFACE

A HISTORY of English diplomacy, that attempted the revelation of Foreign Office secrets, might resolve itself into a series of imaginative conjectures, sure to prove often most unhistoric and generally unedifying. The less ambitious object of this work is systematically to disentangle the thread of international narrative from the general events of contemporary history. Those events have been entirely avoided, except when they formed a part of the particular subject in hand. When the notion first suggested itself to me some years ago, I was in the habit, as a writer for the public press, of seeing several of those high in authority at the Foreign Office or in the diplomatic service. Among these were Lords Granville, Kimberley and Salisbury. The first of these was kind enough to recall for my instruction an oral account of the course of our diplomacy he had himself received, when first going to the Foreign Office in 1851, from his predecessor, Lord Palmerston. That included a summary of our foreign relations, from a date earlier than that of the Foreign Office itself—indeed from the year 1714. The Secretaryship for the Southern Department had then been taken by
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Stanhope, whom Palmerston seems to have regarded as the first official who made foreign policy his distinctive province. And here in passing I may observe I am aware of some reasons given by Mr Pike* for seeing in the Northern department rather than the Southern the specific germs of the Foreign Office. As a fact, I have in the introductory chapter of the present work opened my brief retrospect with a period considerably before that of Stanhope. For the rest it has been my first object, avoiding all excursions into general history, as well as the more universally familiar portions of the diplomatic narrative, to confine myself to the foreign transactions of the English Government, to the individuals chiefly associated with these, and, for choice, to dwell in detail rather upon those that naturally and properly have occupied less space in the general histories of the time.

My special obligations to other works as well as to individuals have been mentioned generally at what seemed the right place in the course of this narrative. Over and above these, independently too of the Palmerstonian reminiscences by which Lord Granville allowed me to profit, I am indebted to Lord Granville himself for many hints upon those periods of which he had personal experience and with which I have had to do. Lord Kimberley also gave me much information bearing on the epoch of his Copenhagen Commission

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in 1863. As regards the diplomatic story of the early nineteenth century, I was shown very many years ago by Mr Spencer Montagu, who afterwards became the last Lord Rokeby, some most interesting family papers rich in fresh impressions of Metternich and of Metternich's time generally. I am conscious of having derived equal or greater profit from frequent conversations on contemporary or former events and personages with that kindest of friends, Lord Currie, who abounded in first-hand knowledge handed down to him by his father, Raikes Currie, of diplomatic transactions during the Napoleonic era. Such acquaintance with the interior of the Department as I may have acquired began when Lord Currie first became Permanent Under-Secretary. Nor have my obligations been less to those connected with the Foreign Office since Lord Currie's time, especially to the present Lord Dufferin and to Lord Fitzmaurice. Among all living experts on international or diplomatic subjects, my greatest indebtedness is to my kind friend of now very many years' standing, Sir Charles Dilke, and to my Oxford contemporary, now of our French Embassy, Sir Henry Austin Lee. Had any of those now mentioned withheld from me their good offices my task could not have been completed. As regards books, Dr Franck Bright's and Sir Spencer Walpole's histories have provided me with innumerable data which I could not otherwise have obtained; while Dr Bright gave me invaluable assistance in preparing the whole groundwork and plan of this volume, as well as in advising
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me about some of its details, and Lord Reay assisted me with invaluable details concerning Pitt's Dutch diplomacy in the Napoleonic era. Apropos of Pitt's financial operations at this period, Sir Charles Rivers Wilson's good offices, and the mastery of the subject possessed by Mr A. T. King of the National Debt Office, have enabled me to illustrate the connection between high politics and high finance, with personal information of great interest and value now printed for the first time.

T. H. S. ESCOTT.

West Brighton,
April 1908.
THE STORY OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The object of diplomacy — Its genesis in Classic Greece — Machiavelli: his influence upon European diplomacy before and after his death — Italy succeeded by Russia as a school of statecraft — English foreign policy — The various causes of its lack of unity — Early examples of Britain’s relations with Continental Powers — Inclination to Anglo-Spanish rather than to Anglo-French alliances — Anglo-Spanish relations changed by the divorce of Henry VIII., the Reformation and the naval enterprises of Elizabeth’s reign.

The elementary object of diplomacy in all countries and ages may be roughly described as the maintenance of international relations on terms of mutual courtesy, forbearance and self-control, such as regulate the intercourse of individuals in private life, the reduction to a minimum of causes of international friction, the actual avoidance or the indefinite postponement of recourse to war for the settlement of disputes between independent states. Should pacific negotiations have failed and hostilities become unavoidable, diplomacy, defeated for the moment, does not sink into an attitude of mere passive, idle spectatorship; preserving presence of mind and cool-
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ess of head even amid the clash of arms, it awaits the opportunity of the peacemaker. It follows, from whatever distance, the varying fortunes of the field. Trained agents at the courts or capitals of the warring states keep it accurately informed concerning the resources of the belligerent Powers, the movement of their high finance, the conflict of interest or opinion among allies, concerning fluctuations of popular feeling, penetrates, if not the tactics of generals, the designs of the sovereigns or statesmen who direct them. It watches and seizes opportunities for mediatorial action with a view to the conclusion of a settled peace. The different states of classical Greece gradually created for themselves a species of diplomatic machinery in that Amphictyonic Council, existing for the purpose of settling disputes between the various Hellenic communities by peaceful compromise instead of by internecine war. To the influence of that body may be attributed the strong public feeling against resorting to the sword in the earlier stages of a quarrel, and, above all, against omitting the due formalities when the rupture came, against, in a word, an appeal to the god of battles without due proclamation by heralds.

The beginnings, however, of European diplomacy are not discernible till the Roman Empire was replaced by the European state system. The essence of the Renaissance statecraft distilled itself into diplomacy; that art had Machiavelli for its first Italian teacher; Spain, two centuries later, produced Alberoni; between these came the Swedish Oxenstern, remembered for a single aphorism, to-day more familiar than any Machiavellian maxim, notwithstanding that the great Florentine may be said to have had all Europe for his
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pupil. No political instructor of any epoch projected his ideas further or more powerfully into future generations than was done by the man whose very name has become a synonym for heartless cunning and unscrupulous craft. If the fact of having influenced the thought and the politics of his time makes a man great, that epithet unquestionably belongs to Machiavelli. As a diplomatist the combination of insight into human nature and dexterity in dealing with it commanded admiration and success. As a writer he condensed into pithy and pungent apothegms those generalisations from his own experience and conversance with affairs which, as will presently be seen, if they did not actually mould, at least reflected themselves in the administrative or executive ideas of his own as well as of later generations.

The earliest professor of the diplomatic art, Machiavelli is also the first to describe the stages and tactics by which this art can alone reasonably count upon success. For to him diplomacy means nothing less than the management of human nature by appeals to its own master-motives or passions. These, from his point of view, are constant qualities. States rise and fall. Fortunes, whether acquired by communities or individuals, are consolidated or melt away. Human nature never changes; its manifestations, like its expedients, may vary in their degrees of complexity; its fundamentals are always the same. As humanity is in its essence unchangeable, so must be the most effective methods of dealing with it in an individual or in a community. Much truth is there from this point of view in the old Italian proverb, "So good a man as to be good for nothing," or, to quote the nineteenth-
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century English variant of the same idea, "A good man in the worse sense of the words."

Fifty years after his death, Europe began to see, personified as it were, in Machiavelli's ghost, the evil genius of the age. Possessed by that sinister spirit, the pious and devout Calvin became a party to the burning for heresy of Servetus at Geneva (1553). Twenty years later the same malignant influence prompted Catherine de Medici to the massacre of St Bartholomew's Day. Another hundred years pass; the master-strokes of policy which signalised the reign of Louis XIV., what are they save modernised manifestations of Machiavellian statecraft? But why confine within such limits the operation of a force which, notwithstanding its Florentine label, amounts in reality to the sum of human nature's concealed but ever-living, dissembled yet always in the last resort decisive, instincts and aims. Nor for that matter was the mocking fiend of Machiavellianism, assuming perhaps other shapes, less busy under the Fronde than under the League. Or again, to descend to our own days, the tactics of the twin creators of existing Italy, Cavour and Napoleon III., what were they but an adaptation to later needs of weapons, meet for patriotism and piety, chosen from the Machiavellian armoury? Yet once more: the idées Napoléoniciennes, the Bismarckian beatitudes (beati possidentes), surely these, quite as much as the policy and maxims of Frederick the Great, are the latter-day fruitage of the sixteenth-century "Prince."

To pass to the Machiavellian spirit in connection with the diplomatic developments of our own country. In England Machiavelli's writings excited much interest very soon after they began

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to be known anywhere. They were recommended to Cardinal Pole, as practical treatises on the arts of government, by Thomas Cromwell, who had visited Florence at the time when they were being written. The eminently practical tone of their leading principles were akin to those advocated by Bacon for conducting physical research. As might be expected, therefore, Machiavelli receives a panegyric in the *Advancement of Learning*. As in his masterly Romanes Lecture (1897) Mr John Morley pointed out, in both Bacon's Essays and History of Henry VII. the student of Machiavelli stands revealed. James Harrington, converted from republicanism to courtiership, the attendant of Charles I. on the scaffold, shows familiarity with Machiavelli in his *Oceana*. After the Restoration the *Leviathan* and *Human Nature* of Thomas Hobbes testify to the literary vitality of Machiavelli. No one can miss the family likeness of the Tudor sovereigns' policy to the Machiavellian model. Bacon, however, himself describes Machiavelli as only putting men's actual practice into formulas. Embodying the materialistic wisdom of his age, Machiavelli taught diplomatists, like statesmen, to regard their calling not as an abstract science but an empirical art. To vary Bacon's phrase, he sublimated the shrewdest and hardest wisdom of his time into precepts which stamp themselves on the memory, though they jar the conscience and revolt the heart.

By the seventeenth century the public as well as professional statesmen had become familiar with Machiavelli's ideas and maxims. The statecraft of the Stuarts or of Cromwell was not more Machiavellian than that of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth at a
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time when the political ethics of The Prince were
known only to a comparatively limited number of
students and specialists. The commanding prominence
secured by the writer of this work is largely to be
explained by the natural tendency to attach the label
of a well-sounding name to any body of doctrines or
practice. So was it with Epicurus, Arminius or
Calvin. In the same way certain natural and in
themselves commonplace methods in domestic or
international politics seem to gain definiteness and
consistency by association with Machiavelli. Among
English writers on international topics familiar
aphorisms connect themselves with Sir William
Temple or the men with whom he lived. These, how-
ever, will be most fittingly, if at all, considered at a
later stage in this work. On this the threshold of our
inquiry only one other remark need be made.

The place of Italy as a school of statecraft and diplo-
macy during the Middle Ages was, in modern times, to
a great extent filled by Russia.* Here the intellectual
activities of the higher classes were not distracted, as
has been the Anglo-Saxon experience, from state
duties by agriculture, manufactures, or even by judicial
and civil employments. The two former were left to
the lower classes. Those who constituted the flower
of the nation, such as did not enter the army, were
trained from early youth for diplomacy.

The diplomacy whose movements are now to be
traced is that in which England has taken an active
part and which have had for their headquarters the

* Diplomatic relations between England and Russia seem to have
begun in the February of 1557, when the Czar Ivan Vasilivich sent an
ambassador to the Court of Philip and Mary.
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English Foreign Office, in one or other of its various abodes.

The traditions of our international administration and the principles underlying the policy of its directors are for the most part not less untrustworthy than are other stereotyped commonplaces of the platform, the dinner-table or the press. On no subject indeed is generalisation likely to prove more misleading than on that of English foreign policy. The insular position of this realm has affected alike the character of its population and the temper of its rulers. How disturbed has been the course of our history may be judged from the fact that, among the thirty-six sovereigns since the Conquest, except in the case of Edward III. (great-great-grandson of John), there is no instance of the crown descending in lineal and unbroken succession through four generations. Repeated changes of dynasty have combined with an unbroken development of mercantile power to create new political forces in the nation. The growth of the English navy and its constantly varying requirements have produced further solutions of continuity in our diplomatic record. Nowhere else has opportunism to such an extent moulded statesmanship. Add to these interrupting influences two centuries of party-government, the periodical transformation scenes resulting from them, and the growth of the popular belief in the international value of matrimonial alliances; here there is more than enough to account for lack of unity in the external policy of the national rulers.

It is, however, possible to trace the varying tendencies which have been operative from time to time and have reflected themselves in the relations
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between England and other nations during shorter or longer periods. England's dealings with her European neighbours only began to be methodised under the first Tudor sovereign in the sixteenth century. Long before that, however, and almost from prehistoric times, the isolated points of contact between these islands and Continental states had been numerous as well as, in some instances, so significant or suggestive as to prepare a rude and insular race for the amenities of peaceful intercourse with countries beyond the four seas; they formed the preparatory school of diplomacy itself. The Western barbarians, described by the Roman poet as remote outcasts from civilisation, thus began to acquire an international status when, after the invasion of their land by the Roman legions, a British princess became the mother of the future emperor who made Christianity the State religion. Before the Welsh or Irish missionaries and the coming of Augustine, Ethelbert's marriage to Bertha, the daughter of the Frankish king, had planted the Cross in Kent. The Latin priest, Birinus, and others of his order who may have followed Augustine were additional links in the chain connecting primitive Britain with the capital of the world. These ties were from time to time drawn closer by the many early British sovereigns who, on the warning of conscience or sickness, retired to Italy that they might breathe their last on soil which the Apostles had trod. Met on his journey thither by the King of France, Charles the Bald, Ethelwulf passed a year in Italy; the purpose of his visit was the presentation to the Vicar of Christ of his son the future King Alfred who already had the pope for his godfather. A Saxon
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college had for some time existed on the Tiber; from Ethelwulf's Roman visit dates not only the completion of its buildings and endowments, but, according to tradition, the institution of Peter's Pence. During that residence abroad the English king found a second wife in Judith, the daughter of Charles the Bald. Hence his prolonged absence from his realm and the consequent unpopularity which faced him on his return.

The next Anglo-Continental marriage in high places was two hundred years later when, in 1035, the Princess Gunhild, King Canute's daughter, became the bride of the Emperor Henry III. Of all the Anglo-Continental episodes in this century, none associates itself with events of more importance than the rivalry between the Saxon party under Godwin and his sons and the French faction, largely stimulated by the foreign bishops, favourites of Edward the Confessor. Hence followed the peaceful visit of William of Normandy and the alleged promise whose violation led to the Norman Conquest.

After the events of 1066 it became an absolute certainty that an anti-French policy would prevail. A lately arrived invader, formerly the chief vassal and now the rival of the French king, could not be other than the enemy of his suzerain. Subsequent events combined to emphasise the estrangement between the rulers of the two countries. Germany, Spain and Guienne entered actively into the situation. A national era of commercial competition opened. The bonds of amity uniting Spain and Guienne on the one hand with England on the other deepened and broadened the separation of England from France.
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During the twelfth century the Anglo-Spanish *entente* became increasingly cordial. The marriage of the second Henry's daughter, Eleanor, with Alphonso of Castile set on foot an international friendship that even outlived the Reformation. The next incident tending in the same direction was the marriage of Edward I. to a Spanish princess of the same name, Eleanor of Castile. To that feat of matrimonial diplomacy the English monarchy owed the establishment of its pecuniary fortunes, and English farming the most profitable impetus as yet communicated to it. The earliest among our royal women of business, Queen Eleanor, brought her husband a more valuable dower than her Southern-European territories in the capacity which, by reconstructing the wool trade and organising the Northumbrian collieries, not only increased the national wealth, but doubled the royal income. Other international connections of the domestic kind had been made with different foreign countries about a hundred years earlier. Of the children born to Henry II., one son at least married a French princess; the eldest daughter became wife of Henry the Lion, of Saxony; another wedded the Norman King of Sicily, then the chief naval power in the Mediterranean. Before, therefore, the twelfth century had closed, the peaceful agencies of her diplomatists had won for England a place of European authority which could never have been gained by the military triumphs of her kings, notwithstanding that French addition to their royal title that remained in use till George III. In 1371, Edward III.'s sons, John of Gaunt and the Earl of Cambridge, found wives in two Spanish princesses, respectively Constance
and Isabel, both daughters of Pedro the Cruel. The bias towards Spain, thus instituted, was strengthened by Henry V.'s strong attachment to the European unities. To him indeed the Church and the Empire were the two guarantees for the maintenance of the national and even social system of Europe. The foreign policy of the Tudors will receive separate notice presently. It is enough here to say that the predecessors of Henry VIII. had all of them, in different degrees or manners, contributed to the building up of the Anglo-Spanish alliance. The master-stroke of Henry VII.'s diplomacy was his son's union with Katharine of Aragon. The relations between London and Madrid were of course changed by the Reformation. English enthusiasm for Spain may have burned hot during the few years of Mary's reign; under Elizabeth it gradually cooled. It died out amid the glories of Drake and the Armada. These last words indicate the continuance of influences as personal and as far-reaching upon English policy as was that exercised by the seventh Henry himself. Mercantile enterprise and naval strength, the creations of a few great men, supported and directed the management of our external affairs in the Tudor period.

How the Stuarts inherited the Elizabethan tradition, how, in spite of his oddities, James I. was true to his Protestantism, and how amid many variations and vacillations the diplomacy of that king made France upon the whole the bulwark of the new religion, all this and much else will be related in its proper place.
CHAPTER II
TWO CENTURIES OF ENGLISH DIPLOMACY
(1485-1697)

Henry VII. his own Foreign Minister—The Great Intercourse—
Diplomatic royal marriages—The evolution of the Foreign
Secretary—The personal element in English diplomacy under
the Tudors—The policy of Henry VIII. and Wolsey—England
as arbitrator between France and Spain—Diplomacy under
Edward VI.—Scotland as the instrument of France—Mary’s
Spanish alliance—Religion as the cloak for international
intrigue—The influence of popular feeling—The policy of
Elizabeth and Lord Burleigh—The Queen’s Spanish inclina-
tions counteracted by her religious opinions, continued by
James I.—The Royal matrimonial arrangements of the younger
Cecil—The Juliers and Cleves dispute—The Thirty Years’ War
—The Protestant feelings of the English people opposed to the
Spanish sympathies of the King—The Peace of Westphalia—
Cromwell revives Elizabeth’s diplomacy—The emancipation of
Switzerland—The Anglo-French alliance—Clarendon as a
Foreign Minister—The Relations of Charles II. with Louis
XIV.—The first Triple Alliance (1668)—Sir William Temple—
Danby—The position of William III.—The Grand Alliance
(1689)—William’s diplomacy up to the Treaty of Ryswick.

RESUMING in some detail the international
narrative, we reach a distinct and most im-
portant landmark in England’s connection with
foreign states under the earliest of the Tudor kings.
The reign of Henry VII. witnessed the establishment
of quietness and security at home and the preservation
of peace abroad. It therefore provided opportunities
singularly favourable for systematising English diplo-
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macy. Upon that, as upon other departments of Imperial rule, public opinion generated by national well-being and the progressive growth of a middle-class could now make itself felt. Henry's Chancellors or Secretaries were serviceable instruments for raising money; there seems no reason for supposing that Morton, Dean, Warham or any other of this sovereign's ecclesiastical statesmen originated, as in the next reign Wolsey was to do, a foreign policy of their own. The king, it may be assumed, was his own Foreign Minister. In that capacity he negotiated (1496) the Great Intercourse—to cite by its best-known name the treaty with Burgundy, then an independent state, under its own duke—for promoting trade between England and the Netherlands and for putting down piracy; it also supplied a convenient means for suppressing Burgundian plots in the Yorkist interest. Among other diplomatic results contrived by the founder of the Tudor dynasty were the marriage of his daughter Margaret to James IV. of Scotland, the overtures to Ferdinand of Spain, whose daughter he desired as a wife for his eldest son, and eventually that marriage between Arthur, Prince of Wales, and Katharine of Aragon, destined so profoundly to influence the history of two hereditarily allied peoples. After this the death of his wife, Elizabeth of York, caused Henry, as a step to a second marriage, to open communications with the dowager Queen of Naples, with Margaret of Savoy and, after the Duke of Burgundy's death, with the widowed duchess. Before these matrimonial overtures could provide him with a second consort, Henry died; he had lived, however, long enough to see his policy yield some result in
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the Treaty of Estaples. This transaction secured him £149,000 and the expulsion from the French Court of Perkin Warbeck, whom the Great Intercourse was to shut out from Burgundy also. Whoever may have been his agents in these negotiations, English diplomacy in the hands of the king who may be regarded as its founder proved successful, both from a political and matrimonial point of view.

After the eighteenth century is reached the chief officials employed in the management of English dealings with foreign countries, or the buildings where their work was transacted, will suggest practicable and convenient heads under which to group different portions of the subjects treated in this volume. State officials charged with most or all the duties of a minister of the exterior existed in the fifteenth century under Henry VI. Not till more than a hundred years later was the business of the king's principal Secretary divided between two coequals in rank and occupation. In addition to any purely domestic functions, these ministers were responsible for the superintendence and regulation of England's external interests. Under Henry VIII. it may be even said that the machinery of the English Foreign Office began to exist in detail. In 1539 the single Secretary gave place to two officials, known respectively as Secretary for the Northern and Southern Departments. The former sphere of duties included Denmark, Germany, the Low Countries, Poland, Russia and Sweden; the latter co-extensive with France, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. From the point of view taken in these pages it will thus be seen that the head of the Southern Department was beyond
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all comparison the more important of these two functionaries. Complications between England and the Northern Powers could be but exceptional and occasional only; as a fact, throughout the Tudor period Germany meant the Empire, whose elective head was for the most part identified with Spain. Hence it follows that whoever for the time presided over the Southern Department was practically the Foreign Minister of the sovereign. None of Henry’s foreign agents can have approached, in point of genius or during his ascendancy in authority, Cardinal Wolsey; but Wolsey’s fall took place in 1529, ten years, that is, before the official division into the two departments. Although, therefore, the conduct of Anglo-French, Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Roman relations remained almost uninterruptedly in his hands, Wolsey could not have been the titular occupant of the position which, more nearly than any other, foreshadowed that of Foreign Secretary, first created in 1782. Never was the personal element in English diplomacy marked more strongly than during the reign of the second Tudor king.

Without any attempt to thread the labyrinth of international movements in this epoch, some of its more characteristic incidents or defined landmarks may be briefly indicated. Of the transactions in which from 1509 to 1547 the English sovereign engaged with foreign states, the general tendency was to commit this country to new international responsibilities, to encourage it to a course of European intervention, and to make the voice of these islands felt in the politics of the Continent. To the League of Cambrai, formed between France and Spain against Venice, England had
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not been a party. The confederation that first formally drew her into the foreign vortex was the Holy League, at once the successor and corrective of the earlier arrangement, and set on foot by Pope Julius II. for preventing the undue preponderance of France. Another object of this combination was to preserve the Italian States to the papacy. In this place, however, the significance of England's membership of the compact consists in the declaration which it implied that the European balance of power was a distinct English interest.

Thus, too, was established the diplomatic tradition which during many years afterwards made the English bias in Continental affairs on the whole in favour of the Empire, then including Spain and Austria, and against France. Thus a ministry of foreign affairs no sooner acquired a potential existence under Henry VIII., than two distinct principles of English international procedure began to shape themselves: the first was that of intervention in Continental affairs; the second that of an anti-French European alliance.

The central ideas guiding Henry VIII.'s ministers were those which, notwithstanding periodical departures from the traditional line, animated their successors throughout the following centuries, as well as the Palmerstonian period, and the democratic break with European intervention as a tradition of the English Foreign Office. Henry’s religious or matrimonial projects and Wolsey’s personal ambitions caused a perpetual fluctuation between the French and the Imperial alliance.

Notwithstanding, however, all the shiftings, vicissitudes and transformations of England’s oversea
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connections under the Tudors, that period ended as it began with Spanish and Imperial friendship. Other things being equal, it was understood that the preference of English diplomacy would be for an anti-French and pro-Austrian policy.

A very brief historical summary will suffice to illustrate the absence from Henry's policy of any deep or abiding principle. In 1519 had died the Emperor Maximilian, chief among the earlier of Henry's Continental allies; Maximilian's son the Archduke Philip, by his marriage with Katharine of Aragon's sister, had left a son, Charles V. of Spain, who claimed the emperorship as an hereditary right. Henry VIII. was also a candidate for the Imperial throne, but subsequently withdrew in favour of the Spanish monarch, whom he supported against Francis I. of France. French diplomacy, seeing in the English king the arbiter of Europe, now engaged in those negotiations which culminated (1520) in the Field of the Cloth of Gold. Eventually, however, under the guidance of Wolsey, the arch-diplomatist of the period, the Anglo-Spanish alliance stood firm, if for no other reason than that the great minister thought it would help him to the papal throne.

No attempt need here be made to follow the international intricacies of the period; one feature in them is invested, by events which happened long afterwards, with too much interest to be ignored. For the first time during these sixteenth-century European complications, arbitration as a diplomatic agency appeared in 1521. In that year Wolsey at Calais mediated on the Franco-Spanish War in favour of England's helping Spain. The personal element
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already mentioned now asserted itself more definitely than before. Twice disappointed in his attempts to occupy the Chair of Peter, and therefore disgusted with Spain, Wolsey negotiated with France an offensive alliance against the Peninsula. A specific justification of this step was forthcoming in the plea that Spanish and Imperialist troops had lately sacked Rome, had imprisoned Pope Clement VII. and thus outraged the religious conscience of Europe. Plausible as this new diplomatic departure seemed at the moment, the divorce proceedings prevented its being a practical success. Francis was not in a position to forget that, as French king, he was the eldest son of the Roman Church first and could only be the ally of the English monarch afterwards. In 1532 he formally approved the pope's refusal to sanction the putting away of Katharine of Aragon, and showed his loyalty to the Vatican by condemning on grounds of religion that step of the English king which Charles V. of Spain, for considerations of national pride if for no other, was bound from the first uncompromisingly to oppose. The whole international episode therefore terminated in no fresh alliance, but in the isolation of Henry.

Under Edward VI. (1547-1553) foreign affairs remained in the hands of Protector Somerset, the most commanding figure among those Lords of the Council from time to time consulted by the Tudor sovereigns in the direction of their diplomacy. Throughout the reign now reached, whether there was peace or war, the same kind of international questions that had exercised the father confronted the son. In addition to these there were the futile negotiations with Charles V.
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against France; they were followed, in 1551, by the proposals for marrying the young English king to a French princess. All this time the official and the popular wish for a spirited policy was frustrated by the state of affairs north of the Tweed; there Henry II. of France had begun the long series of intrigues, for whose conduct Scotland continued to offer facilities till the union of the two countries under Anne. It had at one time seemed as if the Tudor Princess Mary, instead of finding a husband in his son, Philip of Spain, might have married the father, Charles V. Hence the communications, that, begun so far back as 1518, had resulted in the visit of the emperor to Canterbury.

Mary's accession in 1553 gave the signal for the renewal of politico-religious intrigues with the English Romanisers by Renard and Noailles, respectively the representatives in London of the Austro-Spanish power and of France. In none of these could the plea or pretence of religion conceal the consistent reality of political aims. The diplomacy which preceded Mary Tudor's union with Philip of Spain remained the object of the country's uneasy observation from the day that marriage negotiations were suspected to be actually on foot. The air indeed had been full of matrimonial possibilities. The object of Cardinal Pole's sojourn in England was to promote the reunion of Rome and Canterbury. Gossip whispered significantly, if absurdly, about the favour his handsome person had found in the eyes of the English queen. The pope, it was said, so much desired to see Mary Tudor, his cardinal's wife, that he would have absolved the bridegroom from his priestly vows of celibacy. The fatal obstacles were the
fanatical scruples of Mary herself, perhaps of Pole also. If, however, the cardinal’s conscience would not let him marry the queen, his influence was certainly used to prevent her finding any other husband. It was the jealousy of the ambitious cleric, not of the disappointed lover, which spoke.

Popular feeling and national interests had now begun to influence the arrangements of sovereigns and statesmen. The middle classes anticipated advantage to their trade with the Netherlands from their sovereign’s taking a Spanish husband. That appeal to material interest did much to overcome the instinctive aversion of the Protestant mind to a Roman Catholic consort. By independence of her professional diplomatists Mary thought she would best consult the material welfare of her subjects. At this time, however, France swarmed with English refugees. Hence the risk of international complications. At last, after the diplomatists had done their work, the price paid for the friendly understanding with Spain was the war with France, which lost Calais to England and brought on the fatal failure of the English queen’s health.

During the reign of Elizabeth the task set itself by English diplomacy was the now familiar and periodically recurrent playing off of France against Spain. All international affairs were now in the hands of the queen’s greatest minister, Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. The object of Burleigh’s diplomacy never varied; it was always so to divide the Continental Powers among themselves that England could stand alone. On details from time to time the queen and her minister may have differed. On central principles
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of policy there was between them absolute agreement. More than once, indeed, the personal leanings of Elizabeth toward Spain had moved Burleigh's apprehensions, but for a moment only. The loyalty felt by Henry VIII.'s daughter to her father's religious settlement more than neutralised any personal predisposition of her own for a Spanish policy. It therefore became Burleigh's paramount object to strengthen, and if necessary embitter, the queen's antagonism to Rome. That, if properly managed, would constitute his best means for preventing either her marriage with the Spanish king or her inclination to a diplomacy tinged too deeply with Spanish sympathies. Either of these things, if not counteracted, must have fatally interfered with the minister's statecraft. England, he intended, should hold the scales containing respectively Spain and France. It was Burleigh's duty so nicely to adjust the balance that the international equipoise should be perfect and permanent. In this way only would the subordination of England either to France or to Spain be averted. Rather indeed, as was his dominating ambition, would the superiority of England to both be secured. Elizabeth's partialities to Spain did not, as everyone knew, imply any fondness for its national religion. Spain, however, manifestly reciprocated the friendly disposition of the English queen. No state really loyal to the Vicar of Christ could consent to be on friendly terms with a sovereign who lay under the ban of papal excommunication. So argued the most fervent and uncompromising of the papacy's English friends. Consequently they showed their consistency by looking
for future religious leadership in the direction, not of
Spain at all, but of France. Had not Mary Stuart by
her marriage with the Dauphin become potentially a
French princess? Might she not also even yet be able
to assert her claims to the English crown and dethrone
the detested daughter of Anne Boleyn? The ideal
therefore always present to the strongest and most
representative of English papists was the transforma-
tion of England into a Roman Catholic Power first,
and afterwards its union with France in a social and
political as well as religious alliance. To English
Catholics, therefore, Spain seemed no longer a desir-
able or profitable ally, but rather a rival to be defeated
with French help.

Purely secular causes throughout the last half of the
sixteenth century contributed to loosening the heredi-
tary connection of Spain and England. With the
great maritime adventures of the era, there had set in
the mutual jealousy between these nations as com-
petitors in colonial enterprise. The first James indeed,
on at least two occasions, showed his readiness to sub-
ordinate to Spanish interest or sentiment his policy
abroad and his action at home. There can be no
reasonable doubt that Sir Walter Raleigh’s execution
in 1618 was chiefly due to the intrigues of Spain,
whose national pride had been wounded and whose
colonial supremacy was threatened by the exploits of
that English navigator. The second occasion came
later in the reign (1622). During the seventeenth
century Spanish diplomatists had succeeded to the
European position that had formerly belonged to
Machiavelli as founder of the art, and his Italian
disciples. The greatest master of the Spanish school,
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Gondomar, was the ambassador sent from Madrid to Whitehall. Through him the Government of the Peninsula proposed to James the betrothal of his son Charles to the Infanta. The marriage now proposed formed a complete contrast to the two royal matches designed in 1612 by Cecil, the second son of Queen Elizabeth's Burleigh. Nor could any two instances of matrimonial diplomacy more faithfully illustrate the diametrically opposite characters of the men by whom they were respectively originated or negotiated. In arranging the alliance of hearts or of nations Cecil knew only one motive—to strengthen his nation's position as arbiter of European Protestantism.

In 1612 he made his greatest stroke in this direction by securing for the Princess Elizabeth a Protestant husband in Frederick, the Elector Palatine; that union was to affect the whole future of his country and to guarantee for it not only the Protestant succession but its present reigning house. Cecil's further attempt to provide the king's elder son, Prince Henry, with a French princess as wife was frustrated by the potential bridegroom's premature death. Protestant zeal, however, had originally animated the scheme, one condition of which had been that the French princess should be from childhood accessible to Protestant influences. On the other hand Buckingham's readiness to promote the betrothal of Prince Charles to the Infanta, by accompanying the prince to Madrid, was marked by a sense of irresponsibility and was prompted by no other aim than to prove himself the pliant tool of the court. How the incognito journey of Charles and Buckingham to Spain failed in its real object, but en route at Paris made the future Charles I. acquainted with his queen,
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Henrietta Maria, forms a familiar episode in general history.

At first the choice of the daughter of Henry of Navarre may have pleased English taste. That feeling disappeared so soon as Englishmen realised the foothold in the realm given by details of the marriage treaty to papal projects. Yet, in spite of all this, the general drift of English diplomacy at the beginning of the Stuart epoch was decisively Protestant. One instance of this, not yet mentioned, is the episode of the Juliers and Cleves duchies. That affair, occurring in 1609, calls for a few explanatory words. The Duke of Brandenburg and the Duke of Neuburg, both Protestants, claimed the succession to supremacy in the two duchies. By an act of arbitrary intervention the Emperor Rudolph gave the duchies to his relative, a papist, the Archduke Leopold. On this the two ducal and Protestant claimants united in common cause against the Imperial nominee. English diplomacy was then entirely in Cecil's hands. In other words, its Protestantism and patriotism were beyond suspicion. After a short time spent in negotiations, England, the German Protestant Union and France prepared to support by arms the two dukes whom the emperor had displaced. This piece of military policy succeeded and the two dukes regained their thrones. No manifestation of the anti-papal spirit now dominating the foreign policy of England could have been more emphatic or opportune. It was followed by, and may have constituted a preparation for, the distribution of international sympathies that marks the English attitude during the Thirty Years' War. With that struggle our concern here is, of course, but secondary. Nor in
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reference to it need more be done than to indicate the different confusing and conflicting currents to be seen in the diplomatic stream as it then flowed. Each of the factions composing the political parties of the period had its private agents abroad, often without disguise counter-working the accredited ambassador. The king's instructions to his representatives were to put all the pressure which peace permitted upon the Catholic Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand, who was also emperor, to arrange terms with the Protestants. Above all, he was to secure the speedy restoration of the Palatinate to its ruler, the Elector Frederick, his own son-in-law. The necessary promises were repeatedly given by Philip IV. of Spain, the relative, the co-religionist and ally of the Most Catholic Emperor. The Spanish arms were actively employed on the papal side. In England the Parliamentary and popular objection to the royal policy was not that the king was heading for war, but that the hostilities, to which his subjects were in danger of being committed, would be on behalf of Continental Romanism instead of the Protestant cause personified by Frederick. So far as there then existed any means for making popular influence felt upon foreign policy it would have been in the direction of an English alliance with Continental Protestantism against Spain and with the specific object of securing for the future Charles I. some bride who was not a Roman Catholic. Buckingham did not pass away before 1628. Throughout his closing years, ever indeed since the failure of his Spanish mission, he used all his influence, secret or open, to complicate the international situation by placing obstacles in the way of Anglo-Spanish policy.
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The notorious bias of the first Stuart king towards absolutism in politics and against Presbyterianism in religion originated the misgiving of Parliament lest it should find itself committed to support the Catholic emperor against the Protestant Elector. The national feeling was not for peace at any price, but for war if necessary on behalf of the Protestant husband of the English princess. Foreign policy, it will thus be seen, in a scarcely less degree than conflicting views of the royal prerogative at home, was involved in the quarrel between Parliament and king. At least, it was urged by those who insisted that the opinions of subjects should act as a check on the foreign diplomacy of the court; if English armies cannot be used to prevent the work of the Reformation being undone abroad, let the penal laws of the Tudors be enforced against Romanists living within the four seas. But the sovereign who would send Raleigh to the scaffold rather than offend the susceptibilities of Philip III. and his people, demurred to measures whose first effect must have been to exasperate both the Spanish people and the Spanish king. What, however, it chiefly concerns us to recognise here is this. Our foreign policy may have been less spirited than the more pugnacious Protestantism of the period wished. It embodied, as upon the whole it has from that time continued to do, not so much the decision of courts and cabinets as the deliberate purpose of the nation’s sobriety and common-sense. Nor probably has subjection to popular control really interfered so much with the continuity of English diplomacy as it is sometimes supposed to have done. The great principle established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the balance of
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power, had been first formulated by Henry VIII. That equilibrium, through the reign of William III. and indeed till the middle of the nineteenth century, formed the regulating motive of English statesmanship abroad. In other ways the Peace of Westphalia opened a new era in the international relationships of the European system. It secured freedom of worship for the Protestants of the Empire. It created Switzerland. For the first time elsewhere it practically recognised the claims of the smaller Continental states to independent existence. The Empire thus received the earliest in a series of blows, the last of which was to be given with fatal decisiveness by Napoleon in 1806.

Advancing in chronological order, we pause for a moment at the international aspects of the short republican interval dividing the two periods of the Stuart monarchy. Retrospectively regarded, the foreign policy of the Protectorate was an application of the Elizabethan expedient of playing off France against Spain in the Protestant interest. In carrying out his ideas Cromwell found himself confronted by the anti-pathy and antagonism of the courts and capitals of monarchical Europe. Baffling alike Stuart intrigues and foreign designs against English republicanism, he made insults and even outrages the instruments of diplomatic success. One of his ambassadors was attacked and killed at The Hague; another met a like fate at Madrid. This did not deter him from a practical anticipation of those international principles afterwards to be asserted by William III. The position of England at the head of European Protestantism was confirmed. Without military intervention, by the steady employment of diplomatic pressure alone,
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the persecution and the Romanising by brute force of the Vaudois were stopped. Mazarin, Louis XIV.'s minister, desired a treaty with England. Cromwell refused his signature till the French king should have prevailed upon the Duke of Burgundy to guarantee the Protestant Swiss in their own form of worship. Now, English diplomacy definitely declared its preference for a French over a Spanish alliance. The determining motive was, of course, the gratification of the Protector's co-religionists. It is worth noticing that to Cromwell's diplomacy continental Europe owed the unrestricted circulation of the Scriptures. Free use of their Bibles in all parts of the Spanish realm and freedom of international trade had been Cromwell's demands of Spain.

Turning now to the friendship of France, Oliver engaged in the negotiations which preceded the war. One result of the struggle with Spain following the Anglo-French alliance was the acquisition of Jamaica, as well as the introduction of English Bibles, together with English commerce, into West Indian waters. Another territorial gain to England resulted from Cromwell's policy of Anglo-French friendship. The despatch (1657) of the English contingent to help Louis XIV. secured the fall of Dunkirk, then besieged by the French king. The next year the town surrendered, nominally to Spain. Through the Protector's astute negotiations it became at once an English possession.

After the Restoration, English diplomacy still ran in the channel into which it had been directed during the Commonwealth. The minister of Charles II., Clarendon, joined the Northern Protestants against Austria and Spain. That this policy should have been
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carried out, or even have suggested itself as possible, was due entirely to those clauses, already referred to, in the Peace of Westphalia, which transformed the smaller nationalities of central Europe from Imperial vassals into independent states. Clarendon's failure as a Foreign Minister had for its chief and continuing cause his inability to realise the entirely new position on the Continent created by the equilibrium that the Westphalia peace established and by the fresh communities carved out of the Empire. The cultivation of French goodwill also explains the great achievement of Clarendon's diplomacy, the king's marriage with Katharine of Braganza; for Portugal had then thrown off the Spanish yoke and had become the trans-Pyrenean outwork of France. If the motive of the union had been to gratify France as against Spain, its consequence was by the bride's dowry of Bombay to give to her adopted country the first commercial and military centre acquired by England in Western India. After this the foreign policy of England under Charles II. modelled itself on that of Louis XIV. In the June of 1660 that king had effected a Franco-Spanish rapprochement by marrying the Infanta Maria Theresa. The obvious object of this union was to concentrate in French hands the dominion of the Low Countries, and Franche-Comté, as well as to improve the French frontier on the Rhine. Henceforward in his importunities to Parliament for money the systematic plea of the second Charles was the necessity of not being inferior to the French king. Hence, too, in 1668, the first of the international arrangements known as Triple Alliances, for uniting England, Holland and Sweden against French aggression in the Netherlands. That
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was effected by the king’s accredited ministers in the usual way. His other transactions were less “correct”; for, while his statesmen were busy with negotiations their royal master had approved, Charles, on his own account, was himself, over their heads, communicating with the French king. This may serve as one of the earlier illustrations of the private, unofficial and irresponsible diplomacy of which in its due place something hereafter will be said—as, for instance, when Fox and his friends, while in Opposition, kept their own envoys at Paris or elsewhere as rivals to the ministers employed by the Government of the day in negotiations with France or the United States.

Less peaceful in its aims and more unconstitutional in its methods than that of the mortified Whig leader in the eighteenth century, the private diplomacy of the second Charles in 1670 eventuated, two years after the Treaty of Dover, in the Dutch War. National feeling, as might have been expected, was soon to frustrate the international statecraft of the English king. The situation in which the royal diplomatist found himself rather resembled that produced by the personal sympathy of his grandfather, James I., with Roman Catholic Spain when his people were bent on supporting his own Protestant son-in-law, the Elector Frederick, against the emperor. The French king might send his agents to bribe the Houses not to sit at Westminster; but the responsible directors of England’s foreign relations made it known to their employer that the hour had struck for England’s retirement from the struggle to which he wished to commit his country.

To the period now reached belongs Sir William
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Temple, the most widely experienced, accomplished and popularly trusted ambassador of his time, to whom, it may be said in passing, is often attributed a phrase that was none of his. The description of an ambassador as "an honest man sent abroad to lie for the good of the commonwealth" had passed into currency before Temple's time; its real author was Sir Henry Wotton, who, under James I., after twenty years as English representative at Venice, as well as various missions to the emperor and German princes, gave conclusive proof of his own integrity by returning to England a poor man. To a place in the same category indeed as Wotton Sir William Temple is entitled by gifts, qualities and conversance with affairs, resembling those of the most distinguished predecessor in his profession. England, Holland and Sweden had, we have seen, coalesced against France: it was Temple who carried through the threefold compact.

In 1678 he was to accomplish another stroke of policy whose ulterior consequences were to dwarf into comparative insignificance his earlier achievement. This was the betrothal of the Princess Mary, eldest daughter of the then Duke of York, afterwards James II., to William of Orange. The disgust of Louis XIV. at this match could not have been greater had he actually foreseen that it would directly result in the mustering of those forces whose combination was to wrest from his monarchy the prerogative of European arbiter. Charles II. had made the experiment of being his own Foreign Minister, above and independently either of Lords of the Council or of Parliament. In other words he began a series of private deals with the French king. So long as he
pleased his paymaster, Charles pocketed his money with a smile at having dished his Parliament. In 1678 the Princess Mary's betrothal to William of Orange so exasperated the French king that, charging his royal brother with breach of faith, he stopped supplies. Charles then turned to his Parliament for a grant, as he said, to undertake, if compelled, war against France: he also actively took in hand the raising of troops. The Houses, as a condition of any money supply, insisted on these troops being disbanded, and even then did not give enough to prevent the king from once more turning to Louis.

Thus English diplomacy under Charles II. resolved itself into an interchange of cajoleries, bribes, bargains and recriminations between the courts of Great Britain and France. The English negotiator was Danby, though he kept his disapproval in the background and from the first knew that neither his Parliament nor people would tolerate the mutual haggling of Charles and Louis. Not, therefore, without reluctance or even protest did he convey his master's fresh political proposals and pecuniary demands to Versailles. More money Louis would not give. The English centre of diplomatic gravity now shifted to the official residence of the British ambassador, Montague, at Paris. The engagement which Charles had volunteered with Louis was, if he could not openly become his ally, at least to abstain from helping Holland in the Dutch War which France then had on hand. In Charles, Louis saw only a self-indulgent, indolent, vacillating schemer prepared, for a consideration in cash down, to make any promise that there might be a reasonable chance of evading afterwards. In Danby he recog-
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nised the overruling mind that had caused Charles to fail his royal brother of France in so many details. Louis therefore determined to use the state secrets of which he was master for working the English minister's ruin. The French king had already through his agents in London bribed members of the English Parliament. He might therefore consistently enough have now directly laid before the Houses at Westminster an account of his secret dealings and private treaties with Charles. He preferred, however, to follow on this occasion the orthodox diplomatic precedent of making his first communications to the English ambassador at his court. Neither as diplomatist nor as politician does Danby seem to have sunk below the moral standard of his time. In executing his sovereign's behests he only showed his fidelity to the spirit which had animated the Stuart Restoration. Nor, when exposure and overthrow came, did the public opinion of his day forget that he was a scapegoat, the prime offender's agent, rather than the offender himself. If men used strong language in denouncing Danby, its force only meant that the censure, though addressed to a vulnerable minister, had for its real object an inviolable king. Danby was indeed a trimmer and a turncoat. That in his day meant no more than being a versatile tactician. As were the period and the statesmanship, such also were the diplomacy and the diplomatists. Danby had long foreseen the fall of the Stuarts. When, in 1688, it came, he was found in the same camp as Temple, whose personal friendship he had made during that diplomatist's official residence at The Hague. A moral anachronism is involved in the
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notion that affection for a doomed dynasty might have prevented Danby from promoting the Revolution and Settlement, or from accepting, as the reward of his services to the usurper, the dukedom of Leeds in 1694.

With the first sovereign since Henry VII. to reign by a purely Parliamentary title, a new epoch in the narrative of diplomacy naturally begins. The parts which it seems sometimes thought are traditionally characteristic of Whig and Tory in connection with foreign policy are reversed. William III. personifies the principle of English intervention in Continental politics; he stands forth as the advocate of English championship universal and ubiquitous, of Protestantism and of the international equilibrium. Wherever and whenever Continental policy, whether of the Empire or of France, aims at exclusive preponderance in the European system or at enforcing the paramount claims of the papacy, William interposes the authority of his newly-acquired realm. All this is resented by the Tories, now for the most part Jacobites, as ill-advised, interested, unpatriotic intermeddling.

William's marriage with a Stuart princess—the very possession of the British crown—was chiefly valuable in his eyes because of the fresh and mighty leverage which he thus secured for combating the ambitions or aggressions of the French king. The influences that had placed him on his father-in-law's throne were indeed not less essentially aristocratic than the earlier Puritan movement for subordinating kingship to Parliament had been plebeian. The promoters of the seventeenth-century revolution were not less patrician because they happened chiefly to be Whigs. Throughout, therefore, the life of William III. the
maxim of Tory statesmanship was the deliverance of England from Continental entanglements. To talk of Britain as asserting an imperial authority by implicating herself in Continental broils was called by the Tories the treacherous cant of the Orange and Dutch faction. The second article in the international creed of Toryism was that, if war became inevitable, an insular Power should only wage that war by sea. Our true interests, in the authoritative words of Bolingbroke, required us to take few engagements on the Continent, and never those of a land war unless the conjunction is such that nothing less than the weight of Great Britain can prevent the scales of power from being quite overturned. The seventeenth century had produced treatises both thoughtful and original on foreign policy. One of these was the Duc de Sully’s elaborate speculation for securing the European equilibrium by a kind of international Amphictyonic assembly. Bolingbroke in his political writings shows his debt to contemporary thinkers and authors, but, unlike most of them, looks at the international topics of the time from an essentially English point of view, as well as expresses himself with a force and terseness that are all his own.

Political philosophy had been thus for some time teaching by precept when there happened events that were to supply her with a rich store of examples. The state system of modern Europe began to be organised on broad and general lines by the Peace of Westphalia already dwelt upon. Some fresh details were added by the Peace of Ryswick, to which we now pass, and more by the Treaty of Utrecht, half a generation later. The course and significance of
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these two transactions will presently be described in
their proper place.

In 1672 Louis XIV. had invaded Holland. From
that day the Dutch prince, who incarnated in himself
the military patriotisms of his native land, schemed
and toiled only that he might reduce the French
monarchy to impotence. After 1688, he was able to
use the resources of Great Britain in the execution of
his youthful vow. William's patient years of diplo-
matic preparation resulted in the great confederation,
known as the Grand Alliance, about the same time as
his accession to the English throne. In the May of
1689, the combined states of Brandenburg (the
Prussia of to-day), the Empire, Savoy, Spain and
the Dutch States were thus arrayed with England
against France. The absolutism of Louis, unchecked
by parliaments or council board, was constituted his first
great advantage. William's diplomacy was hampered
by the same causes that so often interfered with his
strategy. Had his knowledge of human nature or
his sympathetic skill in dealing with its weaknesses
been on the same scale as his energies and will, he
might have been as great in the council as on the field.
Dexterous manipulation and a nicely calculated appeal
to national prejudices and personal feelings might
have prevented even his foreign birth from operating
as an impediment in the way of his political projects.
Of the condescension to the foibles of individuals or
the susceptibilities common to masses of men, which
is the most useful and indeed the essential quality of
the diplomatist, William had nothing. The attributes
that go to the making of a successful party-leader at
home may, as in the case of Benjamin Disraeli, Lord
Beaconsfield, at the Berlin Conference, make him a profoundly impressive, if not supremely successful, figure in foreign statesmanship. Wholly possessed by the one paramount interest of his life, William neither derived from nature nor acquired by art the consideration for popular antipathies even a contemptuous recognition of which would have prevented a King of England from surrounding himself with Dutch diplomatists as well as Dutch generals. If, however, William III. cannot himself be called a great diplomatist, the Treaty of Ryswick by ending his war, prepared the way for the diplomacy of others.
CHAPTER III

TREATIES AND THEIR MAKERS, FROM RYSWICK TO UTRECHT


THE Peace of Ryswick in 1697 rather marks a stage in the military history of Europe than constitutes a diplomatic event of abiding interest and importance. At the same time it shows the third William’s diplomatic judgment in a light more favourable than has sometimes been recognised. He could have secured a cessation of hostilities four years earlier; he is sometimes blamed for not having done so. He counted in the later negotiations on receiving stronger support from Austria than was actually forthcoming. Had he not been disappointed, he might have obtained terms which would have made the Ryswick settlement a personal and national triumph. As it was, the arrangement proved more advantageous to England than the earlier offer of 1693. That France actually obtained Strasburg and very nearly got Luxemburg, was certainly due to no other
cause than the slackness of William's Imperial ally. The truth, of course, was that circumstances left the English king little choice in the matter. The military operations on the Continent had followed the repulse of the attempt made by James II. to re-establish himself in Ireland. The two campaigns together had exhausted for the time the energies and resources of the country. Our Ryswick negotiators were not therefore in a position to reject the constantly rising conditions demanded by France, since the Duke of Savoy's defection had left us with no independent ally but the emperor, who had long been losing interest in the struggle.

Among those actively associated with the Ryswick diplomacy was Matthew Prior, a man too personally interesting to be ignored. In 1907 Sir Mortimer Durand's successor at Washington was found in Mr James Bryce, then M.P. for South Aberdeenshire for more than twenty years. Though not without official as well as Parliamentary experience, Mr Bryce had achieved literary distinction before he became a political figure. And the selection of men of letters for high diplomatic posts has not of late been as common as it was in the Augustan age of Queen Anne. Joseph Addison, indeed, proved an indifferent Secretary of State. The brother litterateur, Tickell, whom he made his Under-Secretary, was not a success. Even apart from the escapades ending in his expulsion, Steele never became an effective member of the House of Commons. George Stepney, it is true, the poet who as a youth is said to have made grey authors blush, really touched a high point of excellence in international statesmanship; among the Englishmen
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of his time none knew Germany and German affairs so well as this facile versifier, equally in Latin as in English, who at different times was envoy to the emperor, to the Electors of Brandenburg, of Saxony and to others. Few among Germans themselves knew the subject so well. With that possible exception Matthew Prior stands out unrivalled among the poet-diplomatists of his day. "One Prior," is Burnet's contemptuous description of him; "nothing out of verse," are the words in which he is summed up by Pope. Swift, however, at least as severe and, in such a matter, a more competent judge, formed a very different estimate. The most original and penetrating political genius of the time, St John, afterwards Viscount Bolingbroke, endorsed the verdict of his friend Swift, and rated Prior's business habits and aptitude for affairs so highly as to urge on Queen Anne Prior's attachment to his own French mission. The overture to the Peace of Ryswick was the congress at The Hague. The English representative, Lord Dursley, took thither Prior with him as Secretary. This mission produced not only much noticeably excellent work of the official sort, but many copies of impromptu verse; these have something like the musical ring of diplomatic wit which resounded in a later century through the compositions of George Canning and John Hookham Frere. "Who," asks the melodiously epigrammatic Prior, "so blest as the Englishen Heer Secretaris?"

"In a little Dutch chaise on a Saturday night,
On my left hand a Horace, a nymph on my right,
No mémoire to compose and no post-boy to move
That on Sunday may hinder the sweetness of love.
In the October of 1696, Prior was on his way back to England, bringing with him the articles of the Ryswick treaty; he received two hundred guineas for his share in the business. Immediately afterwards, under the Earl Portland, the ambassador to France, he was occupied with the secret negotiations for the first Partition Treaty. That transaction formed the earliest step on the part of William III. and Louis XIV. towards deliberating on the peaceful distribution of the King of Spain's world-wide possessions among his legitimate heirs. At the end of the seventeenth century the health of Charles II. of Spain was failing. To devise such an apportionment of the childless Spanish sovereign's possessions among their respective claimants as would preserve the balance of power and avert the chance of war, became the cardinal object of English diplomacy.

William III. and Louis XIV. were agreed in wishing to settle the Spanish succession without consulting the King of Spain himself or the Emperor Leopold. Eventually England, France and Holland came to an arrangement by which the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, grand-nephew of Charles, should succeed to the Indies, to Spain, and to the Netherlands, then a Spanish state distinct from Holland. The Imperial family was to be bought off with the Milanese; the Dauphin was to get the two Sicilies. While, however, these negotiations were going forward, in 1698, the Bavarian prince died. In 1700, therefore, England, France,
and Holland adopted a new Partition Treaty. This gave the Indies, Netherlands and Spain to the Archduke Charles, the Emperor Leopold's son. France received Lorraine. The national dissatisfaction in Spain with these dispositions produced from the Spanish ambassador in London a remonstrance with the English Government, so peremptory that King William at once handed him his passports. The Spanish monarch promptly retaliated by showing the representatives of Holland and England out of Madrid. Charles was thus left with the ambassador of Louis XIV. as the one foreign diplomatist in his capital. His court had become the scene of factions, conspiracies and intrigues, which here can only be glanced at. One faction had for its centre the queen-mother, a princess of the Austrian house, in her adopted country the champion of her Imperial relatives. In opposition to this group, Cardinal Porto Carrero, Archbishop of Toledo, a worthy predecessor of the prince of Spanish diplomatists, Alberoni, co-operated with the emissary of Louis XIV., Harcourt, the most consummate political strategist and finished courtier of his day, a renowned general in the field, whose diplomacy, social and political, presented an irresistible blend of Parisian wit and Castilian gravity. An Austrian diplomatist, who appeared afterwards on the scene, injured, rather than assisted, the cause of the Empire with the court or the capital. The sick king was in the hands of Porto Carrero. Harcourt was ingratiating, by all the arts of which he was master, himself and the nation he represented, with the Spanish people. Perplexed as to the right bequeathal of his vast possessions, the King of Spain,
at Carrero's instance, consulted the Pope. The Vicar of Christ was then notoriously the tool and creature of France. The will of Charles II. was practically dictated by the papal representatives at his palace. In the first week of November 1700 he died; it immediately became known that Charles had left the whole Spanish monarchy to the Duke of Anjou; till his arrival the Government would be in Cardinal Carrero's hands.

But not without sore misgivings and many tears had Charles at last put his name to this instrument. The triumph for France was greater even than Louis and his servants had dared to hope. "The Pyrenees," on knowing the will proudly exclaimed the French king, "have ceased to exist." The violent disturbance of the European equilibrium thus produced was enough of itself to have plunged the world in war. Yet war, or at least England's active participation in it, might perhaps have been averted had Louis XIV. not, by a master-stroke of infatuation and ill-faith, obliterated the differences dividing English parties, and united the entire country against himself as the nation's enemy. The death of Charles II. of Spain had rendered the efforts of English diplomacy in the matter of the Partition Treaties so much lost labour, and had, irrationally enough, injured the reputation of the Whig negotiators. In his destruction of international compacts, Louis now included the Treaty of Ryswick.

James II. died in his French exile within a year of the King of Spain. Flushed with triumph, Louis XIV. recognised as the lawful heir and successor of James his son, the old Pretender. This affront to William as the constitutional nominee of the English Parliament and people to the throne
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produced a complete and immediate change in those political conditions at home on which has always depended English policy abroad. During the years before the flouting of English opinion and honour by Louis in 1701, party rivalry in Parliament and in the country had been so keen as to prevent any approach to political unanimity on the subject of the national concerns beyond seas. Shortly after the Ryswick peace, the Tories succeeded to power on the basis of non-intervention as a policy. The first of English interests, commercial and Imperial, was, they contended, peace. Tory policy from this point of view was clearly put by Bolingbroke in a single terse and often quoted sentence. "Our true interests," he said, "require that we should take few engagements on the Continent and never those of a land war, unless the conjunction be such that nothing less than the weight of Great Britain can prevent the scale of power being quite overturned." This is the first occasion that a Tory statesman formulated a national policy in words and on lines for which parallels might be found in the speeches made by leading politicians on both sides during our own time. That the uncompromisingly pacific counsels of Toryism did not prevail at the beginning of the eighteenth century and that England once more stood forth as the armed champion of the balance of power, was primarily due to the withdrawal of the French king from the settlement he had solemnly sealed in 1697. William's diplomacy showed itself at its best in his negotiations with the emperor against France. On 15th May 1702, by preconcerted arrangement proclamation of war was made at Vienna, in London, and at The Hague. Before England's
implication in that struggle the king, who was his own Foreign Minister as well as his own commander-in-chief, died. The policy, however, of William III. had too deeply rooted itself in the popular mind and was too much helped by the temper and acts of Louis, to disappear with its author. It was a Whig war and, except during her last year, continued throughout the reign of Queen Anne. It does not belong to the present undertaking to follow, or even to summarise the fortunes of the struggle which began after William's death in the first May of the following reign. The actual outbreak of war was preceded by long and laborious working of that international machinery whose chief triumph is the preservation of peace. The profitless parade of diplomatic activity, which ushered in the war of the Spanish Succession, repeated itself, on the same scale if with less absence of definite result, in the negotiations that closed the struggle by the Peace of Utrecht.

The interval separating these two sets of events was marked by an international exploit of the first political importance at the time, as well as historically memorable for its consequences to the social life and habits of the English upper and middle classes. This transaction, during the second year of the Spanish Succession War, showed English diplomacy not only in its best, but in its most interesting aspect. While William was forming the Grand Alliance against France, and indeed from the time when Clarendon arranged the marriage of Charles II. with Katharine of Braganza, Portugal had been under French influence. At the beginning, however, of the Succession War, the Austrian proclivities of Peter II., the
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Portuguese king, occasioned disagreeable disputes with his ministers. Presently he began to sulk and decline all discussion on the subject by affecting ignorance of a struggle felt in every quarter of the world. He knew of it only from hearsay and took not the least interest in its progress. He would have nothing to say to either of the combatants; he objected even to receiving the ministers of the belligerent Powers. At last, as he said, most reluctantly, he yielded to the importunities of Louis XIV. as far as to entertain the notion, if he never fully signed a document, of an understanding with France. Suddenly he discovered that the French king's word could not be trusted. Happily, he declared, he had kept clear of any entangling engagements with Louis. When the instrument was brought to him for execution, the only notice of it he vouchsafed was to throw the paper down and, in a childishly peevish temper, to kick it round the room. The then minister from England at the Lisbon court, Mr, afterwards Sir, Paul Methuen, heard of this, as, indeed, he heard of everything that passed at the palace. He immediately sought and obtained an interview with the petulant monarch. Of course and rightly, he said, His Majesty was indignant with the French king, who only made promises to break them. Equally of course the Portuguese sovereign desired to turn the present world-wide crisis to his own advantage. Only let him be sure that the state which he honoured with his confidence should be in a position to give something in return. Such a Power was England. What would His Majesty say to the admission of Portuguese wines, for an equitable consideration, to British ports at a duty less by one third

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than that levied on French vintages? The sovereign, while maintaining a discreet silence, showed his satisfaction by the smile that began to overspread his countenance. His chief minister was immediately summoned. Within a week Methuen was able to report home the conclusion of the famous treaty that bears his name.

Never was there concluded an international engagement which came more home to "the bosoms and business" of the English nation. The countervailing advantage to be given by Portugal was the importation of all woollen goods from England. The political and fiscal consequences of the arrangement were, however, almost insignificant in comparison with its social, moral and even physical results to the English generation that witnessed or that followed its ratification. The familiar lines with which the compact inspired the versifier of the next century remain the truest and most suggestive summary of the Methuen Treaty's tendencies and results—

"Proud and erect the Caledonian stood,
Prime was his mutton and his claret good.
'Let him take port!' the English statesman cried:
He took the poison and his spirit died."

Hitherto the habitual beverage of the English upper classes had been distilled from the grapes of Italy and France. The Duke of Marlborough's wars had incidentally involved a disagreeable increase in the import of French wines to England. Many hard drinkers among the upper classes protested that they had outlived their powers of drinking port with impunity. Bolingbroke, whose favourite wine was
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Florence, emphasised the arguments against the war which were drawn from the cellar. He also denounced the Methuen Treaty as an anticipatory interference with the commercial arrangements he meditated between England and her European neighbours. There is nothing at all fanciful in attributing to the topers a good deal of the popular pressure placed upon diplomacy to hasten the conclusion of peace. Amongst the more highly-placed tipplers who protested against compulsory port as murderous, was Dr Aldrich, the logician and Dean of Christchurch; another was Dr Radcliffe, the Jacobite physician, who did not refuse to attend William III., who founded the institutions which still bear his name at Oxford, and who from his bibulous capacities was known as "the Priest of Bacchus." Many other physicians of note went with Radcliffe, as well as a large contingent of the inferior clergy. On the same side as, and by way of contrast to, these divines were many ladies of easy virtue who idolised Bolingbroke and echoed the demand of the clerical, medical and legal viveurs that diplomacy, by re-establishing peace, should, in the interests of morality and health, reintroduce the lighter French wines, too long interdicted by the military ambition of Marlborough and the Whigs.

It will be seen presently, in the case of Alberoni, how the meanest and feeblest of human beings may be made instruments in a great diplomatist's fall. In the present instance agencies of an equally commonplace character played a definite part in promoting the international policy that, exactly ten years after the Methuen Treaty, was to triumph in the Peace of Utrecht. Services connected with the Treaty
of Ryswick had, in the seventeenth century, made Sir Edward Villiers Earl of Jersey. With the Peace of Utrecht may be associated the transformation of its chief promoter, St John, into Viscount Bolingbroke, though the title had been conferred before the treaty was actually concluded.

Before entering upon any details connected with the most famous and the most bitterly controverted international episode of the early eighteenth century, the Treaty of Utrecht may at the outset be described as a typical product of an age in which European politics formed a system of brigandage tempered by conspiracy. Ignoring the welfare, the aspirations, even the national tendencies of their subjects, sovereigns were concerned for nothing else than the extension of their territory, the increase of their resources and their own personal advancement in the ranks of the royal caste which then formed supreme power in the world. Statesmen, supposing them not to be engaged in any intrigue against their monarchs, were reckless of or indifferent to the means, provided they could achieve a momentary success by outwitting a party rival or successfully counter-working an unpopular colleague. The Utrecht settlement was less the outcome of international deliberations held by European plenipotentiaries than the embodiment of private "deals" between the French representative, De Torcy, and the English Tory leader, Bolingbroke. The termination of a struggle that was bringing no return proportionate to the expenditure of blood and money and the disastrous interference caused by it to English commerce and industry formed indeed a sufficient justification for the policy to which the Tories, as the
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peace party, had committed themselves. With Bolingbroke and Oxford the actually determining motive showed itself in the pressing necessities of the Tory party at home. The owners of the old acres had long and bitterly resented their growing unimportance, social and political, in comparison with the increased consequence of the representatives of the new wealth. The large loans necessary for carrying on the war had naturally brought into prominence the Whig capitalists and eclipsed the Tory landlords. Peace had thus become not only a matter of pressing national concern, but, as Bolingbroke repeatedly said, a paramount necessity to the Tory system. From Bolingbroke's point of view, and indeed according to the political ethics of the time, so indispensable an end justified whatever means might prove the least difficult and the most effective. On the other hand the leading statesmen of France desired peace even more keenly than the English Tories. The Foreign Minister of Louis XIV., De Torcy, frankly confessed that he and those with whom he acted wished for it as a dying man may desire life and health. Long before the Tories, under Harley and St John, came into power they had been engaged in confidential communications with the French king's advisers about terms of accommodation. As for the Dutch allies of England and the Spanish allies of France, these were excluded from all knowledge of what was going on. There were two parties to the peace and two only; on one side the Marquis de Torcy, on the other Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke. Among their most active and useful instruments was one of those ingenious adventurers who, like stormy petrels, appear on the inter-
national waters when the air is charged with electricity and the sky is overcast. During the earlier years of the eighteenth century, diplomacy offered the same career to ability, often of very humble station, as war, or as had been done in the Middle Ages by the Church. The poet Matthew Prior had done so well at Ryswick that Bolingbroke vainly endeavoured to secure him for one of the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht. As it was, Bolingbroke's most serviceable agent in the latter business, Gaultier, belonged to the class which, a little later, was to supply Spanish diplomacy with a Ripperda. Jean Baptiste Gaultier, best known as the Abbé Gaultier, was a French priest who had drifted on the tide of circumstance and adventure to England; here he arrived in the train of Marshal Tallard. When the recognition, in 1701, by Louis XIV. of the Pretender as King of England caused the departure of the French ambassador from the English court, Gaultier informally took his place; settling in London he kept the French Government accurately informed of political movements and national feeling. Closely associated with him was another of Bolingbroke's French colleagues. This was Nicolas Mesnager; born at Rouen in 1665, he began life as a barrister, was sent on his first diplomatic mission to Spain by Louis XIV. in 1700, and afterwards to The Hague. In the August of 1711 he was with Gaultier in London, received much hospitality from Harley; with him and with Bolingbroke he concluded (8th October 1711) the preliminaries of the Anglo-French agreement. The next day Bolingbroke introduced Mesnager secretly to the queen at Windsor. Almost immediately afterwards he embarked for France,
taking with him the secret instruments which were the preface to the opening of the Utrecht conferences.

The negotiations thus carried on, partly by letters, partly by journeys of the men now mentioned to Paris, had for their result a detailed understanding between the French and English intermediaries about the terms of peace. "Plain dealing" was one of Bolingbroke's favourite phrases. Had he carried it into practice now, England would have told her allies that if they insisted on continuing the struggle, they must no longer count on her co-operation. That, however, would not have been in keeping with the Franco-Italian subtlety of Bolingbroke's political genius. Keeping his own counsel, he intrigued with the French against the Dutch. The emperor resented the idea of concluding a peace under international pressure as bitterly as did the English war party, the Whigs and Marlborough themselves. Yet peace was now the first of English interests. To secure, therefore, the Anglo-French entente, everything, not even excepting England's Dutch allies and the gallant Catalans, must be sacrificed. Unless the ministers of Queen Anne and of Louis XIV. had exchanged secret guarantees of a mutual understanding before the representatives met at Utrecht, isolated from all European support, England would have been equally impotent to secure peace or resume war. In all this, of course, Bolingbroke and Oxford, like De Torcy and their French colleagues, were acting rather as conspirators than as diplomatists; but then conspiracy had long been counted one of the legitimate international methods of the time. In proof of this, it is enough to mention the precedent of 1698. In that year the con-
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ferences held at Ryswick would have ended, not in a treaty, but in failure involving probably a new war, if the English and French plenipotentiaries, Villiers, Earl of Jersey, and Callières respectively, had not, on first entering the council-chamber, brought in their pockets a written agreement on all controversial points. The precedent of 1678, the year of the Nimeguen Treaty, sometimes cited as applicable to Utrecht, is not exactly relevant; for then the immediately contracting parties were not the ministers of kings, but the kings themselves. Louis XIV. at that time desired peace with Holland. William of Orange would have continued the war. Charles II. of England secretly agreed with Louis to force a cessation of hostilities on William by assuring the French king of England's neutrality.

England's desertion of the Catalans and her acquiescence in the territorial weakening of Holland, her ally, may have been indefensible. To the secret Anglo-French treaty—which preceded Utrecht and which, in return for her recognition of Philip V. as King of Spain, secured her the Protestant succession at home and territorial gains abroad—it would be a pedantic anachronism to object on the ground of principle. Recent experience had emphasised the fact that without the formal execution of a diplomatic instrument practically binding on England and France, no sure step toward peace could be taken. In 1710 the Gertruydenberg Congress had broken down over the relations between the Austrian Empire and the French monarchy. At the period of Utrecht, England might have carried the other delegates with her in the matter of strengthening the Dutch frontier. The one indispensable preliminary condition was for
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England not to insist on the withdrawal by Louis of his grandson, Philip V. of Spain, in favour of the Archduke Charles, who became emperor before the Utrecht conferences opened. When, in the January of 1711, Great Britain suggested the meeting at Utrecht, she would have been making merely an academic proposal, unless she had been prepared to offer France terms on which a great nation and a proud monarch could, without sacrifice of their honour, have seconded the British movements in the direction of compromise. It had already become clear that the chief ostensible object of the war, that of keeping a Bourbon prince from the Spanish throne, must be sacrificed. It was also plain that to push the humiliation of Louis XIV too far would be to risk the wreck of the whole negotiations. The French king must not be asked to sue for peace from conquerors; it was enough that he should take part in the arrangements for its conclusion on equal terms with the neighbouring Powers. Practically the secret preliminaries, already settled in London, had secured the peace before the conferences at Utrecht commenced. Louis XIV. saved his honour by England's acceptance of his grandson as Sovereign of Spain. England secured the French recognition of the Hanoverian dynasty, the cession of Minorca, of Gibraltar, of Newfoundland and a great increase of her territories on the North American continent.

"The Treaty of Utrecht" is an expression with a twofold meaning; used in different senses the words are at once popular and inexact or technically accurate. The entire group of international compacts whose scene was the old Dutch town, in the second decade
of the eighteenth century, is known officially to the chanceries of Europe as the Peace of Utrecht. When our Foreign Office speaks of the Treaty of Utrecht it refers to the treaty of commerce and navigation signed between Great Britain and France, 11th April 1713. This is the famous instrument chiefly due to Bolingbroke and the result of the secret negotiations already described. It was signed on behalf of France by Nicolas, Marquis de Huxelles, and by Nicolas Mesnager. The men who signed for England were John, Bishop of Bristol, and Thomas, Earl of Strafford. The episcopal diplomatist whose name on the document stands before his colleague's, John Robinson, was or had been Lord Privy Seal, had gone through a thorough apprenticeship to diplomacy, beginning at the Court of Sweden where he was chaplain, before settling down seriously to professional churchmanship. "A little brown man of grave and venerable appearance, in manners and taste more of a Swede than an Englishman, full of good sense, punctiliously careful in business"; such was the impression left by him in the best Continental circles of the period. The plenipotentiary whose name came next, Thomas Wentworth, son of Sir William Wentworth of Northgate-Head, Wakefield, having served as page-of-honour to Mary of Modena, queen of James II., in 1688, entered the army a little later; in 1695 succeeded his cousin as Baron Raby; became ambassador at Berlin in 1706; five years later his diplomatic services secured him the earldom of Strafford. Successful in international politics, he failed in Parliament, where his wealth was not regarded as any compensation for his illiterate loquacity, or for the anniversary declamation on the subject
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of the army, inflicted by him on the Upper House. "There was nothing," says Hervey in his pleasant way, "so low as his dialect, except his understanding."

The treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, including as it did every sort of minor matter, executed by these two British plenipotentiaries, was only intended to be between England and France. The English surrender of the Catalans to the wrath of Philip V. had dissatisfied many friends of this country in Spain. Bolingbroke's undisguised appeal to the English jealousy of Dutch commerce made the settlement of European affairs effected at Utrecht as unpopular in Holland as in Hanover, or among the English Whigs themselves. Eventually, however, the Dutch, if with no better grace than the emperor himself, came round to the Utrecht arrangement. The emperor indeed throughout refused any formal responsibility for the documents "done" at Utrecht. But practically he made himself a party to them when, in the March of the next year (1714), he agreed at Rastadt to withdraw his troops from Catalonia, from the islands of Majorca and Ivica, in return for the engagement by France to restore to the Empire Brisach, Fribourg, and Kehl, as well as to destroy the Rhenish fortresses built by France since 1697. On the other hand the emperor was to re-establish in their dignities and former territories the protegés of France, the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne. This arrangement, first draughted in the spring of 1714 at Rastadt, was confirmed in the autumn at Baden. Alsace, gained by France at Ryswick, was confirmed to its French possessors; with them it remained till the Treaty of Frankfort that closed the Franco-
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Prussian War (1871). In its general outlines the Utrecht settlement regulated international relations till the latter part of the nineteenth century. But while Gibraltar remains to this day invincibly English, Minorca reverted to Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The immediate effect of the treaty on Spain was to deprive her of her possessions in Italy and the Netherlands. Seen in its relation to the later developments of the European system, the most suggestive among the separate international arrangements included by the Treaty of Utrecht was the recognition as a kingdom by France of the power that to-day dominates Germany. In his own dominions indeed the ruler of Prussia, the first Frederick, had been known as a king in 1702. The earliest King of Prussia acknowledged by France under the Treaty of Utrecht was his son Frederick William, who reigned till 1740. The treaty further transformed the Duke of Savoy into the King of Savoy. The world had still to wait a hundred and fifty-seven years before the wars of our time resulted in the replacement by Prussia of Austria in the German leadership and in an Italy united under a monarch of the House of Savoy—Victor Emmanuel. It is, however, scarcely too much to say that the earliest preliminaries of these two consummations formed part of the nine separate instruments included in the Treaty of Utrecht.

Bolingbroke, it has been seen, objected to the Methuen treaty with Portugal because it might interfere with his own long-cherished Free Trade policy. As a fact, his commercial arrangements, an essential part of the Utrecht treaty, placed the trade of England on an equality with that of France. By
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this time his critics saw in the international settlements of 1713 the outcome of the plot which, with Gaultier’s help and in the interests of the Tory party, he had laid to satisfy France at the expense chiefly of Holland. So as regards the commercial treaty, the Turkey merchants and other guilds, who complained that it meant their ruin, declared that here Bolingbroke’s tool, who in other matters had been the Abbé Gaultier, was a low fellow who had been a footman, but who had a turn for figures and other dirty work of that sort, Arthur More.
Addison's *Cato* turned to Tory account by Bolingbroke—The Continental results of the Peace of Utrecht—Cardinal Alberoni Prime Minister of Spain—James, Earl Stanhope—The Anglo-Spanish Alliance—Alberoni's intrigues with Sweden and Russia—Stanhope's meeting in Hanover with the Abbé Dubois—The Triple Alliance of 1717—The Peace of Passarowitz and the Quadruple Alliance of 1718—The fall of Alberoni—Ripperda—The Pragmatic Sanction—Walpole as a diplomatist—Cardinal Fleury—The Austro-Spanish Alliance against England—The Treaty of Seville—The first Vienna Treaty—The Definitive Peace of Vienna—The Family Compact of 1733—War with Spain—Was Walpole's policy justifiable?—The War of the Austrian Succession—Carteret—Sir Thomas Robinson brings about the Treaty of Breslau—The Treaties of Fuessen, Hanover and Dresden—The fourth Lord Holdernesse—The change of allies by the Treaties of Westminster and Versailles—The European situation in 1736.

"DISHING the Whigs," to use a familiar and later figure of speech, was admitted by its English authors to have been their real motive in the Treaty of Utrecht. Bolingbroke's policy with that end displayed itself characteristically elsewhere than at the Utrecht conferences. Joseph Addison had been for some time the chief writer on the Whig side. His tragedy *Cato* was produced during the year in which the Treaty of Utrecht was signed. The Whigs determined to mark the first night of the drama with a political demonstration. The piece might of course be counted on to contain
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noble sentiments and stirring speeches in favour of the Whig principle of civil and religious liberty. To lead the applause of such passages, a fashionable Whig claque had established themselves in the Covent Garden proscenium. Bolingbroke, however, had been beforehand in insuring the occasion should be turned to the Tory account. Each speech, soliloquy, aside or piece of acting charged with a complimentary reference to the hatred of tyrants or to the public danger constituted by the over-mastering power of an individual subject was at once taken up by Bolingbroke and by the friends with him in his stage-box. The audience showed themselves quick to seize the point. The ambitious and all-dominating man who bestrode the state like a Colossus—who was he but the military dictator of the hour, the Duke of Marlborough himself? The Peace of Utrecht—what was it but the patriotic device of the Tories as the true friends of liberty and peace for depriving Marlborough of his perilous pre-eminence. From Marlborough, when reduced to the level of an ordinary citizen, English subjects would learn the wisdom which would prevent their princes from prolonging the nationally ruinous game of war? The effect of the appearance and action in the playhouse of the chief author of the treaty reached a most dramatic climax when, just before the curtain dropped, Bolingbroke, calling the principal actor to his box, presented him with a purse of gold.* In this way the Whig playwright's drama, instead of serving for a

* Now too, probably for the first time, diplomatic achievement was recognised in the Anglican ritual by Handel's commission to compose a Te Deum in honour of the treaty.
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panegyric on the military idol of the party, was construed by Bolingbroke's cleverness as a popular demonstration in favour of the chief object of the Whig attack, the Utrecht treaty. On the whole, Bolingbroke's dexterous interpretation of the play was in keeping with popular sentiment about the peace.

The real safeguard against the union of the French and Spanish monarchies in one king was less its prohibition by the treaty than the jealous and mutually opposed tempers of the two nations. The immediate Continental result of the Utrecht arrangements was to leave France slightly weakened rather than permanently injured, and to give Holland a grudge against England for exclusion from any share in the compact known as the Assiento, making Britain the great slave-dealer of the western world.

The court of Hanover detested the treaty not less than did the Emperor of the Dutch himself. Its conclusion by the Tories sufficed to prejudice the Hanoverian dynasty in favour of the Whigs. The Tories were thus more and more impelled to the side of the Pretender. Unresistingly acquiesced in by the mass of the English people, the Treaty of Utrecht completely served the end of all Bolingbroke's foreign or domestic intrigues. Marlborough's victories had for the time destroyed Tory ascendancy. It was re-established after Utrecht; it remained till Bolingbroke's disappearance and the accession of the first Hanoverian sovereign brought upon the stage the first and greatest among the Whig diplomatists of the eighteenth century.

During the first quarter of the eighteenth century the two foremost figures in the international politics of Europe were the Englishman who became the
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first Earl of Stanhope, and the Spanish ecclesiastic, Cardinal Alberoni. The pair started as friends, even colleagues; they were forced into rivalry. European diplomacy became a duel between the two. "Five years of peace will suffice to raise Spain to an equality with the greatest nations of the earth." The man who made this boast, Alberoni, a poor gardener's son who, in 1714, had risen to the Spanish premiership, had an appearance and manner as remarkable as his career. His head, disproportionately large for his body, might have suggested a comic monstrosity of the pantomimic stage. His habits were coarse even for a Spanish peasant of that period. He systematically posed as a blend of the toady and the merry-andrew that he might take his rivals and opponents off their guard. They had reason to regret it if he succeeded, for none of his contemporaries could afford to give him a single point. Having become Bishop of Parma, he was sent by his patron, the Duke of Parma, to confer with the Duc de Vendôme, a soldier as infamously for the coarseness of his manners and the foulness of his speech as he was renowned for his skill and courage in the field. Alberoni saw the situation at a glance and knew intuitively how to deal with his man. Suiting himself to Vendôme's characteristic humours, and outdoing him in his own accomplishments, Alberoni issued from the interview as a conqueror from a fight. Henceforth his career was secure. His cardinal's cap came about the same time that Philip V. made him prime minister. His policy had for its earliest motive the recovery for Spain of her lost Italian provinces and the restoration of the supremacy she had reached when Charles V. ex-
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changed a palace for a monastery. A nation's power was then measured by the extent of its possessions. Nor did Alberoni so far rise above the conventional ideas of his day as to recognise, even if he secretly suspected, that the Flemish and Italian provinces of Spain were and must be a source of weakness rather than strength. The two rivals against whom he pitted himself were the emperor, who had wounded his pride, and the French regent whom he considered more seriously in his way. His first act on coming into power was to attempt the establishment of good relations with England. Thus he brought to a satisfactory close the long-standing arrangements for a commercial treaty between the two nations. He further reinstated the British subjects, by a most favoured "nation-clause," in the commercial advantages received from the Austrian kings of the Peninsula. Bolingbroke may have acted against the Hanoverians; he was never himself a true Jacobite. So Alberoni, a prince of the Church to which the Pretender sacrificed the crown, had no sentimental preference for intrigues with the Stuarts, and impressed the British representative at Madrid with his zeal for George I.

The great work of English diplomacy in the early eighteenth century was Stanhope's Anglo-French Alliance of 1716. That had been preceded by Anglo-Spanish negotiations undertaken, at least by Spain, in order to strengthen by a British alliance the Peninsula against France on the one hand and the Empire on the other. This business was managed entirely by Alberoni and Stanhope. The former has been described; I now pass to the English negotiator.
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James Stanhope, a member of an old Northamptonshire family, was a soldier-diplomatist, as his associate Alberoni belonged to the ecclesiastical section of the class. He had indeed been born into diplomacy, for his father, Alexander Stanhope, was for sixteen years envoy to the States-General of Holland. While a soldier, James Stanhope had served with distinction at Piedmont, at Namur, at Cadiz, at Barcelona, at Madrid and at Port Mahon. Rooke had already (1704) planted the British colours on the rock of Gibraltar. To Stanhope, with his colleague Leake, was due the inclusion of Minorca in England's Mediterranean gains at Utrecht. Stanhope's career as a diplomatist was preceded by an apprenticeship to official life at home. Having made his mark in both Houses he was at one time a commissioner in the Treasury, at another Chancellor of the Exchequer. His earliest diplomatic mission was to Paris. Then in quick succession came errands to Madrid, to The Hague, to Berlin and to the Imperial court at Vienna. At the Utrecht conferences Stanhope served the Whig interest, made himself the spokesman, and gained the confidence of the English commercial classes by his opposition to Bolingbroke's Anglo-French trade compact. As Secretary of State, Stanhope, by his accurate and comprehensive acquaintance of international affairs, really acted as Minister of the Exterior before the Foreign Office as a department of State had come into existence. During the years in which Stanhope's influence dominated diplomacy may be traced the beginnings of the jealousy between the English and Russian courts. Alberoni's machinations, indeed, helped to sow the seeds among the English masses of that distrust in the Czar and his
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statesmen which has been liable since periodically to influence the diplomacy of Great Britain.

In 1716 occurred an international episode in which the Foreign Ministers of Spain and of England, from having been friends and, in a sense, colleagues, began to counter-work each other's political schemes. The diplomatists of other nations entered into and helped to stimulate the rivalry between Alberoni and Stanhope. Goertz, the chief adviser in foreign affairs of Charles XII. of Sweden, urged upon his master an alliance with Peter the Great of Russia. In this way the supremacy of Northern Europe would have been divided between the Swedish and Russian monarchies. Towards that compact Alberoni's attitude was not one of merely benevolent neutrality; he did all in his power to supply the funds necessary to promote it, with the immediate view of weakening Denmark, ruining Hanover, and securing the landing on British soil, from Russian ships, of Swedish troops who might restore the Stuarts.

It so happened, however, that in the year already mentioned Stanhope accompanied George I. during one of his journeys to Hanover. There the English minister met the Abbé Dubois, the priest-diplomatist employed by the French regent Orleans. That interview wrought a complete transformation scene in the politics of Europe. The Anglo-French alliance of 1716 at once dominated the whole European situation. There could be no security for the new English dynasty so long as it lacked means for checking Stuart conspiracy and intrigue. England's promotion of the Barrier Treaty, securing a line of fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands, garrisoned by
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the Dutch, but at the charge of Austria, had so offended the emperor that the Hanoverians could expect no help from him against Jacobite designs and attacks. During their conferences at Hanover, Stanhope and Dubois negotiated the Triple Alliance of 1717. The treaty relation into which England, France and Holland now entered secured this country against attacks from abroad and Stuart conspiracy at home. Thenceforth the Pretender disturbed but little the course of English politics or the progress of English prosperity. The fresh foreign guarantees for the Protestant succession now given were accompanied by material safeguards, presently to be mentioned, against foreign attack on England. Napoleon used to say that to possess Antwerp was to hold a pistol at the head of England. In the eighteenth century Dunkirk first and Mardyke afterwards formed a menace to British security such as Napoleon saw in Antwerp. Mardyke was on the same coast as, and quite close to, Dunkirk. Its harmlessness to this country was practically insured by a provision in the Triple Alliance treaty, reducing its sluices to a width of sixteen feet, and so prohibiting the entrance or exit of ships of war and privateers.

For the reasons and in the way already described, peace had become a domestic and dynastic necessity to England. It was scarcely less important to France. To the regent, personally, it was a matter of life or death. Under the Utrecht treaties he was next heir to the French throne. With a fresh war the obligations of these treaties would have ceased to exist. The renunciation by Philip V. of the French crown would have become waste paper, and he himself the
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lawful heir of Louis XV. The Hanover conference between the two diplomatic managers of their respective sovereigns not only, for the first time since 1688, resulted in a real friendship between the two countries, but for some years to come made the Anglo-French alliance the controlling force in European affairs. At the time it had another consequence. Peter the Great had recently made a progress across Europe with the hope of inducing France to join the Northern confederation against England. Dubois at once acquainted Stanhope with all that was going on, and strengthened himself in his determination of fidelity to the new compact.

During the years now looked back on, diplomacy, if never more active, had also never been more unscrupulous. It was indeed an aggravated Machiavellianism. The relations between the sovereigns and the statesmen of the world, disclosed by the foregoing narrative, were rather those of conspirators, each eager to seize before his fellow the dagger by the handle, than of statesmen consulting about monarchies and peoples. Spanish diplomacy continued to be the most powerful of European agencies. It was imitated and rivalled, if not outdone, by Spain’s disciples in the diplomatic art elsewhere. Austria, Italy and Turkey had been engaged in a war, anxiously and actively watched by England. In July 1718, English mediation secured the Peace of Passarowitz. This extended the Austrian frontier so as to include part of Servia and Wallachia. The consequent attraction of Austria to the federated Powers changed the Triple into the Quadruple Alliance for maintaining the Peace of Utrecht and guaranteeing
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the tranquillity of Europe. By this great compact of 1718, the emperor abandoned his pretensions to the kingdom of Spain, as well as to all territories recognised at Utrecht as belonging to Spain. He also agreed that, on the death of their reigning princes, the duchies of Placentia, Parma and Tuscany should pass to a Spanish prince, Don Carlos. Persons bearing this name have appeared so often upon the stormy stage of Spanish politics, that it may be as well to mention that the Don Carlos now spoken of was a son of Philip V. of Spain by a second wife; after the death of his half-brother, Ferdinand, he came to the throne under the title of Charles III. The only further stipulation on these points enforced by the Quadruple Alliance was that Leghorn should be a free port, and that in no event should the crowns of the Italian duchies just named pass to the sovereign of Spain. Swiss garrisons were told off, at the charge of the contracting Powers, to establish Don Carlos in his new possessions. At the same time Philip V. was to renounce his pretensions, not only to the duchy of Milan, but to the two Sicilies and to the Netherlands.

The arrangement of the Quadruple Alliance was justly considered at the time, and deserves to be looked back upon, as a monument of knowledge, resourcefulness, patience and skill on the part of its chief English promoter, Stanhope. On an issue of Alberoni's own choosing, he had defeated the most astute of Continental diplomats. After the death of the Swedish monarch, he had caused the collapse of the Northern confederation against England. Stanhope's most dangerous opponents were not his professional rivals at the council-board, but his personal maligners belonging to
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the German faction at court. He also had enemies within the ranks of that Whig party which he served so well, equally abroad and at home. Sir Robert Walpole was jealous of his influence with George I.; he also held Stanhope responsible for the slackness in pressing on Oxford's impeachment. Himself essentially a cosmopolitan by experience and temper, Stanhope was always too much occupied with foreign politics to play a very active part in faction fights or personal rivalries at home. In his successful struggle with Alberoni his only allies were his opponent's follies and blunders. Alberoni's absurdities, conceit and arrogance secured for his fall an outburst of delighted ridicule, alike from the court and the entire populace. No weapon was too small or mean to be used against him by the men over whose heads he had risen. The hostility of the French regent, of Dubois and of Peterborough was reinforced by the Spanish king's confessor, and even by a court nurse. Amid the crash of his ruin and exile, the cardinal's cap was plucked from his head, and the very gates of Rome were closed against him by Pope Clement XI.

The European diplomacy of this age resembles a theatre whose stage is crossed and recrossed by a succession of strange personages, each newcomer more grotesque than his predecessor.

The Spanish cardinal was followed by a Dutch adventurer who had taken up the diplomatic rôle and who became a duke. This was Ripperda, the perfect type of a class generated in all epochs, under various appearances, by the forces of political feverishness and international electricity. By birth a Dutchman, by profession an adventurer, he had through Alberoni's
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influence become a court favourite at Madrid. In 1725 he conducted an international transaction which was to change the entire European situation. His title of "Duke" formed the reward given him for his secret treaty between the Emperor Charles VI. and Philip V. of Spain. Thus, at least for a time, was closed that rivalry between two monarchs which had distracted Europe not less seriously than had the aggrandising ambition of Louis XIV. This compact also recognised the Pragmatic Sanction, which had been fully ratified in 1725, and which settled the Austrian succession on the eldest daughter of Charles VI., Maria Theresa. Ripperda's personal peculiarities, his exaggerated contempt for seriousness of conviction and earnestness of purpose, and the rapidity with which he ran the gamut of religious professions, from Popery, through Protestantism to the Moslemism in which he died, do not inspire respect. The man himself must rank among the great international forces of his time. The mere mention of the Pragmatic Sanction and Maria Theresa in connection with his Franco-Spanish treaty of 1725 associates him with events that left an abiding mark on the international relationships of Europe.

Stanhope, as has been seen, had for his Continental contemporary Alberoni, whom he overthrew with little encouragement from his fellow-Whig, Walpole. In foreign affairs, Stanhope and Walpole, his successor, were rivals, often occupied with the same set of international problems. With Ripperda, it now remained for Walpole himself from time to time to deal. In foreign politics Walpole was the first statesman on the Whig side whose sole aim was to keep England clear
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of external entanglements. The earlier international tradition of Toryism had thus become a principle of Whig practice, and on one point, at least, the earliest of the Whig Prime Ministers showed his agreement with the bitterest of his Parliamentary opponents, Bolingbroke.

Ever-increasing taxation was the price paid by the country for its glories in war. Even Marlborough's victories were beginning to arouse a sense of satiety rather than of proud satisfaction. Weariness of the war naturally implied discontent with its Whig authors and conductors. The incessant demands of the struggle on the national resources had given an entirely new influence to the moneyed classes, those who drew their income from the Funds or from other investments, and not from the land. Walpole's conduct of our international relations had therefore, for its chief motive, to restore to the Whig connection those whom the cost of militarism might have tempted to leave it. War expenditure meant a land tax of four shillings. That was enough to make the territorial class the desirers of peace. Walpole's foreign statesmanship was thus, after the usual English fashion, determined by the necessity of strengthening the position of himself and his party at home. Walpole, indeed, was now bent upon beating Bolingbroke not only at his own game, but with his own tools. The ex-footman, afterwards a commissioner of plantations, Arthur More, who had helped Bolingbroke in his commercial arrangements with France at Utrecht, was no sooner out of work than he offered his services to Walpole. They were readily accepted and promptly utilised. The first speech from the throne ever drafted by Walpole, that
opening the session of 1721, promises an extension of our commerce and the facilities in the export of our own manufactures, as well as in introducing the articles used in preparing them for the market. Walpole's negotiations with foreign ministers proved so successful that before Parliament was prorogued, export duties on more than a hundred British manufactures had been removed, as well as import duties on nearly forty kinds of raw material.

In 1723, George I. asked the minister to find him money to prevent by arms the Czar from deposing the King of Sweden. The funds were indeed forthcoming, but only because the minister hoped they would never be wanted. "My politics," he said, "are to keep free from all engagements as long as we possibly can.' Europe had seen both the papacy and the Empire fail in the attempted rôle of world-wide peacemaker; for himself Walpole cherished no such ideas of universal mediation. Tranquillity had become indispensable for the success of his own policy and for the national well-being. The only hope of securing it lay in practically perpetuating the tradition of Anglo-French friendship, established by Elizabeth in her co-operation with Henry IV., acted upon by Cromwell in his alliance with Mazarin, more recently reproduced by Stanhope in his dealings with Dubois at Hanover, 1716. Thus came about Walpole's alliance with Cardinal Fleury, which at least gave the world ten years of, not indeed unbroken, but never long interrupted peace. Before the understanding between the French cardinal and the English minister had ripened into intimate friendship, Fleury constantly said that he had never seen an Englishman with whom it was so delightful to do
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business as Walpole. The English and the French Prime Ministers were fitted by nature for mutual cooperation. Both were economists with a strong predisposition against war. Both were constitutionally tolerant of differences of opinion. Both distrusted extremes and believed in the virtues of compromise. The cordial relations of the two men were much promoted by the geniality and tact of the English ambassador in Paris, Sir Robert’s brother, old Horace Walpole. The British envoy had formed the true estimate of the cardinal’s abilities. When therefore Fleury fell from court favour for a short time, “Old Horace” instead of slighting him, as did other members of the diplomatic circle, became more conspicuously respectful in his attentions than before. The British ambassador’s commanding position at the French court was recognised at home by giving him carte blanche in his dealings with the French Government. Hence the smoothness and success of his brother Sir Robert Walpole’s dealings with the Paris Foreign Office.

Sir Robert Walpole himself was soon to profit by the result of his brother’s well-judged courtesy to the French cardinal during the short season of his former eclipse. In 1727, George II. on his accession dismissed Walpole, and for forty-eight hours replaced him by Spencer Compton, afterwards Lord Wilmington. Queen Caroline’s was not the only influence exercised to secure Walpole’s prompt return to power. Cardinal Fleury and other important personages in Paris represented to the English sovereign the danger there must be to the Anglo-French alliance from any break of continuity in the relations between the two countries instituted and maintained by the Whig minister’s tact.
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The movements of European diplomacy, in which Walpole was to take his part, may be compared to the processes of weaving and unweaving the web of Penelope. Treaties made one day to be broken the next, alliances concluded only to be dissolved, a bewildering series of shifting combinations of Powers. These were the phenomena that came daily under his eyes. Alberoni had fallen not to rise again; but his pupil Ripperda remained to promote any European movement unfavourable to England.

The prime object of the Austro-Spanish alliance, the establishment of a Spanish kingdom in Italy, formed a standing threat to the European equilibrium. The means employed to secure that end exemplified the circumlocutory and mystifying processes of eighteenth-century diplomacy. The policy of the Austro-Spanish understanding, expressed in the Treaty of Vienna (1725), joined Austria and Spain against Great Britain. The stereotyped routine was followed. Congresses that settled nothing were held at Cambrai, Soissons and Aix-la-Chapelle; but no effective counter-move to the Vienna treaty was taken till Walpole organised the threefold compact uniting England, France and Prussia. Stanhope had been willing to purchase the friendship of Spain at the cost of Gibraltar. Alberoni had declined the overture. Gibraltar became the object of periodical attacks and even of a siege by Spain; Walpole's diplomacy at Vienna and Austria's failure to support Spain alone prevented a European war.

In 1729, Walpole combined England, France and Spain first and Holland afterwards in a defensive alliance, the Treaty of Seville. This arrangement
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finally set at rest the question of restoring Gibraltar to Spain, and composed the Anglo-Spanish differences about English trade across the Atlantic. It was seized upon by the Tories and malcontent Whigs, under Bolingbroke and Pulteney, as a handle for attacking Walpole on the ground of sacrificing England's interests to gratify German feeling and to further his own party policy, and conniving at a dangerous friendship between France and Spain. The Treaty of Seville was confirmed in 1731 by the second Treaty of Vienna. This provided, more explicitly than had been done at Seville, the annulment of the first Treaty of Vienna and pledged its signatories to abstain from any action that might disturb the balance of power. Three years later the precarious foundation of treaties based upon artificial arrangements of territory, regardless of national feeling, merely to preserve the balance of power, was to receive a fresh illustration. In 1734, but for Walpole's sagacity and firmness, England might have been involved in the European complications arising out of the Polish succession. In the hostilities that followed, Austria found herself pitted against the united forces of France and Spain. In his firm adherence to the policy of non-intervention, Walpole stood between two fires at home. The old seventeenth-century Whigs denounced him for his absolute rupture with the methods originated by William III. of arming everywhere for the humiliation of France. The Tories raised the cry of treachery to British prestige. The diplomacy, however, which neither domestic opposition nor foreign intrigue was suffered to interrupt, proved successful, not only in keeping England out of the hurly-burly, but in promoting those mediatorial negotiations which in October
1735 resulted in the great treaty known as the Definitive Peace of Vienna. By this instrument Naples and Sicily remained in Spanish hands, Sardinia received Novara and Tortona. Lorraine became the property of France. In exchange for his principality, the young Duke of Lorraine, Francis, betrothed to Maria Theresa, accepted Tuscany. Thus the Bourbons were now established in Naples as well as in Spain and France, and a close connection was effected between Tuscany and the Austrian Empire. In this way did Walpole become associated with the extension of Bourbon influence, destined afterwards so long to prove the source of England’s deadliest dangers. To counteract and destroy this Bourbon ascendancy formed the task successfully accomplished by the elder Pitt when the national recognition of his genius and patriotism clothed him with a power and placed at his disposal resources, diplomatic and military, previously unknown in the annals of English statesmanship.

In its relation to the Bourbons, Walpole’s diplomacy is not always seen to as much advantage as in the case of the Definitive Treaty of Vienna. In 1733 had come the first of those Family Compacts which, renewed in 1743 and in 1761, sealed a conspiracy of the Bourbons against the rest of Europe, with the special object of humiliating and weakening England. These understandings—“pactes de la famille”—to call them by their official name, were made in secret and were surrounded with an air of mystery. Their existence, however, was certainly more than suspected by Continental diplomatists; it was mentioned in the Duke of Newcastle’s correspondence. Walpole therefore may have had some idea of what was going forward, though,
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as he might have said and himself believed, an idea not definite enough or sufficiently substantiated by facts to justify him in making it the basis of his policy. The earliest of these compacts, that of 1733, with which alone we now have to do, committed the French and Spanish monarchies to defend Don Carlos, the son of Philip V. of Spain by his second wife, Elizabeth of Parma, against the emperor and England, as well as to combine attacks upon English commerce everywhere and to watch an opportunity for restoring Gibraltar from its English occupants to its Spanish owners. However successfully the secrecy of the anti-English concert was maintained, the evidence of actual events must have shown a diplomatist, far less vigilant and well informed than Walpole, that far-reaching mischief was intended against England. The public as well as the chanceries of the Continent asked why the French navy should be placed upon a war footing. In Spanish waters the outrages upon English ships and sailors brought the flag and name of Great Britain into daily contempt. The English smugglers may have been troublesome. The brutality of the Spanish reprisals was out of all proportion to the offence. The climax was reached in the well-known episode of Jenkins' ear. The militant patriotism ran high, not only in Parliament and in the country, but at court, and the Duke of Newcastle began to outbid Walpole by favouring the war party. Walpole himself, however, persevered doggedly with his diplomacy; he succeeded in securing the agreement of Spain to a convention for restoring the treasure and the sailors made prisoners on English ships.

The Parliamentary debates on this convention are
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noticeable in the present context, because they brought forward for the first time the statesman who was to redeem English diplomacy and English honour from the disgrace attributed by the patriots to Walpole's pusillanimity. The future Chatham led the attack upon the English minister for having accepted from Spain money compensation scandalously inadequate to the injuries committed. To no purpose did Walpole, in and out of Parliament, endeavour to arrest hostilities by emphasising a diplomatic formula which was then heard for the first time, but has since become a commonplace. "Before," he said, "we can prudently declare war, we must know the whole system of European affairs at the present moment; we must also know what allies our enemies may have and what help we may expect from our friends."

The intense and universal passion of the moment overwhelmed all considerations of prudence. Instead of resigning, as more wisely and honourably he might have done, Walpole yielded to the royal and popular wish by declaring war with Spain, October 1739. When the military passions of a people become strongly excited, diplomacy lends itself as readily to the purposes of the war party as, in more tranquil times, to the cause of peace. So was it now. So was it to prove in the next century when the younger Pitt drifted into hostilities with France, and so again when another peace minister, Lord Aberdeen, invaded the Crimea. Fleury, who a little before had offered Walpole his services as mediator with Spain, ceased to disguise his sympathy with the enemies of England, and made overtures to the Jacobites; he even promised military support for a Stuart restoration.

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Amid the political defeats at home following these diplomatic failures abroad, Walpole's career closed. He had been the first great Whig minister to attempt a systematic reversal of the principle of military intervention in European affairs which the Whigs had adopted from William III. He had, however, done more than this. He had made the cabinet the executive committee of the House of Commons; it followed therefore that the foreign policy of the country had ceased chiefly or necessarily to reflect the ideas and wishes of the sovereign. No longer the exclusive product of courts or chanceries, it began, like legislation itself, to bear the trade-mark of Parliamentary manufacture. Before, therefore, the middle of the eighteenth century there had opened the popular era in the narrative of our international statesmanship. The European system of the Middle Ages was not indeed yet broken up. The European equilibrium still implied a balance of kings and courts rather than of peoples. The principle of nationality systematically ignored by the Utrecht settlement had still to become an inspiring idea of diplomacy. Walpole, however, did something to introduce the notion to the public mind.

Before passing to the relations between his work and that of his successors, something must be said of his connection with the development of Bourbonism, the shape it was assuming and the attention it was exciting in 1733. In that year Lord Carteret and Townshend as Secretaries of State were subordinately responsible for foreign affairs, but the Prime Minister decisively shaped policy abroad as well as at home. Had Walpole then learned of the earliest arrangement between the French and Spanish Bourbons? If he had,
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his persistence with pacific negotiations, foredoomed, as he must have been aware, to certain failure, was without excuse. The chief argument in favour of the 1733 compact not having been known to the minister, as stated by Professor Seeley,* is that the later agreements (1743 and 1761) took the world by surprise. Against this there is now evidence to show that, its secrecy notwithstanding, the earliest of the compacts was certainly known to some of Walpole's colleagues, especially the Duke of Newcastle, then Lord Chamberlain. The Newcastle correspondence, summarised by an expert in this subject in the Quarterly Review (vol. 380, p. 346), has disclosed the existence of a certain "One-hundred-and-one." This mysterious entity, who in the flesh was a lady, proud of her unimpeachable respectability, and expecting to be paid proportionately, constantly recurs to stipulations which have just been agreed upon between France and Spain. Further details, she adds, will be sent when more money is received. These, the duke may rest assured, will only confirm previous accounts of the danger threatened by "the project to the House of Hanover and the whole empire of George II." The later developments of—to adopt "One-hundred-and-one's" euphemism—"the project," under the shapes in which it reappeared or was continued during the greatest foreign ministry of the eighteenth century, that of the elder Pitt, will receive minute notice in their proper place. Meanwhile I pass on to those controllers of England's external relations who more immediately followed Walpole, and to those points at

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which they were brought into active relations with the European situations of their periods.

Two years before Walpole’s retirement died the Emperor Charles VI. Foreseeing his end, he had taken the step intended to ensure the fulfilment of his fondest wish by gaining the consent of Europe to the Pragmatic Sanction; this was accepted both by England and France; nor at the time did any European state refuse its signature, except Bavaria. In 1740, Maria Theresa, as Queen of Hungary, quietly succeeded to her father’s dominions.

The first blow at the agreement, however, proceeded from an unexpected quarter. The great Frederick of Prussia had long resented the loss of the Juliers and Berg duchies; he now made his signature of the Pragmatic Sanction conditional on their restoration; he emphasised his claim by seizing Silesia, at the same time protesting that he had no wish to quarrel with Austria. It had already become a maxim of French diplomacy to miss no opportunity of acquiring influence in Germany. The King of France, Louis XV., therefore welcomed the opportunity of now concluding a secret treaty with the Prussian monarch. Walpole, who lived till 1745, had foreseen the danger to the peace of the world threatened by a possible collision between the militant Prussian monarch and the young Austrian queen. He had therefore advised timely Austrian concessions to the new Prussian crown.

By this time, however, influences very different from those sedulously fostered by Walpole were in the ascendant with the English court, Parliament and people. George II., flushed with
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military ambition, had always desired to pose as the armed champion of the late emperor's heiress; he had more than once asked, or talked of asking, Parliament for money to support her in the field. The belligerent humour of the English king was now to be gratified by the foreign statesmanship of a great minister whose temper was as warlike as the sovereign's—Carteret. This was the remarkable man whose death, when it came, made Chesterfield exclaim, "There goes, take him for all in all, the best brains in England." In his political methods and ideas of home and foreign statesmanship, Carteret presented a contrast not less complete than in his person and deportment to Walpole. To knock the heads of the kings of Europe together and jumble something out that may be of service to this country was, as Mr. Morley has well put it, his dominating ambition. (Walpole, p. 28.) He first came into favour with George I. because he was the only public man of the day who could speak the king's native language. "Fancy," said the adroit courtier to his sovereign, "a gentleman not knowing German!" From being the rival of Walpole in the first Hanoverian reign, Carteret became the most formidable of Newcastle's competitors in the second. With more, or at least with something, of moral ballast, Carteret would have been as great in politics as he was accomplished in scholarship. As it was, the intricacies of foreign affairs in his day exactly suited his tastes and powers. He regarded them as a game in which he could give the ordinary player points and maintain his lead from the opening to the finish. Trained by Stanhope and Sunderland, he knew, as few of his contemporaries
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did, not only the details of every foreign question, but
the nature of the unseen forces to be considered in
dealing with it. Sufficiently loyal as a subordinate,
he no sooner found himself a principal than he treated
with contempt all obligations of party and all scruples
of patriotism. Once he had established himself in
office, he knew no other object than to remain there
on the terms most profitable or pleasant to himself,
and most likely to ingratiate him with the sovereign
and the public. Not less self-conscious than he was
capable, he always asked himself what posterity would
be likely to think of any particular coup, as well as
what momentary effect it would produce. The fame
and the very names of kings outlive the reputa-
tion of subjects. Therefore his first maxim was to
show himself in sympathy with the court: once
delight the boxes, the applause of the gallery will
follow. Carteret's natural turn for diplomacy showed
itself even in his personal dealings with George II.
"Recollect," said the fiery little king, "I am all for
Maria Theresa and the Austrian alliance." "Your
Majesty," replied the minister, "does but follow the
tradition of the greatest foreign statesman among your
royal predecessors, Henry VIII., who was the first to
see in Austria the true English make-weight to France."
The spring of 1741 produced events that fixed un-
alterably the English line in the Seven Years' War.
Frederick's victory at Mollwitz made France side
with the conqueror. The Franco-Prussian Treaty of
Nymphenberg pledged the two Powers to promote
the Bavarian Elector's succession to the Imperial
crown. The eighteenth-century precursor of the
"spirited diplomacy" of our own day, Carteret, in
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1742, successfully urged the timely wisdom of pacific surrender upon a martial queen. The English court had for some time used its influence with Maria Theresa to secure her cession of Silesia to Frederick. The Franco-Prussian compact of Nymphenberg stimulated Carteret to action. From 1730 to 1748, England was represented at Vienna by a Yorkshire baronet, Sir Thomas Robinson. For that work he had been trained in our Paris Embassy. His zeal in negotiating between Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great secured him the nickname of “L’Infallible Robinson.” His industry and skill enabled Carteret to convert the Austrian empress to the English views. In 1742, by the Treaty of Breslau, she made Silesia over to Frederick. Twelve years later Robinson was to prove less successful. His failure to obtain Maria Theresa’s consent to a general pacification caused his recall in 1754, when, as the Duke of Newcastle’s colleague, he went into the House of Commons. The Breslau treaty was not only Carteret’s most important work, it was also his last. Having by his mother’s death become Lord Granville, he resigned in 1744. The Pelham ascendency which followed this event gave, as some thought, a promise of peace, but without its fulfilment.

In France Fleury was now dead; his successor, Cardinal Tencin, proved more vehemently anti-English than had been Belleisle himself. Tencin’s open encouragement to the young Pretender, Charles Edward, culminated (March 1745) in the declaration by France of war against England. A few weeks later France added Austria to the list of her avowed enemies. The struggle originating in the Austrian
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succession, like the Seven Years’ War into which that contest merged by degrees almost imperceptible, belongs to the general history of the time. British diplomacy did not remain an idle spectator of the confused and sanguinary engagements between the Prussian, Bavarian and Austrian troops, suspended rather than terminated as these had been by the Austro-Bavarian Treaty of Fuessen and the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Hanover. The Fuessen Treaty had established Maria Theresa’s husband, Francis, on the Imperial throne. By the Treaty of Hanover, Frederick promised England to accept Francis I. as emperor, but only on the condition of Silesia remaining a part of the Prussian kingdom. Robinson’s persuasive powers were for some time spent in vain on the Austrian empress. At last the British ambassador succeeded, and the Austrian acceptance of these terms was embodied in the Treaty of Dresden, 1745. From the first it had been evident that the primary condition, the “idem velle et nolle” of international friendship, had been wanting to the Anglo-Austrian relations. Nor do these seem to have been improved by the men into whose hands their management had fallen. Robert D’Arcy, fourth Earl of Holderness, as Secretary of State, stood high in Newcastle’s opinion, but his character was traversed by a vein of frivolity, shown, as his opponents declared, by the fact that, when as a younger man he ought to have been a student of politics, he thought of nothing but private theatricals. How, it was asked, could such a man, bred behind the curtain, keep an official secret or be trusted in anything more serious than the business of stage-management? Moreover,
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Robert Keith—who, in 1748, had succeeded Robinson at Vienna—another of Newcastle's friends, was without the tact and energy shown by his predecessor in dealing with Maria Theresa; he weakened rather than strengthened the hold of her English friends upon the wavering loyalty of the empress.

Nor did Maria Theresa at any time underrate the two definite and practical reasons she had for regarding the English alliance as unlikely to stand any severe strain. The Hanoverian court of England was secretly if not openly Prussian in its sympathies. The statesmanship and sentiment of England, she also knew, only valued Austria as an instrument for promoting the paramount object of English policy, the overthrow of the Bourbons. In 1756 the Austrian ruler's suspicions received a most dramatic and unexpected justification. There was, and for some time had been, an understanding—secret, of course, after the manner of the time—between England and Prussia. It took the shape of the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Westminster (January 1756). As a natural check to this move—thought by some to have been the suggestion of Henry Fox, then Secretary of State—Austria and France now engaged in a little business of the same kind on their own account. The Franco-Prussian entente had for some time ceased to be operative. Louis XV. never forgave what he called the personal discourtesy of the great Frederick. He now eagerly welcomed an ally of better manners if not of equal strength. The country-house of the French Foreign Minister, Rouillé, witnessed the final execution of the Franco-Austrian counter-move to the stroke dealt by "perfidious Albion" in the Westminster treaty.

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Maria Theresa's greatest minister, Kaunitz, once described England as Austria's natural friend, France as her natural enemy. In 1756, however, Kaunitz was immensely popular in Paris, and the chief promoter of the diplomatic instrument, by way of answer to the Westminster League, forthcoming from Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles, concluded in the May of 1756, was the product of the secret forces now directing French diplomacy. The conscience of Louis XV. was in the keeping of the Abbé Bernis; Madame de Pompadour was the royal mistress. The churchman and the concubine, combining their different kinds of ascendancy to a common end, secured the king's consent to terms between the two countries by which Austria for the present was to remain inactive, and France not to involve other Powers in war, and above all things not to invade the Netherlands.

Of the two French signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, Rouillé was the Foreign Minister; his colleague's full name was François Joacim de Pierres Bernis. The latter, the idol of fashionable Europe, had made a brilliant beginning at the Venice Embassy in 1740, and, though more than once officially disgraced, remained till his death, in 1794, the most popular of ambassadors in Europe, and not the least successful of diplomatists. Keith, now British ambassador at Vienna, obtained an early interview with Maria Theresa. Why, he reproachfully asked, had she deserted England? Why, was the further enquiry that met this question, had the ministers of George II. forced on her the surrender of Glatz and Silesia? It now remained for English diplomacy to secure its ends by the use of English gold. Heavy bribes from Whitehall to the
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Russian Government at St Petersburg and to their ambassador in London, Bestuchoff, secured the accession of the Czarina Elizabeth, Peter the Great's daughter, to the Treaty of Westminster.

We have now (1756) reached the period of the Seven Years' War. The preoccupation of Europe with this contest was the elder Pitt's opportunity for creating or establishing the modern empire of Great Britain. This therefore is the place in which briefly to explain the leading features of the European situation so far as it concerns the foreign policy of England.

The Western world had divided itself between the support of England or France. It was, in fact, a duel between those two Powers. At the same time the responsibilities in which the treaty system of Europe had involved the neighbouring states made it impossible that the struggle should be confined to the two competitors for supremacy. The tradition of English diplomatic ascendancy, established by Robinson at Vienna, had proved too weak for the skill and resources of French statesmanship. Nor ought Robinson's colleagues, successors or employers to have been surprised by Maria Theresa's exchange of an English for a French alliance. Nothing but tact on Robinson's part amounting to genius kept the empress from breaking with England after the Pelhams had forced on her the surrender of Silesia; and, though he nominally occupied the embassy till 1763, Robinson, between 1748 and 1756, seems to have been mostly absent from the Austrian court. Between the "Devil" of Prussia and the "deep sea" of Turkey, Maria Theresa had been driven by the diplomatic remissness of her English ally into the Versailles treaty with Louis XV.

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The Seven Years' War, as a European episode, consisted of military operations in Germany, which, belonging to general history, need not be recapitulated here. While it was in progress, the elder Pitt began to make himself necessary to the English administrations that were closely following the Continental struggle. At first the policy in regard to it which he advocated for England was an adherence to those traditions of non-intervention, declared by Bolingbroke to be the foundation of Toryism, during the wars ending in the Peace of Utrecht. As time passed on, Pitt saw more and more clearly that in establishing her empire, the one enemy with whom England had to reckon was France; he therefore entirely changed his attitude towards the combatants in Germany. To assist Frederick of Prussia in occupying the French arms in Europe was to withdraw France from her aggressive enterprises in Hindustan and across the Atlantic; he was thus, to adapt his own phrase, literally "winning for England, America in Germany." With the course of conquest that formed the fulfilment of these words we are not here concerned. The diplomatic incidents that it originated, and the diplomatic methods adopted by Pitt for the achievement of his Imperial aims, afford material for a new chapter.
CHAPTER V

CHATHAM: HIS WORK AND ITS RESULTS


PITT’S triumphs in international statesmanship were won during the period of the Seven Years’ War (1757-63), and in the teeth of official difficulties and disorganisation which were then reaching a pitch so intolerable as to necessitate, four years after his death, an attempt to secure something like method and discipline in administration by forming a new and distinct department of State for the conduct of our foreign affairs. The obsolete machinery existing for a Foreign Minister throughout Pitt’s time was supplied by the already mentioned Northern and Southern Departments, both domiciled either at the Cock-pit, Whitehall, or at Cleveland Row, St James’s. This two-fold division had been made when the king’s secretarial
business began to be too heavy for a single servant. The appointment, however, of a second Secretary of State under Henry VIII. did not make either of the two less the creature of the court. Both were to the last practically untouched by any new doctrine of responsibility to Parliament. Throughout the Tudor period, perhaps long afterwards, the question of priority between the two was practically settled by the temporary importance of the work done in each of the departments, and on the ability of the men who did it.* Theoretically their duties and dignity may have been equal. Cases like those of Stanhope and Carteret show that the course of events at home and abroad conspired with the natural adaptabilities of the man himself generally to make one of the chiefs of the two departments practically Foreign Secretary, if not Prime Minister as well. When the Secretaries began to be responsible to Parliament rather than to a king, their importance increased, but the old division of duties proved inconvenient. Many of the blunders that confused and miscarried English diplomacy in its eighteenth-century relations with Louis XV., Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, may be directly traced to the obsolete dual arrangement. It was, to quote Lord John Russell’s description, as if “two coachmen were on the box of a mail-coach, one holding the right-hand rein and the other the left.” The period which closed with the supremacy of the elder Pitt had been marked by intrigues and counter-intrigues between the two Secretaries of State, that

* On this subject see *The Public Records and the Constitution*, a lecture delivered at All Souls, Oxford, by Mr Luke Own Pike, who favours the idea of the Foreign Office having specifically grown out of the Northern Secretaryship.
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alternately agitated and paralysed our diplomacy; during a quarter of a century. The plots and counter-plots of English ministers reflected in miniature the duplicity and overreaching that, on a larger scale, has been seen to characterise the relations of the Austrian, the English, the French and the Prussian cabinets and courts.

During the second decade of the eighteenth century, Carteret and Townshend, both of them Secretaries of State under Walpole, were competitors for the conduct of our foreign policy. The royal favour, the essential preliminary to the achievement of that ambition, could only or most easily be secured by the good offices of one of the royal mistresses. The Duchess of Kendal promised to be the most amenable to the necessary pressure; she had already been in the pay of Bolingbroke; to her therefore, as to the most useful ally in his diplomatic projects, Carteret addressed himself. Speaking of the stateswomen who make international politics their métier, Walpole had said that he knew of only one who would not take money, and she took diamonds. The Duchess of Kendal had a soul above either gold or jewels, but sighed for the ennoblement of her kindred. Carteret and Townshend so hated and distrusted each other that neither of them would let George I. be out of his sight a moment. When, therefore, their sovereign went to Hanover, both these ministers insisted on accompanying him. The absence of the two was the secret of the diplomatic successes already related of the home-staying Walpole. Carteret was now to discover the price fixed by the chief court concubine for her assistance.

Her Grace of Kendal’s niece—probably a synonym
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for daughter—was the bride elect of the son of La Vrillière, the French Secretary of State. As a condition of the marriage, the young lady’s friends insisted that the bridegroom should be made a duke by Louis XV.; the influence of the English court, it was assumed, might successfully be exercised to that end. George I. approved of the match. Carteret resolved to buy his monarch’s mistress by using his influence at the French court to gratify her whim. England then had for its ambassador at Paris a certain Sir Luke Schaub, a native of Switzerland, and a standing illustration of the truth of the French proverb, “pas d’argent, pas de Suisse.” This diplomatist had already been heavily fee’d by Townshend to counteract the policy of Walpole and Carteret; he now took Carteret’s money to obtain for the bridegroom elect the title stipulated for by the young lady’s relatives. Schaub, having betrayed his original purchaser, Townshend, really exerted himself to earn the money paid by his second buyer, Carteret. Townshend, however, had now a trusty agent of his own for counter-working both his rival and Schaub at the French court.

The incident ended in Schaub being recalled for an incompetent bungler, in old Horace Walpole, Sir Robert’s brother, superseding him, and being plainly told by the French regent that the descendant of St Louis could not sully the highest title in his peerage to promote his subject’s marriage with a bride of such questionable parentage. The “old Horace Walpole,” of his more famous nephew and namesake’s diaries, remained at the English Embassy in Paris till 1730. His ascendancy over Cardinal Fleury was due to the marked courtesy paid
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The French minister by Walpole, while that official was for a short time out of favour. Hence the opportunities enjoyed by the elder Horace Walpole of promoting the diplomacy of his brother, Sir Robert, and of contributing to the fall of Carteret. This too-clever servant of the English crown, as social and political diplomatist indeed overleaped himself; the Walpoles took the winning trick in the international game; Carteret himself was shelved in Ireland.

In 1724, the Duke of Newcastle, succeeding Carteret as Secretary for the Southern Department, had France in his province; he managed his French business through the veteran who had relieved Schaub in the way already described. Townshend, however, as the other State Secretary, disputed his colleague's right to the exclusive control of the English chancery in Paris. The Anglo-French diplomacy of this period was as confused and contradictory as the crooked purposes and intrigues of its directors could not help making it. Abuses and inefficiency of all kinds were indeed guaranteed by the arrangements for regulating our external relations during nearly three centuries (1539-1782). However the work might have been divided, it was obviously of a kind demanding the unintermitted supervision and control of one competent and responsible chief. That had no doubt been forthcoming when a Tudor king was his own Foreign Minister and used his Secretaries of State as clerks. Afterwards, however, the welfare of Great Britain beyond seas was left to be intrigued about and quarrelled over by two departmental heads, each playing for his own hand, and constantly endeavouring to assert himself outside
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his own territorial limit. As Southern Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle had nothing to do with Austria, which belonged to the Northern Secretary. This, in succession to Townshend, was William Stanhope, known from 1730 as Lord Harrington. Like Benjamin Keene, he learned diplomacy in the same Spanish school as that studied in by his famous kinsman of an earlier day, the first Earl Stanhope. As has been done by other members of his profession, he illustrated the diplomatic aptitude hereditary in certain families; if, since him, none of his stock have been ambassadors, every generation of Stanhopes has produced men cast by Nature for the part of diplomatist. Newcastle was bent on including all foreign affairs in his province; he plagued Harrington, as he had plagued Robinson, Keene and others before him, with letters marked "most private and confidential," not exactly instructing their recipients what to do, but only saying what, if he were in their position, the writer would do himself.

The chaotic character of our international statesmanship in the early eighteenth century was further promoted by the frequent absences of the two first Georges in Hanover. George I. made the journey to and fro five times in the thirteen years of his reign; his son, including the time spent on the road, out of the three-and-thirty years of his kingship, passed an aggregate of three in his German realm. As absolutist in their pretensions and as autocratic in their ideas as the Stuarts, the earlier Hanoverian kings used their Secretaries of State, Northern or Southern, as servants of their household at home for sending instructions to their representatives.
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abroad. The monarch spent much of his time upon the road; with him was always a minister in attendance. The secretary who stayed at home was caballing against the colleague who was abroad. Which of the two succeeded in making the Government of the day the organ of his ideas, was determined by a scramble that made State policy the creature of luck and chance. The Duke of Newcastle, the real Foreign Minister in the Pelham administration, hated foreign travel for personal rather than patriotic reasons. He saw, however, the inconveniences to the public service caused by gadabout ministers, dancing attendance on feverish and fidgety kings. "The wonder," he said, "is not that things so often go wrong, but that anything should ever go right."

Politically and diplomatically, English ambassadors and their staffs looked ahead as little as might be; if their statesmanship was wise and carefully thought out, it might be overruled at any moment by their private enemies in the favoured faction at home. Literally, too, as well as politically, they lived from hand to mouth. Their salaries indeed were, for the most part, paid pretty punctually. The allowances for incidental outlay, known as "extraordinaries," were always in arrear. The Treasury had to be dunned for months and even years before these claims were settled. Lord Waldegrave at Paris, and Sir Benjamin Keene at Madrid, the latter the most useful ambassador of his time, finding mere importunity fail, tried bribery in the hope of getting back their out-of-pocket expenses. They sent large presents of wine and tobacco to the Pelham brothers, or costlier "gratifications" to under-strappers at St James's and
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head clerks at Whitehall; but no cash came. The British Embassy at Constantinople, in particular, was notorious as a hotbed of scandal and incompetence. Abraham Stanyan (1669-1732) first made his mark in the diplomatic service as envoy to the Swiss cantons. Appointed to the Constantinople Embassy, he acquired the luxurious habits and official indolence of the East. His recall became inevitable. He refused, however, to leave till the Government had squared a long-standing account he had against them; for had he not, as a junior in the service at Turin, pawned a diamond ring and a gold snuff-box to pay his weekly living bills, when his salary was just a year overdue? Let the State settle accounts with him; he would then think of vacating the legation.

Lord Kinnoull, who eventually replaced Stanyan, united with some of his predecessor's tastes a violently ungovernable temper. He reached Turkey at a moment when France was trying to embroil the Porte in a war against the Empire; his instructions were to co-operate with the Dutch ambassador in urging a peace policy upon the Sultan. Instead of doing this, he at once quarrelled with the diplomatist from The Hague, and found his special friend in the Parisian diplomatist, Villeneuve. He was soon recalled; Sir Everard Fawkener was nominated to the appointment. Kinnoull, however, refused to go on board the man-of-war which had been sent to take him home. He remained as a rival envoy for a year at Constantinople, thwarting Fawkener at every point, and eventually asking promotion from his Government as a reward for extraordinary services.

Another diplomatic curiosity of this period is best
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known from Chesterfield's oft-quoted remark—"The truth is, that Tyrawley and I have been dead for some years, but we have not let anyone know." Lord Tyrawley, when in the army, had been Marlborough's aide-de-camp at Malplaquet. Sent as envoy to Lisbon, for the special purpose of preventing war between Portugal and Spain, he had no sooner reached his destination than he was "spoiling for a fight," if not between Spain and Portugal, with his colleague Sir John Norris, whom he abused roundly in all his home despatches. Norris returned the compliment. The two ambassadors excluded each other from the dinners given by them on the queen's birthday. Each of the hosts told his guests that he hated his colleague only one degree more than he did the Dutch minister with whom he had been sent to co-operate, and whom both Tyrawley and Norris always spoke of as "that d--d Til."

Benjamin Keene, at Madrid, had other difficulties than those arising from the retention of his agency for the South Sea Company after he had become representative of the English king; some of these resulted from the peculiar habits of the Spanish court. Philip V. occasionally amused himself by taking to his bed for months at a time, leaving State business to his ambitious wife, Elizabeth Farnese, but stipulating that no final decision should be given till he might be in the humour to deal with State papers. If Keene had possessed the social connection, the spirit and the energy shown by his predecessor Stanhope, he would have passed for Stanhope's superior. As it was, he had not the good fortune to be actively employed under the dis-
pensation of the elder Pitt, whom he would have exactly suited. The trained intellect, the habit of accurate observation which it ensures, loyalty, spirit, promptitude and exactness in fulfilling orders based on the reports furnished, "These, said Chatham, "are the qualities indispensable to a good ambassador." They were all of them combined in Keene.

Among his professional contemporaries, mention has been already made of Robert D'Arcy, fourth Earl of Holdernesse. The son of the second earl, he succeeded to the title in 1722, began his Continental career by going with George II. to Hanover as lord-of-the-bedchamber in 1743. Next year came his embassy to the republic of Venice, lasting to 1746. Serving in the same Government as Walpole, he seemed to that statesman an unthinking, an unparliamentary minister. In diplomacy his figure is of permanent interest. More vividly and consistently than had yet been done by most members of his vocation, he realised the ornamental possibilities of an ambassador's calling, and reflected the dignity and magnificence of the sovereign he represented in the superb appointments of his own daily life. In the sight of the court to which he was accredited and the capital at which he lived, to magnify his apostleship seemed to Holdernesse only the loyal glorification of King George of England.

It is recorded of a popular diplomatist—the Lord Napier and Ettrick of the nineteenth century—that, asked by a great lady who was the most agreeable man in Europe, he replied quite simply, "I am." To a similar question a like answer might properly have been given by William Capel, the third Earl of Essex, who in 1743 represented England at Turin.
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ing to the stately school of Holderness, Essex would not be bored with the drudgeries of diplomacy; he entertained illustrious Englishmen, when on their travels, at his embassy; he introduced them, if they were sufficiently presentable, to the prettiest women, the most serviceable men and the most desirable hosts of the capital. He wrote a few important despatches with his own hand; by his suavity and tact he helped on the treaty between Maria Theresa and the King of Sardinia, which constituted the sum and essence of Anglo-Austrian policy in 1740. He at no time, however, seemed so happy or so much in his element as when arranging the dinner menus, the private theatricals or the concerts which made his house at Turin the most charming and coveted of cosmopolitan resorts in the first half of the eighteenth century. His contemporary, at Paris, and socially his rival, was James, the first Earl Waldegrave. As Holderness had stamped diplomacy with the mark of magnificence and fashion, so did Waldegrave invest it with the associations of intellect. The tradition thus created for diplomacy was to descend from the man who founded it, as a paternal legacy, to his son, the second Lord Waldegrave, who owed his gift of literary portraiture to his father. The first Lord Waldegrave was not only a good talker himself, but made those he gathered about him talk better as his guests than they were ever known to do elsewhere.

All the controllers of English diplomacy in the eighteenth century now passed in review are insignificant in comparison with the elder Pitt, who died Earl of Chatham. His career and achievements belong rather to the general history of this country than to
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the present narrative of diplomatic movements and their directors. The anomalies of his position are, in their way, not less than the picturesqueness of his personality or the durability of his statesmanship. The supreme moulder of international politics, he had, till his decline after 1761, undergone no technical apprenticeship to diplomacy and was never sent on any foreign mission. The mover of fleets and armies from one end of the world to the other, the organiser of victory by land or sea in both hemispheres, he never presided over the departments of Admiralty or War. The unmaker and maker of administrations, the ruling spirit of national policy, he never bore the title of First Minister of the Crown, nor officially advanced beyond the Secretaryship of State for the Southern Department. The object of his diplomacy was to enforce, through his ambassadors, the public opinion which he had created and the national ambition which he had inspired. The specific means employed to pursue that end were those provided by the circumstances and agencies of the time. The fundamental principle of his policy survives to-day in the familiar phrase, "Trade follows the flag." Directly he saw himself backed by the nation, and not before, he took office as a step towards a single end—the salvation of the country and the creation of the empire. The condition on which he entered the Government of the day was that he should in himself embody the entire administration and, though the holder of a nominally subordinate office, should exercise supremacy over every section of the public service. Master of the House of Commons, he dealt with that assembly in much the same fashion as it had been used by absolute
monarchs, not for council or discussion, but for raising the supplies required to enforce a predetermined policy. A ruler by hereditary right might claim the prerogative of war and peace. The true "patriot king," drawing his mandate not from Parliament, but from the nation, was Pitt himself. His statesmanship abroad knew but a single end, to be promoted by two sets of means. The object showed itself in the worldwide ascendancy of England; the method, never lost sight of in all the dealings with foreign Powers, was the thwarting of Bourbon ambition and, as instrumental to that, the alliance between Great Britain and Prussia. Treaties, truces, armaments, campaigns, the bitterest opposition to Hanoverian subsidies at one time, millions lavished on Hanover and Prussia at another, all this judged by the result, becomes intelligible and consistent, as it seemed to Frederick the Great himself when he said "Monsieur Pitt, a la meilleure tête dans l'Europe," and, "England has long been in travail: at last she has brought forth a man." Though during four years he controlled foreign policy—as for that matter he controlled the great spending departments of the State—it would be not less inappropriate to call Pitt a professional diplomatist than it would be to call him a professional soldier, because for the same time he had in his youth held a commission in the Blues. His oratory was the prolonged, but emphatic, echo of the voice which his inspiration had drawn forth from the mass of his countrymen. At foreign courts and capitals he expected British ambassadors to be the nation's mouthpieces and his own instruments. The most memorable phrases of his eloquence, soon after they had been
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uttered, became for all time the commonplaces of patriotism and of practical wisdom. The best-known specimens may be given in a few words here. “Confidence is a plant of slow growth in an aged bosom.” “Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, form the Bible of the English Constitution.” “Where law ends, tyranny begins.” “Every Englishman’s house is his castle; the wind may blow through it, the storm may enter, but the King of England and all his forces cannot cross the threshold of the tenement.”

A consummate actor, with the whole nation, if not the entire world, for audience, the elder Pitt used Parliament as a platform for addressing the nation, just as his son consulted no other tastes than those of the House of Commons. However dangerously near to being platitudes, sonorous generalisations and fine sentiments never fail to move the gallery. Hence their abundance in Chatham’s speeches. To inflame his countrymen with a sense of their duties and their greatness was the one object of his eloquence; to that end it was perfectly adapted. Equally simple was the line of international statesmanship which he had laid down for himself—to employ the greatest European conqueror of his time, Frederick the Great, as an agent and colleague in building up the fabric of British empire. Such an ally was well worth the heavy price of furnishing the gold and arms that defeated the European combination to crush the Prussian king.

Something more must now be said about Pitt’s diplomatic methods and the incidents connected with them. “Omne solum forti patria,” he himself denounced as the fatal casuistry of a villain like Bolingbroke.
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"Nullum solum nisi Britannice" would have been a fit motto for Pitt's lifelong motives. His ambition, had it been fulfilled, would have annexed the four quarters of the globe to the English crown. The diplomacy of Pitt was the embodiment and glorification of the inconsistency and opportunism which in an earlier chapter were seen to be the general characteristics of England's foreign statesmanship. In 1735 he first made his parliamentary mark by denunciations of the English payments to Hessian and Hanoverian troops. In 1757 he risked the loss of favour with George II. by insisting upon the alliance of England with Prussia, and he sent Frederick reinforcements of 12,000 men. Of course, during this interval of twenty odd years the European situation, and with it the international interests of England, had undergone a complete change. Pitt was in advance of all his contemporaries in seeing where the true concerns and obligations of his country now lay. It had, as he was the first to perceive, and as he gradually convinced both court and cabinet, ceased to be merely a question of reinstating Maria Theresa in her ancestral dominions, on the one hand, or of squandering English treasure and lives upon a petty Teutonic principality on the other. The one ally possible for England was in danger of being crushed by the colossal confederacy of Continental states, whose next victim was to be England herself. At the period now reached (1757-1761), the European episode determining Pitt's diplomacy was the understanding, begun in 1733, renewed in 1743, between the French and Spanish Bourbons for crushing England. Taken in connection with earlier documents of the series, the Family Compact of 1761.
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formed part of the Franco-Spanish policy secretly elaborated for dividing the world between the dynasties of Paris and Madrid. Of the first treaty, that of 1733, enough has been said in an earlier chapter. The agreement of ten years later was merely its emphatic enlargement. As was first, among English writers, shown by Professor Seeley, and among English statesmen of his time was first seen by Pitt, each of these treaties formed part of one diplomatic whole. That unity constituted the crowned conspiracy against his country which Pitt baffled. In his early and accurate acquaintance with the designs of foreign sovereigns and their ministers, Pitt contrived to show himself omniscient. He often, however, derived little of this knowledge from the accredited diplomats of England. Thus, in and about the year 1761, Bristol, the British ambassador at Madrid, was as ignorant as a babe of the latest Franco-Spanish negotiation. From his secret agents alone, mysterious and nameless persons, sometimes ladies, Pitt became cognisant of each successive detail within a day or two of its being settled. The official representative of England in Spain, confronted by Pitt with these discoveries, could only raise his hands to heaven in silent horror. General Wall, the Spanish Foreign Minister, admitted their truth, but protested Spain had no ill-will to Britain. That Pitt knew better was due to his spies in every corner of France and Spain. These had forwarded him copies of the clauses levelled against the very existence of his country, contained in the diplomatic instruments which, the English Government were assured, were in no degree inimical to King George. While the fair words were being uttered,
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Pitt knew they were being contradicted by intrigues and by preparations for war. And yet he had really shown a wish for peace. In 1757 he had induced George II. to acquiesce in a secret treaty with Spain, upon terms that, while testifying the sincerity of Pitt's desire to bring hostilities to a close, must have done violence to his patriotic pride. Ever since the Utrecht settlement had confirmed England in its possession, Gibraltar had been the subject of clandestine negotiations between the Spanish Government and English statesmen of all parties. Its surrender to Spain was contemplated by one of the provisions which Pitt entertained in 1757. In return, Spain was to assist England to recover Minorca. It may well be that Pitt acquiesced in such concessions, rather to test the genuineness of the Spanish Government's pacific professions than because he believed his offer would be accepted. The chief of the Madrid Foreign Office, Wall, with whom Pitt and his private agents, as well as the ambassador Bristol, had to deal, shrewdly abstained almost entirely from committing himself by writing, and often succeeded in talking over the British representative. The admixture of Spanish blood still shows itself in the features and complexions to be seen in the extreme West of Ireland. The controller of the diplomatic system of the Peninsula, from 1754 to 1764, was a Galway man. Born in 1694, Richard Wall served both in the Spanish fleet and the Spanish army. In the international affairs of his adopted country he made himself so indispensable that his resignation of office, repeatedly tendered, had been thus far refused. He saw no other way for getting out of harness than by a sufficiently simple ruse. One
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day he appeared at his office in the Prado, with a shade over eyes that looked red and angry. His sight, he said, was failing; the inflammation proved indeed to be temporary only; it had been produced artificially by some ointment. The device, however, succeeded and Wall obtained his discharge. During the ten years he directed the foreign politics of Spain, Wall proved himself more than a match for the combined diplomacy and diplomatists of Western Europe. Bristol, high bred, honourable, but never properly grounded in the elements of his trade, was systematically hoodwinked by him. Pitt's private agents were bamboozled. Only Pitt himself was not to be caught.

Pitt's diplomacy attained its object for two reasons. In an age when the giving and taking of bribes, from the highest to the lowest, was universal, he trusted no foreign statesman or sovereign. He checked the reports received from his ambassadors by the inquiries of his secret agents; in the background of his peaceful international machinery he had stationed an army and navy, at a cost of between eight and nine millions, increased by 100,000 men.

What were the exact means by which Pitt had acquired the knowledge that had shown itself in his whole scheme of international policy and in this strengthening of the national resources as the only method of giving to that policy effect? The details involved in an answer to this question will also serve to explain the secret of the great minister's resignation. Throughout the eighteenth century, Turin was the chief centre of political intrigue in Southern Europe. The English representative at this capital was Sir James Stewart Mackenzie. His first secretary who afterwards became his successor, was a certain Lewis
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Dutens. By detecting and deciphering the secret correspondence between the Neapolitan Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Minister of the King of Savoy and Sardinia, Dutens had discovered the secret treaty of Spain with France which, concluded in the hour of Spain's professed neutrality, constituted the Family Compact of 1761. Dutens himself, whatever may have been alleged to the contrary, had no direct communication with Pitt; he was, however, on intimate terms with one of Pitt's secretaries. To him therefore Dutens confided what he had found out. In October 1761 came the famous meeting of the British Cabinet in London. Pitt denounced to his colleagues "the secret engagements of the whole House of Bourbon." Now was revealed the effect of the work in London society and politics, on which Bussy and his foreign colleagues had long been engaged. These of course had found convenient material on which to work in the social and political jealousy of the great minister. "Does the right honourable gentleman seriously intend us to believe this cock-and-bull story?" asked one of Pitt's colleagues. The thing, it was asserted was an absurdity which no reasonable man could credit. At any rate, if he had them, let Pitt produce his authorities. The only notice taken of this challenge by Pitt was a sneer about playing with men who used loaded dice. "I say," he said, "that which I know; I will not disclose my proofs to an incredulous audience." With these words the great Commoner quitted the room, went home, and wrote his letter of resignation to the king.* In doing so, he of course played his enemies'

*The authorities for the view of Pitt's resignation here taken and for the event connected with it are the Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique (1887-98), Von Ruville's Chatham and Bute and Seeley's House of Bourbon.
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game by leaving the field open to Bute, already his rival and now his assured successor.

For some time before this dramatic dénouement, real progress had been made towards the conclusion of a general peace. With Austria and Russia, France had already come to terms. How successfully the French ambassador Bussy had done his work of throwing dust in the eyes of the London court and cabinet has been already seen. While he had been thus engaged on the Thames, the English peace party had in Paris a representative after their own heart in the chargé d' affaires, Hans Stanley, a vivacious and clear-headed diplomatist, of whom little is now known beyond the fact that he united a good character with eccentric habits, that he committed suicide in 1780, and that he appears in Reynolds' portrait of him as a young man with a long face and dark hair. Stanley occasionally left his diplomatic work in Paris for short visits to London. On one of these occasions he presented himself at Pitt's house in St James's Square—that mansion which during four eventful years was the central bureau of British Imperial policy, civil or military, and beneath whose roof both the English diplomacy of modern times and the British Empire as it exists to-day were born. Pitt, however, never received this visitor, deep as he was in the confidence of his rivals. The man whom Stanley did see, Bute, lived in the Mayfair palace, known to-day as Lansdowne House. This had recently come into the possession of Lord Bute, Pitt's supplanter, and there were discussed and arranged the English conditions for the settlement between England, France, Spain and Portugal constituting the Peace of Paris (1763). Upon
terms compromising neither his own honour nor his country's Imperial position, Pitt, had his health held out and his temper subordinated itself to his judgment, might himself have arranged a treaty. The conventional criticisms of his foreign statesmanship on the ground of its expense are to some extent disposed of by the immense increase in the distance from London of his military and naval operations. This fact alone prohibits a comparison between the cost of English warfare in the times of Marlborough and of Chatham respectively. As regards Pitt himself, his policy and foresight had been vindicated by everything that had happened since he stalked out of the memorable cabinet in the October of 1761, indignantly refusing to be the associate of men who were the willing dupes of Continental knaves, crowned or uncrowned. The charge against him of prolonging the war against the wish as well as against the interests of his country is on the face of it absurd. If the nation had desired that hostilities should cease, had really thought enough, and more than enough, to satisfy the honour of Britain had been gained, it could at any moment have stopped supplies. Even Pitt's nominal supporters in diplomacy and Parliament numbered some who were waiting an opportunity to turn against him. The king's friends, joining with the malcontent Pittites, could have brought down the edifice of foreign statesmanship he was constructing. When he had gone, nothing occurred which he had not predicted. Each day furnished some fresh proof of the enduring reality of mutual obligations of France and Spain, created by the Family Compact which Bussy had fooled the English Parliament and people
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into discrediting, and whose disclosure had followed on the happy accidents already related that conspired to confirm Pitt's success and to justify his judgment. Even as it was, the command of India, secured to England by the treaty and the disestablishment of the military power of France, might not have satisfied the country, had not the great ally obtained by Chatham for England, Frederick the Great, been adding success to success in Germany while the Anglo-French negotiations were going forward. Diplomatically, the peace of 1763 so irritated Prussia that England found herself once more completely isolated.

Unlike Pitt, Bute did not even endeavour to stamp his personality in enduring characters on foreign policy. Pitt himself was still to propound another scheme of European combinations very different from anything he had yet suggested. Notwithstanding Pitt's rupture with the Whigs, the king's uncle, the old Duke of Cumberland, persisted in regarding him as the only head of the Whig party. In that capacity the retired minister was induced to come forth from his seclusion. The conditions of European policy on which he insisted were now to balance the Family Compact by an English alliance with the Protestant Powers of the Continent. The professional diplomatist, Hans Stanley, against whom the doors of Pitt's house had previously been closed, now received his instructions directly from Pitt himself. This envoy was started off to Berlin and St Petersburg to negotiate an alliance against the Bourbon dynasty and its vast designs. The mission, however, proved fruitless. Stanley had no sooner reached the Prussian capital than Frederick unmistakably showed his indifference alike to European
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Protestantism and English welfare. British statesmanship, the Prussian monarch complained, as regards external relations, so entirely lacked continuity, was so fluctuating, so liable to be upset by party necessities or intrigues at home, that he could not risk the welfare of his realm by entering into any fresh arrangements with the Government of King George. The truth of course was, first, that Frederick had already got out of England all he specially wanted, and that he was now bent upon his iniquitous project of dismembering Poland. Moreover, the great Commoner, whom he had before so extravagantly eulogised, had ceased to be the idol of the country, had indeed destroyed his own identity by becoming Lord Chatham. The administration which, as Lord Privy Seal, Chatham directed, was manifestly doomed when Chatham himself went as an invalid to Bath.

The Chatham administration came to an end in December 1767. The chief events of English international concern between that date and Chatham's death in the following May were the partition of Poland and the outbreak of the war that ended in the creation of the United States. Both these episodes placed a severe and continuous strain on the diplomatic machinery and resources of England. Both, however, form portions of the national annals, too familiar, and in most of their details too accessible, to be dwelt upon at any length here. The close of Chatham's parliamentary career, roughly speaking, coincided with the opening of a period in our international relations, not indeed of graver moment, but of perhaps greater complexity than even that with which he had dealt. By converting his private residence in
St James’s Square into the Foreign Office of the country he had, when nominally Secretary of State for the Southern Department, anticipated by five years the concentration of the external affairs of the country in the hands of one responsible minister beneath a single roof. On the 30th of May 1777, Chatham reappeared in Parliament after one of his long illnesses. Swathed in flannel and leaning heavily on his crutch, he insisted on the righteousness and wisdom of granting all the American demands except independence. As, however, for the idea of the Franco-American alliance, the intrigues for which had already begun, that, he said, must mean immediate war. What were the facts? Directly after the declaration of independence, the United States had sent Adams and Franklin to Paris to concert a commercial and defensive alliance with France. The envoys contrived to make themselves the fashionable vogue in some Parisian salons. The formal treaty against England was not so easily to be arranged. One important step in its direction was, however, taken. The diplomatists from the other side of the Atlantic contrived to talk over and take into their pay Silas Deane, while nominally attached to the British Embassy on the Seine. He it was who advised the Americans to seek a general from Europe, in either Prince Ferdinand of Prussia or the Italian Marshal Broglio. Before this suggestion had a chance of bearing fruit, English diplomacy had organised its resources. The first British Foreign Office came into existence in Cleveland Row, St James’s, with Charles James Fox, a leading member of the Rockingham administration, as the earliest English minister to be called Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (27th March 1782).
CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Jealousy between the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary—Fox and Shelburne—Sheridan in the Foreign Office—Fox’s behaviour as Foreign Minister—The Oczakow incident—Joseph Ewart—Eden, Lord Auckland—Fox’s diplomatic ideas those of Chatham—Fox’s relations with France—Peace with England desired by the French Assembly—English foreign politics practically unaffected by the party-system—Pitt’s non-intervention policy—The Declaration of Pillnitz—Hirsinger’s opinion of the English attitude towards France—Talleyrand—Diplomacy and finance—The Duc de Biron—The Marquis de Chauvelin’s mission—Pitt’s Alien Act of 1793—The Loo Convention, 1788—War declared between England and France.

No circumstances could have been more unfavourable than those amid which, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the British Foreign Office was born. The relations already described as existing between the Northern and Southern Secretaries had bequeathed an evil tradition of jealousy and intrigue to the ministers who, as Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary respectively, were to supersede them. The Colonial Office had not yet a separate existence of its own. The colonies themselves, controlled from the Home Office, brought the minister responsible for them into constant contact with England’s neighbours and competitors. They thus placed the minister of the interior in dangerous rivalry with his colleague who conducted our external relations. Moreover, the Whig party, then in power.
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for the second time under Rockingham, was divided by internal differences, personal as well as political. Shelburne, a disciple of Chatham, could support his claim to the Foreign Secretaryship by a thorough acquaintance with the politics and politicians of Europe. Alone among the public men of his age in England he estimated at its true value the rising principle of nationality as a political force on the Continent; he saw the time to be near at hand when foreign statesmanship would be affected by the interests and feelings of peoples as well as by the ambitions of dynasties, and the designs of their ministers. The other claimant to the control of the new Foreign Office, Lord Holland's third son, combined with some of Shelburne's accomplishments the confidence of the aristocratic Whig committee managing the whole connection. A good classical scholar, he had crowned the education of Eton with the acquirement of several modern languages. He had made the grand tour of European capitals and courts with all the advantages of his breeding and station. Shelburne's knowledge of the world was that of a scientific student of affairs. The observations made by Fox were those natural to a well-born man of fashion and pleasure, combining great intellect and shrewdness with rare charm of manner. To have passed over Fox would have been to forfeit votes in the House of Commons. To slight Shelburne was to raise up a formidable enemy for the new department. Party considerations, therefore, made Fox the earliest head of the English Foreign Office, and in so doing placed it at feud with the Home Office, which had been given to Shelburne.

The two departments now created began, and.
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so long as they were held by their first occupants, continued at war. Shelburne, early habituated to Imperial thought, occasionally had a soul above the dull drudgery of domestic detail. The king's personal favourite, the regular intermediary between the court and the cabinet, he used his opportunities at the palace to acquaint the sovereign with his ideas of the way in which the Foreign Office did its work. George III.'s idea of being a real king was to set the ministers he disliked at loggerheads. The offices of Permanent and Parliamentary Under-Secretary were not formally constituted till much later. Fox, however, contrived to find a subordinate place in his department for the author of *The Rivals*. The new Foreign Office employee was not to be its only eighteenth-century official who wrote for the stage. He was, however, the only one who at any period discharged at the same time the duties of Foreign Secretaryship and of theatrical management. In Cleveland Row Sheridan did exactly what his chief told him. At Drury Lane, he saw that Fox had the best box in the house. The story of *The School for Scandal* having been written on Foreign Office paper is, of course, a myth exploded by the fact that Sheridan's dramas had been composed some time before his connection with the Foreign Office began.

The primitiveness of its departmental organisation when Fox became head of the Foreign Office is suggested by the many offers of diplomatic help which he received from volunteers who knew nothing of official life, but who were in the way of picking up much that the Foreign Minister might like to hear. These overtures were periodically renewed
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throughout his whole connection at subsequent dates with the Office, both during his coalition with North ten years later, and again in his final term of office under Grenville. Amongst those who at a later date thus approached him was the diarist, Crabb Robinson; he had, he said, translated something against Bonaparte for a bookseller named Tipper; he thought he might during his travels pretty often hear things which Downing Street would like to know. His new responsibilities had at least the effect of sobering the wayward genius who opens the list of our Foreign Office chiefs. It was Shakespeare's story retold of Falstaff's Prince Hal transformed into England's Henry V. Lord Holland could testify from personal knowledge that throughout his official period Fox never touched a card. In 1793, for the first time in his life he had a house of his own in Grafton Street. Here, in all the social functions of diplomacy, he was sweetness and light personified. Foreign members of the corps diplomatique who most disliked his politics dwelt in the home letters on the incomparable charm of Mr Fox as host. Even George III. joined in the chorus of compliments to the diplomatic dinner-parties of Grafton Street. The Foreign Secretary's present politics might be as bad as were his former morals. When, however, someone praised in the royal hearing the perfections of the ministerial ménage, with a smile of approval the king, emitting first his usual "What, what?" quickly added, as if to close the conversation—"Oh yes, Mr Fox is a gentleman and can make it very agreeable to do business with him." Fox once described himself as a very painstaking man. He stamped the mark of his own
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industry on the methods of the department and he left the daily routine of Foreign Office work much what it was found to be by Palmerston. About the very definite ideas in international statesmanship entertained and executed by Fox, something will presently be said. Socially regarded, he was among the first of English ministers whose dinner invitations included representatives of other intellectual interests than politics. Among those most frequently seated at his table were the historian of the Roman Empire, Gibbon, who had first introduced Sheridan to him soon after the writing of The Rivals, and the most famous European diplomatist of the epoch, Talleyrand. The latter was occasionally his host in Paris, and with less, it would seem, than his usual felicity and point, described Fox as a sophist who ought to be left in the clouds. A toady of Talleyrand, who traded on a reputation for knowledge, chimed in—"True; the clouds are the tutelary deities of all sophists." This was a comment which provoked the sarcastic rejoinder—"Il y a trois savoirs: le savoir-proprement dit, le savoir-faire et le savoir-vivre: if you have the two last you do not want the first." Among other European personages with whom the Foreign Office connected Fox, was the Russian Empress Catherine II.; his advocacy in an episode presently to be detailed, won for his bust in the Imperial drawing-room a place between two of Catherine's historic favourites. Then came the French Revolution and the Whig enthusiasm for the monarchy of the people. The English statesman disappeared from the St Petersburg salon. "It was," said Catherine, "the Monsieur Fox of 1791 only that I received into my collection."
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All Fox's finest speeches were made in Opposition. Such, in the department of foreign policy, were those of 1791 on the Russian armaments, with their fierce attacks on Auckland, as well as in 1803 the outbursts on the renewal of the war. The Secretary of State had brought Sheridan into the Foreign Office by way of doing him a good turn. Some years later than the date now reached, Sheridan in his cups fiercely abused Fox at a private dinner-table—the Duke of Bedford’s—at Woburn. Adair, Fox's most loyal henchman, took up the matter, and was on the point of calling Sheridan out. Harmony was restored by another member of the company interpolating the remark—"My creed is short and simple: devotion to Fox."

The Russian incident just referred to took place in the closing years of the Cleveland Row epoch of the Foreign Office, during its administration by Pitt's Secretary, Lord Carmarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds, and may be briefly summarised. Catherine II. of Russia and the Emperor Joseph were united in hostilities against the Turks. Among the spoils of war that had fallen to Catherine was Oczakow on the Black Sea. The most active, able and ambitious member of the English diplomatic body in Eastern Europe was Joseph Ewart. The son of a Scotch clergyman, and brought up for a surgeon, he had travelled with Macdonald of Clanronald; while doing so he insinuated himself into the good graces of the English ambassador at Vienna, Sir Robert Murray Keith, who made Ewart his secretary and handed him on to his successors, Sir John Stepney and Lord Dalrymple. With both of these Ewart did so well as,
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a little later, himself to become the English representative at Berlin. A well-judged marriage into a famous German family, Wartensleben, strengthened his social position. He became a personage in European diplomacy, and soon gained an ascendancy over the cabinet and councils of the Prussian monarch Frederick William II. The royal and popular anti-Russian tradition, as was seen in an earlier chapter, dates from the reign of George I. It was an active force with the British court and people in the year of the Oczakow seizure. This explains why a diplomatist eager to make his mark in his profession like Ewart should have undertaken to secure the restoration of the captured fortress to Turkey. Ewart now became a principal agent in promoting the alliance of England, Prussia, Holland and the Porte against Russia and Austria.

In 1790 the Emperor Leopold, on succeeding Joseph II., concluded the Treaty of Reichenbach with the Prussian sovereign, Frederick William. By this Austria withdrew from the war, which was thus limited to a struggle between the Czarina and the Sultan. Hazlitt described the bark of the younger Pitt's diplomacy as being worse than its bite. So far, however, his policy of intervention had been entirely successful. From the first he had impressed on his Foreign Secretary, Carmarthen, that the supreme English interest was peace. No question, he said, seemed likely to arise so vitally affecting England as to justify a European war. Hence his general adherence to Chatham's project of including Russia in the Anglo-Prussian alliance for counteracting the Bourbon Compact. Hence, especially in 1788, the cementing of England's relations with Prussia. Before
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this the chief danger to the peace of Europe had been from Denmark. With the Anglo-Prussian treaty of 1788 that peril disappeared. The Reichenbach treaty practically isolated Russia. By doing so its English negotiator, Ewart, incurred the Czarina's deadly enmity. The stories current at the time of the Empress Catherine having more than once attempted his murder and having been only baffled by her Scotch physician Sutherland, were first collected by the diarist Nathaniel Wraxall. They have been pretty conclusively disposed of by an article in The Quarterly Review (vol. Ivii. p. 43).

The personal antagonism between Fox and Pitt in the Oczakow affair showed itself in the former's direct encouragement to Catherine to resist the Tory pressure placed on her for restoring her capture and to treat with contempt any threat of war if she refused. England, he said, would never sanction such a step. He actually sent his friend Adair to St Petersburg, assuring Catherine that the House of Commons would support her rejection of the British Government's demands. The Crimea had recently been acquired by Russia without protest from any Power. Oczakow was in itself of much less importance, as no doubt Pitt himself knew perfectly well. The English minister, however, had passed his word to co-operate with Prussia in the lofty mission of European peacemaker. Thus pledged, he at first went so far with Prussia as diplomatic methods would allow. When these failed he acknowledged the impolicy of further efforts. In reality, he never probably in earnest contemplated them. It was, to use the common phrase, a game of bluff, played on the part of the British Foreign Office with little skill and with
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less first-hand knowledge of political and geographical facts. Pitt and his colleagues pocketed the snub. The Foxites smiled satisfaction.

The momentary cooling of the cordiality of the Anglo-Prussian *entente* was without serious results at the time. The under-strapper Ewart suffered more from his failure than did the employers who, having adopted his suggestions, now threw him over. His last stroke of professional work was to arrange the marriage of the Duke of York to King Frederick William's daughter. Pitt, who through his Secretary of State, Carmarthen, now Duke of Leeds, controlled the Foreign Office, took exception to some details in Ewart's conduct of the negotiations, dismissed the envoy from the public service on a pension of a thousand a year. To avoid personally informing the Prussian sovereign that the English alliance was at an end, Carmarthen gave up the Secretaryship of State to Lord Grenville. Ewart himself on disappearing into private life was gibbeted in some doggerel, as poor as were most political verses of the period when they did not happen to be written by a diplomatic bard of whom we have already heard, Charles Hanbury Williams. The particular Whig ballad-monger who celebrated the shifted Ewart set his piece to the tune of "Ally Croaker"; its literary quality may be judged from the refrain—

"Give me a place, my dearest Billy Pitt-o,
If I can't have a whole one, give a little bit-o."

Ewart's expulsion opened the path of promotion to one of the most conspicuous among the henchmen who waited on the son of Chatham. This was Eden, afterwards Lord Auckland, best remembered, perhaps,
as the father of that Eleanor Eden whose grace and
sweetness kindled the only grand passion which Pitt ever
knew. Eden himself was a great figure in the diplomatic
salons of London and Paris. He owed his position
chiefly to the fact of his being a first-rate political man
of business who had connected himself by marriage
with the powerful and ubiquitous Elliot clan; his wife
was Sir Gilbert Elliot's daughter; his sister-in-law
married the Archbishop of Canterbury. In his Whig
days, Eden had been a prime agent in promoting the
coalition of Fox and North under the Duke of Portland.
Attracted by the splendour of success to the worship
of the rising star of Pitt, Eden took an opportunity of
conversationally justifying himself to Fox; he was cut
short with "Ah yes; but have you seen Mrs Jordan
in The Country Girl at Drury Lane?"

Such are the personal associations that gather
themselves round the establishment of the Foreign
Office as an independent institution. What were
the international ideas bequeathed to his successors
by the initial Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs? During the first administrative term of
Charles James Fox in the Rockingham Government,
the most important business occupying his department
consisted of the negotiations following the declaration
of the United States' independence, culminating in and
ratified by the Peace of Versailles in 1783. All
these transactions were claimed by Fox for his own
department. By the letter of State usage and etiquette,
however, our transatlantic settlements, as a part of
Britain-beyond-seas, belonged to the province of the
Home Secretary, who referred the point of official pre-
rogative to his colleagues. Shelburne secured a
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majority in the cabinet; Fox therefore resigned on the 17th of July. Thus his first stay at the Foreign Office had been rather less than four months. In European politics, the ideas he handed down to his successors were those which had come to him from Chatham. Even Fox's leaning towards Russia in 1791 found its precedent not only in Chatham's general European views, but in his unsuccessful attempt in 1766 to form a Northern alliance between Russia, Prussia and Great Britain; apropos of this he wrote to Shelburne—"Your Lordship sees I am quite a Russ." A Continental alliance to balance the Bourbon League was forced on Fox, as it had been on Chatham, by the foreign policy of the two French ministers that directed the conspiracy against England in the last half of the eighteenth century. The chief author in France of the Family Compact of 1761 had been Choiseul, whose ascendency with Louis XV. continued till 1770, when he fell a victim to Madame du Barry's intrigues. The guiding principle of Choiseul's statesmanship under Louis XV., accommodated to the new circumstances of the time, animated the international methods of Vergennes in the next reign. Only within the last few years have the authors already mentioned in a footnote to an earlier chapter revealed the exact relations between the elder Pitt and the Family Compact of 1761. Similarly the precise methods which Vergennes used against England were imperfectly understood till the appearance, in 1889, of Dinol's *France et les États Unis*. In and after 1774, Vergennes employed all his energies and all his influence with Louis XVI. to counterwork the restraining counsel of Turgot. Surely, he pleaded, the descendant of Louis XIV. and
the great nation he ruled would not so far disgrace themselves as to throw away the facilities provided by the American War for a French attack on Great Britain. Opportunism and diplomacy were as much convertible terms in the eighteenth century as they had been in the age of Machiavelli or of Alberoni. No surprise, therefore, was felt by Fox when, a little later, Vergennes himself proposed that England and France should co-operate against Russian aggression in the Near East.

The reasons that closed our first Foreign Secretary's ears against any suggestion of united action abroad by the two Governments were those for which he condemned Pitt's Commercial Treaty of 1786. That instrument and the discussions caused by it crucially illustrate the fundamental differences of foreign policy between Pitt and Fox. They also show incidentally, but most instructively, the distinction to be drawn in the Whig attitude towards monarchical and republican France respectively. The idea of such a treaty originated, in 1769, with Shelburne. That was enough to call forth the opposition of Fox and of the other Whigs. The notion of our nearest Continental neighbour being our natural and inevitable enemy had been combated by no one more strongly than by Shelburne during the negotiations for the Peace of Versailles. For in 1783 the French ministers had been ready to conclude with the English an arrangement which would practically have secured Free Trade between the two countries. Its formal ratification in 1786 was effected by Eden's agency and constitutes Pitt's chief achievement in legislation.*

* From the English trading privileges in India recognised by this treaty, it is known as the Bengal Convention.
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A compact of the same kind with Russia in 1785 had successfully provided English commerce with a valuable opening, and had made Archangel, from a little village, a prosperous business centre. As regards France, still in 1786 ruled by Louis XVI., Fox grounded his antagonism to Chatham's son on the principles of Chatham himself. It was not the French Government, but the absolutism and the aggression of Bourbonism with which there could be no truce. It was with legitimist France that Pitt and Shelburne, to Fox's great disgust, negotiated Free Trade. Of revolutionary France Fox could write to his friend Fitzpatrick, going abroad—"If I do not see you before you go, make my compliments to the Duke of Orleans, whose conduct seems to have been perfect, and tell him and his friends that all my prepossessions against French connections with this country will be at an end and most part of my system of European politics will be altered if this Revolution has the consequences that I expect."

These anticipations of the benefits to mankind to be conferred by kingless France were not peculiar to Fox and others who shared his political principles. They were in the atmosphere of the time, and were shared by him with the philosophic S. T. Coleridge, the future Tory Southey, and by the devout Wordsworth. Nor, it must be remembered, was it till 1791 that by the Avignon massacres, which the National Assembly instigated, that outside Paris revolutionary France first showed her blood-stained claws. So too, as is well pointed out in a recent life of Charles Fox,* republican

* By J. L. Le B. Hammond, to whom and to whose work let me acknowledge many obligations.
France, during the lifetime of Fox, did not, as Bourbon France had done, sweep the whole world's horizon on the lookout for ground of quarrel against England.

The great act of political proselytism at the hands of the French faction, which compelled Pitt's intervention in the affairs of Holland, had occurred in 1787, while France in name was still under a monarchy. In that year the French or republican party, that had always existed at The Hague, expelled Prince William of Orange, the representative of Dutch monarchy, in the hope of re-establishing the federal constitution of the united provinces. Pitt's foreign policy, perpetuating that of his father, had already secured Prussia as England's ally. The co-operation of the two Powers now effected, without a blow being struck, Prince William's reinstatement under a joint Anglo-Prussian guarantee of securing his House and his dominions. Nor was Pitt less successful in his diplomatic dealings with the revolutionary leaders of the French National Assembly in 1789-90. Spain had molested an English settlement in Nootka — afterwards St George's Sound, Vancouver Island. England was about to assert her right in arms when Charles III. of Spain appealed to his royal brother, Louis XVI. of France, for the military aid to which he was entitled by the terms of the 1761 Family Compact. The French king and his ministers, Montmorin and Calonne, desired nothing more than to deflect the Revolution from its course and weaken it by opening hostilities with England. The declared republicans in the National Assembly at once used their majority to deprive the sovereign of the power of declaring war without its consent. Peace with England was the policy on which the National
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Assembly had resolved. The vote, given after a hot debate, baffled the Bourbon conspiracy for the younger Pitt as effectually as it had been counterworked by the resources and ascendancy of his father. Is it not reasonably certain that, had he been in office and dealing with the same difficulties, the line taken by Fox would have been exactly that which Pitt followed? So long indeed as the unvarying tradition and practice of the British Foreign Office were to maintain the European equilibrium, our statesmanship abroad could not but conform to one pattern. From the Peace of Westphalia to that of Utrecht, and more than a century afterwards, the standard of orthodoxy in international statesmanship accepted and enforced by the managers of our affairs abroad, whatever their party colour, was the balance of power. Foreign politics began to be popularised by Chatham. The means employed might differ; the object to be pursued did not change with successive administrations. The pre-eminence and preponderation of any single state must be a standing threat to the tranquillity and welfare of the entire comity of nations. That belief had explained the elder Pitt's determination to make and at any cost to keep the alliance with Prussia. It explained on different occasions his rapprochement to St Petersburg as well as to Berlin. It explains also the diplomatic changes of front executed by the younger Pitt, as by his colleagues or his opponents.

Reference has been made above to Frederick the Great's remark about the mischievous effects of the party-system upon English policy abroad. Up to the time now reached such consequences will not easily be found. Moreover, the younger Pitt and Fox belonged
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by name to the same party, that in which Chatham himself had been reared. Walpole was its leader. The earliest Tories never went by that name. They were simply, in Walpole's phrase, "the boys"—the patriots who, dissenting from their leader chiefly on the point of subsidies to foreign troops or Hessian and Hanoverian soldiers in the royal employ, protested that their secession from Walpole arose from his betrayal of the national principles which they identified with Whiggism. The elder Pitt united for a time with Walpole's successor in the Whig leadership, the Duke of Newcastle. His great administration was that titularly headed by Newcastle's former colleague, the Duke of Devonshire. When the younger Pitt spoke of chastising Fox for his political delinquencies, he implied that his opponent was a Whig gone wrong—"I'll un-whig the gentleman." No party differences therefore kept the two men asunder. They both of them continued at the same time to be members of Brooks' Club, the social palladium of the party. They had been within an ace of politically coming together before. Their mutual co-operation still remained on the cards. It was never nearer than under the Addington administration, simultaneously attacked by Foxites and Pittites during 1804. One night in that year Pitt and his friend Long, going home together from the House, passed the door of Brooks' Club. "I have not," said Pitt to his friend, "been in that place these twenty years—since, in fact, the Coalition days. Now, however, I think I will go in and sup." Dreading above all things a friendly meeting between his chief and Fox, who probably was already at the club, Long quickly rejoined, "I think you had better not." Pitt
allowed himself to be dissuaded. The two political sections which might then easily have come together were finally kept apart. The French Revolution and its world-wide political consequences, converting the Chatham Whigs into reactionaries, created the new Toryism with a foreign policy separating it, more sharply than was done by its domestic differences, from the old Whig tradition.

Even as it was, the conduct of the English Foreign Office during the period of Pitt's supremacy, up till 1791, showed no break of continuity with the principles of which it might have been managed by Fox himself. In regard to all that had yet happened in France, Pitt paid no heed to the reactionary cries and counsels of his personal supporters or his private and political friends. He remained as superior to mere party consideration as in like circumstances would have been Chatham himself. He was pledged to a policy of neutrality towards the factions of which England's nearest Continental neighbour had become the prey. Absolute non-intervention in the politics of France, whether within or outside her border, was the line he had laid down. In adhering to it, he carried with him the court, king and Parliament. Fox, as leader of the Opposition, was in constant and confidential communication with the French Revolutionary chiefs; he pressed on them moderation and reserve as absolutely necessary, if they were not hopelessly to discredit their cause with their English well-wishers. While Fox was thus appealing directly to Barnave, there called one day at the London Foreign Office the Chevalier de la Bintinaye, with a letter from the Comte de Provence to George III., solicit-
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ing help for the French monarchists. The answer taken home by the French emissary did but emphatically reaffirm the instructions already repeatedly conveyed to Gower, our ambassador in Paris, by Pitt's Foreign Minister, Grenville: His Britannic Majesty had inflexibly resolved not only to take no part in supporting or opposing the measures adopted by other Powers towards France, but to avoid the expression of any opinion of the subject to his European allies. The allusion here was of course to Prussia. That state was prepared to co-operate with the Emperor Leopold on behalf of French royalty and royalists. To Pitt, the Anglo-Prussian alliance seemed of the first importance. He was, however, prepared to forfeit it rather than to run the risk of letting it embroil him with France. Not once, but repeatedly were the English representatives—at Berlin, Ewart, at Vienna, Keith—instructed to say that England could in no circumstances interfere, unless indeed the interests of King George's subjects should be directly affected by what was taking place in Paris. For the English minister to hold entirely aloof from the Pilnitz declaration of the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns, actively to befriend on the first chance the French monarch, was for the moment to isolate his country. By accepting this risk Pitt became the first English statesman who, reversing the tradition of centuries, took his stand upon the policy of non-intervention at any cost. To form one coalition after another in Germany, to subsidise allies with millions in free gifts, or aid them with profuse loans until all the Powers in our pay were successively defeated and many converted into the tools of the enemy, such, in
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outline, is the conventional account of Pitt’s foreign policy during this period. So far as the French Revolution had a constructive aim, to secure popular liberties, Pitt did not yield to Fox in wishing it well. His first diplomatic encounter with the National Assembly about the Nootka Sound settlement left him little reason personally to regret the prospect of the Bourbon monarchy being replaced by the French Republic. How far the English minister’s hope of satisfactory relations with kingless France was to have a fulfilment in fact will now be seen.

Down to 1791, the diplomatic movements preceding the outbreak of the revolutionary war were between the French Government on the one hand and the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick William II. of Prussia on the other. On 6th July 1791, Marie Antoinette, then at Padua, had addressed to her Imperial brother of Austria an appeal for protection from the possibilities of republican violence. Six weeks later the Austrian Kaiser and the Prussian king met at Pilnitz in Saxony. The two sovereigns formally decided, first, that the position of the King of France had become a matter of European concern; secondly, that they would themselves actively join in European intervention on behalf of the threatened dynasty by furnishing a force to operate on the French frontier. A menace so distinct as this undoubtedly supplied the French Assembly with a clear case of war against Leopold and Frederick William. The two crowned heads, in sight of all the world, had thrown down the challenge. Why was it not taken up by the citizen-patriots, who saw in foreign strife an agency favourable for establishing a democratic polity after their own
heart? For the simple reason that the Pilnitz proclamation was not taken seriously, but was regarded as a threat and nothing more. Had not also the sovereigns who made it recently almost come to blows over the Eastern question? What, therefore, less probable than that they should be unanimous against France now? Moreover, the French Assembly, well served by its agents abroad, professed to have learned that even anxiety for the safety of his sister, the French Queen, was not likely to be held by the emperor sufficient reason for making an enemy of the whole French nation. The result, therefore, of the Pilnitz conference had been received in France with contempt rather than with indignation. The stultification of the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns was completed a few weeks later, when Louis XIV. publicly accepted the Constitution prescribed to him by the National Assembly. The royalists as a party protested. Louis only replied that a king's first duty was to identify his own will with that of his people. It therefore seemed worth while for the French Assembly to use its diplomatic resources in the way most likely to divide its two royal antagonists. When these had failed, the diplomatic scene changed to England.

On the eve of the tremendous duel between France and Prussia, in 1870, a veteran servant of the English Foreign Office described the European horizon as absolutely cloudless. So, in 1792, Pitt had never known a time when, from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years' peace. That indeed was not the view of a professional diplomatist like Auckland, or of a political philosopher like
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Burke. Both of these ominously shook their heads when they found men like the English Prime Minister "think no more of the change of Spanish diplomacy or of the death of the Emperor Leopold than of the removal of a Dutch burgomaster." The Girondin ministry in the French Assembly secured the declaration of war against Austria and Prussia in the April of 1792. Before the actual rupture the centre of French diplomatic gravity had for some time shifted to London. At the beginning of that year the stream of communications begins to flow between the English and French capitals. January opens with the recall of Barthelemy, the chargé d'affaires at the French Embassy on the Thames. Hirsinger, who replaces him, is at first delighted with his reception. Nothing could be more charming than the cordiality of Grenville and his staff. Presently come misgivings. After all, the islanders, he fears, do not love and trust France as they ought. Not only does he see everywhere English commerce displacing French, but every day increases the investment of French capital in English funds. Perfidious Albion, he suspects, will not rest content till her flag floats over Mauritius and Réunion. As for His Britannic Majesty, George III., it looks as if he were secretly intriguing with the Emperor Francis II. against France. What, too, if Spain should join the conspiracy on a promise of help with the thirty or forty thousand troops controlled by the English king as Elector of Hanover? But, it may be said, is not England now governed more really and absolutely by the families of Pitt and Grenville combined than by the House of Hanover? Obviously, therefore, the Prime Minister will make the cousin
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who is his Foreign Secretary an instrument of peace. For, to weaken France by an actively hostile combination would be to prevent her helping forward Pitt's policy of balancing the Prussian and Russian power. Hirsinger therefore still hopes that England's antagonism to France is only that of a trade rival. Before January is out, another diplomatic reconnaissance has been ordered by the French foreign Minister, De Lessart. This was conducted by two eminent amateurs in diplomacy, neither of them officially accredited to the English court. One of the pair was a bishop of Louis XVI.'s appointment, transformed by his training from a cleric into Napoleon's future Foreign Minister. An early accident, causing lifelong lameness, had disqualified Talleyrand for the army. Choosing the Church for a career, he had prepared himself for the bishopric of Autun by associating with the primates of Narbonne, of Toulouse and other divines who occupied the box at Madame de Montespan's private theatre reserved for le clergé un peu dissipé. He had fitted himself for republican employment by proposing in the Tiers État, 10th October 1789, the confiscation of church property as a cure for national bankruptcy. He had long been on the lookout for scandals that might tell against the monarchy. The use made by him of what he had picked up in the affair of the diamond necklace, undoubtedly gave a fresh impetus to the revolutionary spirit. Scenting blood in the republican atmosphere, he welcomed the chance of employment abroad, in England first, in America afterwards. While he was yet only in training for his position as a chief minister of the Directory, and of the Consulate before the
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Empire, Talleyrand showed himself the first to understand the growing connection between diplomacy and finance—the Chancery and the City. The London house of the Frankfort Rothschilds was first established in 1798, six years after Talleyrand's earliest English mission. Some time, however, before that, through their British agents the Van Nottens, the Rothschilds did business for and with the English Government. They, like other financial rulers of nations, had of course a connection with Talleyrand, who had been among the earliest to estimate at its true value the new force in international politics. A man so far ahead in his ideas of the aristocratic caste still dominating diplomacy was, of course, denounced by the priesthood as an apostate, by the nobility as a traitor, and, in the same strain, he was taunted with being "a greedy stock-jobber, hand-in-glove with the Jew, intended by nature for the rabbi of a usurer's synagogue rather than a priest in a Christian church." The English début of Talleyrand's ducal colleague did not promise well. The Duc de Biron had been in England before and left unpaid bills behind; he no sooner touched British soil again than a sheriff's officer, tapping him on the shoulder, conducted him to a sponging-house; for, being a diplomatist unattached, he could not plead an ambassador's immunity from arrest for debt.

The most practical part of Talleyrand's mission had to do with money. France, Talleyrand was instructed to say, loyal in everything to the terms of the Utrecht settlement, would not attack Austria unless compelled in the way of self-defence.

On the strength of this explanation an Anglo-
French alliance would, it was hoped, prove practicable, on the further understanding that England should guarantee a French loan of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, to be secured by the island of Tobago. Having submitted these proposals to the English Government, Talleyrand waited a fortnight for an answer. Even then ministerial divisions indefinitely postponed a reply. As Talleyrand gradually found out, Pitt, with his friend Dundas and his Foreign Minister Grenville, favoured the French offer. The other members of the Cabinet were dead against it. Talleyrand's execution of his first international commission was to close neither the affair nor this his earliest connection with England. The French Government had long wished to be represented at the Court of St James in a manner worthy both of France and of England. Hirsinger, like Barthelemy, was merely a temporary envoy. At last an eminently suitable selection had been made in the person of the young Marquis de Chauvelin. The new ambassador reached London on 27th April 1792. He came as practically and especially the nominee of the Girondins, who then dominated the National Assembly; it was their policy to consolidate French republicanism by war and to detach England from a combination against France. A week before the rupture of France with her neighbours, Chauvelin had received elaborate instructions for his English mission. His first object was to obtain a pledge from England of strict neutrality in the coming war, should France find herself compelled to divert operations from her own frontier into the Austrian Netherlands. At the same time he was emphatically to disclaim for his country any thought of
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territorial extension or any wish to interfere in the
concerns of its neighbours. The world's peace
depended on the European balance of power being
preserved. The excessive increase of Russian or
German strength could not but eventually prove
fatal to equilibrium and to tranquillity. As regards
Germany too, it must be remembered that the re-
modelling, if not the disappearance, of the Empire
itself was a contingency that events might easily pre-
cipitate. For Holland to interfere with any French
strategical movements because they seemed to threaten
her borders, must make France her enemy instead of,
as at present, her friend; it must also involve the down-
fall of the House of Orange. Then had the English
Government weighed the cost at home of a collision
with the National Assembly abroad? Ireland cordially
detested the British connection; she would welcome
her French deliverer with open arms. On the other
hand Chauvelin was to insist upon the advantages to
England of an alliance with France. The first of
England's interests was of course material. Good:
supposing Spain to yield to the temptation of joining
the Empire, instead of the country from which she was
separated by the Pyrenees, what more easy than for
England, France, and England's kinsfolk across the
Atlantic to divide amongst themselves the spoils of
Spanish trade in all quarters of the world? The
modest cost to England of the boons a generous France
waited to confer would be that already suggested
by Talleyrand, a British guarantee of a few millions'
loan, against which the West Indian island of Tobago
would be held by the Government of George III.
Talleyrand himself was now, nominally as private
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secretary, really as unofficial colleague, co-operating with Chauvelin. In his native land Talleyrand was equally disliked by the royalists and the republicans. Public opinion, however, agreed with Dumouriez, during his short tenure of the Foreign Office, that Talleyrand was the one Frenchman pre-eminently qualified for doing business with England. In London the unpopularity of his Girondin employers often seemed to be reflected upon Talleyrand himself. Gradually, however, he lived down much of these prejudices. The narrative of Dumont conclusively proves him honestly and steadily, in the teeth not only of abuse but of actual insults, to have pursued his object of keeping France and England at peace. The truth of Dumont's vindication was to some extent anticipated by impartial English judges during Talleyrand's lifetime.

It is one of the ironies of history that a measure, carried by Pitt to promote friendly relations between the two countries, indirectly should have furnished a pretext for the convention's declaration of war against England (1st February 1793). Pitt's commercial treaty of 1786 in the interests of international trade and friendly intercourse had secured to all French subjects unfettered liberty of entrance to England. The Alien Act of seven years later, it was complained, cancelled the earlier treaty privileges, or hampered them by conditions depriving them of all value. By their legislation in 1793, Pitt and Grenville obliged all foreigners on landing in this country to declare the purpose of their visit, to register their names, and to obtain English passports on their departure if they wished to return. At the same time was forbidden the exportation from England to French ports of all
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materials of war, as well as of corn, whether grown in this country or elsewhere. As will presently be seen, the real diplomatic causes of the breach between France and England lay in the conduct not of the English Government, but of the French. Great Britain had repeatedly committed herself to maintain the independence of Holland and Belgium. Patiently as he bore with them, Pitt was at last forced into recognising that the diplomatic and military action of the Convention constituted a menace to his Dutch ally of which he could not remain a passive spectator. And these acts had gone hand-in-hand with the French ambassador's repeated interferences in Pitt's domestic administration, as well as with the appeals addressed by the French Convention to the English and to other peoples to rise against their Government. The incitements to insurrection were, after a fashion, explained by the Paris Foreign Office. As regards Holland no explanation was offered. The only interests served by Chauvelin during his ambassadorship in England were those of the British administration, which he provoked into war. In the home politics of the country where he had resided, his diplomacy gave the impetus which at the beginning of the Revolutionary struggle rallied round Pitt all those sections of the Whig party that had previously opposed him; by so doing they placed him at the head of an undivided Parliament and an absolutely united people.

As Lord Rosebery has made abundantly clear in his interesting and valuable monograph, so far from Pitt having been bullied into war by George III., he infused much of the spirit of his own patient forbearance into his royal master. He had always
believed that after a time France would recover from the disturbances of her system and would tranquilly resume her place in the comity of nations. The chief source of his misgivings, down to the very eve of the European convulsion, was Russia.

In 1788, the year before the States-General opened, while France was as yet monarchical and peaceful, Pitt, co-operating with the Austrian minister Kaunitz and the Prussian Hertzberg, had expended much labour in forming an alliance with Holland. Ever since his failure in the affair of Oczakow, he had looked uneasily at the armed and aggressive form of the Giant of the North. Precaution against menace from that quarter formed the sole motive of the agreement entered into by Austria, England, Holland and Prussia; it took its name from the royal summer residence near Apeldorn. The preliminaries of the Loo Convention were signed at the Loo, 13th June 1788; the full treaty was executed and ratified at Berlin two months later (13th August). In addition to the specific Dutch responsibilities imposed on England by the Loo Convention, there existed general ground of international law on which not only England but all Europe might have resented the violation of Dutch neutrality now contemplated by France. In 1784, the Government of Louis XVI. had protested against the opening of the Scheldt by Austria, who then held the Low Countries. From the French point of view that act constituted a wanton violation of the rights of the United Provinces established by the treaty of 1731. The objection was allowed, and Austria desisted from her attempt. Now, after an interval of eight years, republican France deliberately violated international
usage by that very aggression to prevent which monarchical France, in the common interest of Europe, had risked war with the Austrian Empire. Chauvelin had come to England as representative of the King of France. Strictly, therefore, his mission had ended when Louis XVI. ceased to govern; after that Grenville and Pitt addressed their protests against the French Government not to the French Ambassador in London, but to the Paris Foreign Office.

The practical dethronement of Louis XVI. in 1792 left France without the Government which had accredited Chauvelin to England. The king's execution, 31st January 1792, removed from the French capital even the shadow of responsible administration. Brissot's report to the Convention, on 3rd February, formally opened the state of war between Great Britain and France. Here we are only concerned with the diplomatic pleas and preliminaries of the rupture. These have already been given in sufficient detail.

Passing to the more general treaty violations that necessarily closed diplomatic relations between England and France, there must be noticed the contemptuous cancelling by the French Republic of the essential terms on which, in 1647, the Peace of Westphalia had concluded the Thirty Years' War. This treaty had guaranteed security and independence to the entire population of Alsace. The French Convention violently robbed the Alsatian nobles and clergy of their estates. The responsibilities and honour of England were more closely touched by the victorious advance of the French armies to the banks of the Scheldt, immediately following as it did the French violation of the neutrality of that stream.

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CHAPTER VII

THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN WAR TIME
(1792-1806)


There is no better French authority for the course of Anglo-French diplomacy on the eve of the outbreak of the Revolutionary War than the writer already referred to in connection with Talleyrand, Dumont; his acquaintance with English society dated from 1785. His second visit to this country was made as Chauvelin’s unofficial companion in 1792. From the first he used his knowledge of English life and character to guard his countrymen against mistake on two points. “So far,” he re-
marked, "from being, as is the fashion to say, well received, we are really cold-shouldered. No one believes in us or likes us. Chauvelin's position is only possible on condition of his not seeking important interviews, lying low, and as far as possible keeping out of evidence." All this was literally true. Within a few weeks after the mission had begun, on 21st May 1792, Chauvelin had handed in a censure of the English proclamation against seditious writings, with a demand that it should be laid before Parliament. Grenville merely returned the document with a curt endorsement to the effect that the French ambassador was exceeding the limits of his proper sphere. From that moment Chauvelin's failure was assured. The second fallacy, of which in his home letters Dumont warned his friends to clear their minds, related to the position of the English Prime Minister and the true English temper towards the new forces which had declared themselves in France. Irresponsible gossip may tell you, he in effect says, there is a power in England greater than that of the minister or the king, secretly but irresistibly sympathising with the new order in France. Do not believe it for a moment. Pitt, and Pitt alone, personifies the genius and the fixed resolve of the British nation. Whatever it may be, his policy is the expression of the national will. Fox has forty followers, all of whom would die for him, but is the mouthpiece of a faction. Pitt relies only on himself, yet carries the whole country in his portfolio. Chauvelin himself lived, after his retirement from England and from diplomacy, long enough to endorse from his experience the truth of Dumont's words. After his return to France and the restoration
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of the monarchy, his former republican associations secured him a year's imprisonment; between 1804 and 1812 he held several municipal offices; after that he began a new and successful career as an orator in the French Chamber. Before his death, in 1832, he visited private friends in England; well received in London society, he acknowledged at more than one dinner-table his own mistakes and the accuracy of Dumont's impressions.

Though untrained to international politics as a profession, Dumont had performed one of a diplomatist's chief duties in trying to undeceive the rulers and people of France as to English opinion and resources. After the outbreak of the war the entire course of English diplomacy was personally directed by Pitt. The professional diplomatists abroad were used by him not so much to execute, not at all to suggest policy. Their one business consisted in sending him news. Thus each of our foreign chanceries became an emporium for transmitting information on which the English minister intended to act. Some of those who distinguished themselves in that capacity may now be mentioned. First in order of distinction and importance comes Thomas Bruce, the seventh Earl of Elgin, whose removal of Greek statuary from Athens brought down upon him the lash of Byron's satire. Born in 1766 and living to 1841, he began his career by a special mission to the Emperor Leopold in 1790. Two years later he was envoy at Brussels. In 1795 he became head of the embassy at Berlin. To the Austrian capital, Scotland contributed another son of the same calibre as Elgin, and one of Pitt's most trusty informants. The second Earl of Minto repre-
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sented his Government in most of their dealings with the Austrian Foreign Office under Thugut. That minister, in his anxiety to oppose or support any international project which Minto might desire, by way of winning favour with the Northern peer once suggested the abolition of the pope. The British ambassador drily replied that, as a Scot and a Presbyterian, he had no particular respect for the Vatican, that it seemed, however, to be a question between the Christianity of Roman Catholicism and the worship of the Goddess of Reason in Europe; on the whole he thought the former alternative to be the less objectionable of the two. Thugut's chicanery and hollowness were penetrated both by Minto and another of our Vienna ambassadors, Spencer, at their first interview. With Kaunitz, they both said, we can do business. Of Minto's relations with Thugut, something will presently be said.

Minto's personal charm must have been greater than that of any diplomatic contemporary. Women and children, it was said, at once took to him by instinct, and afterwards clung to him in love. As an Elliot of Stobs, he belonged to a family conspicuous in all generations for its influence and success. During its short possession by England (1794-6), he was Viceroy of Corsica. While thus representing George III. in Bonaparte's native island, he had in a sense, for about a twelvemonth, Napoleon for his subject. As Lord Minto he became Governor-General of India in 1806. Created an earl for his Asiatic achievements, he came home only to die, in 1814. Slightly senior to Elgin, the second Earl Spencer had become first Lord of the Admiralty in the stirring years
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of Nelson; he brought to the Austrian capital the native shrewdness of an English squire brought up among horses, but with a manner polished by the experience of almost every European court. Before then, however, in 1792-3, Spencer was much at Brussels. The Belgian capital at that epoch shared with The Hague and Vienna the same sort of notoriety for diplomatic conspiracy and international intrigue as had formerly belonged in succession to Madrid and Milan. Neither military nor naval attachés at that time existed. But Spencer obtained much information particularly valuable to Pitt, from Sir John Murray. This was a distinguished officer who personally followed the Duke of Brunswick's operations when that general's gallantries and preoccupation with executing Catherine II.'s commands in the partition of Poland left him time to go through the formality of taking the field. But for the shrewd Murray's practical advice, some of Pitt's colleagues, if not Pitt himself, might, by a repetition of the Quiberon affair, have been made the cat's-paws of the dispossessed royalists for pulling out of the revolutionary fire their estates, that were the only things for which those patriots cared.*

But it was from Vienna that Pitt first received confirmation of his suspicions that England's allies had chiefly gone into the war with the motive of pocketing English gold or feasting on Polish plunder. At Vienna, Minto, Straton and Spencer were all of them ambassadors during the wars of the French Revolution. To Straton belongs the distinction of

* Original details confirming this view will be found in the Auckland Papers, vol. ii. p. 64, and in an article by Mr Oscar Browning, Fortnightly Review, February 1883.
having been the first to unveil the secret policy and the real purpose of the allies who were affecting to co-operate with England for the pacification of Europe. The personal safety of the French king with his family and the restoration of the French monarchy had stood foremost in the Pilnitz programme. Those ends began practically to be ignored before the first campaign had fairly begun. So long as England regularly provided the sinews of war, Austria and Prussia would make a show of joining their arms with hers. But the real word of command had been given by the Empress Catherine from St Petersburg. Following the Russian example, Austria and Prussia saw in the European convulsion an opportunity of enriching themselves at the cost of a feeble and a friendless state. It was the story of the 1761 Family Compact in a new setting and brought up to date. The same mixture of ingenuity and luck by which Chatham's understrappers had ascertained the earlier conspiracy of the Bourbon houses now put Straton, Spencer and Minto on the scent of the plan formed by the great military monarchies for blotting out Poland from the map of Europe.

The Austrian Foreign Minister, Cobenzl, pointedly declined to reassure Straton on the subject; he could only say that the Austrian ambassador in London, Count Stadion, would in due course give all needful information. The reports received at the London Foreign Office were to the following effect: No sense of honour constrains the international thieves; the jealousy entertained by Austria and Prussia of each other far exceeds their common dislike of France. On that jealousy French intrigue successfully plays. If
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Austria deserts Prussia in Poland, Prussia will retaliate by making common cause with France against her, and promptly invade Bavaria. Should Prussia decline her part in the Polish plot, an Austrian and French army will march on Berlin. The international intrigues, counter-intrigues, military and political conspiracies of the war of the Austrian Succession were in fact beginning to repeat themselves. Austrian and Prussian generals, not less than Austrian and Prussian statesmen, kept a sharp lookout, not for the professed enemy, but for the best market in which to sell themselves, their Governments and their allies. *Non olet*; if Pitt delayed his remittances, were not the resources of France inexhaustible, and was not French money quite as good as English? Such, literally, was the tenor of the scandalous chronicle that forms the diplomatic history of the first year of the struggle. In the course of 1794, the victories of Hoche and Pichegru had laid Prussia at the feet of France; the Duke of Brunswick's retreat completed for the time her withdrawal from the contest. Austria's retirement was soon to follow. Meanwhile, both England's nominal allies occupied themselves alternately with devouring Poland in fragments or thrusting their hands deeper into the British purse. Pitt's appeals to Austrian faith and honour were heard with a smile of contempt in the chancery and salons of Vienna. The financial condition of Austria had become almost desperate. Pitt's subsidies alone saved the Bank of Vienna from breaking. Even so, in an interview held in 1799 with Minto, as Sir Morton Eden's successor at the British Embassy, Thugut feared that Napoleon's advance on the Austrian capital could not
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be resisted unless £500,000 more were at once forthcoming to pay the troops. Thugut's name suggests the new era in the diplomatic personnel of Europe opened by the Revolution. The aristocratic tradition of the Austrian Foreign Office, represented by Kaunitz, was first broken when his successor was found in the son of a poor boatman on the Danube, who had done so well at the Oriental School at Vienna as to attract the notice of Maria Theresa and to be started by her in a diplomatic career. With Thugut's control of Austria's external relations, there opens a fresh chapter in the record of the intercourse between London and Vienna. England had mildly protested to Austria and Prussia against their Polish policy. Several amateur diplomats had suggested to Downing Street, as a little diversion from the central war, an Anglo-French intervention to preserve some remnants of the national carcase feasted on by the Imperial or royal vultures. In August 1799, Minto informed Grenville and Pitt of the Austrian designs in Italy. Savoy and Piedmont, if not Naples, were to fall to the Vienna monarchy as its prize in the general scramble. England had only two conditions to suggest: the first, that she relied on Austria as the one barrier to France in the Low Countries; the second, that in return for giving Austria free hand, she must insist on a commercial treaty particularly favourable to British trade.

The point has now been reached at which a general view may be formed of English diplomacy under Pitt, first with reference to Britain's allies, secondly in connection with their enemy France. As regards the former, English statesmanship, even when backed by open cheques all round, had failed
to secure not only the prompt and efficient prosecution of the war, but anything like fidelity to England on the part of her colleagues in that enterprise. What happened not once but habitually, was this: Pitt, sometimes directly himself, more frequently through his Foreign Office and his representatives abroad, concluded at a particular juncture and for a definite purpose an agreement with one of his partners in the struggle. That always meant a British payment for a specific end. The money had no sooner changed hands than the object for which it had been given was ignored. The payee, before beginning to perform his part of the bargain, looked for some other market in which to sell himself for a higher price than that given by Great Britain. This is what had happened in 1795, in a fashion so much more conspicuous than upon any other occasion, as to necessitate a brief retrospect of the transaction.

The year just named was that of the Basle treaties between France, Prussia and Spain. These concern us here only so far as they furnish another proof of the degree in which British agencies, military as well as diplomatic, had now ceased to produce any practical sense of obligation to England on the part of her allies. On 5th April 1795, in return for her neutrality, Prussia received the guarantee of France that at any general pacification of Europe, hereafter, she should receive full territorial compensation for any possessions she might surrender. The single plea on which the French Convention had added Spain to Austria and Prussia in its earliest declaration of war was a suspicion or conviction of Spanish ill-will to the Republic. By the Basle treaty of 22nd July 1795, Spain pur-
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chased peace with France at the cost of her interest in the West Indian island of San Domingo. Of that arrangement the London Foreign Office might well be a passive spectator. Its only interest for England was, as the event proved, that it prepared the way for the Franco-Spanish understanding which united the fleets of both countries against Great Britain at Trafalgar, and two years after that for the Treaty of Fontainebleau (27th October 1807) for the partition of Portugal. The earliest appearance, therefore, of an entente between the two countries separated by the Pyrenees in a way presages the peninsular portion of the war that itself formed the prelude to Napoleon’s fall.

In view of what the future had in store, it is of some interest to mention that in the last month of 1793 a British agent obtained from a spy at Toulon and forwarded to the Foreign Office an account of the unsuccessful attack upon Toulon, containing the earliest mention in any British document of Napoleon’s name.

Meanwhile the results of Pitt's Austrian negotiations experienced a momentary improvement. This was partly due to Baron Thugut’s vigorous political sympathies; for though, as has been seen, not belonging by birth to the Austrian aristocracy, that controller of the Vienna Foreign Office had all their exclusive prejudices. He distrusted and hated revolutionary France as cordially as did Catherine II. herself. The generalship of the Austrian troops for which England was sole paymaster had long proved scandalously inefficient. As a condition of further supplies, Pitt insisted on a change of commanders. Here he had the support of Thugut. Further Anglo-Austrian negotiations resulted in the Prince of Coburg
The Foreign Office in War Time being superseded by Clerfayt. Though that change did not produce all the results which had been hoped, an improvement set in with the appointment of the Archduke Charles; this was entirely due to the good understanding between Pitt and Thugut. These two were for a time united in a genuine co-operation. That fact alone makes it unlikely that Thugut should have sold the Austrian cypher to the French, or should have preferred his speculations in the French Funds to Austrian victories in the field. In 1797, the Austrian nobility had lost heart, the national exchequer was empty. Thugut's energy, helped by French delays, alone prevented Bonaparte entering Vienna unopposed. Even as it was, Thugut failed to avert the military collapse; the Leoben preliminaries, on 18th April 1797, gave the Netherlands to France; as a quid pro quo, Austria, out of Napoleon's Italian plunder, was to receive Venice with other territories on the Adriatic. How in this scramble England diplomatised or forced herself into Malta will presently be seen in connection with other political incidents belonging to that episode. Both the Leoben provisions and those of Campo Formio were formally ratified by, and included in the Franco-Austrian Peace of Lunéville which, opening the nineteenth century, marks the final withdrawal of Austria from the struggle, the end of Pitt's second coalition against France, and the temporary retirement of Pitt himself.

Other movements of British diplomacy remain to be noticed. Meanwhile, what were the overtures to France for a general pacification made by Pitt during the progress of the events already described? The manifesto published by the English minister at
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the beginning of hostilities had expressly declared his wish to listen to terms of accommodation on the first opportunity. In 1793, Fox had brought forward a resolution condemning the war, to find himself beaten by 226 votes. The next year, however, at least two motions in favour of peace negotiation were proposed with Pitt’s approval and by his own friend Wilberforce. Directly a settled Government existed in France, Pitt had always said he would press proposals for peace. In 1795 the establishment of the Directory seemed to give the awaited opportunity. During the next spring, “without committing ourselves too far, we might, I think,” said Pitt to Grenville, “get someone to sound the new French administration as to terms of a general peace.” “I have,” replied the Foreign Minister, “the man you want, ready for the work. Wickham at Berne is discretion itself and on the best of terms with his French colleague, who is high in the favour of the new régime at Paris.” In executing his commission, Pitt failed only because success was out of the question. England, in her unsuspecting innocence, held herself bound in honour to entertain no proposals for ending the war, save on the condition of the Low Countries being restored to Austria. That, Wickham’s French friend assured him, was absolutely inadmissible. So ended the parley. The true reason why the affair fell through was, of course, that the early vigour and success of the Directory had already filled the French mind with definite hopes of universal conquest. Pitt’s diplomacy, however, was still actuated by a belief that with patience he might still attain his pacific end. In Malmesbury he had a negotiator who combined great position, a grave
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urbanity of address with rare professional skill and a real devotion to himself. Malmesbury therefore was, in the autumn of 1796, chosen by Pitt to confer in Paris with the Foreign Minister of the Directory, La Croix, the representative of Republic patriotism in its most extreme and aggressive form. Pitt had other reasons than the high qualifications of his representative for hoping for a good result from his new negotiations. England had recently taken the Cape of Good Hope and many of the French possessions in the West Indies. The English Government could therefore offer the Directory a substantial return for the necessary concessions. At the outset, however, of the discussion, La Croix let it be known that he could not relinquish so valuable a prize of war as the Netherlands. On that point Grenville had instructed Malmesbury that he must not give the smallest hope of any relaxation. La Croix, whose personal bearing from the first had been the reverse of reassuring, abruptly declared the conversation closed. Still indefatigably tenacious of his peace policy, Pitt, in the autumn of 1797, through the same representative as before, renewed his endeavours to end hostilities. Since Malmesbury's former mission the international situation had undergone an important change. The already mentioned preliminaries of Leoben (18th April 1797) became afterwards (October 1797) the Peace of Campo Formio. By that Austria had secretly made over to France those Low Countries whose cession the English Government said it was bound in duty to its allies not to entertain. The question of the Low Countries cannot therefore have again arisen between the French and British plenipotenti-
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aries. The new objection raised by the Foreign Office at Paris was that the London plenipotentiary did not fully answer to his official style, that his authority was too limited, and that he had to refer home for instructions more often than seemed respectful to a great Power like France. The true cause of the miscarriage was that militarism had acquired the ascendant in the Directory and that the fighting faction knew the French army thrrove best on war.

The next occasion on which peace prospects between the two countries came into sight had a dramatic interest wanting to the earlier negotiations. In 1799, Napoleon, advancing another stage towards the Imperial crown, had become First Consul; in that capacity he wrote directly to George III, suggesting a peace. Pitt and his sovereign entirely agreed that the state of French affairs contained little promise of successful negotiation. The English reply, they were further united in thinking, should reciprocate the First Consul's willingness to end the war, and should propose the restoration of the French monarchy as the safest means of doing so. The actual composition of the answer, of course, fell to the Foreign Secretary. Naturally stiff and didactic, Grenville was the last man fitted to pen a conciliatory despatch. He now produced not a reply to Bonaparte's letter, but a censure of French national and diplomatic methods in the form of a note to our ambassador in Paris. It was thus neither a refusal nor an acceptance of the First Consul's offer. Without a touch of epigram or a single felicity of expression, it formed a ponderously-phrased lecture on the enormity of the courses pursued by France.
since she had dispensed with the services of her king. It is now known from a recent chief of our Foreign Office, George III. on reading the draft thought it much too strong, regretfully adding, "I suppose it must go."* As the king shrewdly anticipated at the time, the passage which chiefly roused the indignation of Napoleon, and which strengthened immensely his position with his countrymen, was His Britannic Majesty's intimation that the reinstatement of the Bourbon monarchy would form a guarantee of French sincerity, which he might reasonably expect, and which would greatly assist the process of the negotiations. Napoleon did not take the trouble of referring Grenville's effusion to the French Foreign Office, or even privately to Talleyrand. He personally penned an acknowledgment which gave him both a literary and a logical victory; he appreciated, he gravely said, the English king's gracious admission that nations had a right to choose their own form of government. This was indeed only what he had expected, seeing it was by the exercise of such a right that His Britannic Majesty held his own crown. Unfortunately, however, the King of England had annexed insinuations, such as tended to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and were no less injurious to the nation and to its Government than would seem to the subjects of King George a French suggestion to restore the Republic which England had adopted in the middle of the seventeenth century, or an exhortation to recall to the British throne the family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a revolution had compelled to

* Lord Rosebery's *Pitt*, p. 143.
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descend from it. Still, not less anxious for peace than in the first instance, Napoleon would at once suspend hostilities; plenipotentiaries from both sides might then meet at Dunkirk, or some other convenient place.

Now, as has so often happened, English action abroad was constrained and interfered with by the influences of faction at home. The sympathies of Fox, as has been seen, had reinforced Pitt in 1794, by the secession of the Portland Whigs. Whether, as in the cases of Portland and of Windham, these actually became members of Pitt’s reconstituted administration or remained outside it, they formed the life and soul of the fighting party, and the most serious of all checks upon the pacific diplomacy of Pitt himself. The international prospect now began pretty consistently to be seen through the medium of the militarism personified by Spencer and Windham. Of these, the former, returning to England from Vienna in 1794, had then become First Lord of the Admiralty; the latter was now a leading figure on the War Office staff.

Under such strong personal influences it had become a fixed article in the faith of Downing Street, that no declared wish of Napoleon for peace could possibly be sincere. Grenville was not merely the head of the Foreign Office; he was the most orthodox and rigid incarnation of its prejudices, its punctilios, its proprieties, its red-tapery and its routine. “The First Consul,” he said, in his most pompously oracular and infallible manner, “wishes to gain time and to put your Majesty and your servants off guard.” Pitt insisted on his right to judge for
himself, and dared to see in Bonaparte’s offer a sign of the times.

Accordingly, in 1800, before Grenville’s outraged officialism had fully recovered from the shock of Bonaparte’s irregularity, Pitt suggested to our ambassador at Vienna, Lord Minto, that Austria might be disposed to co-operate with him in an international reconnaissance of peace possibilities. Austria, however, as has been seen, after what happened at Leoben, had already committed herself to the agreement with France, which, in February 1801, was formally confirmed by the Peace of Lunéville. Our Vienna embassy’s reports more than justified Downing Street’s scepticism of Napoleon’s sincerity. He refused to discuss the peace preliminaries except after he had provisioned his troops in Malta and Egypt; Malta was then blockaded by the English. In Egypt the victory of Aboukir Bay had cut off the French troops from the rest of Napoleon’s army. To have entertained, therefore, his terms of parley would have been for England to have renounced the chief advantages she had thus far gained, and practically to have surrendered to French control the land of the Pharaohs and the island of St Paul. The divisions in the British Cabinet formed, as has been seen, the great obstacle at home to ending the war. Pitt’s determination to get peace on any tolerable terms would have triumphed over the difficulties raised by his colleagues. The insuperable bar was Bonaparte’s resolve to employ an armistice for the purpose of recruiting his strength against England. Only in a secondary sense did Pitt’s pacific vigilance or Addington’s weariness of war procure the Peace of Amiens; its real cause
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was the need felt on both sides for an interval of comparative rest. Moreover, the year which witnessed a fresh advance in the negotiations that ended in the Peace of Amiens, had seen the disappearance of the last diplomatic impediment to the termination of the war. So long as Austria had held England to her promise of defending the Austrian Netherlands, there could be no reason for expectation of an ending to the conflict. But in 1801, Austria had by her own act purchased peace from Napoleon at the price of possessions in the Low Countries. Thus the true agencies that rendered at least a truce morally certain at a distant day were not Pitt's diplomacy and the coalitions against France in which it resulted, but the relentless crushing of Austria in Bonaparte's triumphant course.

One nominal ally England still retained. This was the state against whose encroachments Pitt had tried to guard by the Loo Convention, and whose ruler, Catherine II., had endeavoured to secure English co-operation in averting the international calamities with which the French Revolution threatened well-ordered Governments throughout the world. Sweden took the lead in answering the Czarina's appeal against France. There were some overtures from the Russian Government for a naval demonstration in which the British fleet was to take part. Eventually, on the 25th March 1793, Lord Grenville as Foreign Secretary and Count Woronzow, then on his earliest English mission, signed a treaty between the two Powers that laid the foundation for the future coalitions against France, and that pledged both Powers to carry on the war until France, in a manner approved by each of
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them, should restore her conquests. This compact gave the pattern for other treaties soon afterwards arranged between England on the one hand, and Sardinia and Spain on the other. The foreign offices of London and St Petersburg were absolutely at one with Pitt and his most enlightened foreign contemporaries, Haugwitz and Kaunitz, in renouncing any idea of interfering in the domestic affairs of France. Their one ostensible object was to prevent such an international preponderance of the republican state as should jeopardise the European equilibrium. Between England and Russia things went smoothly till the period of the ill-advised expedition of the two Powers to Holland, in 1798, for restoring the royal House of Orange deposed by Napoleon. Then came mutual recriminations between the two Governments; the Czar complained of the slackness of the English commander; the inevitable retorts followed. Yet, in 1799, Woronzow, writing home, could speak of no foreign monarch ever having been so popular in England as Paul I. By way of reciprocating English goodwill, the Czar wishes Woronzow to let it be known that he intends bestowing on the English representative at St Petersburg, Earl Whitworth, the Grand Cross of the Order of St John of Jerusalem.

These and other amenities on the part of the Czar towards England, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, were made known here by a Russian diplomatist about whom a few words may be said. The place in popular and fashionable life filled in our own time by Baron Brunnow, on the outbreak of the Crimean War, closely resembled that during the years which preceded the
Tilsit treaty of 1807 occupied in English society by Count Woronzow. Eventually, as will be seen, he quitted the Russian service to settle down to the life of an English country gentleman in Hampshire. His daughter's marriage with the eleventh Earl of Pembroke made him the grandfather of the English War Minister of the Crimean epoch, Sidney Herbert, who died Lord Herbert of Lea. Woronzow himself, during the epoch now approached, presents himself in the light less of a Russian emissary than of a Russian institution in this country. Other envoys from St Petersburg pass and repass between the English and the Russian capitals. Woronzow, wherever he may be stationed, always seems within visiting distance of Downing Street.

The personal details that supplement the official narrative of the Russian Foreign Office now drawn upon* present lifelike portraits of Grenville and Pitt, filled with misgivings for the possible results of the diplomatic misunderstanding between Russia and Austria in 1800. By this time, however, experience must have rendered Pitt proof against surprise or illusion about the conduct to England of any of her allies. No obligations, diplomatic or military, to Great Britain could keep Austria or Prussia from a private deal with the common enemy at any convenient moment. Diplomatically, he had always been ill-served at St Petersburg. The slackness of our embassy when in the charge of Sir Everard Fawkener, at the time of the Oczakow affair, allowed, or rather invited, the interference of Fox and the mission of his

* The collection of treaties, from 1801 to 1831, between England and Russia, published by the Chancellor of the Russian Foreign Office.
friend Adair to encourage the Empress Catherine to hold out against all demands. Since then Fawkener's son, William Augustus, had from time to time done much of the work of the embassy. The information he sent home came irregularly, and was largely made up of social gossip and political fiction. Our St Petersburg embassy seems only to have begun to be in good working order some years later under Lord Leveson-Gower, presently to be mentioned. The first germ of future international differences is latent in the suggestion of the favourite device of a partially instructed and perplexed diplomacy, a congress to be held, as the Czar thinks, at the Russian capital. The basis of any such discussion might be the annexation of Belgium to Holland, the restoration of the French and Italian frontiers as they had existed before the war, and a particular show of respect to the Germanic Empire. The pervading tone of the British despatches is courteous reserve or urbane criticism. The English suggestion that any congress there might be should meet, not at St Petersburg, but at Düsseldorf, is resented by the Czar as a slur on his good faith. He never seems quite to recover his amiable equanimity. A reminder of his promise to assist England with troops only elicits the abrupt remark that the soldiers of whom he had spoken were recruiting their health and were not yet fit for work. At the same time there shows itself the sense of grievance cherished by Paul against Great Britain since 1798. The Czar had caused himself to be nominated chief of the order of Knights of St John of Jerusalem; in that capacity he claimed possession of Malta, bitterly complaining of the English negligence which had caused Napoleon's seizure
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of the island. What, in 1799 he wished to know, were the British intentions respecting it? Lord Whitworth, now representing King George at St Petersburg, is instructed by Grenville to disclaim for His Britannic Majesty any wish permanently to keep the place, or any idea, at the present moment, of giving it up. After this, Whitworth’s self-respect forbids him to continue his residence at the Czar’s court. For some time to come the English embassy is in the hands of a chargé d’affaires. This official sends home complaints of the personal outrages to which he is subjected. The English request for explanations provokes the reply that the Russian emperor only vouchsafes explanations to his Creator. Simultaneously also Woronzow in England hears from St Petersburg that his mission to England is at an end, that his private affairs require to be attended to at home and his own health to be recruited at a German spa. Any arrears of work would be cleared up by State Counsellor Lisakievitch.

Henceforth, having left the diplomatic service of his country, Woronzow remains in England as a private resident; periodically, however, when occasion needs, he resumes his diplomatic rôle, passing most of his time at his villa near Southampton Water. Here, from Count Pahlen, the head of the Russian Foreign Office, he heard in 1801 of its having pleased the Almighty to take to Himself the Emperor Paul (who had, to speak plainly, been strangled by a palace assassin in his bed). The new emperor, the Czar Alexander, the nation’s hope and love, intends a little later to make Woronzow Imperial Minister at home, but wishes him, before leaving England, to execute a
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few commissions. Alexander's guiding principle is a desire to stand well with England, and to do his utmost to please and serve her. During 1801 reappear between Great Britain and Russia those conventions for the good of the human race, first set on foot by the Empress Catherine. Alexander's amiability and devotion towards his ally can, however, only find full expression if England ceases to stand out against the maritime league, whose sole objects are peace and justice. This in plain fact meant that Great Britain should surrender the maritime privileges that formed the prize of the naval victories securing her supremacy over the seas. The rights which England had thus placed herself in a position to exercise had already excited the opposition of the Northern states; in so doing they had brought into existence that Armed Neutrality which forms a chapter in the general history of the period, or would be minutely examined rather in a treatise on International Law than in these pages. It was a long outstanding question, the constantly recurrent subject of much polemical diplomacy on the part of England and Russia. Beginning with the Empress Catherine II., it entered upon an acute phase under Paul I. Even during the next reign it figures largely in the controversial correspondence between London and St Petersburg which led up to the earliest hostile appearance of a British fleet in Danish waters, commanded by Nelson, 1801. Alexander, however, was above all things anxious to improve Russian commerce, long injured as it had been by misunderstanding with the greatest trading nation in the world. Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren may never have had the official style of British ambassador. The Russian mission

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to which he was attached seems to have originated in some court function, possibly the Czar's coronation. Between 1801 and 1804, however, he filled an important position at our St Petersburg embassy. His manner had the mixture of dignity and frankness which pleased the Russian court. His naval and maritime knowledge proved useful to our diplomacy. He found a congenial colleague at St Petersburg in Count Nikita Petrovitch Panine, who had been disgraced by Paul I., but who was recalled by Alexander and made Vice-Chancellor, with the special purpose of negotiating with the English representative. Like Woronzow, Panine had fallen out of favour with Paul for his English sympathies. These were regarded by Alexander as a qualification for the place. Meanwhile the final settlement of Malta might remain in abeyance. The immediate necessity was an amicable understanding to include not only England and Russia, but Denmark and Sweden also. The matter ended for the present by the impounded English vessels being set at liberty, and by the restoration to their lawful owners of the English money and other valuables seized by Russia.

Mention must be made of another English diplomatist who, so far back as the Empress Catherine's time, had exerted all his remarkable powers to prepare the way for an Anglo-Russian alliance. This was Alleyne Fitzherbert, Lord St Helens, famed throughout Europe for his quiet, polished manners, and a sagacity that sometimes resembled inspiration; he had achieved the earliest of his great diplomatic successes by arranging for Pitt the Nootka Sound difficulty, and concluding the arrange-
ment that in 1793 united England and Spain as allies. It was Fitzherbert's distinction to win the good opinion equally of Whigs and Tories. Fox, when sending him on his earliest visit to Russia, had commended him to the Lord Malmesbury already repeatedly mentioned—Mirabeau's "rusé et audacieux Malmesbury"—as a man of parts, of industry, and meriting entire confidence. Malmesbury himself alone demurred to the justice of this eulogy; for, being at The Hague during the ambassadorship there of the already mentioned Lord St Helens, he found our envoy there perfectly courteous and friendly, but careless about his work, and unpunctual in his appointments.

But the early nineteenth-century ambassador to Russia, most notable alike for the incidents of which he formed part, and for his family connections, was the Lord Leveson-Gower who in 1833 became the first Earl Granville, the future father of the Foreign Secretary in the Victorian age. The son of Pitt's first Lord President of the Council, Granville Leveson-Gower had begun his diplomatic career under Lord Malmesbury, with whom he served at the Paris embassy, and whom he accompanied to Lille on the peace negotiations in 1797 already described. The Dutch capital must then have ranked above the Russian in the diplomatic scale; for it was not till 1823 that, as Viscount Granville, he went to The Hague. Here, however, he only remained a year, for in 1824 he replaced Sir Charles Stewart as ambassador at Paris. Nineteen years earlier, 10th October 1804, he had taken up his appointment at St Petersburg during Pitt's formation of the third coalition against Napoleon. So acceptable did Granville prove to the Czar Alexander as to be chosen for his companion
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during the Imperial visit, in 1805, to the seat of war
In Russia he remained till the close of our diplomatic
relations with that country.*

Meanwhile the London Foreign Office had
(20th February 1801) passed into new management
Grenville's lecture to the First Consul, after the
Napoleonic overtures of 1799, was among the lates
of his despatches as Secretary of State. He was
succeeded by Lord Hawkesbury, afterwards the second
Earl of Liverpool. During the administration which
now opens, Downing Street was agitated by Russian
intrigues with Turkey against England. Constanti
nople swarmed, as Hawkesbury complains, with:
Russian diplomatists or Bonapartist agents, bent upon
making mischief between Great Britain and her ally.
Hawkesbury's protests to the Russian minister,
Katchoubey, as summarised and handed down in the
Russian official record already referred to, read less
like the compositions of a diplomatist than the
questions posed by an international casuist upon sub-
jects that lie on the border-ground between diplomacy
and ethics. The relations thus produced between the
two Governments were not improved by the events
that attended or followed the short cessation of hostili-
ties, the preliminary, as it proved, to the most serious
stage of the war, the Peace of Amiens. In connection
with that transaction, the diplomacy of the First

* In his Life of the Second Earl Granville (i. 4) Lord Fitzmaurice has
recalled the fact that Lord Granville Leveson-Gower owed the preserva-
tion of his life to his absence from the Parliamentary precincts in 1812.
During his Russian ambassadorship, Spencer Perceval's assassin had
conceived the idea of the grievance which eventually caused the attempt
in the Prime Minister's life. Bellingham afterwards confessed that the
illet which killed Perceval had been intended for Viscount Granville.
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Consul proved simplicity itself. The Napoleonic policy, never lost sight of amid the confusion and sophistry of negotiations, was frankly to surrender nothing of the ancient domains or the recent acquisitions of France. Hawkesbury's first proposals were the evacuation by the French of Egypt, and the retention by the English of Ceylon, Martinique, Trinidad, and other colonial conquests made during the war. The French counter-draft of the treaty now discussed provided for Egypt's restoration to the Sultan, of the harbours of Italy to the Pope and the King of Naples; Port Mahon was to be ceded to Spain, and Malta to the Knights of Jerusalem. Ceylon, never having belonged to France, but having been taken from the Dutch, was readily allotted by Napoleon to England. The arrangements about Malta, Egypt, Holland and the West Indies led to several months' discussion. At last, 1st October 1801, the preliminaries were executed in London; within a fortnight Colonel Lauriston came with the ratifications from Paris. The definitive treaty between Great Britain and France was signed at Amiens, 27th March 1802, for England by Lord Cornwallis—who as our general in America had ruined the British cause by the surrender of Yorktown, and who afterwards became successively Irish and Indian viceroy—for France by Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand.

The conventional reason assigned for Pitt's resignation in the preceding February is his conscientious opinion that the union with Ireland should be accompanied by Roman Catholic emancipation. At the same time he did not wish to add to the king's troubles by importuning him on so distasteful and
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distressing a subject. The true cause of Pitt's retirement must be found in foreign rather than domestic politics. In 1801, George III. had consented that emancipation should be regarded as an open question by his ministers and not mentioned by himself. As a fact Pitt left office only because he saw a breathing-time in the war had become necessary; he did not believe a satisfactory peace with Napoleon to be possible; he would not associate himself with a mere temporary truce. Further, he knew himself to be necessary; he could look forward to coming back on his own terms at a more auspicious hour. Lord Malmesbury's published letters of 1801 and George Canning's unpublished letters to Frere place all this practically beyond doubt.*

Notwithstanding Canning's satire and Pitt's contemptuous approval, the House of Commons, without a division and amid the applause of the country, had approved the Amiens settlement. The Lords, who had long made diplomatic criticism their speciality, accepted it with more reserve. They gave the treaty, it is true, a majority of 114 to 10, but among the non-contents were such experts in international statesmanship as Spencer, our former ambassador at Vienna, Grenville the late Foreign Secretary, and a representative of many shades of national opinion, Lord Carnarvon. On the other

* "Pitt (says Malmesbury, February 1801) is playing a selfish and criminal part, going out only to show his own power and to return as a dictator." So in letters, for a sight of which I was indebted years ago to Mr Alfred Montgomery, expressed himself Pitt's protegé and pupil, George Canning, whose marriage to an heiress had been promoted by Pitt, but who never quite forgave his master for using Addington as a warming-pan in 1801.
hand the supporters of the peace could truthfully argue that it conferred on England territorial advantages at least equal to those which had come to her by any earlier arrangement. By the Treaty of Versailles we had indeed lost considerably; by the earlier treaties of Ryswick and Aix-la-Chapelle we had gained nothing; but now, after having drawn the fangs of European Jacobinism, we had established trophies of victory in the West Indies as well as in the Mediterranean, greater than the gains brought us by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, or of Paris in 1763. Pitt was not likely to be too lenient a critic of Addington's diplomacy. He acknowledged, however, that his temporary successor and rival had made no concessions which he himself had not been prepared to offer at the Lisle Conference in 1797, when, rather than break off negotiations, he had instructed Malmesbury to give way either on the Cape or Ceylon. Therefore, while taking exception to some of its details, Pitt was entirely for the Amiens respite. Not that it would pave the way to a final settlement or that with Bonaparte any lasting pacification was possible. But as he put it, rest had become indispensable to this country.

The course of Anglo-Russian diplomacy may here be resumed. The Peace of Amiens and the incidents connected with it at once began to change for the worse the relations between the cabinets of London and St Petersburg. To the Maltese grievance was now added the Russian complaint of England's disloyalty as an ally in exacting no guarantees against the absorption of Turkey for which Napoleon and Talleyrand were intriguing. Just two years after Amiens, in the May of 1804, Pitt's trusted friend, the
second Lord Harrowby, afterwards the first Earl, became Foreign Secretary. To him Woronzow, still acting as the Czar's unofficial ambassador, complained of British ingratitude for Russian services in the matter of Malta, where the Czar had so steadily disapproved the schemes of France. Harrowby's predecessor in Downing Street, Hawkesbury, had been importuned, not so much for political reasons as (Napoleon desired he should know) on grounds of international ethics, to put down the newspaper writers whose attacks so grievously affronted the honour and wounded the conscience of the First Consul. Nor ought the Channel Islands longer to furnish an asylum for the unscrupulous émigrés who were equally ready to stab with their pens or poignards the blameless Bonaparte. This species of French diplomacy reached its climax in the prosecution of Peltier, a French subject residing on British soil, defended on the charge of libel by Sir James Mackintosh. The fashion thus set of charging the diplomatic atmosphere with moral issues soon found a follower in Russia. Woronzow's moral sensibilities may have been blunted by long habituation to the ethical laxity of Downing Street. Happily the Czar possessed servants whose primitive innocence was untainted by and proof against British Machiavellianism. Such a man was Novosiltzow, who reached London during 1804, as an apostle rather than ambassador, to implore Harrowby's co-operation in preventing the atrocities of English privateers and a general retrogression to barbarism. The Novosiltzow mission was socially a success; politically it could not be called a failure. The Czar's latest emissary was dined and lionised by Fox, Spencer, and the whole fine flower
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of the Carlton House set; a few months later he writes home that he is going to change the English Cabinet.

The combination contrived chiefly by Malmesbury and George Canning against Addington had indeed already brought about Pitt's recall. His second administration had begun. In the spring of 1805, Novosiltzow's errand of treaty-mongering, peace-patching, piety and philanthropy bore fruit in the Treaty of St Petersburg, as well as in the formation of the Anglo-Russian-Neapolitan coalition against France. This was produced less by Pitt's diplomacy than by Napoleon's latest atrocities. By the new treaty also the Black Sea was closed against English privateers, described by Russia as the bane of the ocean; it was in fact regarded as a neutral water, of which Turkey and Russia were part-owners. Harrowby and Novosiltzow in their frequent interviews seem rather to have exchanged fine sentiments about the moral law as the one true diplomatic sanction, than to have condescended to business details. Still, on either side a keen lookout was kept for the main chance. The last move in the English military game against Napoleon had been the blockade of the Elbe. That interfered with Russian commerce as well as checked the common enemy. Novosiltzow ventured to hope the blockade might be raised. Anxious though he is to oblige Russia, Harrowby can only lay his hand on his heart and avow it would be a sin before God if England neglected any step to crush the Colossus that oppresses suffering and afflicted Europe. The Harrowby-Novosiltzow colloquies retain throughout their morally didactic character. The English complaint that Russia tolerates Asiatic
cruelties elicits the rejoinder that the Czar always has been and is the champion of true religion and the friend of real humanity. As a fact the spoliation and oppression of Christians in Greece or elsewhere in Eastern Europe are due chiefly to the misconduct of two English agents in the Morea, Morier and Foresti. A new pundit from St Peters burg, Czartoriski, meanwhile has taken up his parable; on 19th August 1804, he has formulated the suggestion of an Anglo-Russo-Turkish treaty as the best solution of the difficulty. About this point, if the record of the Russian Foreign Office may be trusted, the diplomatists began to find mere diplomacy rather monotonous and digressed into conversations on a variety of improving themes ranging from fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute to the latest masterpieces in political writing, especially Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which Pitt’s approval had done much to bring into vogue.

Not indeed that the international business which had brought Novosiltzow to London was long ignored. Between the British and Russian Cabinets the arrangements for a coalition against France, settled by the Treaty of St Petersburg, were confirmed, 31st August 1805, by the Convention of Helsingborg; provided a monthly payment by England of £1800 for every thousand men co-operating in the common cause. The pecuniary stroke completed, Novosiltzow, after a conference with Pitt, betook himself successively to Vienna and Berlin; at the former he settled a fighting treaty between Austria and Russia. At Berlin he could do nothing, for the simple reason that by this time the Prussian Government had sold themselves to Napoleon at the price of receiving from France the
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British Electorate of Hanover. Notwithstanding their practical preoccupation with robbery all round, the controllers of the diplomacy of the period never forgot that they were above all things "men of sentiment." Their chief professor of platitude and cant, Novosiltzow, has still the Czar's instructions to formulate a new code of international morals. In that task he seeks assistance from the greatest English lawyer of the time, Sir William Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell. Observing these futile operations of hypocrisy and rapacity combined, Napoleon quietly observed to Talleyrand—"There is no diplomacy like that of the boots and spurs, if one only takes one's adversaries separately and in detail." That indeed was the Bonapartist method. Guided by an unerring insight into the situation, political as well as military, it defeated the combined statesmanship of Europe at its own game. Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and British ambassadors had so far congratulated themselves that, while their colleagues in the West were being outdone at every turn by Bonaparte, they had kept the Sultan from being drawn into the French vortex. Before the end of 1806, Turkey had sought protection from Russian menaces in the friendship of France. After the battle of Jena the Porte declared war against Russia, and the Czar told the English ambassador at St Petersburg he must in future rely on the unassisted forces of Great Britain. Meanwhile Napoleon exemplified his favourite international methods by alternately and separately treating with Russia and England in the intervals of his systematic creation of difficulties and ill-will between the two. Pitt's most lasting contribution to English diplomacy was to do much towards redeeming it, in the
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eyes of foreign nations, from that lack of continuity, said by foreign critics to be inseparable from party government. In the "Talents," ministry, formed on Pitt's death, January 1806, Fox for the third time became Foreign Secretary; he had already been in correspondence with Napoleon on the subject of ending the war. Lord Yarmouth, so conspicuous at various foreign capitals in our diplomacy of a few years earlier, was one of the English travellers whom Napoleon had seized and kept a prisoner ever since the rupture of the Peace of Amiens; he was now chosen by Fox to discuss terms of accommodation with Talleyrand. The conditions peremptorily to be insisted upon by him were the restitution of Hanover to England, the handing over of Sicily to England or her allies, and the British retention of Malta and the Cape of Good Hope. Yarmouth did his work perfectly, but failed to keep Talleyrand to the conditions accepted and advanced by Napoleon. Mrs Bouverie's house was then a great social centre on the Whig side. Here Fox arranged a later mission to Napoleon with Lord Lauderdale, but with no better result than the former. As in 1806 Fox carried on the foreign policy of Pitt, so after Fox was Napoleon dealt with in the same manner first by Howick, the future Earl Grey of the Reform Bill, secondly by his Foreign Office successor, George Canning.
CHAPTER VIII

HIGH POLITICS AND HIGH FINANCE

Sir James Bland Burges, the First Foreign Under-Secretary—The State of the Foreign Office on his entering it—George III. on Dudley Ryder (Lord Harrowby)—Growing connection of finance with politics—The founding of the house of Rothschild—The sources of Pitt’s loans—The process of treaty-making—The exchange of presents between the negotiators—Sir William Hamilton and the snuff-boxes—Diplomats’ perquisites to-day—The ethics of diplomacy—Have they improved?—Secret treaties—George Canning becomes Foreign Secretary—The fall of the Holy Roman Empire (1806)—The Berlin Decrees—Canning regarded as an upstart—The Treaties of St Petersburg and Bartenstein—Canning refuses to grant subsidies to England’s Allies—Russian resentment—The Treaty of Tilsit—The Orders in Council—The secret Tilsit treaties—How did Canning get to know of them?—The spy Mackenzie—The Count d’Antraigues—Was Talleyrand at the bottom of it?—The attack on Denmark justifiable—The Crown Prince of Denmark’s interview with Jackson the English envoy—The results of Canning’s Danish policy—The Orders in Council reissued—Relations with Portugal—Meditated Anglo-Russo-Spanish alliance.

WITH Canning opens a new era in our diplomatic narrative. Before entering upon it, something may be said about the administrative machinery which he found ready to his hand, as well as about the personal and inner life of the Foreign Office when he first undertook its management. The department, it will be remembered, had no sooner been formed than its earliest chief, Fox, partly perhaps to oblige a friend, engaged an assistant in the person of R. B. Sheridan.
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Whoever after Sheridan may have done the work of the position, and whatever may have been their style, the title, "Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," does not seem to have been in general use till it was given in 1789 by the Duke of Leeds to his chief understrapper. The person thus designated was James Bland Burges, who had sat in the House of Commons; he was a well-known man about town, of literary tastes, and a brother-in-law of the Lady Milbanke, whose daughter became Lady Byron; he received a salary of £1,500, and he had for his junior colleague a future Secretary of State, already described in these pages, Lord Harrowby, then Dudley Ryder, M.P. Incidentally it may be mentioned that a lady descended from Bland Burges eventually became the wife of the Foreign Office Under-Secretary of our own time who died Lord Currie. Meanwhile, in the Foreign Office of the eighteenth century, there were other Under-Secretaries not inferior in importance to Bland Burges. In addition to Canning himself, who in that capacity had first entered the department in 1796, there was George Hammond, apparently employed by the jealous Grenville to be a check upon Canning and so to ensure despatches, as soon as they were deciphered, not reaching the eyes of the Prime Minister before their examination by the Secretary of State. A curious compound of conscientious industry and na"ive conceit, Bland Burges, in the portrait he has painted of himself, stands out as the reorganiser, if not in a sense the real maker, of the department. He found the place a chaos; he left it a pattern of method and routine. Mountains of despatches, coming from or going to foreign courts, were piled up in confusion.
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No note of their contents had been made; nothing in the nature of an index had been attempted. To disinter from the accumulation a document for reference was to search for a needle in a hay-loft. "I addressed myself," said Burges, "to a labour of Hercules." The new official at first had thoughts of docketing and arranging the whole mass of manuscripts. The united clerks of the establishment threatened to strike if the task was not reduced to rational limits. "If," said the Duke of Leeds to his Under-Secretary, "you persist in this freak of quixotism, you will have the establishment to yourself." Burges therefore had to content himself with introducing a system on which it remained for his successors to improve, if improvement were possible. That his heart was really in his work may be seen from his arrangements for the day. Between 9 and 10 a.m. he reached the Foreign Office; there was no break for luncheon, but a little after five he went off for dinner to the French Ambassador's, looked in again at the office for an hour or so afterwards, and then refreshed himself with supper at the Duke's.

In those days George III. occasionally paid surprise visits to the bureaux of State. He had nothing but praise for the industrious apprentice at the Foreign Office, and sighed much over the contrast presented by the "idle boy," the second Lord Harrowby that was to be. "I cannot," parentally observed the sovereign, "approve a peer's eldest son being in this place. If Mr Ryder wished to learn effective business, he ought to have done so as a Lord of the Admiralty, where he might have found plenty to do. Surely it is extremely strange that an Under-Secretary should be running about to races and watering-places instead of doing his
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duty. Only last week I saw him at Weymouth when I know he ought to have been at his desk.”

As might have been expected in so hard a worker, Bland Burges proved a great stickler for the honour of his department. The Duke of Leeds, though pompous, was by no means dull; but he shirked the drudgery of detail, and was always ready to relieve himself and his staff by passing on troublesome business to another department. In this way he had allowed Hawkesbury, when at the Board of Trade, to conduct certain negotiations about Customs' duties and revenue which really belonged to the Foreign Office. “I never,” said Bland Burges of his chief, “see him in office hours without being reminded of a man crossing a stream on stepping-stones, so carefully, that his shoes always keep dry.”

The Under-Secretary shrewdly saw in Pitt the supreme master of the whole administration; from the first, therefore, he determined to make himself indispensable to the Prime Minister rather than to the chief of his own department. He constantly brought to Pitt's notice facts that it might serve him to know, and individuals whom he might find useful, especially in his financial operations. If his memory may be trusted, Bland Burges once helped Pitt in his private affairs to the extent of £1000. Against this statement one may set Disraeli's characteristic words about the statesman on whom in so many ways he modelled himself. “Mr Pitt always preferred a usurer to a friend, and to the last day of his life borrowed money at sixty per cent.” Maret described the war which the French Convention declared against England, in 1793, as one got up by stock-jobbers.

Undoubtedly, the City first began prominently to
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figure in and vitally to influence home and foreign politics during the wars of the French Revolution. The most notorious Continental diplomatist of this period, Talleyrand, had been bred for a priest before being promoted to the head agency of Napoleon's political intrigues; similarly the capitalist who first illustrated and cemented the mutual relationships between finance and statesmanship had been brought up for a rabbi in the synagogue of his native town, Frankfort-on-the Maine. Talleyrand was the earliest among statesmen to recognise in the controllers of the money-market the eventual masters of sovereigns, statesmen, ambassadors and generals. His first visit to England, in 1792, was at least as much financial as political. On his way he had felt the pulse of Continental capitalists—among them, it may be conjectured, the patriarch of the Rothschild clan, then just beginning to be a personal force in contemporary affairs. He was thus prepared, on presenting himself in Downing Street, to show the English Government with what ease and safety it might supplement a French alliance with a guarantee of a French loan.

Nathan Meyer Rothschild, who on reaching England first took up his residence at Manchester, did not establish his business in London till 1798. By that date, however, other branches of his family, transplanting themselves from their native Judengasse, had rooted themselves in several of the great European centres. If perhaps unlikely, it is therefore chronologically just possible that the Rothschilds may have been among the capitalists mentioned by Bland Burges to Pitt as available for floating his enormous war loans. Of Bland Burges himself it may be said that official
diligence was his forte and social omniscience his foible. With Burges, Pitt repeatedly discussed the details of ways and means for the public service. The records of the conversations that have been handed down contain indeed no mention of the Rothschild name. With an accuracy and freshness of detail insured by his access to the innermost archives of Downing Street, Lord Rosebery has so fully described Pitt's subsidies that little need be said about them here. They were of two kinds: direct gifts, or guaranteed loans, which came to much the same thing. The tenders for loans from 1799 onwards were too closely connected with the political work of the department to have been ignored at the Foreign Office. None of these tenders came from foreign financiers, whose agents, in fact, were then in London, not to lend but to borrow for their respective governments.

Pitt's close confidant in money matters, public as well as private, was his friend Thomas Coutts, the founder of the famous bank where the minister kept his account, and whither, in recognition of the firm's serviceable patriotism, George III directed his private patronage.* Pitt's administrations lasted from 23rd December 1783 to 17th March 1801, and from 15th May 1804 to 11th February 1806. During

* The facts of the first Earl of Harrowby having been not only Pitt's Foreign Secretary but his intimate friend, and of the fifth Earl being a partner in Coutts' Bank, seem to have caused some confusion. As Pitt's acquaintance, the first Earl may or may not have been known to the Messieurs Coutts of those days. The connection between the family of Ryder and the bank of Coutts only began in the nineteenth century, when the fourth Earl was introduced to the banking firm by Lady Burdett Coutts. For these facts I am indebted to Mr George Marjoribanks of Messrs Coutts & Co., as well as for searching the bank records to ascertain that none of Pitt's war loans were floated by Messrs Coutts.
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these two terms some of his transactions were with bankers as a body, some through a single firm asking on their own and other's behalf. The houses with which Pitt thus negotiated his loans in the years now specified, were, Robarts, Curtis & Co.; Boldero, Lushington & Co.; Smith, Payne & Smiths; Newnham, Everett & Co.; Esdaile & Co.; Goldsmid & Solomons; Sir F. Baring; Barnes & Co.; Battye & Co.; Steers & Mortimer; Jacob & D. Ricardo; and the committee of the Stock Exchange.*

Among the usages of the Foreign Office now under consideration is the process, so often mentioned in these pages, of treaty-making. This may briefly be described. Two nations or more, as the case may be, decide that the time has come to make a treaty, convention or agreement, on lines about which they are generally unanimous. Sometimes a very early interchange of opinions by the governments concerned reveals a divergence of view so serious as to preclude all hope of agreement being reached; in that case, the original intention is abandoned and the meeting of plenipotentiaries never takes place. The first stage is reached when plenipotentiaries on both sides are named. These then meet and show each other their full powers—in other words, the authority to negotiate given them by their respective governments. Among the officials who thus assemble, one may be expected to put forward a draft treaty, prepared before he has come into conference, as a basis of negotiation. The other side examines it, either accepts it as a starting-point, or puts forward

* For these details of Pitt's war-loans, now given for the first time, I have to express my obligations to Mr A. T. King of the National Debt Office.
a differently-worded document known as a counter-draft. In this way there gradually come into existence, a set of proposals, whose general tenor the negotiators approve. Then ensues the discussion of the document, article by article, clause by clause. Alterations and amendments are now proposed, disputed points are referred by the plenipotentiaries to their respective governments. After a length of time, which varies according to the subject-matter, there is elaborated a form of words satisfactory to all the parties concerned. Signatures are now affixed; even after that the treaty does not come into force till there have been exchanged by the signatories ratifications; in monarchies these are given by the sovereign, in republics by the Chambers. The method of procedure pursued in the making of treaties has undergone no great change since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To-day, however, the plenipotentiary stands at one end of a telegraph wire whose other extremity is held by his chief at home. His responsibility, or consequently opportunity, of making his mark by a personal contribution to foreign policy has become much less than formerly.

The European equivalent of the Oriental backsheesh traditionally connected itself with the treaty-making of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the September of 1793 the British ambassador at Naples, Sir William Hamilton, announces to the London Foreign Office the conclusion of a convention with the Neapolitan Government; he passes as a matter of course to the exchange of presents between the diplomatic staffs engaged on both sides. The sums distributed in
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money gifts among the Italian and British officials employed, and paid into the respective Foreign Offices of the two countries, amounted to £500 on each side. In addition to this the King of Naples, through his ambassador in London, the Marquis Circello, sent the British Secretary of State, Grenville, a snuff-box set in diamonds, valued at one thousand pounds. An article of the same sort, presented by the Neapolitan sovereign to the British ambassador, Hamilton, cost but £500, though twice that sum seems to have been allowed for it by the Neapolitan court. "This," complains Sir William Hamilton, "is the only perquisite that has fallen to my lot in nearly thirty years' residence; it is hard to be jockeyed out of half its value."

Canning went to the Foreign Office first, as Parliamentary Under-Secretary, in January 1796. The snuff-box question was then going on; it formed the subject of one of his brightest foreign office jeux d'esprit. By this time it was an understood thing that the English ambassador negotiating a treaty should draw on Downing Street for £500, to be given to the members of the foreign government concerned in negotiating the treaty. A similar sum was allotted to the British negotiators by their foreign colleagues. There had now grown up a practice on the part of the Downing Street staff of claiming these foreign gifts as their own perquisites. This habit had not been resisted by Lord Henley, Lord Minto's predecessor at the British Embassy in Vienna. Grenville, as Foreign Secretary, supported the Downing Street claim. When treaties were in progress of making, much bickering was exchanged between the office at home and the embassies abroad. The Foreign
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Office drew bills on the embassies. The embassies promptly dishonoured them.

With Canning in his Under-Secretarial days was associated in Downing Street John Hookham Frere, the translator of Aristophanes and the versifier whose "whistlecraft" gave Byron the metre for Don Juan. The two friends together composed the metrical draft to the British representative at Vienna; a single stanza is enough to show the drift of the whole—

"Let the snuff-box belong to Lord Minto;
But as for the five hundred pund,
I'll be judged by Almeida or Pinto,
If his Chancery must not refund."

The pleasant custom of giving snuff-boxes, or gratifications in other shapes, has now completely lapsed. The only perquisite that ever falls to a minister or ambassador to-day is when "full powers" have been sent him to negotiate and sign a treaty; to these powers is attached an impression of the Great Seal, enclosed in a copper box of more or less ornamental design. This box the diplomat is allowed to keep as an interesting memento, but its value is only a very few shillings. Should the treaty, however, deal with a royal marriage, the box is of silver. Without its innocent little pickings, diplomacy to the officials of Pitt's and even of Canning's time would have seemed shorn not only of its romance, but of one among its solid and perfectly legitimate attractions. For the Secretary of State, for the ambassador, and for the gentlemen immediately attached to these, there were, as has been seen, be-jewelled arrangements of gold and tortoiseshell, readily exchangeable in the market for ready cash. The satellites of the great men to whom came the lion's
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share of the spoils may seem to have been ungenerously dealt with. They did their best, however, to find reciprocal compensation in exchanging smaller gifts with each other. Thus excluded from all chance in the scramble for the £500 worth of valuables, a man in the position of Bland Burges thinks himself in luck if he receives a quarter cask of Malaga wine, as well as some boxes of almonds, raisins and grapes, from a former colleague then accredited to the Spanish court, William Douglas Brodie.

The snuff-box tradition lingered on at court long after snuff-taking had gone out. During her sojourns abroad, Queen Victoria, before she gave her famous shawls, now and then presented a snuff-box. The fourth Earl of Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary, when minister in attendance on the late sovereign, speaks of such a gift going to the wrong person. The mistake was only discovered when the snuff-box had been converted into coin.

Does the desuetude into which have fallen these pleasant little customs, and all formerly comprehended by the term "gratifications," coincide with any improvement in the ethics of diplomacy? That is a question apposite enough to the fresh chapter in our international story opening with George Canning. The best answer to it will be given by a short statement of facts. Diplomacy has been called the war of peace-time. Its progress ought therefore to have been marked by some of those ameliorations which have taken place in the usages of arms. Explosive bullets were prohibited before the first Hague Conference by one of the Geneva Conventions. At the Hague Conference England, yielding to pressure caused by spite, abandoned even the use of the
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Dum-Dum expanding bullet. Is it possible to record some analogous concessions to the moral law in the international practices of peace? What are the facts? To-day, as much as in the time of Chatham, despatches are systematically intercepted in the post by Continental powers. In all countries, too, telegrams from abroad which appear to be possibly political are at once submitted to the executive. Thus, if England wants to convey anything indirectly to the French or German Government, no cipher is used; the information is telegraphed, without any attempt at disguise, to an English official at an agreed address abroad. As for secret treaties and the whole machinery of deception implied by them, these things have now gone out of fashion, for the simple reason that they are no longer possible. The last instance of a compact of this kind was the re-engagement treaty by which Prince Bismarck virtually upset the Triple Alliance after his consent to it had been extorted from him. As for the Triple Alliance itself, that has never been a matter of diplomatic confidence. Such privacy is impossible in the case of anything to which Italy is a party. In 1878, the Anglo-Turkish arrangement about Cyprus was made on the eve of a conference and could only remain confidential for three weeks. It was accompanied by several other arrangements of a like kind, notably those relating to Austria’s position in Bosnia. Governments exchange confidential letters. England and Italy have done so on two occasions on subjects of common interest, such as the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean. But since 1878, no really secret treaty has been executed. Parliaments are now active. A country
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under parliamentary rule could enter into no engagement that would not at once become the subject of parliamentary question. The result of a ministerial refusal to reply would be the inference that such a treaty existed. That inference would be fatal to its secrecy. If on the other hand the treaty were denied, the denial would have the effect of weakening any engagement that might actually exist.

While these lines are being written, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is Sir Edward Grey. As nearly as possible a hundred years ago his ancestor, Earl Grey, then Lord Howick, on the death of Fox, filled the same office. Fox lived just long enough to know that his diplomacy, even when most vigorous and skilful, had been baffled by Napoleon at every point. Where Fox had failed, Grey scarcely tried in earnest to succeed. Fox must have foreseen also the fall of the ministry to which he belonged on the same question, that of the Catholic claims, as had proved fatal to his rival Pitt. The succession, under the Duke of Portland, of George Canning to the Foreign Office is memorable for other reasons than the sustained vigour of his administration. It had ceased to be a war between governments; it had become on the part of the English people a struggle for existence. Canning, in this respect as in others the true successor of Chatham and of his son, saw the time had come for independence of official traditions, of Cabinet cliques. Policy abroad, he urged, must be based on the patriotism, the good sense and the resolution of the taxpayers and electors at home. The disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire removed, in 1806, the keystone of the arch in the international system whose
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influences had shaped and coloured all European diplomacy before Canning's control of the Foreign Office. In the European welter that had come with 1789 men scarcely noticed the fall of the institution which had begun when, one thousand and six years earlier, Pope Leo had placed the Imperial crown on the brow of the Frankish king. All that at the point now reached the world had been concerned to observe was the successive overthrow by Napoleon of the Austrian sovereign as the representative of the old Rome, and of the Czar as the Imperial legatee of the new. The emperor was still a supreme power, when, as Under-Secretary in 1796, Canning had drawn up the English answer to Spain's excuse for, in the face of existing treaties, allying herself with France. Canning then held no office; he had, however, during Addington's administration, when Hawkesbury was at the Foreign Office, made himself the mouthpiece of those who held Napoleon's policy in Egypt and the Levant to be conclusive against substituting for the war a hollow peace. By the Berlin Decree, November 1806, Bonaparte, posing as the lineal successor of Charlemagne, had declared Great Britain outside the pale of European comity. In Prussia, the diplomatists and the whole official class were full of resentment against Napoleon for the humiliation of the treaty of Schönbrunn. This feeling gradually spread among their fellow-countrymen. It was not therefore Prussian diplomacy but Prussian patriotism, though as yet imperfectly organised, which produced the reaction that proved eventually fatal to the French emperor, who was now concerned to find a capable confederate in executing his scheme of universal monarchy.
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In England, so far, politics had been, and to a great extent still remained, a lordly game, the most active players in which were the great patrician or at least titled families. Its accurate as well as traditional knowledge of diplomacy confirmed the ascendancy of the Upper House in foreign politics, and made the Foreign Office itself an appanage for the nobility. So far Fox was the only commoner who had been Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Fox himself was the son of a lord, and the nephew of a duke. Descended from the Bristol Canynges, the rebuilders of St Mary Redcliff church in 1470, the Foreign Secretary could indeed point to a descent more ancient than that of half the peerage. Like Chatham, however, he had not been born into the ruling class. His more recent ancestors had settled at Garvagh in Stuart times; his father had married beneath him; his son was sneered at by the exalted classes who had long manned the Foreign Office as a young Irish adventurer; he owed his start in life, they said, to having been taken away from the second-class actress, his mother, by a rich uncle. Even George Canning's brilliant successes at Eton and Christchurch hurt rather than helped him with the magnates, Tory and Whig alike, who from Bolingbroke's day had detested and distrusted "that d——d intellect." Pitt, however, sent for him. Then came the parliamentary seat so easily arranged in those days for youths of promise; this was followed six years later by marriage to an heiress, the Duchess of Portland's sister, with a fortune that made her husband independent of profession or of office. Canning's career thus presents no exception to the absolute rule that in England private wealth is
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the indispensable condition of public success. It was, however, strikingly appropriate to the new socio-political order now beginning that the first man of genius who, since Fox, on the Whig side, had managed the Foreign Office, should be warned off as a trespasser and cold-shouldered as a parvenu.

In Canning's day any particularly exciting question that turned up was called, in Foreign Office slang, "a bustle." The new Secretary of State had been at his post only six months when there came upon him a greater "bustle" than any the department had known since the Oczakow affair of 1792, and in comparison with which for its results Oczakow was insignificant. Apart from the personal energy and spirit of Canning, the Portland administration, in which he first became Secretary of State, was pledged, by the Pittites who formed its backbone, to a policy worthy of their departed master. One vital modification of its methods was, however, admitted. Half-hearted coalitions paid by England were to be given over. Here Canning would have found himself in general agreement with Fox. When the third coalition uniting England, Austria, and Russia against France was formed by the Treaty of St Petersburg (1805), Canning indeed had himself protested against these arrangements. "Let us," he said, "in future rather turn our attention to helping all states who of their own free will go against Napoleon." Pitt's negotiations with that end were actively going on at the moment of his death. They were continued by Fox as soon as the peace discussions of 1806 had manifestly become a failure. Fox, however, in the "Talents" administration had concurred with
Grenville as First Lord of the Treasury in starving the war and withholding that vigorous application of resources which would have at least attached their allies if it had not actually brought the struggle to a close. Castlereagh, when becoming War and Colonial Secretary, had, like Canning, made it a condition that this ill-timed parsimony and slackness should cease. The two men began by providing the King of Prussia with £100,000 in cash and military stores for 200,000 men. At the Foreign Office, Canning's first task was to negotiate with Austria about a European pacification, but on the express condition of united action by all the allies against France. The Russian grievance against England was deepened by rumours of diplomatic dealings between England and Sweden. The Czar then began to complain of Britain's bad faith in the matter of subsidies. Nevertheless, in April 1806, he became a party to the Treaty of Bartenstein pledging England, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, to carry on the war together and not without each other's approval to make peace. Thus far Prussia had not given England much reason to trust her as an ally, whether in diplomacy or in the field. She is now to appear in a new character. Towards the end of June 1807, Napoleon had broken the army of the Czar at Eylau. After that battle the French conqueror tried to bribe Prussia to desert her vanquished ally; the offer was refused—with what results to Prussia herself will presently be seen. Meanwhile, Napoleon's necessities were to furnish a novel and interesting illustration of the growing connection between the rulers of states and the controllers of the money market. The military operations against Russia...
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were about to be crowned by the victory of Friedland; these made it desirable that he should secure the goodwill of so important a section of the Czar's subjects as was formed by the descendants of the chosen race domiciled in Southern Russia. At the same time, as Talleyrand shrewdly remarked, and as that diplomatist has been seen to possess good reason for knowing, the Hebrew capitalists were the men capable above all others of replenishing the Imperial purse. Limits to the possibilities even of Prussian plunder had begun to hint themselves; if Prussia was drained the French troops must find a new paymaster. Napoleon did not go to the Jews. He assembled them at Paris in a meeting impressively representative of their intelligence not less than of their wealth.*

The supreme achievement of Canning's first Secretaryship of State was now at hand. The Foreign Minister's declared refusal to follow the example of his master Pitt, in the matter of coalitions, paid by England and not earning their money, had not prevented him from sending £250,000 to Austria soon after he took office, as well as smaller amounts, together with stores and troops to Russia. The Czar, however, through the head of his Foreign Office, General Budberg, appeared before the English ambassador at St Petersburg as a martyr suffering in mind, body and estate from his simple-hearted confidence in England's violated promises indefinitely, if need be, to supply those sinews of a war into which Alexander had entered not from any motives of personal profit, but from a disinterested feeling of duty to the peace and welfare of Europe. To the injustice


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done by England to himself must be added the injuries inflicted upon the commerce of his realm by Great Britain's persistent opposition to the Maritime League of the Northern Powers. Hence, he said, the wrongs sustained from English ships by the commercial interests of his realm. Such, briefly, was the Russian case against England. The charges were disposed of by Canning in a famous despatch. The refutation had, of course, irritated the Czar rather than convinced him. After the decisive defeat of his troops at Friedland, he determined to violate the promise he had given in the Treaty of Bartenstein of refusing any accommodation with Napoleon which did not include his allies. He therefore obtained an armistice from the victor, and arranged the famous meeting with Napoleon on a raft in the river Niemen, off the town of Tilsit. What followed was a new version of the Bourbon Family Compact brought to light by the elder Pitt.

The most amazing stipulations of the Tilsit agreement between the two Cæsars did not directly affect England and may be very briefly summarised. The point from which they started was the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy in Spain, of the Braganza line in Portugal, of the Turkish Sultanate if necessary, and of any other institutions which might interfere with Bonaparte's distribution of European countries among kings belonging to his own family, or with the rearrangement of Central European states; these were to be parcelled out so as to become the most effectual bulwarks of the usurper's throne. In exchange for Russian neutrality or help with regard to those projects, the Czar was at once to have a free hand in Finland; he was to be allowed to absorb the entire European dominions of
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the Porte and to push his conquests up to the Golden Horn. One significant condition the French emperor insisted on. The Czar was not in any event to possess Constantinople. Mr Gladstone's "bag and baggage" policy of a generation since was anticipated to the letter by the nineteenth-century Charlemagne in a characteristically vigorous phrase—"Those brutes of Turks" were to be expelled from Europe. Their capital, however, must not pass into the hands of any European Power.

The secret articles of the Tilsit Convention directed against Great Britain scarcely occupied a morning's talk. The English Government was to be allowed four months to repent of its perversity. If by the 1st of November the London Cabinet had not cancelled the system of maritime outrage which was its selfish and savage way of dealing with the enlightened Continental system and Berlin Decree, the islanders must be treated as the common enemies of the human race. The reference here was to the Orders in Council prohibiting all trade between English subjects or allies and any ports in French occupation. These Orders had first been issued by the Whig Government of Grenville and Grey, in the January of 1807. They were thus in force when the Duke of Portland and Canning succeeded to power. They were expedients of what has been called the "tu quoque" school of statesmanship, and retaliated against France the perpetual blockade to which Napoleon had condemned the British Isles. Napoleon's diplomacy of systematically embroiling Russia with England began to be put into execution at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Tilsit compact between the two emperors was but the last in a series of transactions.
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These placed the Czar at the disposal of the French emperor in the long-cherished and carefully thought-out plan of destroying the sea power of England. Europe as a whole had made itself the French conqueror's tool in this design. Denmark and Portugal alone remained outside the Continental system. If both the recalcitrant states would not declare war against England, handing over their fleets to France as European emancipator, they must be threatened with immediate hostilities. Such was the plot matured by the two rulers on their raft in the Niemen. The general features of the conspiracy possessed indeed little novelty for Canning, who had long suspected something of the sort to be in the wind. Where Pitt found only reason for thinking, Canning was in a position for knowing that difficulties of transport alone prevented Napoleon's descent upon Ireland, as a base for operations against Britain. Once let the French emperor obtain the vessels he needed, the invasion of England would come as surely as the Channel could be crossed.

By what precise means or on what exact dates the secret articles of the Tilsit treaties reached the Foreign Secretary may not even yet be certainly known. After the lapse of just a hundred years since the Tilsit negotiations were held, the details that have gradually come to light concerning them suffice for a narrative tolerably circumstantial, if at one or two points conjectural of the episode. Writing on 22nd July to Brook-Taylor, Garlike's successor as our envoy at Copenhagen, Canning mentions intelligence having reached him "yesterday" from Tilsit about Bonaparte's designs. By whom and from whom were the tidings here referred to conveyed?
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On or about 21st July, there called at the Foreign Office a mysterious stranger desiring to see the Secretary of State on a confidential matter of urgent importance. This visitor was almost certainly an English spy named Mackenzie, who said that, concealed behind a curtain on the raft, he had caught occasional glimpses of the animated and cordial manner of the two emperors to each other, and had overheard clearly all their conversation. Mackenzie has been thought by some to be a myth. The Denmark documents of the Foreign Office contain reasons for regarding him as a reality. It does not, of course, necessarily follow that Mackenzie's tale was all of it first-hand. Some scraps may, as the eavesdropper said, actually have reached his lurking-place. The rumours, of which at the time the air was full, may easily have enabled him to eke them out and to give them a plausible appearance. But in well-informed quarters at the time the agency through which the Tilsit secret reached the Foreign Office was believed to be that of Count d'Antraigues, an ardent French royalist who took an active part in the restoration of Louis XVIII. Canning himself may have had direct communications from the regent of Portugal. He was also in the habit of supplementing letters from ambassadors, as well as from private friends, with a very careful study of the Paris newspapers. Canning, however, spoke of his informant as an exalted personage whose name it was impossible for him to reveal. Was this only Canning's full-dress Foreign Office manner of affecting a grand indignation at the suggestion by some of his opponents that the man behind the curtain, so far from being some highly placed, curiously com-
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municative diplomatist, would turn out to be a common-place international spy. Or could Canning's informant have been Talleyrand? In favour of this last supposition, so long ago as 1797, at the Lille Conference with Malmesbury, Talleyrand had been ready to intrigue with England against Napoleon. In 1807, Talleyrand was under sentence of dismissal. Though he had formerly favoured or even suggested Bonaparte's Portuguese and Spanish schemes, moved by pique against his master, he may now have been ready for a new trick. Certainly Napoleon himself suspected Talleyrand.

At any rate, the news brought by the enigmatic caller at the Foreign Office, whether Mackenzie or another, was fully and exactly verified by events. Canning's memory was still fresh when enough of the secret articles were known to vindicate his action. The final justification came with their full text, not published till 1877.* Before Canning's time, Denmark, it must be remembered, had been forcibly admonished, by Nelson's bombardment of Copenhagen in 1801, of the heavy forfeit to be exacted by England for future participation in the Armed Neutrality. Yet in 1806 Canning had learned from Captain Dunbar's report about the preparations going forward in Danish docks of stores and ships. This, as Denmark did not deny, might mean war with England. At the same time the Danish Government excited further suspicion by its acquiescence in, though not its formal adhesion to, the Continental System; Denmark also had denounced England's violently practical answer to the Berlin Decree. However rough the British reprisal, it was

* These details are most clearly and instructively brought together by Mr H. W. V. Temperley in his Life of Canning, p. 93.
gentle in comparison with the original provocation. As will be seen a little later, both the Decree and the Orders in Council were mistakes, recoiling with equal severity upon their makers. The Napoleonic edict from the Prussian capital had been accepted as mutely by the Danes as was Napoleon's later threat of taking for an enemy any neutral that allowed the infliction upon her shipping of the outrages threatened by the Orders in Council. Canning's predecessor at the Foreign Office, Howick, had first remonstrated with Rist, the Danish representative in London, on the evident partiality of the Copenhagen cabinet to Napoleon. About the same time, before the Tilsit meeting, Canning acquainted the Danish court through our envoy, Brook-Taylor, that our engagements to Sweden and the protection of British reinforcements might bring English ships into Danish waters. Denmark therefore had for some time given Great Britain much reason to distrust her and could complain of no lack of warnings, severe or gentle, that England was not prepared to stand much trifling from a professedly friendly Power. Both delicate hints and stern monitions were fresh in the Danish mind when Canning heard, whether from Mackenzie the spy or from another quarter, that Bonaparte had publicly declared Denmark's adhesion to the new anti-British Maritime League to be not less certain than it was essential. Under these circumstances the indignant denial by the Danish Crown Prince of any intention to make common cause with France produced no impression upon the latest English envoy to Denmark, Jackson. "Were you," asked George III., when Jackson recited the whole incident, "upstairs or on
the ground-floor at the time of your telling the Danish prince you did not believe him?"

"On the ground floor, so please your Majesty."

"That was well," rejoined the king, "for your sake, otherwise had he been of my way of thinking he would certainly have kicked you downstairs."

What followed is too well known to be repeated at any length. The Danish army was defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley at Roskilde; Copenhagen, bombarded by land and sea, surrendered on 8th September, the ships anchored in her harbour. On 28th October the British and Danish fleets, both flying the English flag, paid a friendly visit to King Gustavus IV. of Sweden, the most loyal and dauntless of England's allies. "Bustle and glory too," triumphantly murmured the whole Downing Street staff, after the pupil of Pitt, in "weathering the Northern storm," had shown himself a worthy successor of the master-pilot.

Denmark may have been, as she protested, true to England, but appearances were against her. When Jackson refused to be reassured by the Crown Prince's fair words, he still had in his ears Canning's warning reminder that, so far back as July, Napoleon had told Talleyrand to insist on the closing of Danish ports against England. "However fair the promises for the future, we cannot," had been Canning's final instructions to his representative, "forget that in the near past, as we already know from the Danish Foreign Minister, Bernstorff, the Crown Prince at once undertook not only to shut us out of the Baltic, but to place himself in everything at Napoleon's disposal." Canning, moreover, had other informants in this matter; first Pierrepont, our ambassador to Sweden,
and secondly the King of Sweden himself. The latter, in letters to our Foreign Office and to George III., begged there might be no delay in the British fleet’s going to the Baltic. Canning’s diplomacy and his consequent action were justified by the result. If he had not fully succeeded, to quote his own words, in “stunning Russia into her senses,” he caused the Czar to pause, to delay for some months his adoption of the Continental system and his declaration of war against England. The practical results of Canning’s Danish policy were that the landing of French troops in Ireland was prevented, and the chance of the Irish rising against us to a man disappeared. The Baltic remained open; we could therefore send our promised reinforcements to the King of Sweden; we could enable the Spanish General Romana to run the French gauntlet, to convey 10,000 troops back to Spain and train them there for afterwards rising against French despotism. The precedents for the strong measures taken were, the British occupation of Portuguese property, the island of Madeira, to prevent its being seized by France in 1801, and, as security against a like risk, the taking of Lisbon by the Fox and Grenville Government in 1806.

The vigour which marked Canning’s first period at the Foreign Office did not cease when the echoes of the Copenhagen cannonade died away. The accounts from foreign capitals now received by the Secretary of State conspired with the course of public events to increase the probability of an effective European concert developing itself against Bonaparte. To avoid whatever might mar the rising harmony became therefore a paramount object of Canning’s policy. In all
this, Canning consistently and successfully revived Pitt’s policy of non-intervention in European affairs, except for the necessary protection of essentially British interests. The first of those interests, for the moment, was the maintenance of our sea-strength unimpaired. On 11th November 1807, therefore, new stringency was given to the Orders in Council issued in the preceding January. Our representatives abroad were instructed to acquaint foreign governments with the proved inadequacy of the existing measures. Let them (were Canning’s new orders) understand that it is not enough to hold all ports of France and of her allies to be in a state of blockade. Whoever is not for us must be considered against us. It is not enough for a country to practise mere neutrality or even to make, after the Danish manner, professions of friendship. The test must be the reception of the British flag. Where that is excluded, we have to deal as with an open enemy. In this matter Canning, it must be remembered, was using a weapon not of his own forging or unreservedly approved by him. The idea of the Orders in Council seems to have been struck out by George Rose, Pitt’s Secretary to the Treasury.* Canning himself lived to disapprove of them and to protest against their continuance.

The next act in the diplomatic drama had, meanwhile, opened in Paris. The Portuguese ambassador to France was told that Napoleon’s mission as champion of international morality compelled him to insist on Portugal punishing England for her wanton outrage on Denmark, by a declaration of war. The diplomatic situation now developed had, it must be confessed, a

* See also page 224.

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certain drollery. So far from Great Britain protesting against Portugal's mute sufferance of the seizure of her subjects and shipping by Napoleon, England actually advised her to save herself by accepting the French ultimatum. "By all means," in effect said Canning to the Lisbon Government, "make war against us as the Dictator of Europe desires; only do your best to avoid the confiscation of English property." Portugal acted on the advice, took its place among our declared enemies, but spared the property of British residents. This was not enough for the French emperor, who, upon his favourite principle that war ought to support war, had long since arranged to gratify his favourites by the plunder of British possessions in the Peninsula. While in the very act of appropriating the valuables belonging to the prosperous merchants of Frankfort, and the masterpieces of Italian art at Rome, Bonaparte had cherished the design of looting the traders of all nations, especially of England, in Portugal and Spain. On 17th October 1807, the French invasion, and with it the panic at the Lisbon court, began. This was part of the policy arranged at Tilsit, and some time before then discussed between Napoleon and his Foreign Minister. The peace negotiations of 1806, instituted by Fox, had been conducted by Yarmouth, Lauderdale and Rosslyn. So far back as then Talleyrand made no mystery of the French intention to absorb the whole Peninsula. More than that, the accounts of the negotiations furnish the earliest circumstantial evidence to show that, in 1806 Talleyrand keenly supported the peninsular projects.* Then at least there could have been no

* O'Meara, ii. 330; Thibaudeau, vi. 296.
reason for imputing to Talleyrand dissent from or even indifference to Napoleon's Iberian schemes. The most cosmopolitan of London drawing-rooms in Canning's time was that of Miss Lydia White, regularly visited by Canning, Castlereagh, Sir James Mackintosh, and an emporium of diplomatic gossip. "If," said to the present writer the late Mr Alfred Montgomery, "we knew the secrets of that house, we might find that as a visitor there Canning knew enough when as yet Talleyrand could not have told him a word about Tilsit." Before the French Revolution had kindled the European conflagration, England, France, Portugal and Spain had become, by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, nominal allies. After Tilsit, Russian diplomacy in the person of the Czar's ambassador at Madrid, Baron Strogonoff, keenly alive to the precarious nature of any agreement with France, so worked upon the Spanish Government as to make it meditate hostilities against France in the Pyrenees. The plan was to unite England, Russia and Spain in maintaining the liberties of that very peninsula against which the Tilsit peace had given Napoleon a free hand. Every detail of this new arrangement became known to Napoleon on the day of his victory at Jena. Three years after the Anglo-Russian rupture completed at Tilsit, the Czar himself, in the December of 1810, withdrew from Napoleon's commercial system, and so by his own act cancelled the conspiracy to which he had with the French emperor been a party at the riverain frontier of his empire and of the Prussian monarchy. This secession was followed by a Russian proposal to England for action on behalf of absolutism in Spain.
CHAPTER IX

FROM TILSIT TO CHAUMONT


The excitement caused by the Tilsit revelations subsided, the echoes of Canning's bombardment of Copenhagen died away. The European states began to group themselves round France in hostility to England. Russia indeed, by refusing from regard to the interests of her land-owners strictly to enforce the suspension of trade with Great Britain, stood aloof from Napoleon; she thus began to provoke those suicidal reprisals from the French dictator which were to lure him to his ruin at Moscow. On the other hand Denmark now became openly hostile to us. Even Sweden, on 7th September 1807, by the capitulation of
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Rugen, enabled Napoleon to make himself master of Northern Germany. Portugal alone still refused to acknowledge the Berlin Decree. Though that country had at our instance formally accepted Bonaparte's ultimatum and made a declaration of war against us, her regent's refusal to confiscate English property had caused Napoleon to invade her territory. At Tilsit, we know, the Czar had been authorised by Bonaparte to absorb Finland, which from the thirteenth century had belonged to Sweden, and to annex the Danubian provinces that were part of European Turkey. In return he was to connive at Napoleon's bestowing on members of his own family the Braganza monarchy in Portugal and the Bourbon crown in Spain. The French attempt to carry these designs into execution began in the second year (1808) of Canning's initial term at the Foreign Office. In that year England had for its representative in Portugal Percy Strangford, Viscount Clinton, who accompanied the Portuguese court to Brazil on its flight there from the French invader. The Portuguese ambassadors to the British capital have often been equally in favour at the palace and in society. From 1808 to 1811 the Portuguese envoy in London was Chevalier de Souza Coutinho, afterwards Conde de Funchal, notable alike for his skill in politics and success in society. The treaty signed by Canning and him, 2nd October 1807, formed the basis of Anglo-Portuguese relations throughout this period. The clauses of mutual alliance and defence were accompanied by an arrangement for the King of Portugal's departure for Brazil. That was immediately carried out, and across the Atlantic the king remained till his realm at home had been cleared of the enemy.
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For some little time before his actual invasion of the country in 1808, Spain had engaged the diplomatic and military attention of the French emperor. The retrospect of the relation into which Napoleon and Spain had so far been brought contained little that can have seemed entirely satisfactory to either. For what were the fortunes that had attended the connection between the two? Spain had no sooner joined the first Coalition than French armies crossed the Pyrenees; three years later she entered the service of France, only to find her battleships beaten at St Vincent. To suit his convenience at the Amiens negotiations, Napoleon surrendered the Spanish West Indian colony Trinidad to England; on the renewal of the war he forced Spain into hostilities with England, and so brought upon her the humiliation of Trafalgar. In the years that followed, Napoleon was systematically misled by his agents as to the state of national feeling and political movement in the Peninsula. Canning, on the other hand, thanks partly to the excellent working order into which every division of his department had been brought, found himself better informed than any Foreign Minister yet had been as to political movements and popular feeling abroad. In particular he knew that, so far from being brought, as Napoleon believed, by national discontent to the verge of a revolution, Spain remained loyal to her established dynasty, and would wage war to the knife against the alien who tried to supplant it.

On the 27th of October 1807, Napoleon followed up the Tilsit plot with what his satellites applauded as a political master-stroke. This was the Treaty of Fontainebleau between France and Spain for the
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partition of Portugal. The British Foreign Office under Canning now knew enough of Napoleon's international methods to feel sure that his compact with the Spanish Government was but a blind. The expressions of Talleyrand and others in his confidence, some years before, about Spain were now recalled. Bursting with self-importance and with odds and ends of news picked up by him in strange European corners, a native of Napoleon's own Corsica, Pozzo di Borgo, of whom more will be said later, contrived at this time frequently to be closeted with Canning, as before he had been with Pitt. "It is only," exclaimed this foreign visitor, "a trap for catching the Spanish court. Directly Bonaparte has put the people at Madrid off their guard, he will make a single meal, not merely of Portugal, but of Spain too. Hence all this apparent regard for the national pride, with the promises of restoring to the Bourbon crown the jewels taken away from it by England in the Atlantic." Such indeed, before the nineteenth century had completed its first decade, was to prove the case. Canning did not become member for Liverpool till 1812. It was, however, during his earliest term of office that he more specially began to insist to his Parliamentary followers, on popular platforms as well as in official despatches, on commerce and trade as the handmaids, if not the foundations, of empire. War had given a stimulus to British manufacture of all kinds, more particularly to the cotton goods of Manchester and the woollens of Bradford. The Continental System had prevented the actual importation of these British products into the countries most needing them, and had so caused distress less to England than to her neighbours. On slavery and its
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abolition Canning's views, when the occasion for expressing them came, proved to be not unlike those of Burke; the negro he described as a being with the form of a man and the intellect of a child. As regards trade he was liberal enough to make an opening towards the establishment of free commercial exchange. His great principle was that trade with this country must in the long run prove more necessary to foreign nations than to England. "Our own colonies," Canning said to Souza, "supply us with ample means of self-support." Canning's conviction that Napoleon's difficulties in Spain were only beginning with his success in duping the Spanish court was justified by the national incidents immediately following the French invasion.

At this point we are again reminded that during the earlier years of the nineteenth century were busily at work certain diplomatic agencies independent of and separate from any Foreign Office machinery. In France, after his deposition and during his imprisonment, Louis XVI. conducted an entire series of negotiations between himself, the French royalists and foreign Powers friendly to the monarchy, through the Duc de Breteuil, his former minister, and through Mallet-du-Pan. This last was the distinguished French publicist who associated himself with Malouet, Mirabeau and others, in the cause of moderation during that period of frenzy when to advocate political sobriety was denounced as treason to the rights of man. His property had been confiscated, his library burned by the Jacobins. With broken health and spirits, after some months of wandering, he found himself in England a penniless exile; nevertheless he contrived to start in London an international newspaper written
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in French, *Le Mercure Britannique*, on the plan of the extinct *Mercure de France*. Pitt, during his first premiership, recognised the refugee’s abilities by employing him on several little Foreign Office missions; he eventually rewarded his services by giving his widow a pension of £300 a year and his son an appointment in the Audit Office. In due time this son succeeded to his father’s official career, and was himself followed by a son of his own who, beginning life in the Board of Trade and as private secretary to Lord Taunton, helped Cobden in his French commercial treaty and became afterwards Sir Louis Malet, Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office. The exact precedent for the international enterprise of Spanish patriotism in 1808, had been in 1794 the mission of Count Alfred de Puisaye, the leader of the royalist rising against the Republic in la Vendée; De Puisaye’s adventures, before he succeeded in escaping to England, recall the wanderings and escapes of the Young Pretender in the Western Highlands. De Puisaye himself, though kindly received by Pitt, only succeeded in promoting the disastrous Quiberon expedition.

"It was," at a later date said Napoleon, "that fatal peninsular adventure which ruined me." Before that, however, when one of those about him pointed out the risk of invading Spain, Bonaparte’s words had been, "Believe me, countries governed by monks are not hard to conquer." The sneer sank deeply into the ecclesiastical mind of the threatened country. It transformed Churchmen into diplomatists and soldiers. It was a Franciscan friar, Jean Rico, who, in Valencia, first planned and led the national rising against the French.
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He was followed by Balthazar Calvo, a canon of Madrid. The Spanish multitude instinctively distrusted its aristocracy. In a democratic and largely a peasant priesthood, the peninsular patriots of the cottage and of the pavement found natural leaders whom they were prepared to follow with the same fidelity that fifteen years earlier had been displayed by the Paris mob towards Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois. The rising against the French at once became popular and as sanguinary as might have been expected in an age when the rabble in Southern Europe was excited and demoralised by bloodshed soaking the whole continent. Conspicuous among the official representatives of Spain in London at this period were Admiral Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, the Duke of Infantado, the Duke of Montellano, the Duke of San Carlos, and, as chargé d'affaires till his arrival, the Chevalier Campuzano. To-day these may be names only, but though one or two of the number came a little after that period, the diplomatists now indicated, between 1808 and 1812, were in daily communication with the English Foreign Office, both under Canning and Castlereagh. On the other hand the men despatched during these critical years from Downing Street to Madrid were the pick of the service. John Hookham Frere, as we already know, not only possessed Canning's intimacy, but had not a little of the literary brilliance and versatility with which the diplomacy of the time sparkled. Richard Wellesley, at a later date to become successively Lord Cowley, the Marquis Wellesley, and head of the Foreign Office in 1808, succeeded Frere at the Madrid embassy; after a short interval he was himself followed at Madrid by
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Charles Richard Vaughan. All these representatives of Great Britain felt a strong personal interest in the struggle for national existence forced upon the country to which they were accredited. Some of them may, like Frere, have expected too much from the hurriedly raised Spanish levies. Here they might perhaps have profited more than they did from the sound and shrewd counsel of certain among the English settlers in the country. Chief among these was a British merchant at Cadiz, named Strange, who, before being assassinated in his efforts to calm an insurrectionary mob, had warned the English ambassador against trusting too implicitly the military organisation or professions of the Spanish leaders. The negotiations conducted by our Madrid embassy had great results. Encouraged by the British promise of arms, help and the necessary supplies, Spain entered into a treaty with England not to conclude a separate peace with Napoleon. At the same time Sir Arthur Wellesley at the head of the British reinforcements, arrived to take the chief command.

By associating it with the championship of a people rising against an invading despot, the Foreign Secretary attracted the enthusiastic interest of the country to his diplomacy. To the British masses foreign policy till now had seemed an affair of experts chiefly in the House of Lords. The invasion of Spain enabled Canning to bring down international statesmanship to the level of popular comprehension, much after the manner that Socrates had been said to cause philosophy to descend from the gods to men. Whatever the mistakes due to his impatience and irritability, Canning as Foreign Minister lifted his department above the level of party. British ambassadors began to be popularly regarded,
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not in their former light as the agents of court or of cabinet, but as trustees of the national honour and agents in executing the national will. As Canning's political opponent Sheridan put it, all factions must unite to help a people animated, like the Spanish, with one spirit against Bonaparte. It was, he said, the kind of chance in vain longed for by Fox. Therefore, from all Foxites, Canning must receive a support as cordial as if the man whom they most loved were restored to life. To the Tory Foreign Minister, Canning, had indeed come the opportunity, denied to the democratic Fox, of popularising the technicalities of his portfolio. As he himself put it, in making Spain the theatre of war the common tyrant of mankind had offered for a battlefield a sea-girt and mountainous region where the numerical inferiority of the British armies will expose them to less disadvantage than in any other theatre of European warfare. Till now no Foreign Minister had been sure that his operations might not be hampered by the indifference of his official staff, or his policy at some critical point overruled by some ministerial colleague. Thus when Fox on his third term, after a month's interval of Lord Mulgrave, followed the Earl of Harrowby, he had the greatest difficulty with the permanent members of his staff, attached as these were to the Tory tradition of the Duke of Leeds. The Duke of Leeds himself, in Pitt's Government, and the Prime Minister worked harmoniously together only on the principle of the one never trusting the other out of his sight. When, with Pitt still at the Treasury, Grenville went to the Foreign Office, the Secretary of State was incessantly complaining, with or without cause, that even if despatches
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for his department were not actually intercepted, Bland Burges or one of the other Under-Secretaries, who had now become institutions, contrived to curry favour with the Prime Minister by acquainting him with their contents before the papers had been fully mastered by the Foreign Minister himself. Once Canning was established in Downing Street, inter-official jealousies and suspicions began to be unknown. The Secretary of State's position resembled that of a later Foreign Minister, Palmerston, at the height of his power; he had become not merely the chief of the department and the framer of a policy, but the personification of the popular mood and the national purpose.

Canning's diplomacy proved universally intelligible and had an inspiring influence on every section of the British people. It not only appealed to the deepest sentiments of the race; it was immediately accompanied by visible and practical steps for the succour of a now friendly people struggling to be free. The man who was the life and soul of the administration to which he belonged had, for the relief of Napoleon's latest victims, opened a subscription list which everyone signed. From the beginning of June 1808 to Canning's resignation in 1809, the money subsidies sent by Great Britain amounted to £3,100,000. The cash was accompanied by every variety of military stores and materials, as well as articles of dress. In addition to the state supplies, purses for the Spanish patriots were started in all centres of business or pleasure throughout the United Kingdom.

Canning, by sheer hard work and tact combined, induced the English representatives of the Spanish Government, whom he saw almost daily, to use their
influence for overcoming mutual jealousies among the Juntas that now governed Spain; at the same time he instructed his own agents in Spain to beware of wounding the national pride of a susceptible race. The answer of the English people to the stimulating appeal of Canning's statesmanship was promptly rewarded by the defeat which (19th July 1808) the Spanish commander Reding inflicted on the French general, Dupont, at Baylen. Then first the English people were satisfied that the enterprise to which their minister had committed them was practicable.

The British ambassador to Madrid at this time was Canning's old personal friend, John Hookham Frere; he had received the appointment partly in recognition of his having secured the safe convoy to Spain of 10,000 Spanish troops, pressed by Napoleon into French service, from Denmark, under the command of Romana. The Foreign Secretary had a generous belief in the military vigour of the Spanish resistance to Napoleon. Frere shared this faith and practically retained it after he ought to have been undeceived by experience. On the other hand Castlereagh, the War Minister in the Portland Government, though without anything of Canning's genius, was not his inferior in administrative ability, had no sympathy with his optimism and resented his tendency to interfere in matters outside his own department.

On 10th December 1808, Frere received instructions from Canning, urging stronger and prompter military action. There seemed a danger of the operations in the Peninsula coming, in 1809, to an ineffectual close. Overbearing some of his Cabinet colleagues, the masterful Foreign Secretary concluded a treaty with the
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provisional Government of Spain; this pledged both Spain and England to abstain from making a separate peace.

At last Frere perceived as clearly as, with some reluctance, did Canning himself, that, whatever the native courage and potential efficiency of the Portuguese or Spanish troops, British training, command and discipline were necessary to render them trustworthy. Here the English War Minister would generally have agreed with the Foreign Minister and his representative at Madrid. Canning and Castlereagh differed in their ideas of the exact capacity in which the Duke of Wellington, then Sir Arthur Wellesley, landed at Lisbon in 1808. It was with the entire approval of both that he became next year Commander-in-chief. Meanwhile Frere was occupied with the critical task of manipulating the morbidly acute susceptibilities of the Spanish Government and people in such a way as to overcome their objection to Spanish fortresses being garrisoned by English soldiers.

While thus engaged, Frere heard at his embassy of a private emissary from Castlereagh having reached Spain to arrange for the landing of an English contingent at Cadiz, without this purpose being officially communicated to the Foreign Minister at home, or to his representative at the Spanish capital. The relations between the Ministers for War and for Foreign Affairs were embittered by the incident just recounted; they were strained beyond endurance by the Walcheren expedition, whose failure was attributed to the War Office slackness in postponing it from the early spring to the late summer. Incompatibility of personal character and political temper was, however,
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enough to explain the rupture which had from the first been inevitable. The two men indeed represented respectively not only two schools of political thought, but two mutually opposed social dispensations. The contrast in their personal appearance was only the outward and visible sign of the deeper differences dividing them in their attitude towards affairs and upon tendencies at home and abroad. As they sat not far from each other in the House of Commons on the same Treasury bench, Castlereagh, with a certain magnificent air, throwing back his blue coat the better to show his broad chest and white waistcoat, thrilled the assembly with proud admiration for its patrician leader. Canning, on the other hand, imitated his master Pitt in wearing his coat tightly buttoned up to his neck-cloth, while, folding his arms, he clothed his finely cut features with an expression, half-humorous, half-scornful, such as became the intellectual ruler of the Chamber. The House, if it feared Canning's rhymed epigrams, was put at its ease by his lucid rhetoric, and particularly admired the skill with which, like Brougham, he could dovetail into an elaborately prepared context passages freshly suggested by the arguments or incidents of debate.

The Portland Cabinet had no sooner got to work than the world knew there was not room in it both for Canning and Castlereagh. The Foreign Secretary took little trouble to conceal his conviction that either he or the War Minister must go. The wonder is not that, according to the custom of the time, the two men brought their quarrel to a crisis in a duel, but that the precedent of the hostile meeting between Pitt and Tierney sixteen years earlier had not been followed long
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before. The traditional accounts of the Canning and Castlereagh encounter are confused and contradictory; so minutely careful an authority as Sir Archibald Alison, rebutting the charge of the two principals in the affair having caused a Cabinet scandal, declares that when they fought both had ceased to be ministers. May not the truth be that both had placed their resignations in Portland's hands, but that the king's pleasure on them had not been taken?

The next resignation, that of the Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland himself (he died a few weeks afterwards), made Spencer Perceval premier and provided a famous Foreign Secretary of a later day, Lord Palmerston, with an opening for his great career. Canning was immediately followed at the Foreign Office by the third Earl Bathurst. Bathurst had been made Master of the Mint by Pitt, had retained that post under Addington, and had been the Duke of Portland's President of the Board of Trade. With a happy knack of making himself useful in any position at the shortest notice, he was always in readiness for temporary employment, as now, in the capacity of stop-gap and warming-pan. One of his diplomatic missions had for its object to encourage the Tyrolese in the rising against Napoleon. Perceval was already in communication with Frere's successor in our Madrid embassy, Lord Wellesley, the elder brother of Sir Arthur who was leading our army to victory. In rather less than two months Wellesley had sufficiently wound up his business as British representative at the court of Madrid to return to England and to become at the Foreign Office the colleague of a minister quite as antipathetic to himself

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as Castlereagh had been to Canning. It was in 1818 that Brougham examined Goodall, the headmaster of Eton, before the Education Committee of the House of Commons as to an alleged injustice done to Porson, when an Eton boy, in not selecting him for King's, Cambridge. In the course of his reply Goodall, while admitting Porson's attainments, denied that he was near being the best Greek scholar in the school. Lord Wellesley, he added, was altogether his superior. This accomplished Hellenist, after having been Lord of the Treasury, received his official training as Governor-General of India; he more than maintained the tradition of scholarship with which Canning had first associated the Foreign Office. The international ideas to which as Secretary of State he gave effect may be inferred from his fidelity to Pitt's views about England's duties towards Jacobinism, and from a speech of his own still classical, made in 1794, denouncing the law of Nature first promulgated by Danton, and ordaining that the Alps, the Pyrenees, the ocean and the Rhine should be the only boundaries to the French dominions. During one period of his life Lord Wellesley so closely resembled his brother the Duke of Wellington, that they were constantly mistaken for each other. The most striking features of both were the eyes, blue in colour, very round and very large, and in a less degree the more famous hook-nose; the nose was done justice to by D'Orsay in his speaking likeness of the Duke; the only picture portraying the Wellesley eyes is a drawing by Goya. By the time Lord Wellesley entered the department it had been put into such first-rate working order by a series of Under-Secretaries, that its business went
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almost automatically. Among those organising officials, the most active had been the George Hammond already mentioned in these pages. Hammond, after several foreign missions elsewhere, had in 1791 gone as the first representative of the English Government to the United States; here he was warmly welcomed by Jefferson as the pioneer of happier relations with the old country. Hammond only retired about the time of Wellesley's establishment in Downing Street. Wellesley's connection with Hammond's earliest patron, Pitt, was enough to recommend the former Under-Secretary to the new head of the Foreign Office; during the three years that he held the seals Wellesley's administration proceeded much on the lines that Hammond's experience suggested.

The next change in the directorship of the department was caused by Perceval's assassination in the May of 1812, followed by the abortive attempts to patch up a ministry in which both Canning and Castlereagh should serve together with Wellesley, under Grenville and Grey. These efforts failed because the one principle to which Wellesley at the Foreign Office had pledged England was support of the Peninsular War. Grenville and Grey regarded that struggle with the general Whig impatience and only wished to see it at an end. On the 8th of June 1812 the ministerial interregnum was ended by the formation of Lord Liverpool's long-lived Cabinet. The new premier practically offered Canning his choice of places; the offer failed to include the leadership of the Commons, which was to go to Castlereagh. Canning's refusal was prompted by no personal objection to serve under Liverpool, but by a dislike to identify himself
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with an administration, formed at a critical time, beset by increasing difficulties and not likely, as it seemed, to be favoured by fortune in any department of its policy. During 1810 and 1811 our army under Wellesley had dispossessed Napoleon of Portugal. On the other hand most of Spain was held by the French; the victory of Wagram, the revolution in Sweden portended apparently the consolidation of Napoleon's power. The French conqueror's marriage with the Austrian emperor's daughter, Marie Louise, in 1810, is now known to have been but the device of Metternich, who arranged it, for luring the enemy of Austria to his ruin. Followed, however, by the birth of a son, the King of Rome, in 1811, it then seemed to insure the Napoleonic dynasty's perpetuation. Moreover, the Liverpool government had scarcely established itself when a fresh trouble confronted it in the outburst of the second American War. This was the earliest great event that engaged Castlereagh's diplomacy. Its circumstances and issues call for a few words of explanation.

This fresh contest really resulted from the combined influences of the original revolt of our transatlantic colonies and the French Revolution. The Americans never forgot the help rendered them by France in securing them independence. Consequently at the outbreak of hostilities between the French Republic and the European allies, a strong party in the United States cried out for war against Great Britain. George Washington partially restrained the anti-English feeling of his countrymen; one of his latest acts was, 19th November 1794, to carry out a commercial treaty with Great Britain. After
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his retirement, the one check upon American enthusiasm for revolutionary France disappeared. The maritime code of France and the Orders in Council of England placed American commerce between two fires. Obviously, however, it was to the interest of France not to alienate from her a Power so ready to take part with her against England as the United States. Finally the Franco-American treaty of Morfontaine, 30th September 1800, established between the two countries a new code.*

British diplomacy now prepared to counteract the Morfontaine Convention by a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation; this was eventually signed, December 1806, in London by Castlereagh and the American plenipotentiary. That arrangement was repudiated by President Jefferson, who in an angry message to Congress denounced in 1807 the revised and more stringent version of the British Orders in Council. In the March of 1808 the United States enforced the Non-Intercourse Act. This forbade all dealings with either of the European belligerents, expressly denounced the English Orders in Council, but ignored the Berlin or Milan Decrees. Meanwhile Jefferson had been succeeded in the American presidency by Madison, who instructed his Foreign Secretary, Smith, to endeavour to compose the difference with the English representative at Washington, Erskine. The violent search by an English ship of the American frigate Chesapeake, and one or two other collisions on the high seas between United States and British vessels, had so heated the popular mind that a diplomatic rupture had

* Alison's *Europe*, vol. v. p. 97.
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become inevitable. On the 18th of June 1812, both American chambers, by large majorities, declared the existence of war between Great Britain and the United States. Before that dénouement, Castlereagh had no sooner established himself at the Foreign Office than the Orders in Council, which had been one of the causes of this new war, were repealed by him. Here Castlereagh did not, as has been said, undo Canning's policy; he merely gave effect to it, for as early as the December of 1808 Canning had protested to the original deviser of these Orders against their continuance. Canning, of course, finding them in existence, had first adopted and then stiffened them. The idea of these Orders originated with one who, now (1812) agreeing with Castlereagh in their repeal, like him still insisted on their absolute necessity in the first instance. This was George Rose, the already mentioned (page 203) Secretary to the Treasury under Pitt, and President of the Board of Trade under Portland, and, though not in the Cabinet, consequently a ministerial colleague of Canning and Castlereagh. As Canning said during the debate which preceded the annulment of the Orders, the step had been taken in the first place for political not commercial reasons; it had not proved altogether successful; it was now time to retrace it.

This is not the place to relate the incidents, comparatively little known though they are, of the war with our transatlantic kinsmen which resulted from the retaliatory measures against the Continental System, initiated as they were by the Whigs and continued by the Tories. The second Anglo-American war was closed, on the 24th of December 1814, by the Treaty of Ghent. This purely Anglo-Saxon convention was
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by no means a definite settlement of all outstanding difficulties, was silent about the right of search, a chief cause of quarrel and subsequently always refused by America. Its chief permanent interest arises from two of its provisions; one of these concerned the boundary of the American State of Maine and the British province of New Brunswick. Another clause contained the principle of international arbitration. The St Croix river formed the boundary line between the American and British dominions. The ownership of certain territories near this stream, as well as of islands in the bay into which it flowed, was to be settled by a mixed American and British commission. Any disputed point was to be referred to some friendly sovereign, whose judgment was to be final. The great lakes, which, roughly speaking, divide the British from the United States' possessions of North America, had been the scene of some severe fighting in the past war. Their future neutrality was to be insured by the prohibition on their waters of all armed vessels. The arbitration machinery provided at Ghent was resorted to in 1834 when the King of the Netherlands, as umpire, made a division of disputed territory satisfactory to neither party and eventually repudiated by both. Anglo-American relations, as will be more fully shown hereafter, were to be placed on a more satisfactory footing by the British surrender of the right of search at the Paris Congress of 1856. They were only disturbed for the moment by the Trent affair in 1863.

The Continental movements which followed Napoleon's Moscow disasters in 1812 and their relations with British diplomacy may now be mentioned.
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While Castlereagh was about to reconcile England with her kin beyond the Atlantic by the Treaty of Ghent, the agency of Prussia was laying the foundation of a new European system. By the Convention of Tauroggen (30th December 1812) the Prussian general, York, liberated from the French service the German soldiers pressed by Napoleon into his army. The reconstruction of the Prussian military system by Stein's military reforms followed; Prussia's position as a first-rate Power was assured. What part would the Czar take? Would any memories of Tilsit still hold the Eastern to the Western Cæsar? At St Petersburg a strong-French faction had been headed by the Czar's favourite minister, Romanzoff. The fascination exercised by the personal greatness of Napoleon on Alexander had been but temporarily weakened. It was now apparently as strong as ever. The visionary element in the Czar's temperament, which explains so much of his vacillation and so many of his inconsistencies, was accompanied by a jealousy that matched even his dissimulation. Romanzoff's advocacy of the benefits Russia might yet gain from the goodwill of a country whose leading spirit was showing the extraordinary degree of recuperative power inherent in Napoleon, may have been more urgent than discreet. The Northern autocrat at any rate resented it, plainly charged his minister with interested motives, and looked for advice elsewhere. It was largely an English weight that decisively turned the scale against France. Castlereagh and Metternich had recently come to an agreement about the reconstruction of France in the general interest of Europe on lines which Alexander approved. The Czar practically
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endorsed the English and Austrian diplomatists’ plan by eventually resolving to treat Napoleon as the public enemy of Europe. The Scandinavian Powers required no diplomatic pressure to follow the Prussian lead. Charles XIII. then still reigned in Sweden; Bernadotte, whose fortunes had been made by Napoleon, acted as regent, with all the power of the state in his hands. “Tell your master,” he had said, on 13th February 1813, to Tarrauch, the Prussian ambassador at Stockholm, “that in six weeks I shall disembark at any point of Prussian territory desired 35,000 Swedes, as many Prussians and 10,000 Germans.” The real direction of European affairs had now passed to a mightier force than that wielded by generals or statesmen.

The French Revolution had given men ideas of liberty, of self-government, and had taught them the power of the individual in politics. The great soldier whom the Revolution had raised up, by trampling on the races and tribes of the Continent, had insured a reaction in favour of nationality as a principle. Without that ethnic revival, Wellington’s armies, Canning’s and Castlereagh’s diplomacy, would not have expelled Bonaparte from the Peninsula by 1814. The Nemesis which finally overthrew Bonaparte was the offspring of a diplomacy so infatuated as to ignore the renascence of nationality as a political force.

On the 14th of October 1809, Napoleon had signed the last convention to which he ever put his pen as conqueror. This was the Treaty of Vienna, stripping the Austrian Empire of 50,000 square miles, of more than 4,000,000 inhabitants, extending the empire of France to the gates of Constantinople, and cutting off Austria from
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the sea by the line of Illyrian provinces in which the French power had entrenched itself on the shores of the Adriatic. As yet Austria had not joined the new European coalition against the mighty victim of Moscow. The French ambassador to the court of Francis I., Otto, in his letters home drew a powerful picture of the gloomy impression of the French future stamped on the Austrian mind by rival diplomatists. The Austrian aristocracy, with Metternich for its prophet, now protested that they had always detested and never believed in the Napoleonic empire. The first duty of their sovereign and his statesmen was to resume their historic position at the head of the Germanic power. At once the state must be freed from its blighting connection with Bonaparte. Otto faced this storm of personal and political obloquy with equal courage and skill. He had indeed an ally in the Austrian contriver of reaction, Metternich. This diplomatist had learned the rudiments of his art abroad; he who perfected himself by his English experiences, and above all by his contact with Castlereagh. The future president at the Congress of Vienna was then in the prime of life, fresh from those ambassadorships at Dresden, Berlin and Paris in which he had learned so thoroughly the business of his profession. Entirely devoid of personal, though not of political preferences, Metternich knew that his country's position midway between the two Powers gave her as much to fear from Russia as from France. His sole object, never for a moment lost sight of, was so to use the opportunities developed by events that Austria might secure the means of maintaining her independence in the struggle which he saw to be approaching. This contest,
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as he held, must shake every monarchy to its base. As yet, however, there had not sounded the final stroke of the hour of Napoleon's doom. Metternich therefore with his professional colleagues affected to regard Bonaparte as Austria's very good ally. Castle- reagh's representatives unofficially sounded him on joining England in the last movement against Bonaparte. Metternich expressed admiration for the lofty qualities of Great Britain, but was prevented by genuine devotion to French interests from entering into even his admired friend Castlereagh's proposals without the knowledge and approval of France. The desertion of York's division from Napoleon in 1812 had made Metternich more reserved, perhaps, about the French alliance; it did not affect the exclusively Austrian aim of his policy. Castlereagh now re- enforced the applications which poured into the Austrian from the Prussian capital. "If," said the English minister, "the Imperial armies are placed on a war footing, the British Treasury will at once furnish ten millions sterling."

Next to solicitude for his own state came Metternich's fear of a reaction. The revolutionary wars, he saw, had begun in the union of the kings of Europe against a people— that of France. The hostilities which had convulsed Europe since, had now resolved themselves into a com- bination of monarchs and peoples against a single soldier. That soldier was crushed—but by forces as democratic as those which the French Revolution itself had first brought into play. In Prussia, in the Tyrol, in Austria itself, the masses had risen against the tyrant who till then had defied all. Those masses were indeed now well affected enough towards those who were born

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and bred to govern them. But was it to be supposed that the multitude, having learned the reality of its power, would long acquiesce in subjection to any crowned ruler? Metternich therefore aimed at giving the Austrian Kaiser an army at least as powerful as that now possessed by Prussia. "It is moreover," he had long since said to Napoleon, "necessary to us as your ally. We may not draw the sword, but we cannot speak with authority in the council-chamber unless we are in a position to draw it with some effect."

These considerations had not indeed prevented Metternich from approaching Castlereagh with proposals for a general pacification. The French ambassador in London may, as Metternich said, have been privy to all that was going forward. At the same time the mission of the Austrian agent to London was marked by elaborate secrecy; that he might avoid Paris, the Vienna emissary travelled by the circuitous route of Copenhagen and Gothenburg. The exact proposal thus brought to Castlereagh was, for such friendly intervention on the part of Austria, a peacemaker armed to the teeth, as would bring to a close the desolating war. Not that Austria contemplated active opposition to Napoleon. On the contrary, Wessenberg, the Vienna envoy, was to insist with the British Foreign Office on the good understanding that existed between Vienna and the Tuileries. The French Government, however, so effectually dissembled all affection for its Austrian ally that, contriving to intercept the messenger from Vienna, it arrested him at Hamburg, and examined all his despatches to report on to Napoleon. At the same time Austria's rôle as European mediator did not
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prevent the favourable reception at Vienna of Stackberg, sent in confidence by the Czar with view to an Austro-Russian alliance against France. The address and skill of the consummate Metternich ensured him against any false move in the complicated game of double intrigue. Each member of the European coalition against France, as well as the French minister at Vienna, Otto, by turn believed himself to enjoy the monopoly of Austrian friendship and confidence.

While, by his alternate or simultaneous attentions to France and the leaders of the new alliance against her, Metternich was gaining time for his country to strengthen her armaments, British diplomacy was paying to Napoleon some of the homage of imitation. The French emperor enriched any state that he wished for the moment to conciliate at the expense of his friends or foes indifferently. Great Britain,  à la Bonaparte, sometimes found it internationally useful to give away what was not strictly hers to give. When, however, she bought votes in the European council-chamber, she never asked any but her enemies to pay for them. Napoleon, on the other hand, almost by choice, plundered his friends if it suited him to make a deal with either foes or neutrals. Thus at Tilsit, to gain the Czar, he had taken Finland from Sweden, though he had not long since concluded an armistice with the Swedish king; the compensation to be granted Sweden was Norway, which formed a part of Denmark. Not to be behind-hand in the general generosity at the expense of others, England now came forward with the suggestion that Denmark should make good any losses she had sustained out of
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Saxony, which was indeed in the possession of an enemy, but to which Britain had no more of lawful title than belonged to its then holder, Napoleon himself. Metternich bided his time with the clear foreknowledge that Napoleon, in the manner he had always done, would find some chance of separately negotiating with the Powers allied against him. The detachment from it of any member of this league might, as the Austrian diplomatist saw, suddenly change the whole face of Europe. So it fell out. At the very crisis of Franco-Austrian negotiations, Napoleon ingeniously attempted to bring back his relations with the Czar to the point reached at Tilsit; he therefore sent his envoy Caulaincourt to St Petersburg to arrange a fresh Franco-Russian treaty on the basis of dismembering Austria. This was only one in a series of diplomatic efforts by Napoleon to withdraw Russia from the coalition and to deal with Alexander singly. There is an old story of a conscience-stricken thief on his deathbed sending for a clergyman. The holy man gave absolution on confession, and putting his hand to his waistcoat pocket found that his watch had gone. The professional instinct, even in articulo mortis, had been too strong for the felonious penitent. The anecdote exactly illustrates the manner in which Napoleon, even when he must have known that he had lost his last stake, went on with his endeavours to evade his captors by robbing them separately and causing them to fall out with each other. Within twelve months of the wreck of his plans at Moscow, Bonaparte had coerced Austria and Prussia to join him against Russia. When the two German Powers shook
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off his grasp, diplomacy had no very difficult task in making of the entire Continent a camp armed against its recent conqueror. England, Russia, Austria and Prussia took the lead; the smaller German states and the Italian sovereigns dispossessed by Bonaparte fell into their subordinate places.

After the concentration of the confederates in Saxony, the Leipzig victory gave them the whole of Germany. Their first specific proposals for peace (November 1813) was the offer to Napoleon of France as it existed in 1800. When these terms were refused, there followed, in February 1814, the Congress of Chatillon. The foreign plenipotentiaries who assisted at this meeting were, on behalf of Austria, Count Stadion; for Russia, Count Razumoffski; Prussia sent Baron Humboldt; Napoleon was represented by his deputy, the able and trusty Caulaincourt, who had become to him even more than was Talleyrand at the zenith of his skill and influence. The English delegates were Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, the latter our ambassador successively at Berlin and Vienna, and the half-brother of Castlereagh, whom he eventually succeeded in the Londonderry marquisate. The occasion, however, seemed to demand a still more authoritative envoy from Great Britain. The most ubiquitous and active diplomatist of this epoch was the cosmopolitan Count Pozzo di Borgo, a Corsican by birth, of exactly the same age as the famous compatriot to whose ruin he applied all his energies and opportunities. He had always been ready to act as international agent for any Court or Cabinet which made it worth his while. In this way he had a little earlier in his career been
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largely employed on foreign and domestic errands by Pitt. As he was frequently in England at the time, there seems no reason why he should not have fetched and carried for Canning, or why, for that matter, he should not have been one of Canning's informants in the affair of Tilsit. His wife's drawing-room had few rivals as a fashionable and distinguished centre. In the Pozzo di Borgo salon the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, may have first decided upon the expediency of despatching to Chatillon no less an envoy than his Foreign Secretary. That, indeed, had been the object of Pozzo di Borgo's latest visit to London. As regards the arrangement of any practicable terms with the French emperor, Pozzo di Borgo had indeed at this time not less completely purged his mind of illusions than had long since been done by the Czar, whose court and policy Pozzo di Borgo then represented. When at this time the rulers and statesmen of Europe did agree, their unanimity sooner or later produced results. The sovereigns and their diplomats had determined to place Napoleon outside the pale of European monarchs.

The conviction which had possessed Metternich when he was negotiating the French Emperor's marriage to the Archduchess Marie Louise, was that destiny had selected him to bait the trap for Bonaparte. In this object he found a tool in Pozzo di Borgo and a colleague in Castlereagh. Hence the devout reflection contained in his autobiography between 1810 and 1813—"Negotiations and events will bear witness to my having used all the means in my power to further the ends of God." The final instruction given by Napoleon to Caulaincourt on the eve of the meeting
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was, "Sign anything that will prevent the occupation of Paris by the victorious Allies." Among all the Powers, Great Britain alone brought to the Congress a generally deserved reputation of consistency. She had from the first disclaimed any idea of territorial aggrandisement as the result of victory. As for the political future of France, that was for France to decide; Castlereagh only offered the suggestion that the best guarantee for French tranquillity would be found in a Bourbon restoration. Before, however, the Congress actually met, Napoleon's successes against Blücher had raised the French demand and given a new tone of exultant defiance to the conqueror. "At least," he remarked, "I am nearer to Munich than the Allies are to Paris." He therefore clung to the belief of its being possible to break the European concert and come to terms with Austria alone. That end, he thought, might be furthered by his Austrian wife. Metternich, however, may have trembled for the fate of Vienna, but was quite indifferent to the fall of Marie Louise. The Austrian princess had indeed served the diplomatist's purpose by falsely suggesting to her husband that he had a friend in the Kaiser at Vienna.

The practical outcome of the Congress of Chatillon was to bring home to Napoleon's mind the fact of his dethronement having been irrevocably decreed. French territory was to be kept within the limits of the old monarchy as it existed before the Revolution. Should that arrangement be rejected by Bonaparte, Austria, Prussia, Russia and England were to maintain each of them 150,000 men in the field. In addition to the cost of her own army, Great Britain
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was to pay an annual subsidy of £5,000,000, to be equally divided among the other powers. At the headquarters of the armies belonging to each of the contracting Powers were to be military experts representing the various Allies. To prevent any quarrels over the plunder, the trophies, it was stipulated, should be divided in equal parts among the combatants. No peace was to be made without the common consent. The Chaumont Compact held good for twenty years, and admitted of renewal before that term expired. The contingency, in view of which the Powers formulated their future policy by the treaty of Chaumont, realised itself when, against the advice of Caulaincourt, Napoleon declined the offers made him at Chatillon, and so brought that congress to an end.

This is not the place in which to dwell on Napoleon's tardy acceptance of the situation, on his abdication (4th April 1814), and, through the combined agencies of his former minister Talleyrand and his old ally of Tilsit Alexander, the recall of the Bourbons in Louis XVIII. The next international episode in which England actively figured was the Congress of Vienna. This will be considered in a new chapter.
ENGLISH diplomacy, personified by Castlereagh or his representatives, had been not less active in negotiating the treaties of Chaumont and of Paris than had been English generalship in effecting Napoleon's military overthrow. The London Foreign Office had now to prepare for the Vienna Congress. Their programme for this assemblage had been drawn up by the chief European Powers in a secret clause of the Treaty of Paris. Before his overthrow at Waterloo, half of Europe might have been described as belonging to Napoleon, the other half to the nations banded against him. Austria, England, Prussia and Russia had privately agreed to limit their territorial discussions to those portions of the world which Bonaparte's disappearance had left without a ruler. Amid the conflicts, confusions and obscurities of the meeting,
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Castlereagh for England, Talleyrand for France, Nesselrode for Russia, saw clearly what each of them meant. Canning did not enter the Liverpool Cabinet as President of the Board of Control till 1816, a year after the Congress had done its work. He was therefore the Foreign Secretary's Cabinet colleague when, as will presently be seen, he attended the Aix-la-Chapelle conferences. As regards the resettlement of Europe, Canning and Castlereagh agreed with each other on most of the essential points. They both showed themselves equally penetrated by the ideas of Pitt in thinking the undue preponderance of Russia not less dangerous to the world's tranquillity than the ascendancy of revolutionary France.

The first antidote to the Russian peril was the readmission of France under her new king into the comity of great Powers. Here, then, at Vienna, Castlereagh might count upon the support of Talleyrand, who, playing entirely for his own hand, awaited the cropping up of some question, disagreements about which might help his own country. Thus the subject either of Poland or Saxony might divide Europe into halves; any of these issues might procure an ally for France. The Continental statesmen with whom in this enterprise Talleyrand had to lay his account were the Prussian representative Hardenberg, and his compatriot Stein, who was at Vienna, less as Hardenberg's colleague, than to offer his advice on any military topics that might arise. The smaller states were represented by Lowenheim and Schoell. Metternich presided over the meetings. Castlereagh was already his acquaintance. The two men became at Vienna not only colleagues, but up to a certain point
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confederates. At least Metternich openly congratulated himself that the changes and chances of party government had sent him the patrician Castlereagh instead of the parvenu Canning. A high Tory himself, Castlereagh was charged with the representation of a Tory party and a Tory policy at Vienna. In performing this task he showed not only ability and firmness, but moderation and even liberality; he proved himself as true a disciple of Pitt as Canning could have done in supporting Talleyrand's claim of a place for the French envoy at the table. He had carried Metternich with him in defeating the Russian proposal that France should not be admitted to the congress till all questions affecting her had been arranged by the Allies.

The Czar had done much to promote the Vienna meeting; at its opening he had pleased everyone by his adroit solution of a difficulty about precedence among the plenipotentiaries. "Let them," said Alexander, "sit and sign in the alphabetical order of their respective states." That the congress did anything more than record the decisions of Russia was due mainly to the English deputy and his Austrian coadjutor. Naturally, therefore, France went with them in resisting the Czar's attempt to steal a territorial march on Europe. The Russian scheme was that, as the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, Poland should become a Muscovite province. This, said Nesselrode, would be only a proper recognition of the international services rendered, and the personal sacrifices made by Alexander. Bribed by the promise of Saxony for Prussia, Hardenberg supported Nesselrode. The assembly was on the point of being dissolved—for the Czar talked of securing by the sword that which the injustice of the council-chamber
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refused. He would, however, have united, with one exception, all the Powers against him. Prussia indeed was at his beck and call. Metternich and Talleyrand agreed with Castlereagh to combine their armies, if necessary, against Alexander, and to pledge themselves to a kind of self-denying ordinance in carrying out the Treaty of Paris. With some reluctance, Castlereagh was brought to acquiesce in the addition of a secret clause allaying the land-hunger of Prussia at the expense of Saxony instead of Poland. Metternich had now brought round Castlereagh to his scheme of a Germanic confederation, hindered indeed by Austrian and Prussian jealousies, opposed by Talleyrand, but at last accepted.

The British plenipotentiary had thus prepared the way for realising an ancient tradition of British statesmanship in the Low Countries. By a secret article of the Treaty of Paris, Austria had once more explicitly repudiated any claim in this part of Europe. It had been the idea of Queen Elizabeth and Burleigh on behalf of England, of Henry IV. and Sully on the side of France, to form the seventeen provinces of Flanders into a single state by way of barrier, as English statesmanship desired, against Austria and France;—as French diplomacy designed, against the Hapsburgs. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the same idea had found favour with Pitt, who thought that the principality thus to be created might have a Prussian suzerain. So long as it constituted a real barrier to the great European Powers, its actual ownership seemed, to all promoters of the plan, of secondary significance. The great minds which had advocated it all ignored, as much as did Castlereagh himself, the mutual incompatibility
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of two states with such opposite antecedents as Belgium and Holland. National sentiment was not then recognised as a privilege of smaller states. Castlereagh's acquiescence in the yoking of Belgium to Holland is easily explained; first, he followed an ancient Tory and national tradition, descending from the days of the Tudors to those of Pitt; secondly, there was the feeling that even a temporary union might diminish the French temptation to provoke another war. No influence of Canning's over Castlereagh stimulated the British plenipotentiary to a protest against the outrageous impolicy of subjecting a people, republican by tradition and sentiment like the Dutch, to a heterogeneous monarchy.

The new state came into existence, and the King of Holland began to be known to the courts of Europe as King of the Netherlands and Grand-Duke of Luxemburg. The conditions on which he received his fresh dignities were, that he should reign as a limited and parliamentary sovereign, after the British fashion, and that he should share with England a debt of £4,200,000 due from Russia to the Amsterdam bankers. Canning, it has been seen, realised that, wisely administered and properly used, our colonies could make England a self-supporting nation for whom foreign blockades, like that of Napoleon, could have no fear. If, as regards the colonies, Canning was before his time, Castlereagh was not behind it in making a surrender which excited the scornful comment of the imprisoned Bonaparte. Java had been taken by England in 1810; from that date it had enjoyed a high degree of unbroken prosperity. It was now signed away by
our representative at Vienna. In return, Castlereagh's diplomacy obtained for England, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, the Cape of Good Hope, and some fair-sounding but futile declarations against slavery. Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands did indeed commit themselves by special and separate agreements with England to abolish the slave-trade in all parts of their dominions at the first possible moment. On a cognate matter, England accepted, at Castlereagh's instance, an important commission from her Allies. Moorish piracy was the curse of the Mediterranean. England undertook that her navy should remove it, and fulfilled the obligation by her great sailor, Lord Exmouth. After this, the pleni-potentiaries were so much keener for enjoyment than for work as to inspire the Prince de Ligne with the epigram—"The Congress dances but does not advance."

On the 7th of March—according to one account as he was going to a ball, according to another during his midnight slumbers—Metternich received the news that Napoleon had escaped from Elba, was being welcomed with enthusiasm near his landing-place in the South of France; joined at every stage by deserters from the restored Bourbon, he was even marching on Paris. Diplomatic discussion was now broken by an interval of national dismay, political perturbation and hurried armings of Powers great and small. At Vienna, Castlereagh and Metternich were not entirely taken by surprise. Their despatch-boxes contained private letters from recent visitors to the captive of Elba, intimating that his reappearance on the mainland might occur at any moment.
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Castlereagh indeed had, on the earliest selection of Elba, predicted it. The only way, he had said, of preventing Napoleon’s return and a renewal of the war, was to confine him on some Atlantic rock like St Helena. The congress now completed its work by declaring Napoleon the common enemy of Europe, and by a call to battle. Chateaubriand did not become ambassador to England till 1822; a presentiment of what might happen showed itself in a remark he made as a Bourbon courtier in the February of 1815—"If the cocked hat and surtout of Napoleon were placed upon a stick on the shores of Brest, it would cause Europe to run to arms from one end to the other."

Comparing notes on the news that had interrupted the congress, Castlereagh and Metternich agreed that luckily the thing had happened at least a fortnight before it was due; what if it had come before the congress had dispersed? Napoleon’s movements had indeed been hastened by two considerations. His confidential agent, Meneval, had told him that the congress, if it sat long enough to agree on the matter, would certainly ship him off to a remote spot in the Atlantic. Napoleon had also learned from the newspapers, which he never missed seeing, the growing unpopularity of the restored Bourbons. The army and the nation seemed ripe for another revolution. Moreover, the season approached when the nights would become longer; his departure required darkness for safety. Thus there was no time to be lost. On the allied sovereigns and their ministers Bonaparte’s escape had an electrical effect; all were at once galvanised into unanimity. In their efforts to over-
reach each other and to secure some advantage for their royal employers, the plenipotentiaries, for weeks past, had seemed every day to be nearer to a rupture. Dynastic rivalries now became of no more account than national aspirations. After the victory of Waterloo had completed the military overthrow begun at Baylen and Leipzig, Castlereagh, Nesselrode and Talleyrand had arranged (20th November 1815) the second Treaty of Paris.

This gave to France a frontier rather less liberal than was provided by the treaty of 1814. It exacted from her an indemnity of £28,000,000, and further saddled her with the cost of a foreign army of occupation for not less than three or more than five years. England's share of the indemnity paid by France amounted to £5,000,000. Castlereagh effected a theatrical surprise by announcing that he had received instructions from home to treat the British moiety of the fine levied on France as a contribution to the cost of strengthening the Netherlands frontier against any neighbouring Power. The plenipotentiaries returned the compliment by at once unanimously nominating the Duke of Wellington to the command of the army of occupation. From being the liberator of Europe, Wellington was now becoming, as for thirty years he remained, its sage. Castlereagh had at first been disposed to support Hardenberg and Stein in presenting Prussia with Alsace and Lorraine. Wellington's practical common-sense scoffed at a transfer based upon a territorial connection belonging to ancient history, and certain, he protested, to act as a standing challenge to France against Prussia in the future. Metternich
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and Nesselrode agreed with him. The proposal therefore fell through.

Meanwhile the negotiations for the second Peace of Paris had produced an incident which opened a new international epoch; it is indeed conventionally spoken of as having divided English diplomacy into two schools, though, as will afterwards be seen, this was its apparent, rather than a real, effect. The Czar himself drew Metternich aside with a request that he would inform his master, the Emperor Francis, of the Russian ruler's desire to ask his advice on a matter purely of sentiment, such as monarchs alone could decide. The meeting between the two sovereigns took place a few days later. Its subject had been explained in a memorandum handed in the first instance by Alexander to the Austrian diplomatist. On examination Metternich found it to contain a philanthropic aspiration clothed in a religious garb. The suggestion, he said, supplied no material for a treaty, and had in it a great many phrases that might have given rise to theological misconstruction.

So originated the famous programme of absolutism, based on the New Testament, that Holy Alliance which was to go some way towards confirming Canning in his policy of non-intervention, as well as towards converting to it reactionary Tories like Castlereagh. Each of the rulers was to consider himself and his subjects as members of a Christian family comprising the whole Continent. The sovereigns entering into the sacred league were to give mutual assistance for the protection of religion, peace and justice as became potentates entrusted by Providence with a royal mission. Useful or necessary changes in legislation and administration
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ought only to come from the free, intelligent and well-weighed conviction of divinely appointed monarchs. Other Powers might be invited or permitted to support Austria, Prussia and Russia in promoting this millennium. The only two potentates who received no invitation from the Czar were the pope and the Sultan; the former was omitted as being the tyrant of Christendom; the latter because he was not a Christian at all. The Austrian emperor having read the paper, remarked—"If this refers to religion, it is for my confessor to consider; if to politics, it is the business of Metternich." The Duke of Wellington thought the English Parliament would have liked something a little more precise. On the other hand the English Prince Regent, while not authorising his ambassador to sign the alliance, sent from the Brighton Pavilion his blessing to a compact conceived in the interests of morality, religion and all the virtues.

At the congress itself, Castlereagh's urbane grandeur and magnificent serenity produced an impression comparable with that created by Beaconsfield's personal ascendancy some sixty years afterwards at the Congress of Berlin. Castlereagh's territorial bargains brought us as well out of the business as would have been done by any of his contemporaries. In diplomacy, Castlereagh was the aristocratic type of an aristocratic system. It would have needed an original and creative force in diplomacy to have prevented the unequal marriage between Norway and Sweden, as between Belgium and Holland, the cession of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, or the transfer of Venice from Italy to the Austrian emperor. Before the meeting Metternich had confided to the Czar his suspicions of Castlereagh's
not caring more for legitimacy than did Canning himself. Had, however, the Austrian diplomatist found his English colleague as complacent as he had expected, Metternich probably would not have complained of having had to spend hours daily in teaching him the position of the chief places mentioned by the plenipotentiaries. Discussing at St Helena the results of the congress, with his medical friend O'Meara, Napoleon expressed himself more contemptuously and even abusively about Castlereagh. Yet it was this same captive of St Helena who upon another occasion said—"There must be a great deal to admire in a man who puts Talleyrand so thoroughly out of temper as Castlereagh." The difference between Canning and Castlereagh as international statesmen was at least as much one of temperament, of personal prejudices, of social antecedents, as of practical politics. Personally Castlereagh, like the Duke of Wellington, was not interested in "the mushroom constitutions," as they called them, by which the two Ferdinands, Kings of Naples and Spain respectively, were restored by the great Continental Powers to put down. On the other hand, Canning's good wishes for the Spanish Constitutionalists were limited by his policy of non-intervention; at the beginning he plainly told his Spanish friends that if there was to be a struggle, they must fight the battle of political freedom for themselves. Foreign politics in 1809 had brought the disagreements between the two men to an issue; the same department of affairs was instrumental in re-establishing relations between them in 1814. Family reasons seem to have made Canning anxious for change of scene. Castlereagh suggested his going as ambassador to Portugal. Returning to
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England in 1816, Canning entered the Cabinet as president of the Board of Control. To speak of Castlereagh in this year and during the short remainder of his life as the promoter of an international system as reactionary as Canning's policy had been progressive, is not only to censure Castlereagh but to reflect upon Canning himself. Whatever the foreign policy carried out, having been settled by the Cabinet, it was the policy of Canning as well as of Castlereagh. The practical unanimity of the two men showed itself in connection with the Aix-la-Chapelle conferences, September 1818. These were attended by Canning, if not as Castlereagh's official representative, yet as a Cabinet Minister speaking with experience and authority on foreign affairs. The form in which the general results of the Aix-la-Chapelle meetings were embodied was determined by England's refusal to form one of a general league like that of the Holy Alliance. That was Liverpool's ultimatum. The one tangible result of the Czar's Holy Alliance project, in 1815, had been a Quadruple Treaty committing England, with the three other great Powers, to put down by arms any fresh outbreak of Jacobinism or revolution in France.

At Aix-la-Chapelle it had no sooner been decided that the allied armies should be withdrawn from French soil than France, under a legitimate and reactionary monarch, Louis XVIII. claimed admission to the Quadruple Treaty. She further supported the Austrian and Russian proposal that this agreement should confer on those who signed it the power of calling periodical conferences for maintaining European peace and order. Canning first protested against England's acceptance of any such responsibilities. The then Foreign Secretary
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and the Prime Minister went with him. Only in a secret treaty was any mention made of the revolutionary contingencies which might necessitate intervention in France. The published treaty merely announced that France, being once more happily settled under her natural sovereign would co-operate with her Allies in maintaining the general peace. For that end, it was added, special meetings of the Powers might be held after the regular diplomatic formalities. Then came the English clause framed by Canning and stating that in no case would the affairs of a smaller state be discussed by the great Powers except at its own request and in the presence of its own representatives.

It was the events which followed the Aix-la-Chapelle gathering that in the public mind brought Canning and Castlereagh into sharp and decisive contrast with each other and insured the former's return to the Foreign Office. The Continental sovereigns and their ministers, on leaving Aix-la-Chapelle, arranged to meet again as soon as necessary or convenient. Two years later this further meeting took place at Troppau. There they publicly paraded the royal right of federative action for the support of legitimacy and absolutism, as, it was declared, had been decided at Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1821 took place another gathering at Laybach to restore Ferdinand of Naples to his throne. Castlereagh reluctantly, as it seemed, and indecisively protested that England could not be a party to any programme of this sort. He did not, however, withdraw the British representative from the place where the Eastern monarchs were in conference. Those Allies therefore agreed to ignore England and to act for themselves against the rising nationalities.

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The City now took alarm; throughout England, indeed, finance and commerce cried for something less ambiguous and compromising than Castlereagh's diplomacy. How, it was asked from Liverpool to Plymouth, were plain men to know what they were committed to, when ministers spoke with one voice in Parliament and with another in Continental council-chambers? The necessity of confidential understandings—not a Holy Alliance or a formal compact of any kind to hold the revolutionary spirit in check—had been pleaded for by Castlereagh. "Secret treaties," replied Canning, "have become impossible. Whatever conventions you have must be examined, must be ratified in Parliament, and must stand their trial by public opinion."

In the progress of our foreign statesmanship a real turning-point had now been reached. Something like the same choice between two ways had presented itself to the eighteenth-century directors of our foreign affairs. Bolingbroke and Walpole, while differing on almost every other subject, were equally against a policy of intervention except under absolute compulsion and for maintaining some material interest. Pitt had been driven into war by France, but always held with the principle that his enemy's domestic affairs were not his concern. From 1807 to 1809, Canning had followed the traditional line of English policy when refusing to interfere in the domestic affairs of Portugal or to offer any advice to the Portuguese regency in its relation with the local juntas. "We Englishmen," were Canning's words, "may carry in our bosoms the image of our Constitution. We should not, however, therefore expect to see it reflected in every other
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country." Canning’s personal acquaintance with Portugal had begun when he went to Lisbon as ambassador. His official connection with that state grew eight years later out of its relations with Brazil. During the residence of the court of Lisbon at Rio, the colony had eclipsed the mother country in importance and prosperity. When the King of Portugal had in 1821 returned to his European capital, his Brazilian subjects declared themselves an independent nation under his son, Don Pedro, as their emperor. On reassuming the Foreign Secretaryship in 1822, Canning told his Portuguese friends that Brazilian independence must be taken for an accomplished fact, but proceeded to act as mediator between the disputants. Eventually, through Charles Stuart (Lord Stuart of Rothesay), his envoy, Canning arranged the difficulty between Lisbon and Rio, and secured the acceptance by each of terms regulating their intercourse; taking up the subject touched by Castlereagh at Vienna, he secured from Brazil, and all Portugal’s American colonies, a promise to abolish the slave-trade.

Canning’s diplomatic residence in Portugal, and his mediatorial offices between it and Brazil, already described, were the appropriate precursors of his succession to Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary in 1822. Thus, in Canning’s second and longer term at the Foreign Office, Portugal took up almost as much of his attention as, during the Secretaryship of State that had begun in 1807, was given to Napoleon. Canning also it was who had arranged with Count Souza in London the treaty defining the Anglo-Portuguese entente of 1822 maintained throughout this period. The champions of Continental abso-
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Lutism successively enabled Ferdinand of Naples and Ferdinand of Spain to trample under foot the Constitutions given to their subjects. Spain had become the headquarters of all that was reactionary in the Peninsula. Our ambassador at Lisbon reported an impending attack by the Spanish "apostolics," as they were called, upon the institutions of Portugal. Not in the capacity of champion of political liberties, but in virtue of treaty obligations, Canning, in the December of 1826, sent English troops to Lisbon; for the time Portugal was secure against attack from Spain, or from the French forces by which Spain had been overrun. To Canning as a Foreign Minister Portugal owed much. He was not spared to witness the termination of the domestic difficulties that had begun for the country with the return in 1821 of King John VI. from Brazil. The rivalries that distracted the Portuguese court and nation were not composed till 1834; by that time four Secretaries of State had received Canning's portfolio. In its dealings with Portugal English diplomacy was under a debt to others than Secretaries of State. But for our ambassador at Lisbon, Lord Strangford, the King of Portugal, in 1808, would have thrown himself into the arms of France. Nor could the English representative in Portugal have dispensed with help which came to him not in the ordinary way of diplomacy. For it was from a Jewish resident on the Rock, Benoliel, Strangford had discovered Bonaparte's plot to bribe some Irish captains in the garrison into betraying to him Gibraltar. A day or two later he arranged everything for the court's departure, with its jewels, archives and insignia, for Brazil. Sir Sydney Smith has been credited with effecting this splendid emigration, but
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speaking in Parliament, as early as 1817, Canning showed the honour of the thing to belong to Strangford alone. When he joined the royal party in their transatlantic exile Strangford found fresh occasions of confirming John VI. in his attachment to England.

On other matters interesting England scarcely less than did Portugal, and of deeper importance to the rest of Europe, the centre of diplomatic gravity in Canning's day was less at London than at Vienna. Canning, it must be remembered, never withdrew England from the Quadruple Treaty which ranged the Allies against French Jacobinism and the working of which was chiefly regulated at the Austrian capital. The Greek question Canning lived to see assured of settlement on his own lines. The fortunes of another classical country, Italy, also occupied him during these years; the cause of this was a secret treaty with Austria, signed by King Ferdinand of Naples. That clandestine compact violated not only the Treaty of Paris, but a resolution of the Vienna Congress. At Vienna—with England's approval, if not on her initiative—it had been resolved that, outside the Austrian possessions, Italy should consist of independent states. Metternich secretly had, indeed even at the congress, aimed at an Austrian protectorate over the whole peninsula. He had, however, uttered no word on the subject, and afterwards saw that Italy might cease to be the geographical expression he had described it as being, unless her petty rulers were maintained only as satellites of the Austrian system. As against France, the European concert was in 1822 complete. On other points the conflict between Austrian autocracy and British
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liberalism, if often veiled in Castlereagh’s time, was sometimes acute in his day as well as in that of Canning. Here is an instance of the collision: England had acquiesced in the establishment of Ferdinand upon the throne of Naples and Sicily. The British representative, Lord William Bentinck, had compelled King Ferdinand to grant his subjects a Constitution after the English model. Not only did Austria use her influence to subvert the new régime, Castlereagh let Metternich know that privately he agreed with him, and that he felt sure of its being better generally to retard than to hasten the operation of this most hazardous principle (that of liberty) which is now abroad. Not of course that Castlereagh liked oppression, or proposed any other final end of his foreign policy than freedom; but the first article in his faith, inherited from Pitt himself, was the necessity of an Austrian alliance as a counterpoise to France. What greater madness could there be than to risk or compromise that connection for the sake of emancipating a people not yet certainly ripe for independence?

The Troppau and Laybach congresses of 1820-1821 formed the occasion of Castlereagh’s most serious mistake. The object and date of these meetings was communicated not too courteously to the London Foreign Office. Instead of simply intimating the impossibility of England’s taking part in them, he added the confession that the British Government highly disapproved the popular movement which had given Austria the trouble of restoring Ferdinand to his throne. While he had acted as plenipotentiary at Vienna, Parliament had not been
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sitting. Since then his policy had been severely criticised at Westminster. His attitude to the deliberations of the East European monarchs might have brought about his resignation, had not his own hand ended his life in the next year.

Castlereagh, in 1816, had become Marquis of Londonderry; he was at the time of his death expected to take part in the Verona Congress, whose meeting began at Vienna (September 1822). His place at it was filled by the one man whose views on the whole most resembled his own, and whose opposition most hampered Canning—the Duke of Wellington. Meanwhile, for the first time in the history of that department, public opinion had indicated the new and only possible head of the Foreign Office. In a different capacity, the elder Pitt had not been more undoubtedly and imperatively the choice of the nation in 1757, than was Canning when he returned to Downing Street in 1822. During that year were happening events which proved the international legislators of 1815 at Vienna to have failed not less signally as permanent peacemakers, than had been done by the Eastern monarchs who stiffened at Troppau and Laybach the edicts of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The impulse of nationality had proved contagious. In Spain, Ferdinand VII. had weakly yielded to the demands of his people for a constitutional and representative system. After much deliberation, the Powers who had been instrumental in its restoration entertained the Bourbon plea of being threatened by the popular institutions of a neighbour separated from it only by the Pyrenees. The new monarchical and reactionary France had from the first
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meditated putting down by arms the rising liberalism of Madrid. Poland had been originally encouraged by the Czar Alexander; she was now clamouring for independence. Finally, Greece had begun to break the bonds which held her to Turkey. Evidently therefore it had become necessary thoroughly to do what the delegates at the Austrian capital seven years earlier had begun rather than finished. The Duke of Wellington distrusted Canning as a crypto-liberal, and despised him as a social upstart. He lost no time, however, in making the new Foreign Secretary aware of his willingness to go to Verona. The Spanish question, added the Duke, in some shape or other must certainly come up for consideration. What were to be the instructions? Canning's reply may be the charter of the non-intervention policy which in 1832 had been wittily described by Talleyrand;* it did not substantially differ from the memorandum drawn up for his own guidance by Castlereagh when he had thought of representing England on the occasion. England would be no party to coercing or threatening Spain. Canning's instructions to Wellington stated the whole of his policy in the Peninsula. So strong had been the pressure of the French Government, that the King of Spain had revoked no liberties given by him to his people. The revolution following this step was put down by French assistance. Portugal, however, our old ally, had profited by British support to retain her free institutions. All Canning's advices from abroad went to show that French Bourbonism would

* "C'est un mot métaphisique et politique qui signifie à peu pres la même chose qu'intervention."
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not be satisfied till it had silenced the popular voice in Portugal as well as in Spain. He therefore made a memorable declaration in Parliament. If, he let it be known, of her own accord Portugal were to make war against France, England would be neutral. If, however, Ferdinand VII. were to solicit or accept the help of Louis XVIII. in coercing Portugal, England would at once take up arms on behalf of her ancient ally; already there existed a Franco-Spanish arrangement, which the British minister was determined to thwart. At the same time, straining every nerve to prevent a regular war between royalist France and republican Spain, he implored his liberal supporters at home to restrain rather than stimulate the Spanish parliamentarians, who now had their king in their power.

The colonies of Spain across the Atlantic were at this time in full revolt. France, like for that matter Austria and Russia, wished to assist Spain in re-conquering the dependencies that had long gradually been slipping away from her. The French reward for these services was to be a substantial share of Spain’s transatlantic possessions. Canning did not dispute the right of Spain to reduce to subjection her insubordinate dominions. If however, they were to be regained only to become French property, England would at once help them to make good their efforts at independence. The spirit and features of Bourbon diplomacy still remained much what they were when, more than half a century earlier, the Family Compact had been baffled by Chatham. Canning was not less successful in checkmating the scheme concocted by the two branches of
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the "house." The whole episode cannot be summed up better than in Canning's own famous words—"I have called in the New World to redress the balance of the Old." Nor did that achievement stand by itself.

Canning not only secured for England the support of the United States, he practically inspired the most famous message to Congress ever delivered by the first magistrate of the Western Republic. The Monroe Doctrine, formulated by the United States president, 2nd December 1823, did but embody the principle of the Foreign Secretary's ultimatum to the aggressive pretensions of French and Spanish legitimacy. Canning's declaration had in it nothing of menace to the courts of Paris or Madrid. James Monroe would have disclaimed any intention of interfering with Great Britain in Canada or with the Portuguese Emperor of Brazil; he merely warned those whom it might concern that his Government would not allow Americans who had shaken off a foreign sway to be brought back to a state of dependence, or to be disposed of and overwhelmed by European owners whom they had dispossessed. The cost of disregarding the true moral of the Monroe message forty years after its delivery was paid by Napoleon III. and the luckless victim of his ill-starred project, Maximilian. In another way Canning seems to have averted a world-wide crisis more serious than was generally suspected at the time. During his communications with the American minister in London, Rush, it clearly came out that the monarchy of Louis XVIII. had been offered, and desired to accept, a commission from Spain for conquering the whole of South America. Alone among European
statesmen, Canning denounced the project; it would not have been abandoned as it was, had his attitude with the French ambassador in London, Polignac, been less firm.

The impossibility of English co-operation in any scheme of Continental coercion had been dwelt upon by the London Foreign Office under Castlereagh as it was under Canning. The charge against the former minister is not that he failed to understand or even to emphasise England's resolution to follow the line of non-intervention; by his public declarations he had made that policy his own. This, however, was only to throw, as Brougham said, dust in the eyes of the House of Commons; for at the same time he, like the Duke of Wellington, did not disguise his sympathies with the absolutism of the Holy Alliance, and privately encouraged the Imperial Allies in their campaign against popular liberties. On accepting the mission to the Verona Congress in September 1822, the Duke of Wellington thought the first place in the discussion would be occupied by the insurrection in Greece. Here English diplomacy found itself in a position beset by difficulties and anomalies. Russia was then England's chief diplomatic rival in the Near East; the maintenance therefore of Turkish rather than of Russian influence had become a tradition of British policy. With a view, as was said, of establishing himself at Constantinople and of making the Black Sea a Russian lake, the Czar did violence to his autocratic and legitimist convictions by encouraging the attempt of the Porte's Hellenic subjects to cast off the Turkish yoke. In England the Philhellenic sentiment had aroused
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strong indignation against Austria for encouraging the Sultan to deal with the Greek patriots as with common rebels; Canning also shared a scholar's prejudices in favour of the independence of a classical and interesting land. Nor had he anything but scorn for the feeling in favour of Mohammedan rule, because the Turk, though a tyrant, was a gentlemanly one. On the Greek question, therefore, English diplomacy had before itself a twofold task. It had to prevent, on the one hand, the provisional government in Greece, and the aspirations centred in it, from being crushed; on the other it had to guard Turkey against Russian encroachment. The Congress of 1822—which, as already said, having first been convened at Vienna, had been moved to Verona and took its name from that place—settled nothing. It was followed by meetings of ambassadors at St Petersburg first, in London afterwards. These gatherings would have been memorable if for no other reason than that they witnessed the official début of the English minister's cousin, Sir Stratford Canning, afterwards known as the great Eltchi of the Crimean War period (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe). Canning's famous Parliamentary declaration on the subject has been mentioned above; by it he denied the right of the Powers to interfere between Spain and her revolted South American colonies. That denial was emphasised when in the autumn of 1823 he would have nothing to do with a conference on the subject held in Paris. In the following winter he declined a like offer from Russia to assist at a similar assemblage for settling the affairs of Greece. This was shortly after the Austrian and Russian emperors had conferred upon the subject at
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Czernowitz. Neither potentate personally had any Philhellenic sentiments. Even now the Czar moved unwillingly and under strong domestic pressure. Metternich and Nesselrode drew up a memorandum which was sent to Canning in London. Nothing, was the English minister's decision, could come from a discussion of this paper. He would, however, cause England to be represented at any conference held on certain conditions he now stated; of these the first was that Russia should practically show herself a friendly Power by re-establishing her mission at Constantinople. The matter seemed likely to arrange itself through Sir Charles Bagot and Lord Strangford—accredited from England respectively to the Russian and Turkish capitals. The Czar still delayed sending an ambassador to the Porte; Turkey pleaded her consequent absolution from all promises about Greece. Nevertheless, 1825 was not to end without witnessing Canning's diplomatic master-stroke. In November the London Foreign Office received a confession from the ambassadors of the Great Powers that England alone could help them out of the difficulty. At an earlier stage of these negotiations Canning had sent the Duke of Wellington to St Petersburg to assist in preparing what came to be known as the Russian or St Petersburg protocol. He had, in fact, from the first, desired to accept if possible the Czar's suggestions as a basis for arranging this international business. For some time, on the plea of having no interest in the Eastern question, Prussia had withdrawn from the negotiations; Austria, influenced by Metternich, who loathed everything Hellenic, sulked. The sole parties to the arrangement were
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thus, England, Russia and Turkey. At last the matter lay exclusively between Canning and Nesselrode.

During this period the Russian ambassador in London was Prince Lieven; the Princess Lieven's salon was a political power in its way, as well as a fashionable resort; Canning, Aberdeen, Grey, Metternich and George IV. all regularly attended her receptions. The English king piqued himself on his epistolary criticisms of his minister's statesmanship; his letters about diplomacy had often tried Canning's patience. By her bright and tactful badinage the Princess Lieven laughed the royal censor out of thus parading the facility of his pen. Certainly the conciliatory influences of the Princess's parties softened down more than one difficulty in the way of converting the St Peters burg protocol of April 1826 into the Treaty of London (July 1827). Thus did a lady's drawing-room help the Foreign Office to create the new Hellenic kingdom.

This was the last diplomatic business conducted by Canning. On 30th April 1827 he had become Prime Minister; on the 8th of August he died, from the effects of a chill caught at the Duke of York's funeral. But for an act of courtesy to one who, though his acquaintance, was scarcely his well-wisher, Canning's life might have been spared. At the funeral in St George's chapel, Canning observed the Duke of Wellington, who stood next him, to suffer from the coldness of the stones on which they were standing; he at once placed beneath the duke's feet his own court hat, which he had been about to use as a mat for himself.

In the portrait gallery of English Foreign Secre-
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taries, the commanding place filled by Canning is due not only to the actual work he accomplished, but to his freedom from the prejudices of his class and his craft. Austria, Austrian ideas and ways were then the idols of English Society, and especially of the set which Canning, after his youth, knew best; by daring to be independent of the modes in fashion at Vienna he made Metternich his enemy, but he carried out much in which his predecessors had failed; he illuminated the British name, and for thousands of his countrymen for whom the subject had no interest before, he invested the records of international statesmanship with a living and personal charm. In his diplomatic methods he reflected the practical common-sense of his country; he had as little liking in the abstract as had Pitt for Russian idiosyncrasies and Russian doings. Distrust of Russia had indeed now become a tradition of Tory diplomacy; that did not prevent his making a wise use of the materials at hand in his dealings with Greece; amongst such materials was the 'Russian co-operation. No taunts prevented him from using the leverage which it supplied.
CHAPTER XI

THE CANNING TRADITION


The death of Canning alone ended his difficulties with the Duke of Wellington; he lived, however, long enough to satisfy the court with the Cabinet formed by him in 1827. George IV. had nothing to say against Canning’s choice of Lord Dudley for the Foreign Office, though he foresaw that the Chancellor of the Duchy, Lord Aberdeen, would ultimately become the head of the department. Lord Dudley combined an inveterate optimism with some eccentricity; always one of the wealthiest peers in England, he had lately received almost fabulous revenues from his collieries; two or three years before he became Foreign Minister, he had described the

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new prosperity as extending to all orders, all professions, all districts, as enhanced and invigorated by those arts which minister to human comfort, as well as by those inventions which seem to have given man the mastery over human nature. The personal characteristics of the man who followed Canning in his department were extraordinary absence of mind and a habit of chinking the sovereigns in his pocket while muttering to himself. Hence the wits of the period in Paris, where he was as well known as in London, spoke of the appointment as specially appropriate because "ses affaires lui ont été toujours étrangères." The delight of the new Foreign Minister at his promotion was unbounded; he would, it was truly said of him, willingly have given £6000 a year for his office instead of receiving that sum from the public. No member, therefore, of the administration laboured so hard to patch up the differences between the Duke and Huskisson which threatened to wreck the Cabinet. On foreign affairs Dudley outdid Canning in his dislike of the Sultan and his people. To such a point did he carry his anti-Turkish sentiments, that his social influence was actively used to ostracise the English partisans of the Porte from drawing-room and club. "If," he said, "three Christian sovereigns could divide Christian Poland without interference from England, her safety cannot surely be bound up with a barbarous Mohammedan despotism. Rather should it be our policy so to direct any new arrangement consequent on the Ottoman downfall as to prevent it from turning too much to the profit of Russia, too little to that of Greece."

The Goderich administration, which retained
Dudley as Foreign Secretary after Canning's death, did not, it will thus be seen, contemplate executing the Treaty of London in a manner less favourable to Greece than did Canning himself. Thus, under dissimilar but mainly Tory dispensations, was English diplomacy brought round to the support of oppressed nationalities. Thus for the time did Tory diplomacy break with the principle of antagonism to Russia, stamped though it was declared to be by the high authority of the second Pitt. The secret articles of the London treaty arranged for an armistice between Greece and Turkey; the efforts to secure this involved the entire destruction of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets at Navarino. That incident was spoken of in widely different language by the rival party leaders of the time. The Duke of Wellington talked of unprovoked outrage and suggested apology; he had, he said, always disliked the Treaty of London; he protested against the idea of its having any connection with his own St Petersburg protocol. The foreign policy that had culminated in the Navarino incident, not only hastened the dissolution of the Goderich Government, but threatened to prevent the formation of the Wellington Cabinet which followed it.

The Foreign Secretary, whom so many had refused to take quite seriously, alone kept the Duke's men together. Had Dudley gone out, Huskisson and the Moderates would have followed him. The Greco-Turkish question had split the whole heterogeneous ministerial connection. To the Duke himself it was a shabby trick. His tepid retainers saw in it no more than a regrettable incident. On the other hand the Whig leaders, Althorp and Russell, whom the new ministers wished to con-
ciliate, spoke of it as a necessary consequence of the Treaty of London, and as honest a victory as had ever been gained since the beginning of the world. The Porte now demanded of England an indemnity for the destruction of its fleet, and the withdrawal of the Powers from intervention in Greece. Dudley referred the Turkish ambassador to the Treaty of London: he further pointed out that the recent action at sea had been begun by the Turks themselves. Dudley's official methods may have been as procrastinating and as confused as some critics have said. He cannot be charged with lack of clearness in deciding on a policy or of strength in carrying it out. His resignation in 1828 was due to no failure, but to the impossibility of lasting co-operation between the Canningites and the Tories. So far Foreign Office influence had been the cement that kept the ministers together. When that lost its cohesive power, Dudley resigned, together with Huskisson, whom he had so often kept from retiring before.

As Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the fourth Earl of Aberdeen had already done a good deal of Foreign Office work, and was a Scotch Tory after the Duke of Wellington's heart. Beginning public life in diplomacy, he had, as ambassador at Vienna in 1813, won over Austria to the Treaty of Toplitz which secured the independence of the small Rhenish states. Being, a year later, on duty at the Congress of Chatillon, he employed his experience of private theatricals to delight the evenings of the cosmopolitan company. More lately he had taken part in the Greek negotiations. He now brought to the control of the department not only the serious shrewdness of
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the Scot, but a matured and accurate insight into the dark places of European diplomacy. No one was more at home behind the diplomatic scenes in Vienna, or had given Castlereagh sounder advice about Austrian aims and ideas. "Metternich," said Aberdeen, "is singularly acute, but withal not a very clever man, very vain, always Austrian, and predisposed for war if the risk to his country be not too great."

The last Lord Rokeby died in 1883. On one of the frequent occasions of my meeting him, while Mr Spencer Montague, he gave me many interesting details about the Princess Lieven's evening parties, at which the Lord Rokeby of that time met weekly the leading diplomatists, English and Continental, of the period. From this ancestor’s unpublished papers the Lord Rokeby of whom I knew something vividly described "the international set presided over by the fourth Lord Aberdeen. Metternich belonged to it and showed himself there exactly as he was. Not (wrote Rokeby) the Machiavellian genius some have described him, but the pleasantest and most equal-tempered man I ever knew. He never lost his temper in his life nor had a mean thought or said a mean word about anyone. But he wanted pace." The schoolfellow, at Harrow, of Byron, the "travelled thane, Athenian Aberdeen," now showed himself much stronger for non-intervention than for the Hellenic cause. "Tear up the Treaty of London," was his advice to the Cabinet. This was Wellingtonian Toryism with a vengeance, utterly impracticable, of course, because it would have undone the work laboriously completed by the Foreign Office under three successive chiefs, because Russia, then thoroughly on the alert, would at once have put her foot down.
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Moreover, it would have not only destroyed the results of the European alliance, but have combined the Powers against an isolated England. Wellington, however, was for limiting the new Greek kingdom to the Morea, to a few islands, for exacting the payment of a large indemnity at once, and a heavy annual tribute afterwards from Greece to the Sultan. This was too much even for the Duke's particular Cabinet ally. The Foreign Secretary, in fact, himself at once negatived the Prime Minister's proposal. At the time of Aberdeen's entering upon office, Russia and Turkey were at war about Greece; the Greek insurgents held the Morea; the Powers who had signed the Treaty of London were preventing the return of Turkish troops to Hellenic soil. In the Opposition, Lord John Russell illustrated the eighteenth-century anti-Turkish tradition of the Whig leader, Charles Fox; for he had denounced the Turk, though in language less severe than had been used by ministers themselves, and particularly by the Secretary at War, the Turcophil of the Victorian age, The Palmerston of 1827 plainly asked in the Cabinet, and through his organs in the press, why the Turks should be kept at Constantinople.

As Prime Minister in 1853, Aberdeen was to be charged with slackness in the Crimean War with Russia. As Foreign Secretary in 1828, he was taunted with the patrician prejudices, causing him to sympathise with Russian or even Turkish absolutism rather than with the Greeks struggling to be free. Aberdeen has been censured for not uniting with Austria to prevent the settlement of the Russo-Turkish War which (14th September 1829), while slightly increasing the
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Czar's Asiatic dominions gave Russia the protectorate of the Danubian provinces. The Treaty of Adrianople, however, gave the Czar much less than he had expected and had long held out for; there was no sign of help coming to England from Vienna, even if British diplomacy had averted the Adrianople arrangement. Aberdeen's views about Russia were in general consistency with those of Canning, and, in his later years, of Pitt. Towards Russia, indeed, the line taken by our Foreign Office was the same under Aberdeen as it had been under Dudley. With both these ministers the English policy always was to prevent Russia from isolated action as the liberator of any oppressed nationalities whatever. Aberdeen had no sooner become Foreign Secretary than he sent Lord Heytesbury to our embassy at St Petersburg, with instructions showing his disbelief in Russian promises and his apprehension of a Russian advance. Soon after the new ambassador's appointment, Aberdeen heard that the Czar had directed the blockade of the Dardanelles. He at once sent out word that all English ships, whatever they carried, must be outside this operation. Russia yielded; the blockading orders were cancelled. A coolness was left between the two governments, and the Treaty of London ceased to be the subject of Anglo-Russian co-operation. In 1807, as has been seen, Napoleon had resolved in no case to allow the Russian occupation of Constantinople. Aberdeen formed the same determination in 1828; he never afterwards departed from it. As regards the Treaty of Adrianople, the facts concerning Aberdeen's connection with it are very simple. He disliked and condemned its concessions to Russia, not less strongly
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than had been done by our ambassador at Constantinople, Sir R. Gordon. He accepted it, however, as a necessary evil, for these reasons. The military exhaustion of Turkey had become as severe as that of Russia. Moreover, the struggle had produced effects so widely disturbing as to revive the scare of revolution in France and elsewhere. European diplomacy, therefore, with Metternich at its head, disliked the Adrianople terms; it insisted for political reasons on the necessity of peace at any price. The ultra-Tories, who now blamed Aberdeen for not remembering Oczakow, logically ought to have included the foreign idol of Toryism, Metternich, in their censures. For what were the facts?

The Czar Nicholas, without any protest from the Continental Powers, had made war on Turkey for alleged offences against himself and his subjects. England alone dissented from the step; she became the benefactress of Europe by not acknowledging, and so by removing, the blockade of the Dardanelles. Like some of his diplomatic contemporaries, Aberdeen was mistaken in anticipating an early collapse of the Sultan's European sovereignty. Because he regarded the Porte, which he had wished to preserve, as doomed, he had gradually determined, in his own words, "to make something out of Greece, to establish it as a solid Power, which if necessary we may cordially support in future."

In another matter our foreign policy at the period now reached, maintained its practical identity with that of Canning. The affairs of Portugal were not yet settled. In 1830, Don Miguel had become so popular in Portugal that he had been requested to
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declare himself king, even without the consent of the Cortes. Asked to intervene on behalf of Donna Maria, Aberdeen took the course which would certainly have been that of Canning. To impose the young queen on the Peninsula, and to keep her there by British support, would be equally bad, he said, for Portugal, for England, for the connection between the two countries, and for the new Portuguese Constitution. The relations between the London and Paris Foreign Offices under Aberdeen passed through some vicissitudes. His own sympathies and those of the Duke of Wellington with reactionary France have been exaggerated. But for the days of July which placed Louis Philippe on the throne in 1830, war between France and England could scarcely have been averted. In the January of that year Metternich's good offices secured for Aberdeen the sight of despatches from the French ambassador at Constantinople to his government; these documents showed the French monarchy to be meditating, in concert with Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, an expedition against Algiers. Aberdeen lost not a moment in letting France know that England would not acquiesce in any project of permanent conquest or aggrandisement. Our ambassador in Paris, Lord Stuart of Rothesay, alluding at this time to rumours of a possible revolution, declared them to be utterly unfounded. Ten days later the Bourbon monarchy had fallen, and the danger to England from a Franco-Egyptian alliance was at an end. The change of dynasty was not effected without the exchange of many communications between Paris and London. English observers, amongst them perhaps Aberdeen, were asking themselves whether the French
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changes which had begun would stop short of an attempt at another republic. Lord Stuart of Rothesay's advices from France were reassuring. Meanwhile Charles X. looked for an asylum outside his own country. The dethroned monarch had been alarmed by rumours of his intended kidnapping; he had applied to the English Embassy for protection, perhaps in the shape of a British man-of-war to watch the French vessel conveying him from his kingdom.

Aberdeen had now to confront some hostility of English feeling and the actual opposition of his chief; for the Duke of Wellington protested against recognising the deposition of Charles X. till the Allies of 1814 had been consulted. Aberdeen held his own opinion; eventually he brought round to it not only the Duke with all his colleagues, but popular sentiment as well. Nor, as a fact, would the English public have tolerated armed intervention to save a monarchy to whose representative, whether Bourbon or, as in Louis Philippe he had now become, Orleanist, they were altogether indifferent.

In England, diplomacy had now become national. By a logic like that with which Omar Pasha justified the burning of the Alexandrian library, Archbishop Whately once whimsically argued the uselessness of treaties; if they ceased to express a national conviction, they could not be enforced; if they did express it, that conviction would enforce itself and they were superfluous. At the same time Charles X.'s appeal was at least technically justified by the letter not only of the treaties of 1814 and 1815, but by the international understanding sealed a few years later at Aix-la-Chapelle. All those arrangements provided
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for foreign interference in French affairs if the revolution should reassert itself. The deposition of Charles, it might be said, was caused by his own unconstitutional acts; but the documents which the Powers had signed said nothing about such conduct relieving them of their obligations. The truth, of course, is that the Vienna treaties and those which followed them were by common consent lapsing into a dead letter. This was a year or two later to be more fully recognised by Lord Palmerston. He as Lord Aberdeen's successor began his course as Foreign Secretary under Earl Grey, November 1830. The Aberdeen despatch of 1829, explaining to the Continental courts England's recognition of Louis Philippe, contained the argument that the principles of Canning obviously most applicable to the present time committed England to a limitation rather than an extension of her European responsibilities. As concerns our nearest Continental neighbour, the beginnings of that Anglo-French entente, completed in the present reign, were made by Aberdeen when refusing the appeal of Charles X., he had insisted that to entertain it would have been to charge the French people with detestable and incredible cruelty and baseness. The same conciliatory consideration of French feeling characterised his treatment of the Belgian question, so far as it can be said to have existed before his retirement in 1830. In that year the revolutionary example of France had been followed by a popular rising in Belgium against the connection with Holland. The King of Holland had applied to Aberdeen for English troops to protect him against the Belgian insurgents. The request was refused, but as Belgium and Holland were now practically at war with
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each other, English diplomacy summoned the Powers to a conference held in London (1830) for considering the whole subject. The arrangement of an armistice was immediately followed by the discussion of the plenipotentiaries under the presidency of Palmerston, who had come in during November. The conference was a mere diplomatic formality, held to register a foregone conclusion, the erection of Belgium into a separate independent state. This constituted the earliest intimation that only by bayonets and cannon could the Vienna treaty be maintained as part of the public law of Europe.

In the Belgian affair Aberdeen had shown great skill in managing Louis Philippe and his chief minister Talleyrand. Aberdeen's successor profited by his example. Palmerston and Talleyrand, before going into the London conference, had agreed that the severance of Belgium from Holland was an established and irreversible fact. On 20th December 1830, the conference discussed the conditions on which this separation should be effected. The three most important questions to be settled were the exact territorial limits of the two countries, the division of the debt of the United Netherlands kingdom and the choice of an occupant for the Belgian throne. The conference held its first sitting towards the end of 1830; on the 20th and 27th of the following January it settled the territorial matter by a compromise: Holland retained all her possessions of 1790; Belgium received the remainder. Luxemburg, about which there had been much discussion, was still to constitute part of the Germanic confederation. In February the Dutch delegates
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accepted this arrangement without demur. The difficulties still to be surmounted were raised by Belgium; they related chiefly to the future king of that country. The national congress of Belgium had nominated and indeed gone through the form of electing Louis Philippe's second son, the Duc de Nemours, to the throne. Consulting Palmerston on the subject, Talleyrand was plainly given to understand that such a choice would be regarded by Great Britain as portending a union between Belgium and France; this would disturb the balance of power, and might involve war. War, indeed, as it was, seemed already inevitable. The substitution of Casimir Perier for Laffitte as French premier, with Sebastiani for his Foreign Secretary, helped to avert the summary close of the conference and check an appeal to arms. Eventually the choice fell on the Princess Charlotte's widowed husband, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. He persuaded his subjects to accept in the January of 1831 the eighteen articles embodying the resolutions of the Powers; he thus pacified his adopted country, but did not prevent its invasion by Dutch troops.

English party-differences now complicated the difficulties of diplomacy. Three international experts, by their timely appearance on the stage, helped to compose the agitation. The first, Earl Granville, our ambassador at Paris, a favourite of the whole corps diplomatique, adroitly made opportunities of soothing Belgian susceptibilities on the subject of Luxemburg. At this time, too, there had recently come to represent England at Brussels the son of George III.'s staff surgeon, Sir Robert Adair. This staunch and capable Whig had always been so keen a partisan that at the
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age of six, in the Wilkes and Liberty riots, he suddenly left his mother, Lady Caroline Keppel, with whom he was sitting, to take part in breaking his father's windows because he was a placeman. He faced much risk when, in 1831, he interposed successfully to prevent a collision between the Dutch and French troops, being, in his words to Coke, the old friend of Charles Fox, "shot at once or twice like a Holkham rabbit." The third diplomatist who, as intermediary, promoted a settlement, and who, by his acceptance of the Russian modifications of the treaty, became one of the creators of the new kingdom, was Sylvain Van de Weyer, then a young Belgian remarkable for the clearness of his head and the charm of his manners, well-known to society in the last century of the representative of the court of Brussels in London. To these names may be added that of Lord Durham, who, as the Prime Minister's son-in-law and a Liberal after the Foreign Secretary's heart, had been sent to St Petersburg to remove Russian prejudice against the latest addition to the monarchies of Western Europe. The Prime Minister, Grey, had another influential relative in diplomacy, his brother-in-law, Lord Ponsonby, British chargé d'affaires at Brussels. Lord Grey himself, it will be remembered, had been Foreign Secretary in 1806. An imperious aristocrat, with special knowledge of international politics, he was not likely to give his Foreign Minister the absolutely free hand which Palmerston first secured under Melbourne in 1834. Throughout the episodes just narrated the policy of England had been shaped as much by Grey as by Palmerston. The Prime Minister suggested alterations in his Secretary
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of State’s despatches, and went over them, clause by clause, in the Cabinet. In his own department Palmerston made at home and abroad the appointments he desired. Grey, however, took care that the diplomatic service was largely recruited from his own personal connections or intimates.

The Belgian treaty was signed by Palmerston and Talleyrand on 22nd October 1832. Meanwhile, among other affairs engaging the Foreign Office were those of the Peninsula. In the July of 1831, Portuguese outrages on a French subject had brought French men-of-war to the Tagus. A little later an Englishman became the victim of like treatment. In 1832 a British squadron appeared in Portuguese waters. To pass over the intervening incidents, the work of English diplomacy in Portugal and Spain was to secure constitutional government for both countries. Even under Grey, the tendency of Palmerston’s intervention was systematically to be upon a less conditional scale than had been that of his declared master Canning. Portugal, which in 1832 engaged Palmerston, also affords the best illustration of the principles on which Canning’s intervention was based. The English alliance with Portugal dated from 1793. Canning tightened it by fresh political and commercial links. He only fulfilled a legal liability in coming to its rescue. Palmerston, whenever he intervened, did so to prevent any single Power from dominating Europe; he thus needed no pressure of pre-existing compact to appear as the champion of constitutional liberties. Palmerston, it has been already said, was less completely his own master at the Foreign Office under Grey than under Melbourne.
In the year, however, before he first went there, he had warned the House of Commons that his ideas of intervention were far more wide and strenuous than those of Canning. Yet he perceived that the time was coming when English opinion would not sanction such "intermeddling" (his own word) except for the safety of our Indian and Colonial Empire. Aberdeen was sometimes charged with a Tory leaning towards the absolute monarchies of Eastern Europe. Palmerston professed the Whig tradition of preference for Liberal France. His diplomacy, however, from 1835 to 1845, might be described as a series of duels with the two leading French ministers, Guizot and Thiers, equally with the motive of checkmating French designs and of maintaining Turkish independence. This period included the episode of Mehemet Ali in the East and of the Spanish marriages in the West. The former of these involves some reference to transactions between Russia, Turkey and the other Powers during Palmerston's first term at the Foreign Office when the Prime Minister was Grey. In 1833, Russia had profited by the preoccupation of the Western Powers with Belgium to extort from Turkey the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. This gave the Czar Nicholas what his predecessors had desired, but had never been able even to come near obtaining. The war-ships of every nation except Russia were excluded from the Dardanelles. The Czar stood forth before the world as the sole friend and protector of the Sultan. It was not till the beginning of 1834 that the text of the Unkiar Skelessi treaty reached the Foreign Office. Long before this, however, circumstantial rumours

* Speech in Parliament, 1st June 1829.
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of the transaction reaching England had excited indignation against Russia in and out of Parliament. O'Connell had spoken of the Czar as "the monster Nicholas," had abused Palmerston for his subservience to the brute that had kicked his country. Like other European countries, England swarmed with Polish exiles. The Foreign Secretary found himself hustled and hooted as he rode from Piccadilly to Whitehall. Nothing ruffled his cheerful calm. In the House of Commons, Henry Bulwer's motion for papers bearing on the Russo-Turkish rumours were resisted, on 11th July 1833, by the Foreign Secretary on the ground that Russian troops had evacuated Turkey. Yet, as it appeared from the Morning Herald of 21st August 1833, on the mere promise of such an evacuation, the treaty had just been yielded by the Porte to the Czar. When the newspaper just named printed the treaty, Palmerston did not dispute its genuineness, but continued to say he was not in possession of the original, and to refuse in the national interest the production of all papers.

Whatever may have been the comments of Palmerston's immediate predecessor in his post on Unkiar Skelessi, Lord Aberdeen differed from many of his party in generally approving Palmerston's treatment (1830-40) of Mehemet Ali's attempt to throw off the Sultan's suzerainty and make himself an independent prince. Both Aberdeen and Palmerston had expected that Louis Philippe and Thiers would aid and abet by all agencies at their command, Mehemet's scheme for disintegrating the Turkish Empire, and for making Egypt the seat of a new and separate Oriental Power. Long before Napoleon's invasion of that country,
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Egypt, under Louis XVI., had taken a powerful hold of the popular French imagination. Playing to the gallery was the Orleanist king's and his minister's idea of strengthening their hold upon their people. One of the keys to French action at this period is the curiously bitter personal estrangement between the Czar Nicholas and Louis Philippe. Russia befriended the Sultan and aimed at restoring Syria to him. That sufficed to make France Mehemet Ali's partisan. Meanwhile, Palmerston and Metternich determined upon a settlement of Eastern Europe, independently if need be of France. The English and the Austrian statesmen convoked the London Conference of 1840; on the 15th of July in that year a convention was signed by England, Austria, Prussia and Russia, to insist upon Mehemet's restoration of Northern Syria to the Sultan; it further granted him the hereditary government of Egypt. This compact, if generally known as the Quadruple Treaty, has also been called the Quadrilateral Treaty, as if to distinguish it from an earlier compact of 1834,* by which another group of four Powers guaranteed, as has been already said, constitutional government in Portugal and Spain. The exclusion of France which had thwarted Palmerston by separate negotiations with Mehemet Ali, brought her to the verge of war with England. The fall of Thiers alone maintained peace. The English representative, Henry Bulwer, bore the brunt of the falling minister's personal fury.

The Austro-English naval operations required

* Before this, in 1834, Palmerston had arranged between England, France, Spain and Portugal another Quadruple Treaty for settling the Peninsula.

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before the final settlement of Mehemet Ali did not diminish, but rather enhanced, the diplomatic prestige accruing to Palmerston from this transaction. He had discredited the military resources of Egypt, the invincibility of Mehemet himself, and the necessity which it had been said Louis Philippe and his ministers would experience of yielding to the war-cry of France. In doing this Palmerston had not only divided the Cabinet, he had placed his House of Commons majority under a dangerous strain. He had gone perilously near to involving Europe in a general war. But all his calculations and the private intelligence on which he so greatly relied had been justified by the event. Russia had tacitly abandoned the pretensions embodied in the Unkiar Skelessi treaty, to keep Turkey indefinitely under Russian tutelage. The Dardanelles were closed against the war-ships of all countries. Turkey herself had been presented with the opportunity of showing her capacities of progress, and of entering upon a new career under the common protection of Europe. This is what the shrewd Aberdeen had foreseen when he dissented from his colleagues in their outcry against Palmerston’s early diplomacy in the Mehemet Ali imbroglio. The cleverness and success of Palmerston’s coup are beyond doubt. At the same time he exposed himself to the criticism of Thiers. Mehemet Ali was to be crushed that the integrity of the Turkish empire might be maintained. And yet the Sultan was to shed Acre and Egypt that Mehemet Ali might be satisfied.

The Palmerstonian triumphs, though placing England at the head of Europe, did not prevent the fall of his Government. That brought with it the return under Sir Robert Peel of Lord Aberdeen in 1841.
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The new head of the Foreign Office at once made it his business to foster the *entente cordiale* between England and France. In this task he received help from the new French minister Guizot, his own congenial friend. Apart, however, from recent causes of friction he had to contend against some inauspicious general circumstances. The Anglo-mania which had made itself fashionable throughout France before the Revolution, had been followed by a social intimacy between the upper classes of both countries. Hence, among other things, it had grown the polite mode for English girls of good position to receive their education at French convent schools. Now the reaction was due. There had become epidemic in France a cordial and all but universal detestation of English success, statesmanship and designs. Each country was disposed to fix its eyes exclusively on the worst points of the other, and to see in its neighbour a rival whose interest conflicted with its own in every quarter of the globe. The French ministerial changes, replacing Thiers by Guizot, proved favourable to the conciliatory efforts of our new Foreign Secretary; unlike Palmerston, he went little into society himself; he was helped without knowing it by the prevailing temper of drawing-rooms and clubs. Talleyrand had died in 1838. The social atmosphere generated by his personal qualities had tempered British patriotism with a good-humoured toleration of French peculiarities and peccadilloes. There still lingered the echoes of the laughter excited by his accounts of Louis Philippe, whom he seemed never to take quite seriously, and by his innumerable good things said at London dinner-tables. While, however, desiring to make France our
friend, Aberdeen laid his account with the possibility of finding her determined to be our enemy. Hence he gratified the court by the pains he took to remove the grudges against us with which Palmerston had inspired the rest of Europe. Amicable relations with every European state and, so far as that policy permitted, real friendship with France fairly described Lord Aberdeen's policy during his second Foreign Secretaryship. The London and Paris Foreign Offices owed something of their success to their respective monarchies. The young English queen had already begun to exercise an influence on foreign politics, as real as that of her predecessors and far more beneficent.

The French interest in Egypt, and the English determination to keep the line open to India caused periodical though not dangerous differences. But in 1841, the French governor of Tahiti had summarily seized and imprisoned a British subject named Pritchard, generally described as a consul, but really a missionary. Public indignation already glowed fiercely, and was further inflamed by some strong and unguarded words of the usually cautious Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel. War-fever in the two countries soon reached its height. Aberdeen and Guizot, however, had privately agreed between themselves that they would both resign rather than be parties to a violation of peace. The settlement and its precise terms were the personal contrivances of the two statesmen rather than the products of their diplomatic machinery. The anti-English feeling was so strong in the Chamber of Deputies, that any vote for an indemnity to Pritchard for the outrages he had undergone could not be thought of. After some further
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communications between Aberdeen and Guizot, Louis Philippe supplied the money from his own civil list. From 1841 to 1846, the period of Aberdeen's second Secretaryship, the diplomatic record of England resolves itself into a narrative of the personal friendship uniting the men who controlled the Foreign Offices of Paris and London. The popular idea that Aberdeen's conduct of foreign affairs bore the impress of Palme- rston's mind is disproved by facts. He and Guizot had entered into an understanding that neither of the pair would take any important step without first ascertaining the other's wishes. Thus, for the only time, the London and Paris Foreign Offices were absolutely at one, and for practical purposes constituted a single international department. More apposite than Tahiti to the time at which these lines are written (1907), was Aberdeen's Moorish policy in 1844, demonstrably the exact opposite of that which Palmerston's would have been. In the Cabinet he stood alone; he himself disliked the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, he accepted it as an accomplished fact in 1841; he further acquiesced in the logical consequences of this step when he recognised that, having established themselves in Algeria, the French could not but resent the behaviour of the Moors. The British consul at Tangiers was instructed to exert his influence with the Emperor of Morocco to yield. The British admiral in Moorish waters had orders to do nothing that might inspire the Moors with the hope of moral or material support from England. How did the matter end? The French, having effected their object, retired from Morocco. The Anglo-French war panic ended harm-
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lessly. The *entente cordiale* between the two countries had not been impaired. The very abuse heaped on Aberdeen and Guizot in their respective countries was thus a kind of compliment. The phases of the Greek question presenting themselves to Aberdeen in 1843 were less critical than those occupying Palmerston six years later. The revolution, as it was called, of the earlier date merely marked the popular victory in the struggle for constitutional rule against a capricious and autocratic monarch. The result was taken by Lord Aberdeen for a legitimate manifestation by the Greek people in favour of constitutional government. Even this purely domestic episode provoked the busy display of Anglo-French diplomatic rivalries. At this time England was represented at Athens by the future Lord Lyons, who, as Sir Edmund Lyons, was a brave sailor and accomplished admiral, but, unlike his more famous son, not a born diplomatist. The representative of France was Mr Piscatory. Each of these ministers had his own man among the Athenian place-hunters. Piscatory was intriguing to get Coletti into office. Lyons backed Mavrocordato. It was a mean and mischievous squabble. With nautical bluntness Lyons by letter and speech let Piscatory know what he thought about him. With undiplomatic prolixity of trivial detail, he wrote home to the Foreign Secretary, complaining of all he had to suffer from his French rival. In reply Aberdeen, naturally disgusted at the whole affair, in a sharp letter pooh-poohed his agent's grievance, but in a despatch to Paris plainly let the minister of Foreign Affairs know that he must not presume too far on their personal friendship. Guizot was given unmistakably to understand that if Piscatory
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did not obey more exactly instructions from Paris, Lyons also, notwithstanding Aberdeen's reprimand, must be expected to get out of hand.

During Aberdeen's second turn at the Foreign Office there were anxious communications between Whitehall and Washington. One Anglo-American dispute of some standing was being settled when he took the seals in 1841. In that year the British subject, M'Leod, charged with murder on board the steamer *Caroline* in the Canadian rebellion of 1838, was acquitted. Had he been found guilty and executed, the relations between the two countries would have been subjected to an intolerable strain. Another question whose settlement by Aberdeen removed a dangerous and frequent cause of quarrel was the right of search on vessels by cruisers engaged in the suppression of the slave-trade. Anglo-American friction was at this time aggravated by the indolence, if not inefficiency of the British minister at Washington. When therefore Aberdeen took in hand the irritating and inveterate differences about the north-east boundary of the States and the British provinces, he sent out Lord Ashburton, the head of the great house of Baring. Ashburton's fitness for the work was universally recognised; his personal credentials for the mission were the possession of an American wife and of commercial interests which made American welfare a scarcely less concern to him than that of Great Britain. The affair was settled by a compromise; Palmerston called it a bad bargain. The Ashburton treaty, however, that the envoy brought home, secured an agreement with the United States for suppressing the slave-trade; its chief concession to America was a
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swamp productive only of inferior pine-trees. At the cost of this the peace which the Ashburton treaty secured could not be considered dear. The one failure of the Ashburton mission was that it did not decide the ownership of the Columbia River littoral.

Thus in the first decade of Queen Victoria's reign, Aberdeen's diplomacy on the other side of the Atlantic, whatever its defects, had gone far towards removing any risk of immediate rupture between the two portions of the Anglo-Saxon race. Meanwhile in France the diplomatic compact uniting Aberdeen and Guizot did not prevent Louis Philippe from privately intriguing with Russia against the English Government to which he owed his throne. Had Thiers remained in office, the French king must have been drawn into war with England. As it was, the curtain had begun to rise upon a fresh act of the international melodrama in which the leading parts were sustained by the diplomatists of London, Paris and Madrid. The most important incident was the selection of husbands for the young Queen of Spain, Isabella, and her sister Fernanda. That was only one of several episodes.

Egypt, by the overthrow of Mehemet Ali, had been withdrawn from the sphere of French influence; British diplomacy was converting the land of the Pharaohs into an outpost of India. These things had wounded French self-love to the quick; they had set the astute Louis Philippe on the congenial work of private intrigue against England. In this he was stimulated and assisted by the Paris salons which formed part of his court, and whose mistresses found among their guests colleagues in the wives of
Russian statesmen like Benckendorff, Nesselrode and Tchernitcheff. The queen-mother of Spain, Christina, flitted to and fro between Paris and Madrid. Afterwards she posed as the admirer of England and the friend of Queen Victoria; now she was being fêted by the French king as the mother-in-law elect of the Duc de Montpensier, whom he wished to make the husband of the younger Spanish princess, Fernanda.

Meanwhile a French envoy, Meunier, had arrived in England to sound the British Government on the subject. The diplomacy of this affair calls for mention here, but the negotiations and their ending have been written about so often that it is unnecessary here to follow all the details. In 1840, during the Carlist War, Guizot's unofficial mention of the subject to Palmerston not only confirmed the English statesman's suspicion of Louis Philippe's being bent on securing the young Queen Isabella as a bride for his son; it drew forth the declaration that England must veto such a match. Louis Philippe therefore abandoned this idea and directed his efforts to promoting the marriage of Isabella with her cousin the Duke of Cadiz, and to securing for his own son, the Duc de Montpensier, the Princess Fernanda. He had satisfied himself that the union of Isabella and the Duke of Cadiz was not likely to be fruitful. The child that might be born of the Duc de Montpensier and the Fernanda marriage would in that case be heir to the Spanish throne.

Addressed by Guizot on the same subject in 1841, Aberdeen, who had then just gone to the Foreign Office, declined a suggestion of limiting the Spanish queen's choice to a Spanish or Neapolitan Bourbon;
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but added that such a match, if desired at Madrid, would not be opposed by Great Britain. In 1845, Queen Victoria and Prince Albert were on a visit to Louis Philippe at the Château d’Eu. The royal guests then supplemented the work of the London Foreign Office by a definite agreement with their host himself. First, Queen Isabella herself must marry her cousin, the Duke of Cadiz. Then Louis Philippe's son, the Duc de Montpensier, might become the husband of Isabella's sister. Neither the cordiality between the reigning houses of France and England, nor the mutual devotion of the French and English Foreign Ministers caused the French king really to abandon the idea of uniting the French and Spanish branches of the Bourbon family. The matrimonial diplomacy of the French court and its chancery did in effect revive the seventeenth-century Family Compact for a union of the French and Spanish crowns baffled by Chatham. But it displayed features of calculating heartlessness on the part of the French king that were new.

At the Château d’Eu house-party in 1845, the English and French royalties had further settled that neither of the Spanish princesses should find a husband in Leopold of Saxe-Coburg; this was the cousin of Prince Albert and brother of the King Consort of Portugal; his name in this connection was then mentioned for the first time. In 1846, Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office and at once fell out of favour at court for naming in a despatch to Madrid Leopold as a possible suitor for Queen Isabella. Guizot seized this indiscretion as an excuse for hurrying on the Montpensier marriage which he had already agreed to
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postpone. Meanwhile the representatives of England and France, Henry Bulwer, afterwards Lord Dalling, and M. Bresson, had been squabbling daily and making bad blood all round at Madrid. In fact, so ruse an observer from behind the scenes as the already-mentioned Lord Rokeby attributed the entire dispute far less to any jealousy of Palmerston and Guizot than to the quarrel between Bulwer and Bresson. Bulwer's protest against Louis Philippe's nominee, the Duke of Cadiz, a perfect monster with a square face and a turned-up nose, being forced upon a young sovereign all but brought the French and English diplomats to blows. On 10th October 1846, Queen Isabella, however, took this man for her husband. On the same day her younger sister, Fernanda, became the wife of the Duc de Montpensier. Guizot's promise to delay the Montpensier marriage had thus been broken. He defended his breach of faith in a letter to his friend Henry Reeve, the well-known Edinburgh Review editor.* Guizot's distrust of Palmerston amounted to monomania, and the mere mention of Leopold's name had caused him to scent a fresh Palmerstonian plot. In her, till recently unpublished, papers on the subject, Queen Victoria ascribes the whole difficulty to Aberdeen not having been at the Foreign Office instead of Palmerston, and to Louis Philippe's and Guizot's dishonesty.

More forcibly than had been done by the Franco-Turkish-Egyptian imbroglio or by any other international complication, the affair of the Spanish marriages illustrates the effect of a purely and essentially diplomatic episode on the entire relations of two countries.

* Reeve Memoirs, 181-2. 291
for some time to come. To that result other causes were indeed accessory. The matter developed itself into a competition of nations as well as a rivalry of courts and Cabinets.

Formerly Spain supplied England and France with the same bone of contention that Egypt has in our time been. Of the two principal Spanish parties, the Moderados looked to France; the English protégés were the Progressists. Consequently, the retirement of Queen Christina, a Moderado, and the regency of the Progressist Esparttero in 1841 were regarded as abasing France and exalting England. About the same time De Salvandy, the new ambassador from France, reached Madrid. Told by the authorities that he must present his credentials to the Regent Esparttero instead of to Queen Isabella, then a child of ten, he appealed to the traditional right of ambassadors to approach the sovereign, of whatever age, in person. Thus he said, in 1715, the diplomatist accredited by the King of Spain to the French court was received in person by Louis XV., although then an infant of five. One of Palmerston’s favourite diplomatists, Aston, had just succeeded Villiers as minister at the Spanish capital. Salvandy therefore complained to the French Foreign Office of an affront placed on himself and his country by a British intrigue. Aston’s conduct, in taking sides against the French ambassador, gave some colour to this charge. Aberdeen, however, at that time Foreign Minister, composed the differences by despatching a severe reproof to Aston, and showing the French Government a copy of it. The intercourse between the French and British Governments and Spain now became almost affection-
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ate. The two Powers had but a disinterested wish to merit the benediction of peacemakers. They would mutually yield, or would do anything; only let their co-operation restore peace to distracted Spain. Apropos of the light thrown by them upon Metternich, I have already expressed my obligations to the unprinted family papers shown me long ago by the last Lord Rokeby. As regards the present subject they suggested, I remember, the probability of the Spanish marriages idea having almost simultaneously presented itself to the French king and the Spanish queen-mother in or about the year 1841. Louis Philippe at the time would come to no decision till the return of his emissary, Pageot, from London, whither he had been sent to report how the idea was received by England. Except at the point just mentioned, the manuscript evidence accessible to me contained nothing calling for any modification in the accepted version already given of the diplomatic incidents subsequent to 1841.
CHAPTER XII

REACTION TO INTERVENTION

Palmerston's diplomacy—Its manner too offhand for the Court—Palmerston on his defence—His dismissal from the Foreign Office—Lord Granville's essay on British Foreign Policy—Lord Malmesbury as Foreign Minister—He recognises Napoleon III. as Emperor of the French—Malmesbury's private Secretary, Sir H. D. Wolff—Affairs in Italy—The Peace of Villafranca—Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office—Succeeded by Lord Clarendon—The diplomacy of the Crimean War—Sir Stratford Canning and Menschikoff—The first Vienna Conference (1853)—The Vienna Note—The Four Points—The second Vienna Conference (1855)—Dissatisfaction caused by Lord John Russell's diplomacy—England's allies make peace with Russia—"Take care of Dowb"—The Congress of Paris—The diplomatic results of the War—The gradual independence of the Balkan States—The Black Sea clauses, objected to by Russia, abrogated in 1871.

PALMERSTON’S description of himself as a disciple and a successor of Canning was offered with an ingenuous diffidence which, in early days, constituted his chief personal charm. Such, according to William Wilberforce, were then his modesty and prudence that, for want of a little self-confidence, he lost the Cambridge University seat to Lord Henry Petty. Like the earliest of English Foreign Secretaries, Fox, he had begun as a high Tory; his official début was made under Perceval and Liverpool. But afterwards he went with Canning for Catholic Emancipation, and with Huskisson for Free Trade. These
vicissitudes of his political experience and his subsequent necessities as a liberal leader reflected themselves in the whole course of his international methods. A spirited foreign policy was at once agreeable to his early Tory traditions, and to his own personal tastes. During his first premiership, the House of Commons defeat, inflicted on him by Cobden on the Lorcha Arrow affair, gave him the opportunity of proving his strength in the country, of obtaining a majority of seventy-nine, and for a time of overthrowing his enemies of the Manchester School. Nevertheless, as none knew better than Palmerston himself, Cobden's influence on the conduct of external affairs was henceforward a power to be reckoned with. Palmerston had a preference for constitutional government abroad as well as at home. The stand made by him for popular liberties in Italy and Austria was stimulated and even decided by the old Whig jealousy of the sovereign's interference in the interests of Imperial absolutism. The aristocratic Whigs and occasionally the new Disraelian Conservatives formed his real support in the resolution that England should "count for something," by which, in effect was meant everything, in the councils of Europe. When, in 1844, the Czar Nicholas paid his famous visit to Queen Victoria, Palmerston was not among the English statesmen who interviewed him. The possible establishment of England in Egypt was then the subject of Anglo-Russian communications. "Henceforth," Palmerston said, "our only foreign policy is to keep Egypt open and say 'hands off' as regards India and the Colonies." Aberdeen, as has been said, saw in Palmerston the political sportsman, ever ready in
any part of the world to let slip the English dogs of war. As a fact, even during his first Secretaryship, Palmerston withstood much pressure from personal and political friends to join France in intervening to put down the Carlist rising in Spain. In 1844, he would, like Aberdeen, Peel and Wellington, have recognised the Czar as the protector of the Greek Christians, and would even have allowed France separately to settle the Eastern question with Russia. At a later date (1856) he resisted some political and popular pressure by abstaining from all show of sympathy with the Danubian States in their efforts after independence. To that era also belonged his expressions about Servia, which, addressed to Baron Brunnow, startled out of his composure that seasoned diplomatist. The Prince Consort's views on the place, the responsibilities and opportunities of England in the comity of European nations, as they can be gathered from Sir Theodore Martin's biography, did not materially differ from the Palmerstonian ideas.

The duel between the Foreign Office and the court, filling so large a space in the early Victorian era, was caused more by the official methods of the Secretary of State than by his objects. The Spanish marriages and Palmerston's unfortunate mention of the Coburg candidate for Queen Isabella had, as has been seen, stirred the first breeze between the department and the palace. How stiffly it blew from Windsor is shown by Lord Esher's and Mr Benson's epistolary selections for 17th April 1847. This early complaint is to the same effect as so many that followed it; drafts to Foreign Ministers have been, in the future must not be, despatched without being
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previously submitted to the queen. During the period now reached, however, the sovereign alleged another grievance than one of state formality against the unconscionable minister.

In the revolutionary year of 1848, the queen's relations with the French and Russian sovereigns remained those of personal cordiality. She had forgiven Louis Philippe the double-dealing of his international match-making. Victoria of England and Nicholas of Russia interchanged expressions of mutual regard and belief in their common preservation for the world's welfare. That seemed natural in the case of the only two monarchs whose thrones had not been violently shaken by the earthquake shocks of 1848. As a member of the reigning comity of Europe, the queen vetoed her Foreign Minister's plan for joining the King of Sardinia to secure Italian independence. It would, she said, be a disgrace to please the republican party by driving Austria out of her possessions in Italy. Disraeli once called Palmerston's Italian policy in 1848 "too clever by half." But for that defect, it might have gone still further than it actually did towards accomplishing the achievements of eleven years later and their consequences. The English court differed from the English minister in considering its first duties were owed, not to oppressed nationalities, but to menaced monarchs. Palmerston's policy aimed at nothing less than the annexation of Lombardy by Sardinia and the creation of a Venetian republic. France alone, said the queen, would be the eventual gainer by this base and quixotic enterprise. The comment of politicians at home and abroad on the royal outburst at the time,
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was that it bore the signs of Aberdeen's inspiration, Palmerston thought or said so. It all, however, arose out of the queen's Irish worries. If Italy were to be helped to independence, on what principle could Irish subjection to England be defended?

With the antagonism thus developed between the Foreign Office and the palace there may be compared the mutual relations of the Foreign Minister and his political opponents or allies. The queen's description, in 1848, of Palmerston's international correspondence was "bitter as gall and doing great harm." A few years earlier Palmerston, with great personal success, had made a diplomatic tour through Continental capitals. Referring to this in 1845, Disraeli, in what Palmerston described as an interesting and courteous letter, told the Foreign Minister that, had he paid a later visit to Paris, he would have cured the French of their distrust of him and would have made them his friends. Without leaving England, Palmerston, by his Parliamentary defence under Lord Stanley's attacks during Sir Robert Peel's ministry, had contrived to correct many foreign misconceptions about himself, in 1845. The charge against him was that by having pursued a policy of restless interference with the business of the world he had left a heritage of anxiety to his successor. In reply he pointed to three occasions during a decade on which he had avoided the only real danger of war that had arisen. In 1830, Austria, Prussia and Russia were actually preparing to attack France. Palmerston, as Lord Grey's Foreign Minister, prevented a European war. To the same period belonged the Anglo-French Convention for delivering Antwerp to Belgium; this averted a European disturbance.
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The third appearance of Palmerston as peacemaker connected itself with the treaty which, in 1840, disposed of the danger arising from Mehemet Ali's attempt. Palmerston's elaborate justification of himself and attitude is contained in a memorandum drawn up in 1848 as well as in the House of Commons speech of 6th March 1849. The memorandum will be found on page 102 of Palmerston in "The Queen's Prime Ministers" series. The substance of the speech is in the easily accessible histories of the period. Some of its chief points were as follows:—In 1849 Palmerston's diplomacy had, as he claimed for it, made England the chief mediator of Europe, the safe asylum of discrowned kings, of fallen statesmen, and the steady champion of well-ordered constitutional reform. For a man whose position was raked by the cross-fires of Radical and Tory, in addition to the musketry of the court, Palmerston's composure was remarkable and his mistakes comparatively few.

In the instructions to his agents abroad he had commended timely concessions on the part of established governments in the interests of European peace. This advice was called an incitement to revolution by the reactionary Conservatives, who made common cause with the Cobdenites against the "incorrigible Pam."

If, according to Foreign Office traditions, in the spirit of Wellington and Peel as well as Canning, he accepted the accomplished facts of the new order, he heard himself called a treaty-breaker. He was also the first Foreign Secretary to feel the daily attacks of the press. The Times had fallen foul of him; he was charged by the newspaper with fomenting the Sicilian revolution, and further with conniving at the
supply of ordnance to the insurgents. In the memorandum already mentioned he successfully showed that a chief object of his sending Lord Minto to the South of Europe had been at once to comply with the pope's request for British encouragement in the Vatican's project of political reform, and to press upon the insurrectionary party advice which might maintain the crowns of the two Sicilies on one head. But for an untoward accident, the Minto mission would have had this effect. As for the smuggling in of arms by the rebels, Palmerston put a new complexion on the facts at the same time that he made the amende to the King of Naples. So, too, in the case of Northern Italy. His misgivings about Louis Napoleon's ultimate aim did not prevent him from joining France in mediation between Austria and Sardinia; upon the Sardinian king, Charles Albert, he had personally impressed the folly and peril of renewing the war. The object of the French President, as Louis Napoleon then was, in maintaining the papal power at Rome could only be, as Palmerston saw, to secure the head of the Church for an ally in his own Imperial projects.

Palmerston condemned at this time also Russian intervention to suppress Hungarian patriotism in Austria. Herein he showed entire consistency with that earlier reluctance to involve England in foreign affairs already noticed. In the course of conversation during a visit to Valençay,* alluding to the English diplomatist, Talleyrand had said—"He has not the power of reasoning." Yet neither Queen Victoria's dislike of his democratic proclivities in foreign affairs nor their

* Talleyrand's château, near Blois.
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own distrust in him prevented the Vienna statesmen invoking his mediation in 1848. Palmerston’s advice to Austria was “Give up Lombardy and the greater part of Venetia to the King of Piedmont and maintain a compact empire.” Here at least was the prescience which is a part of statesmanship.

The department presided over by Palmerston gained in his day rather than suffered by its standing quarrel with the court. “Two capital hits clean off my own bat.” Such were the words which he had used to describe, so far back as 1834, the earliest intimation to Austria of his resolution not to acquiesce in her suppression of Italian autonomy. The second stroke so complacently dwelt on was the expedient belonging to the same period for counter-working the Russo-Prussian league of Münchgrätz that almost amounted to a second birth of the Holy Alliance.

If on the whole Palmerston was good as a negotiator, as an interpreter of English feeling he was nearly infallible. Hence his indifference to the royal reprimand for his republican leanings in 1849. That was the year of Tory and Absolutist reaction from democratic impulse throughout Europe. The spectacle disgusted Palmerston; his combative spirit took fire against it. Those who can recall the public feeling of the time are aware that English opinion was more bitter against the Czar for his treatment of Kossuth in 1849 than when, five years later, the Russian troops crossed the Pruth. It mattered not what place in the Cabinet Palmerston held. His was the master-mind that stamped its foreign policy with his own image. In the conduct of external relations, if anywhere, knowledge is power. Palmerston was the best-informed diplomatist in
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Europe. For his acquaintance with the coulisses of Paris politics he owed much to the active and resourceful secretary of the embassy, under the first Earl Granville, afterwards under Lord Cowley, between the years 1840 and 1867. This was Henry L. Bulwer, afterwards Lord Dalling, the diplomatist whom we have seen pitted against Bresson at Madrid, and whom Palmerston had done much to mould after his own ideas.

Napoleon III. himself had many effective and ubiquitous agents. Palmerston was sufficiently served by our then deputy representative at the Elysée.* Nor did news of intrigues at the Quai d'Orsay, or rumours from the lobbies of the corps législatif reach the newspaper editors of the boulevards more quickly or surely than by way of our chancery in the Faubourg St Honoré they travelled to Palmerston at Cambridge House. Neither the Peers' censure on Palmerston's doings of 1850, nor the hostile vote of the Commons in 1857 weakened his hold on the strings of foreign policy. He did not really come to grief till 1851, when he lost his place for prematurely recognising Louis Napoleon's act of usurpation. Whether he was at the Foreign Office or not he set the tune to which ministers played and the middle classes never grumbled at having to pay the piper. The Lords voted him down, the court cut him, but the pre-Household Suffrage constituencies placed him at the head of the administration which had come after the close of the Crimean War and the tottering of the Aberdeen Government to its fall. Palmerston, however, by this time had learned

* H. L. Bulwer, the novelist's elder brother, had, in subordinate but influential capacities, boxed the compass of diplomacy before himself becoming an ambassador. Retiring as Lord Dalling, he died in 1872, the year before Lord Lytton.
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that a spirited foreign policy, such as suits the country, must have its limitations, and must assure to those who pay for it a solid as well as a glorious return.

Palmerston's first specific recognition of the hold of Cobdenism as a force in foreign affairs was when, in 1842, he had denounced the Ashburton mission to settle the Maine boundary as a dangerous and gratuitously entangling responsibility. Two years later he uncomplainingly acquiesced in the readiness of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, as well as Aberdeen himself, not only not to resent, but to entertain the pretensions of the Czar to the protectorate of the Greek Church. After 1837 the inviolability of our Asiatic possessions had become a commonplace of our diplomacy. Hence during his second term of office Palmerston had done not more than would have been done by Aberdeen, when he set in motion the Foreign Office machinery for repelling, through Persia, Russian designs on British India, and securing Herat for England. The maintenance of British interests in the nearer East would have been admitted as a principle of our policy by the non-interventionists themselves. Palmerston fell, by reason not so much of what he did, as of the way in which he did it. He habitually violated the stereotyped laws of State and court etiquette. He compelled his reluctant colleagues mutely to acquiesce in their exclusion from a sight of the important despatches sent off at critical junctures to British ambassadors abroad, or to the ministers of other countries. The climax came in 1851, after the Secretary of State had placed on record his recognition of Louis Napoleon's coup d'état. Palmerston's argument against his dismissal from the Foreign Office was as
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ingenious as it proved futile. If, he characteristically said, a Foreign Minister were never to converse with an ambassador without having previously consulted the Cabinet, there would be an end to the friendly intercourse which so often acts as oil to the wheels of the diplomatic machine. Lord John Russell's sole remark on this plea took the form of the curt statement—that he had asked the queen to appoint a new Foreign Secretary. Thus did Palmerston receive check from his queen, but it was far from being checkmate. Indeed, it improved his position not only with the country, but with some of his least sympathetic political associates. Thus, Lord Grey in 1845 had refused to sit in a Cabinet with Palmerston at the Foreign Office. Now, in 1851, Grey was among the earliest to express to the fallen minister regret at his downfall and admiration at his pluck.

During the Christmas holidays of 1851, Palmerston removed his personal belongings from the Foreign Office, and Lord Granville took possession. "You have got," said the departing minister to the newcomer, "a very interesting, but a very laborious office. Eight hours' work, when little is doing, must be your daily minimum. When there is a 'bustle' you must give more, or you will find yourself in arrears." "Palmerston," was the way in which I have heard Lord Granville put it, "gave me something better than advice in the shape of a comprehensive and most interesting review of our diplomacy from the establishment of the Foreign Office under Charles James Fox."* Lord Granville's instalment at the

* The conversation on this subject allowed me by Lord Granville suggested to me the lines on which this book is written.
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Foreign Office marked the victory won by a queen of thirty-two over a *rusé* diplomatist and man of the world of sixty-seven. Henceforth it was therefore said the Foreign Office would go in leading-strings to the court. At least there would be no more "scores" to be made by the Secretary of State "off his own bat"; no more international pyrotechnics, Roman candles one day and Greek fire the next. The chorus of eulogistic welcome from friend and foe that greeted the new minister was almost too fervent and too unbroken. "Sufficiently liberal," "conciliatory," "safe," were the epithets applied by Aberdeen to Granville when speaking of "the excellent appointment likely to remove very serious embarrassments." The queen lost no time in personally testing the capacities of her latest servant, and in showing that he would be held directly responsible to herself. The Chinese emperors require a written proof of ability and knowledge before they select their state councillors. The English queen was content to receive such a credential after the appointment actually had been made. Lord Granville was told to put down on paper his ideas of the principles on which the external relations of the realm should be controlled. "The time," added his royal mistress, "is peculiarly favourable for such an exercise." The revolutionary storm of 1848, she added, had now spent its force. There could therefore no longer be any excuse for mere hand-to-mouth policy. Something like continuity in our foreign statesmanship had thus become practicable; on what principles was it to be based? This formed the subject of the probationary essay set by the sovereign to the new-
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comer; in this way he was to show himself up to his work, and define beforehand the general rules to whose observation he pledged himself. This test composition was revised and discussed by the Cabinet before it received the finishing touches of the queen. Its full text has not been published; its chief points are given by Lord Fitzmaurice.* It dwells on the interest and duty of Great Britain, with her world-wide possessions, to encourage progress of all kinds with other nations. Then comes the cut at Palmerstonianism. Justice, moderation, self-respect, and a refusal of any undue attempt to enforce her own ideas by hostile threats, should be England's chief aim. We are, however, above all things a trading people, and, because a trading, a civilising one. Therefore it is an elementary duty to obtain for our foreign trade, in all seas, the security required for commercial success. Non-intervention in the affairs of other countries was the principle which, if adhered to, would secure alike the dignity of the Crown, the safety of the kingdom, as well as strengthen the nation's influence for good upon the opinion of the world. Non-intervention, however, did not mean that diplomacy should fall into desuetude. On the contrary, the cause of international well-being and peace would be best promoted by an ably-manned foreign service, whose agents abroad might be trusted to send home the best information procurable on all matters of social and commercial, as well as political interest. A foreign programme exactly applicable to individual cases that might arise obviously could not be drawn up beforehand. The queen was respect-

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fully asked to bear in mind that a single unforeseen event might, like a move on a chess-board, necessitate counter arrangements totally different from those originally contemplated. That the Foreign Secretary, dutifully co-operating with his colleague, came off from all his court examinations with flying colours may be judged from the fact that, on the Liberals going out in February 1852, the queen emphasised her confidence in the retiring minister, while the Prime Minister called him one of the best Foreign Secretaries the country ever had.

The short-lived Conservative administration of Lord Derby for ten months in 1852 preceded that of Aberdeen first, and of Palmerston afterwards. In it the Foreign Office was entrusted to an amiable and capable epicurean nobleman, Lord Malmesbury, born into diplomacy, and a son of the peer who figured so prominently and frequently in the international transactions of the Napoleonic era. Known throughout Europe by the name of "Tamarang," he was welcomed to his new position by the whole corps diplomatique, with the exception of a single small but very active clique. This consisted of the Orleanist partisans, led by the clever and agreeable Belgian minister, Van de Weyer; Madame Van de Weyer, an American heiress, made their pleasant house at Windsor a social power during the second half of the last century. Like Palmerston, Malmesbury had lived intimately with Napoleon III. during his early London days; he therefore always knew that the prince had accepted the republican presidency as a stepping-stone to the Empire. He remained Foreign Secretary just long enough to witness the
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event he had expected. One of his last official acts was, on the 1st of December 1852, to announce in Parliament the British recognition of the new French ruler as the Emperor Napoleon III. The exact title chosen had given offence at the conservative Russian court, because it seemed to imply an hereditary right in the Bonaparte family, and to ignore as a mere parenthesis the interval of Bourbon or Orleanist monarchy between the First Empire of 1804 and its reproduction forty-eight years later. This subject gave rise to many communications between the Foreign Office in Lord Malmesbury's time and our embassy in Paris, then under Lord Cowley—a man, to quote an expression used to me by the late Lord Granville, "born to be an ambassador, perfectly straightforward himself, but unfailingly quick to detect guile or duplicity in others." His interviews at the Tuileries were satisfactory; he was able to send home the new emperor's assurance that the numeral "III." conveyed no idea of hereditary right, and that he recognised as valid all that had been accomplished in France since the days of his famous uncle. At the same time, Cowley confirmed an impression, long since conveyed to Malmesbury by personal intimacy with Louis Napoleon, that the new emperor was bent on signalising his reign by a European re-settlement, which should supersede that of Vienna in 1815. Lord Malmesbury embodied these ideas in a memorandum never published, but shown to me privately some years since. Granville's ministerial term had introduced as Under-Secretary a man afterwards to be much heard of in foreign politics, A. H. Layard; his place under Malmesbury was filled by the then
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Lord Stanley, who as fifteenth Earl of Derby was eventually himself to become head of the department.

Among the Foreign Office appointments and changes made by Lord Malmesbury, not the least interesting and sagacious was the choice of his private secretary, Henry Drummond Wolff. He had entered the office at the age of sixteen, as a junior clerk in Palmerston's second term. Palmerston thought his clever pen might be very useful on the Whig side, and made him more than one handsome offer. The then Mr Wolff, however, never swerved from his Conservative allegiance. Malmesbury's confidence in this gentleman was shown by his selection for more than one informal mission, about the postal service and other matters, to Paris during the Second Empire.* As Secretary to the British Government of the Ionian Islands (1859-62), he had much to do with the arrangements for offering the Greek Crown to Queen Victoria's second son, Prince Alfred, as well as for ceding the islands to Greece.

Before the beginning of Lord Cromer's mission to Cairo, the Foreign Office under Lord Salisbury had been disposed to regard Egypt as an incubus. Sir H. D. Wolff was sent in 1887 to Constantinople about its evacuation. The attitude of France and Russia wrecked the proposal. Both now and during his later Secretaryship of State (1859) Malmesbury displayed coolness, foresight and a politic accessibility to the Liberal ideas of his recent predecessors. In 1852 the plots against

* These references are not particularised because Sir H. Drummond Wolff's recent autobiography contains the interesting and instructive details concerning them.
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Napoleon III. brought French demands that England should advocate the surrender of political refugees by Switzerland. The friction between Paris and London was long and severe. Malmesbury's policy helped to promote the common consent of the two peoples, which averted the apparently inevitable rupture. So, too, some ten years later. Between 1859 and 1862 Napoleon III. had committed himself to Italian autonomy. Count Buol on the other hand had declared Austria's resolution to stand upon the settlement of 1815; in doing so, he spoke of the English court's Austrian sympathies. Malmesbury knew that Gladstone's Neapolitan Letters and the enthusiasm evoked by Garibaldi had doomed the Austrian occupation of Lombardy. The Liberal tradition established by Canning and perpetuated by Palmerston at the Foreign Office, had on this point secured a continuity of policy whichever party might be in power. A predisposition in favour of a people struggling to be free, notwithstanding palace preferences, had taken its place among the traditions of the Foreign Office. Then came in quick succession the French victories of Magenta, of Solferino and the confinement of Austria within the Quadrilateral. Thus far our Foreign Minister had gratified alike the palace, the public and Napoleon III., by omitting nothing which could localise the Italian war and prevent its becoming a general one. The court now sent a decisive message to the Foreign Office. As a consequence Malmesbury, while himself true to the line of neutrality, gave the Tuileries a strong hint that, if peace were not speedily concluded, England might not be able to prevent the march on Paris of Prussia and of
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her German allies. The result was the peace of Villafranca, signed 11th July 1859.

This treaty was facilitated by the equal anxiety of the conqueror and the conquered for a cessation from war. Its important connection with the international politics of all the Western Powers calls for a few further words now. Nationally, not less than diplomatically, Great Britain was for the completion of Italian unity. The Villafranca instrument, though a real step in that direction, did less, not only than Cavour, but than English statesmanship had hoped. Mad with mortified vanity, as well as baffled patriotism, Cavour scornfully resigned rather than accept the peace. Even the London Foreign Office, through our Paris ambassador, Cowley, protested against the Villafranca terms. Palmerston, now at the head of affairs, denounced them to the French Foreign Minister, Persigny. In language as strong as any that could have been used by Cavour himself, Lord John Russell, writing to Vienna, vetoed the preponderance secured to Austria in the new Italian confederation which the Villafranca treaty created.

To smooth matters over for the moment his favourite device of a congress was proposed by the French Emperor. The unpublished history of the congress that did not take place, is notable for the reappearance as a diplomatic agency of the pamphlet which had figured so largely in that capacity at an earlier time. The pamphleteer was only the mouthpiece of Napoleon III. himself; that monarch, the world now heard, was the true friend of the Church; as such he counselled Pope Pius IX. to renounce his threat of flight and to remain in Rome. Let him,
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however, surrender the ecclesiastical territory outside the city. By so doing he would gain in spiritual authority much more than he lost in temporal power. The French emperor acquainted Queen Victoria with his responsibility for this composition; he also, through his cousin, Prince Napoleon, told the Sardinian minister that the pamphlet was his method of shelving the congress and bringing himself into line with England. Queen Victoria had rebuked Palmerston's anti-Austrian tactics in 1849; when, in 1860, accepting the congress, she stipulated for freedom to Italy in choosing its Constitution. Anglo-French diplomacy was balked of its congress; it had opened that political campaign for a united Italy which did more than all the previous military movements that preceded it.

The two months separating the first foreign ministry of Malmesbury from that of Clarendon, witnessed Russell's occupancy of the place from which in 1851 he had dislodged Palmerston. Russell, as an ex-Prime Minister, accepted the department reluctantly, and only after Lord Lansdowne had reminded him that Wellington also had taken foreign affairs after being Prime Minister. Russell held the position for only two months, and resigned it to his successor, 21st February 1853.

Clarendon's foreign ministry was famous chiefly for the Crimean War. As regards that struggle, its diplomatic preliminaries and associations alone need be mentioned here. A treaty with the Porte in 1740 had enabled France to secure for the Latin Church the possession and custody of the sacred shrines in Palestine. Profound religious indifference came over Western Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century;
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it did not affect Eastern Europe. The sacred places at Jerusalem, neglected by the Latins, were sedulously cared for by the Greeks. There was thus a conflict between the national rights established by treaty and those given by custom. The nineteenth century's spiritual revival awoke French interest in the consecrated antiquities of Syria. As President of the Republic, Louis Napoleon had already restored the pope to Rome; in May 1850, he asserted by arms the French claim to confirm the Latin monks in the ownership of the scriptural spots and relics. The whole question was referred by the Porte to a mixed commission, whose conclusions were given to France in a letter, and in a firman from Constantinople to the Greeks. The two documents contradicted each other; this might have been expected from the fact that the object of the letter was to satisfy France, of the firman to propitiate Russia. Now began the dispute between Paris and St. Petersburg. Louis Napoleon's diplomacy aimed at entangling England in the discussion. Between the courts and people of Paris and St. Petersburg a lasting bitterness had grown out of the ex-president's seizure of the Imperial dignity, as has already been said, by the style of Napoleon III. Refusing to follow the example of the other Powers, the Czar persisted in addressing the new French monarch not as "Monsieur mon frère," but as "Mon cher ami."

The next step at this stage of the transactions was the mission of a Turkish agent, Afif Bey, to Jerusalem, for the purpose of executing the compromise by which the Porte thought to settle the matter. Instead, however, of affairs being brought nearer to an arrangement, the Greeks were furious at the Turkish conces-
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sions to the Latins; the Russian Government prepared an army corps for active service and sent Prince Menschikoff ostensibly on a pacific errand to Constantinople. Not till some time later did it become known that the most important business entrusted to the Czar's emissary was secret. It consisted, indeed, of a demand that the Porte should unconditionally acknowledge, by a clandestine treaty, Russia as the protector of the Greek Church throughout the whole of the Sultan's dominions. This discovery was made by the new British ambassador to the Porte, Sir Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe). He reached Constantinople a little later than Menschikoff in the February of 1853. Menschikoff's presence at the Turkish capital had made peace difficult; Sir Stratford Canning's rendered war certain. Meanwhile, from the official point of view, of the relations between the Porte and the Czar, the purely diplomatic dispute had narrowed itself to a single issue—the exact construction of the seventh clause, closely connected, however, as that was with the fourteenth clause of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji between the Porte and Catherine II. of Russia in 1774. These articles, collectively if not singly, empowered the Turkish ambassador at the Russian capital to make from time to time such representations as were necessary in the interests of the Sultan's Christian subjects. Did that provision justify the comprehensive ultimatum presented to the Porte by Menschikoff?

Such, in a nutshell, was the essentially diplomatic difference. Mutual jealousies and recriminations on the part of the diplomatists of the Czar and the Sultan increased the difficulties of pacification and enabled the
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war-party to twist a personal squabble between Menschikoff and the Porte's Foreign Minister into a slight upon the Sultan. When the new British ambassador was still on his way from England, the Grand Vizier induced the British chargé d'affaires, Colonel Rose, to take steps for preventing a Russian attack on Turkey by bringing the English Mediterranean fleet to Vourla. Private and personal reasons, presently to be mentioned, rendered it certain that the effect of Stratford Canning's arrival at a place so full of explosive material would be as a lighted match in a powder-magazine; Canning had not forgotten the Czar's refusal to receive him as English ambassador on a former occasion—in 1833. Before going to Constantinople in 1853, he told Lord Bath he should now have his revenge against the Russian emperor by fomenting war.* From the day on which the great Eltchi established himself at Pera, he became the personification not only of English policy throughout the whole crisis, but of Turkish also. The Turkish emperor's chancellor, the controller-in-chief of the British diplomatic machine—he was both of these as well as ambassador.

Louis Napoleon, the real disposer of the diplomatic movements going forward on his side, now brought France and Russia at sea within striking distance of each other. Hitherto, and during part of February 1853, he had openly courted no rupture of peace; he had indeed removed one danger of war by substituting as his representative at Constantinople De la Cour, till then French minister at Berlin, for the fiery and impractical Lavalette. Directly, however, he knew of British ships being on the move, he sent

his own fleet to the classic Salamis. The Porte's concessions to Russia and France had now practically ended the quarrel about the holy places; they had left Turkey without a single ill-wisher except Russia, for the Sultan’s European provinces had been tranquillised and Austria propitiated by the withdrawal, on British advice, of Omar Pasha from insurrectionary Montenegro.

The British ambassador at St Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, not as yet the recipient of the Czar's conversational menaces, and the Russian ambassador in London, Baron Brunnow, were both working for peace as strongly as Stratford Canning at Constantinople was pressing on war. Nicholas had first broached personally to Aberdeen and Peel in 1844 his idea of the Turk being "the sick man of Europe," and his wish to co-operate with England rather than France in disposing of the Turkish estate. England was to have Crete or Egypt, or both. In 1852 he reopened this matter with Seymour, adding that while he did not want Constantinople for himself, any other Power must be kept from it. "Therefore," he concluded, "my wish now is the same as England's, to retain for the present the sick man in his old domains and to keep things generally as they are."

Affairs were now precipitated by Menschikoff's presentation to the Porte of an ultimatum for acceptance within five days. Russia's final terms repeated in a more emphatic form the Czar's demand for universal and unconditional recognition as protector of the Sultan’s Turkish subjects. The Porte referred the claim to the British embassy; Stratford Canning ordered its summary rejection. Now came the
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entrance of the Dardanelles by the English fleet to hold itself at our ambassador's disposal; Russian invasion of the Danubian principalities followed. This last incident led to the weary series of diplomatic communications between London, Paris and St Petersburg. It was closed in the late winter or early spring of 1854 by Lord Clarendon's statement, that if the Russian troops did not recross the Pruth before the end of April, it would be considered by England as the Czar's declaration of war. The conduct, the intrigues, the leaders' quarrels and the vicissitudes of the struggle belong to general history, and need not be retold here. Hostilities had in effect begun before diplomacy despaired of peace. At our own Foreign Office, Lord Clarendon with his staff, including permanent Under-Secretary Hammond, and political Under-Secretary Lord Henry Petty, afterwards Lord Lansdowne, was at work night and day. Not less busy were our own chief embassies on the Continent or the chanceries of foreign Powers. Yet at this very time the combatants were actually pressing to the field with the speed and spirit of knights pricking to the tournament. The French and English fleets were riding at their anchorage in Besika Bay. The great Eltchi, in the manner already described, had vetoed the Porte's compliance with the Czar's last orders. By 17th June 1853 Lord Clarendon had arranged a friendly understanding with Austria. This was described at the time by one of Clarendon's predecessors, Granville, as "only a step in the right direction," because it did not, as some had hoped it would do, include Prussia. The truth is that our diplomacy at Berlin was baffled by Count Bismarck, then beginning his career. To him the true Prussian
policy seemed anti-English and pro-Russian. Thus began the rapprochement between Berlin and St Petersburg that eventually conduced to the successes of 1866 and 1870. At this time the grouping of the European Powers was as follows: England had joined herself to France by definite treaties for a specific purpose. With Sardinia she had a good understanding since the Italian rising against Austria in 1849. In 1853, Austria had become England's ally, but was already negotiating a defensive alliance with Prussia.

In the summer of 1853 the Austro-English entente showed itself in the arrangement for a conference at Vienna. The outcome of this, it was hoped, might be some expedient for saving the honour and satisfying the reasonable demands of Turk and Czar. To that end, on 30th June 1853, France contributed a draft Note for acceptance both at Constantinople and at St Petersburg. At the beginning of July England came forward with a draft treaty. The Powers assembled at Vienna were asked to make their choice between the two documents. Austria and Prussia expressed their preference for the Note; this, therefore, with a few alterations, was sent simultaneously to the Porte and to the Czar. The Czar promptly accepted it. The Sultan's refusal in fact though not in form was due to the British ambassador at Constantinople, who had already devised a plan of his own for arranging the business; Stratford Canning indeed had by this time not only drawn up an alternative Note of his own; he had secured its favourable reception by the four European Powers as well as by Turkey herself. The messenger who brought the Vienna Note from the Austrian to the Turkish capital
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had actually crossed on his way the bearer to Count Buol at Vienna of the competitive document issued on his own responsibility by the English representative at the Porte. Clarendon told his ambassador that he could not acquiesce in this individual attempt to override the results of the Vienna Conference and to undo the work of the British delegate, Lord John Russell. Stratford Canning now changed his tactics with the Sultan and urged adhesion to the Vienna document. The Porte, however, well acquainted with his private views on the subject, valued the personal more than the official opinion of the great Eltchi. Turkey avoided refusing the Note point-blank, but insisted on modifications certain to be denied by Russia. The point of the changes next stipulated for by the Porte was such a definition of the Kutchuk-Kainardji and the Adrianople treaties as would have given the Sultan himself instead of the Czar the personal protectorate of his Christian subjects. Russian diplomacy, directed by Menschikoff, aimed at assimilating the Czar’s tutelary right over Greek Christians throughout the Turkish Empire to that exercised by the Austrian emperor over Roman Catholics throughout Turkey in Europe. To Stratford Canning this demand seemed a dangerous and needless extension of the Czar’s autocratic prerogatives. Hence the limitations on which the Porte now insisted.

Meanwhile, in April 1854, a fresh diplomatic movement had been made. The four Powers had agreed on a protocol declaring their intention to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire as essential to the European equilibrium; they would also secure the civil and religious liberty of the Sultan’s Christian subjects.
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The fighting alliance between England and France was followed by a defensive alliance between Austria and Prussia. The protocol proceeded to offer to the Czar certain suggestions too familiar, by the name of the Four Points, to call for recapitulation now. The general tendency of these recommendations was to substitute common European action for that of the Czar, not only in relation to his Christian subjects, but his general dealings with Turkey. The Four Points were nominally accepted by Nicholas as offering the only way of escape from the danger he chiefly dreaded, the accession of Austria and Prussia to the hostile European confederation. At the same time he urged the resumption of the Vienna conferences, but died before his real disposition towards the Four Points could be tested or the conferences yield any definite result.

As at Utrecht in 1713, the Vienna Conference of 1853 sat more than once; the second Vienna meeting was held at least a full year after the first. At the re-assemblage of the plenipotentiaries in 1855 (5th March to 4th June) the genius of diplomacy ventured on a novel relaxation in its social habits; this, which might have disgusted the stately conductors of the Vienna Congress forty years before, promoted a genial temper among the statesmen of 1855. The French minister, De Bourqueney, sighed for a cigar; tobacco, as a help to the public work of high politics, had not then come into fashion; he therefore suggested an hour's adjournment that the diplomatists might enjoy a quiet smoke. Thus far the Turkish ambassador had not opened his mouth. He now sprang to his feet, seconded the proposal, and walking off with his French colleague, lit up directly he had passed out of the
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council-room. The British delegate denied himself
the consolations of nicotine; yet some such solace he
must have needed under the pressure of his anxieties
on the spot, aggravated as these were by unsympa-
thetic comments on his conduct at home. Clarendon
was hourly expressing, to his friend and predecessor
Granville, disgust with the "devilries at Vienna," and
the nobbling of Lord John Russell by the French
delegate, now Drouyn de l' Huys. Russell had from
the first disagreed with his colleagues at home in
himself wishing to force the Vienna Note upon the
Porte. At this time the friendly relations of England
with Austria had been cemented by more than one treaty.
There seemed a prospect of other states acceding to the
Anglo-Austrian compact. In the December of 1853
Palmerston's disgust at Aberdeen's slackness had
caused him to resign his seat in the Cabinet; he
resumed it in the February of 1854 on the despatch
of the Anglo-French ultimatum to St Petersburg, and
of the English fleet to the Black Sea. The Crimean
War had reached its sixth month. The episode of the
Four Points had resulted in a closer diplomatic in-
timacy than before between England and Austria.
The relation also in which England stood to Sardinia
as protagonist in the drama of Italian liberation from
the Austrian yoke, already one of the French
emperor's known projects, formed a fresh link in the
union that held together Great Britain and France.
These circumstances seemed favourable for British
policy at the Vienna conference of 1855. As our
plenipotentiary, Lord John Russell brought with him
to the Austrian capital the authority naturally be-
longing to a former head of the London Foreign
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Office. The complaint against him in both Houses of Parliament, but especially in the Peers, then particularly keen on discussing European affairs, was that proposals put forward by him at the conference as his own were really of French or Austrian origin. The subtlety which was one of his intellectual characteristics showed itself in his support of complex, confusing and impracticable arrangements for regulating the navigation of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. This was the rock which wrecked the Vienna peacemakers and dimmed at least one great reputation. The single point in 1855 waiting to be settled was the position of Russia in the Black Sea. There was professed a general agreement that Russian preponderance in these waters must be prevented. Limitation of the number of Russian vessels in the Euxine, counterpoise, counterpoise and limitation mixed—such were some of the seven competitive plans proposed.* To balance the number of Russian ships by an equal number of ships belonging to the Powers, formed the suggestion of the Austrian plenipotentiary, Count Buol; it was supported by the French delegate, Drouyn de l’Huys, and, for a time at least, by Russell for England. Then came quarrels and recriminations between these delegates. Profiting by their quarrels, Russia refused any interference with her status in the Euxine. Palmerston had never believed in any of the Black Sea expedients put forward. The conference broke up fruitlessly, 4th June 1855.

* The final Black Sea proposition was Count Buol’s, that if Russia exceeded a certain allowance of ships, the Powers might at once raise their naval quota in the Black Sea by the amount of the Russian excess. Vexed at his failure, Buol charged Palmerston with having got up the whole war to give Sardinia a chance of showing herself off. Drouyn de l’Huys also accused Russell of dishonourably deserting him.
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After the conference, the experience common with England during the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic War was about to repeat itself. The British Allies, or at least the chief of them, went on strike. Already France had broken faith by separate negotiations with Russia. Napoleon III. now decided on withdrawing 100,000 men from the Crimea; he had, as has been said above, first thought of establishing his dynasty on the basis not of an English alliance against Russia, but of a resettlement of Europe in the interests of France. Early, however, in 1855, Louis Napoleon reverted to the precedent of his famous uncle's direct communication with the British sovereign in 1801 by flinging his professional diplomatists over and himself writing to Queen Victoria that he wished above all things to act in accord with England. In Paris, however, the war had never been popular as it was in England; any real attempt to continue it would have jeopardised rather than strengthened the Imperial dynasty. In the summer of 1855, Cowley, our French ambassador, wrote home to Clarendon that Paris was desperately sick of the Anglo-French adventure in arms and its disappointments to French patriotism.

During the next November, France and Austria united to concert terms of peace with Russia without England's knowledge. Palmerston's characteristically strong remonstrance and threat, that Britain would, if need be, continue the war alone, was followed by a peace-protocol arranged between the Austrian and English ambassadors in Paris. This was accepted by the new Czar in the middle of January 1856. Next month, under the presidency
of Lord Clarendon, there met in the French capital the Congress of Paris. Its first act, on the 25th of February, was the immediate suspension of hostilities.

Enough has been already said about the doings of diplomacy during the progress of the war. Before passing on to the serious work of peace-making, a word may be given to what was at the time gravely called a diplomatic mystery of a ludicrous kind; the laughable little incident is not generally recorded in the memoirs of the period. The sister, it must be explained, of the War Minister, Lord Panmure, had married a certain W. H. Dowbiggin. The son of this marriage, Colonel Montague Dowbiggin (99th regiment), served in the Crimea, and was naturally an object of interest to his uncle, who was the civil head of the army. In 1853, Lord Panmure telegraphed to Lord Raglan—"Be sure you take care of Dowb." Somehow or other these seven words found their way into the newspapers. Seen in print, they excited the perplexed speculation of Europe, from the Caucasus to Gibraltar; at last one of Gortschokoff's staff informed Nesselrode's private secretary that he had found a key to the British cipher. It meant, he said, nothing less than that an Indian Maharajah, from enmity to Russia, had placed his sword at the disposal of the British queen. When Delane and his leader-writer, afterward his successor, Thomas Chenery, made their trip to the Crimea, they were beset by inquiries and theories as to the true significance of the cryptogram; they could, however, throw no light on the matter; it really puzzled, they said, the English press and public quite as much as the Foreign Offices and embassies of the Continent. "Dowb," who brilliantly justified Panmure's recom-
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mendation, died during the later sixties; he left by his second marriage a daughter, who—such is the irony of fate—married a Russian baron of great wealth named Tchihatchef, a clever and hospitable savant residing at Florence. After her husband's death the weekly receptions and dinners at the baronial villa were continued with every charm and success by his widow.

Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, popular with all classes in England, and famous for his remarkable likeness to Lord Brougham, had now returned to London. As to the Czar's terms or objects, his lips were sealed, both on his official visits to Lord Clarendon and his appearances in society; he really knew nothing about it at all; everything rested with his imperial master, and the only person who had ever been in the secret of that sovereign's intentions was Count Orloff, the Russian plenipotentiary in Paris. A private letter from one who assisted at the congress now spoken of, says Lord Clarendon, the president, attracted much less attention than did the stately and majestic grace of Prince Orloff or the irresistible charm and personal fascination of Julian Fane, then a rising star of British diplomacy, pleasant in manner, quick of insight, shrewd in suggestion; he did so well at Paris in 1856 that immediately afterwards he was moved on to be Secretary of the Legation at St Petersburg. The game to be played by the representatives of Austria and Russia at the meeting soon disclosed the malignity of both Powers to England. The settlement of Eastern Europe evidently seemed to them a secondary question in comparison with sowing dissension between England and France. Here at least Napoleon III.
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showed some gratitude to the country where in the
days of his exile he had received kindness. His speech
at the opening of the Corps Législatif, 5th March
1856, gave prominence to two points: his readiness
to continue the war alone had negotiations failed, and
his adhesion to Great Britain as ally. The merits of
their work did not preserve from great obloquy the
two men who during this period chiefly represented
England at the foreign conferences.

Russell's indiscretion at Vienna has been already
mentioned. Our Paris plenipotentiary, Clarendon, had
been unwise enough to write some letters to the Italian
statesman Cavour that brought on him the charge of
prolonging the Crimean War so that Sardinia, as the
liberator of Italy, might have the opportunity of asserting
herself. On another minor matter there was a second
hitch. A dangerous intimacy now seemed to unite the
diplomatists of Paris and St Petersburg. The clauses
about the Danubian principalities gave Russia a
chance of strengthening her hold in that part of
Europe and of acquiring the Isle of Serpents at the
mouth of the Danube. The details of this question
might have wrecked the Paris congress, but France
and England, according to Lord Malmesbury's
account,* came forward with a suggestion that any
minutely local or technical points might if necessary be
referred to a meeting of the plenipotentiaries specially
convened for the purpose. The convention arranged
at this meeting supplemented the treaty of 30th March
1856 with provisions for the demarcation of the
Bessarabian frontier; for the evacuation of Moldavia
and Wallachia by Austrian troops; for the departure

of the British squadron from the Black Sea and the Bosphorus; and for replacing under Turkish sovereignty the islands in the delta of the Danube. Of that delta the Isle of Serpents was now declared to be an appendage. For the future this island was to be furnished with a lighthouse. The protocol containing these arrangements was to have the force of a convention.

"Protocol" is a word that necessarily often appears in the present work. Its uses are legion. A complete definition of it would, as the obliging Head of the Treaty Department at the Foreign Office once said, require a pamphlet to itself. Sometimes it means a record of proceedings; at other times it is equivalent to a record of ratifications of a treaty or convention. Again, in such a convention or treaty some particular clause may be modified by a protocol attached to the instrument. In popular phrase, protocol may be employed as a synonym for the rough draft of a treaty; that use, however, is quite unauthorised. On 6th January 1857, the protocol now referred to was signed by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain (Lord Cowley), France (Walewski), Austria (Hubener), Prussia (Hatzfeldt), Russia (Brunnow), Sardinia (Villamarina) and Turkey (Mehemed Djemil). This was not the only document subsidiary to the chief and central convention. There were also specific agreements between the individual Powers. Of these minor treaties the two in which England had a concern were a tripartite treaty between Austria, England, France and the Porte, guaranteeing Turkish integrity, reluctantly acceded to by England and irresponsibly accepted by France. The other arrangement, initi-
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ated at the London Foreign Office, but eventually acquiesced in by the other Powers, was with Sweden, who pledged herself to abstain from separate compacts with St Petersburg; if attacked, she was to receive assistance. Another group of provisions made at Paris in 1856 related to the subject which, known as the Armed Neutrality, had caused international heart-burning in the eighteenth century. By this time Great Britain had given up her earlier claims against neutrals. She now formally and in principle renounced all such demands; she also accepted the doctrine that free ships make free goods, though only on the condition, purely nominal and never fulfilled, as the result proved, that America renounced privateering. With the provisions or signature of the Treaty of Paris* the United States had nothing to do. England, too, with her allies entered into a guarantee for securing the local privileges of the Danubian principalities; this was the most definitely retrograde movement then executed by us from the non-intervention policy which Canning had set on foot.

The diplomatic results of the Crimean invasion alone call for mention here. Europe by that war took upon herself the responsibility formerly claimed by the Czar of securing religious toleration for the Sultan's subjects. The Porte's promises of amendment proved worthless. The diplomatic

* The peace arrangements afforded another instance of the growing connection between diplomacy and finance. The millions wanted for the war expenses by the Treasury were at once at the lowest rate of interest advanced by the Rothschilds. Rival financiers were ready with offers while the matter was in actual settlement between Whitehall and New Court.
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history of the years following 1856 records the progressive undoing of the results arrived at by the Paris congress. In 1860, the Christian massacres in the Lebanon gave Napoleon III. an excuse for the military occupation of Syria. In 1861, the activity of French diplomatists, notwithstanding the apathy of the English, enabled the two Danubian states, Moldavia and Wallachia, to form by their union the principality of Roumania. In 1862, Palmerston's refusal of Brunnow's suggestion to support those strugglers for freedom, did not prevent the Servians from expelling the Turkish garrisons and forming a Constitution. In 1870, with the connivance of Prussia, the Czar told the signatories of the Paris treaty of fourteen years earlier that he would no longer be bound by the clause excluding his warships from the Black Sea. Our then ambassador at St Petersburg, Sir Horace Rumbold, ordered from home to present the English protest against this step, expressed his belief that had we hinted at war, nothing more would have been heard of the subject. The purely verbal expostulation had of course no effect. The Powers who had put their names to the Treaty of Paris met in London to register the Czar's decision; by 31st March 1871, the Black Sea clauses of the great international instrument which had dissolved the Vienna conferences, and so prolonged the war, were by European agreement abrogated.

In the Balkan Peninsula all warnings of events had been lost on the Turk. In 1875, the exaction of their uttermost farthing by Mohammedan landlords and the extortions of tax-collectors caused a rising of the Christian peasantry in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was attributed to Panslavonic intrigue; Slavonic
emissaries had of course been at work. Our foreign policy was now directed by Disraeli, not yet Lord Beaconsfield; he met the proposal of Austria, Prussia and Russia to coerce the Turk, with the remark that the Porte had not had time to execute its latest reforms. True to the Tory traditions of Whitehall, he discouraged any European concert likely to favour Muscovite expansion and to endanger British Imperialism in the East. Early in 1876, the programme of administrative reforms (the Andrassy Note) was accepted by England and Turkey. Before that, however, in the November of 1875, the status of England in the Near East, the position and the international relations of Egypt had been dramatically affected by Disraeli's diplomatic coup—the purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. The time at which this stroke was made, as well as its diplomatic and commercial surroundings, added to its impressiveness. The Foreign Loans Committee, the collapse of South American securities, the dulness of trade, the cheapness of silver, the dissolution of Turkish credit, and the prevailing gloom of the commercial atmosphere formed the sombre background against which the transaction stood out in brilliant relief. In earlier years Palmerston was only one of several British statesmen who had opposed the Canal, not because it was a Frenchman's idea, but because it gave to French interest overwhelming preponderance in Egypt. Not till 1869 or 1870 did English experts confirm the view of De Lesseps that the Canal was not only a success but a power. During 1875, Mr Frederick Greenwood, then editor of *The Pall Mall Gazette*, learned the intention of France to dominate
the new waterway. To Mr Henry Oppenheim he suggested the purchase. Disraeli, struck by the idea, approached Baron Lionel Rothschild. The £4,500,000 for securing the shares to England were at once forthcoming; the Rothschilds were the only persons who could have found the money; their profit on the transaction, at two and a half per cent. was £100,000.* From all Europe, except France, as well as from De Lesseps himself, congratulations on the Suez purchase poured into the Foreign Office.

*The best account of the Suez Canal shares' purchase is contained in an article on the subject in The Quarterly Review, vol. 142. If, as is generally understood, the writer be Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, G.C.B., its knowledge and accuracy require no other guarantee than his name. The purchase is only one point at which the Rothschilds' connection with Egypt has been fortunate, not only for that country, but for all politically or commercially concerned in it. In 1885, the Powers were at diplomatic feud with each other about the land of the Pharaohs. Egypt's complete bankruptcy was only averted by monthly advances from New Court, on no other security than a private note from the Foreign Secretary Lord Granville.* The £9,000,000 loan of 1885 was of course a great success, but its good fortune had been preceded by an anxious season of prolonged risk. M. Charles Lesage, French Inspecteur des Finances, in his Achat des Actions de Suez, from the financial rather than the political side discusses the Suez purchase and makes some strong and even fierce remarks on the Rothschilds' arrangement with the Government for finding the money. (L'Achat des Actions de Suez, Paris, Libraire Plon, 1906).
CHAPTER XIII

THE PASSING OF PALMERSTON


One result of the Crimean period and of the Palmerstonian policy was to emphasise the contrast between two schools of foreign statesmanship. During the years immediately after the Crimean War, one general election was decided wholly on the issue of foreign policy; two other elections were largely influenced by it. In 1857, beaten in the House of Commons by the Manchester School over the war with China, Palmerston annihilated his opponents on an appeal to the constituencies. In 1858, popular feeling for Italian unity, championed by France in the war against Austria, helped to replace the Conservatives by the Liberals. In 1859, Palmerston's alleged servility to Napoleon III., as attested by the Conspiracy to Murder
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Bill, brought back Derby and Disraeli. Palmerston, in fact, was condemned for not being sufficiently Palmers-tonian, and, at his sacrifice, Cobdenism was avenged for its defeat of a twelvemonth earlier. Notwithstanding these checks to non-intervention, the cause with which Cobden and his friends had identified themselves was not permanently thrown back. The succession of events were merely instances of the ebb and flow, the action and reaction incidental to all great movements. Palmerston often dwelt on the progressively reforming system of Turkey. So early as 1836, Cobden, in his pamphlet on Russia, proved the non-existence of any such system. For years Cobden, as one who preferred the Russ to the Mussulman, heard himself popularly described as half traitor and half lunatic. Before he died in 1865, his own views and those of John Bright were spoken of as the common-sense of the Eastern question. Had he lived a little longer, he would have heard a Conservative Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, confess that when we backed the Turk in the Crimea we put our money on the wrong horse. The Peelites were against Palmerston's intermeddlings abroad. But non-intervention was first made a political watchword, as has been seen, by Palmerston's departmental successor. The Foreign Secretary of 1851, Lord Granville, Cobden's intellectually and politically convinced disciple, whether in or out of office, applied the Cobdenite doctrine of non-intervention to our external relations, with an energy and definiteness not generally shown, as Mr John Morley has pointed out, by the titular followers of Peel.* Lord Granville, too, on again taking over the

* John Morley's *Cobden*, vol. ii. p. 150.

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Foreign Office, in 1880, confirmed in his Egyptian appointment the Lord Cromer. This is the expert who has recently given his testimony that England, in extending and consolidating her world-wide empire, has uniformly disarmed jealousy and obstruction by the knowledge that her flag, wherever it flies, secures to the foreign trader the admission of untaxed imports.

Everywhere in the propagation of his views, but especially abroad, Cobden was helped only less by their proved soundness than by the calmness of temper, tact and knowledge with which they were expounded and applied. The extreme unpopularity with all classes of landowners of his anti-protectionist teaching undoubtedly, at first, added strength and numbers to Palmerstonianism. So far, therefore, Cobdenism, for a time, proved not only not an ally, but an actual enemy to the non-intervention cause. Cobden's European travels, at a time when Puck's feat of putting a girdle round the earth had yet to become a commonplace, gave him a real claim to the title since bestowed on him—"the first international man." To varied and accurate cosmopolitan experiences he added, upon each return home, the tolerant good-humour and the wise control of speech that won recruits.

All the authentic palace memoirs since Cobden's day, from Sir Theodore Martin's Biography of the Prince Consort down to Lord Esher and Mr Benson's edition of Queen Victoria's Letters, show not only that the ascendancy of the court over the Foreign Office was even greater than had been generally supposed, but that we had come within a measurable distance of re-establishing in our external statesmanship the personal authority of the Crown as it existed under George III. Cobden, through his socially well-placed informants,
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Charles Villiers and Milner Gibson, knew this at the time as well as did any of the professional courtiers. To have given the rein to any momentary feeling of resentment, to have recognised the fact by a single injudicious expression, would have raised a fresh, perhaps a fatal, prejudice against the anti-Palmerstonian movement.

During Lord John Russell's second term at the Foreign Office, in the Palmerston ministry, he had to do with a descendant of the Mallet du Pan who, in the eighteenth century, had been employed by Pitt, and had helped him in negotiating with France the commercial treaty of 1786,* thought that Free Trade, if judiciously planted, might strike its roots in Continental soil. This was the future Sir Louis Mallet, afterwards to become permanent Under-Secretary of State for India. In his words, taken down by me in his room at the India Office in 1879, I give the following account of the transaction:—In 1858, Louis Mallet, though his disciple, had no personal acquaintance with Cobden. To John Bright, therefore, and not directly to Cobden himself, did he first mention the project. But, to quote Mr Bright's own words to me, "the idea was Mallet's and not mine. At my breakfast-table he first came to know Cobden; with Cobden he went to Paris."

During a morning's conversation at the Tuileries the general lines as well as the most important details of the arrangement were discussed. Cobden himself remained after Mallet. But to quote Mr Bright verbatim—"The diplomacy, and there was a great deal of it, of the treaty, was done by Mallet, who had a genius for that

*Generally known as the Bengal Convention, because by it France gave England a free commercial hand in that part of India.
sort of work." The same period and the same absence from England produced another compact with a second foreign state. After travelling up and down the Danubian peninsula, Sir Louis Mallet brought home with him from Vienna an Austro-English treaty of commerce and navigation. Cobden, indeed, in this period had an important political ally in the Cavour who, on the foundation of the Kingdom of Sardinia, was to raise the fabric of a regenerated and united Italy; but English policy, which in this sense means Cobdenism, it was that took the initiative in inducing Napoleon III. to relax the prohibitive system then in force throughout his realm. Later triumphs of the Cobden statesmanship abroad were the reduction in 1865, by the German Zollverein, of duties on imported articles and manufactured goods. Of that movement the commercial treaties and tariff changes of 1868 and 1869 were the continuation.*

* This seems a fitting place at which to explain exactly a diplomatic term so familiar as to have passed into a popular figure of speech. "The most favoured nation" clause, when it occurs, is inserted in commercial treaties as a means of preventing the goods of each of the contracting parties being treated in the territory of the other more unfavourably than the similar goods produced by some other country. For instance, let it be supposed that a treaty of commerce between Great Britain and France contains a most favoured nation clause, that under the British Customs' tariff French wines pay an import tax of ten per cent. Let it be further assumed that diplomatic negotiations result in the British admission of Spanish wines of the same quality as the French wines at a tax of five per cent. Then under the most favoured nation clause, French wines would automatically benefit by the reduction granted to Spanish wines at five per cent. also. In such a case as the foregoing the most favoured nation clause is quite unconditional. The clause, however, may be so worded as to be conditional; it depends on the kind of treaty negotiated by the contracting parties. The United States, and possibly some others, have always denied that the favours granted by reciprocity treaties are acquired under ordinary "most favoured" articles, unless the same concessions are made in return. Thus, by a treaty between France
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During these achievements of the new machinery that had supplemented our diplomatic system our Foreign Office under Lord John Russell was engaged with two or three international incidents which had begun to make their pressure felt so far back as the period of the Paris Congress. In 1856, by foiling, as had been already explained, the Russian attempt to occupy the Isle of Serpents, Palmerston had prevented the Russian diplomatists from so arranging the Bessarabian frontier as to reach the southward point on which their eyes were fixed. The Anglo-French entente, which by his independent recognition of the Second Empire had cost Palmerston his place in 1851, was severely strained by the Crimean War. It practically gave way during the period of the subsequent peace negotiations. Palmerston, however, as Prime Minister, with Clarendon at the Foreign Office, succeeded in confining Russia within the frontiers that had been fixed at Paris. The Orders in Council and the British right of search brought the United States and England to blows after the Napoleonic wars. The Foreign Enlistment Act, of December 1854, empowering England to increase her soldiers in the Crimea by perfectly useless foreign legions, embroiled the London and Washington Foreign Offices before the complete execution of the settlement of 1856. The controversy was complicated by alleged English infraction of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850); this had prohibited and America French silk goods might be admitted at a reduced rate. The Washington diplomatists would not allow the inference that any most favoured nation clause with England confers on British silks the same privileges as have been given to French. "If," says the United States Government, "Great Britain desires participation in the privileges of France, let her make some special concession to the United States as an equivalent."

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both the United States and England from any enterprise to their own profit on the littoral of the contemplated waterway through Central America. The constructive breach of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty alleged against England arose from her connection with the Mosquito Islands in the Bay of Honduras, over which she claimed a protectorate. The difference remained open for three years; it was settled in 1859 by the American purchase of the islands on a guarantee of security to all local interests of Great Britain. But for some time public feeling on both sides of the Atlantic ran not less dangerously high than it was to do over the affair of the Trent, in 1861. In that year the interception by a federal vessel of the British ship carrying the confederate envoys supplied the Prince Consort with the last occasion of an actively beneficent intervention in our foreign policy at an anxious crisis.

The Prince's life coincided with a noticeable change in England's diplomatic objects and methods. In his younger days, those of the Holy Alliance epoch, diplomacy was regarded as an agency for executing or baffling the territorial or dynastic ambitions and intrigues of sovereigns. The anti-national and autocratic lengths to which European statesmanship had gone at Vienna in 1815, prepared the way for a reaction towards the recognition of racial rights and political self-government. Diplomacy during the latter part of Russell's and Clarendon's course tended to become an instrument for securing the great national forces of democracy and liberty. Between 1859 and 1865 Russell watched from Whitehall and saw that his department was perfectly supplied with the latest news.
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concerning the settlement of the Balkan peninsula by Prince Couza's election (1859) as Hospodar of Moldavia and Wallachia. So too with each stage in the later developments of the Italian policy adopted by England not less than France from the day on which Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, became an ally in the war against Russia. Palmerston had defined his attitude to foreign states, in whose quarrels he did not intervene, as that of a judicious bottle-holder. No English Foreign Minister ever laboured with such secrecy, astuteness, and success to regulate international relations, in the interests of Italian unity then so dear to his country, as did Russell. Though unrecorded in any histories, perhaps, even in memoirs of the period, his were the skilful offices which encouraged the good understanding between Cavour and Napoleon III., and which prevented its being impaired by the outburst of English indignation when France, as the price of a liberated Venice, took Savoy and Nice.* Thus the Zürich treaties, ending, in the November of 1859, the Franco-Italian War, really bore the impress of Russell's mind.

This was the period during which the English public made a remarkable advance in its knowledge of foreign politics. Palmerston, indeed, had prepared the way for this progress by generally treading in Canning's footprints. Canning had been the first Secretary of State to make the Foreign Office the most important department of the day, and to invest external politics with a popular interest transcending that of domestic affairs. Exactly the same thing in his turn was done

* As a fact no explosion of English or any other feeling for a moment could have endangered co-operation between Cavour and Napoleon, who understood each other perfectly throughout.
by Palmerston. Between 1850 and 1860 the foreign policy debates of the popular Chamber were as good as those of the Peers. The Savoy and Nice discussion produced a survey of our international relations and the principles on which they rested from the third Sir Robert Peel as wise, as clear as, and richer in information than, any utterance on the same subject from his famous father. Here I may correct a mistake on this subject widely current at the time and since then almost stereotyped. The story is that A. W. Kinglake, whose exceedingly low voice often made him inaudible, delivered a masterly dissertation on the Savoy and Nice question, that no one heard it except Peel who was sitting next him, and who made the oratorical hit of the next evening by literally reproducing Kinglake's unheard, and so unreported, words. The facts, as given me by both men, are these. Kinglake did indeed compose an oration on the subject. Prevented from going to the House, he did not deliver it. Happening to see his friend Peel, whom he knew intended to speak, he meekly asked that fine orator, for such Peel was, whether he would care to see some notes he had put together on the matter.

There were, Palmerston used to say, only three persons who ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein question: the first was Prince Albert, and he was dead; the second was a German statesman, and he had gone mad; the third was Palmerston himself, and he had forgotten it. The chief points in connection with this subject necessary to bear in mind are the very intimate connection established by ancient law between the two duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, the facts that the King of Denmark was only Duke of Schleswig-
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Holstein, that the Holstein duchy was inhabited by Germans and formed part of the Germanic confederation. There were in Denmark certain enthusiasts for nationality, who, while leaving Holstein alone, were bent on eliminating any German element from Schleswig and making it in every way a Danish province. As an early result of this policy the German Lutherans in Schleswig were deprived of public worship in their own tongue and of German teachers in their schools. In November 1863 the Danish Assembly, the Rigsraad at Copenhagen, passed an act incorporating Schleswig in the Danish monarchy. This act, ratified by the king then reigning, and by his successor, Christian IX., violated a convention on which English diplomacy had taken great pains, the Treaty of London (1852). The breach of international obligation fully justified Bismarck's appeal to the Powers that had signed the broken compact; Lord John Russell put all the machinery of our Foreign Office in motion to cooperate with France in adjusting the difficulty. Outside the Foreign Office popular feeling in England clamoured for armed intervention on behalf of Denmark. The Prime Minister, and ex-Foreign Secretary, Palmerston himself, in July 1863, declared that those who attempted to overthrow the rights or interfere with the independence of Denmark would find that they had to contend with other Powers than Denmark alone. By not resigning his Cabinet office after finding himself committed by these words to resist Prussia, Russell made himself responsible for them; he did not even, as he had opportunities for doing, undeceive Denmark by explaining away the utterance of his chief.
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An English rival to English diplomacy asserted itself. Sometime before this, on several different occasions, Palmerston thought he had reason to complain of *The Times* for forcing his hand or increasing the difficulty of his negotiation at critical points. Here he had found the court in entire agreement with himself; the Prince Consort, in fact, knowing his private acquaintanceship with Delane, had even asked him to expostulate with the famous editor on the inconveniences to the public service caused by Printinghouse Square. Now Lord John Russell, by no means a victim of the traditional Whig prejudice against the press, complained of being hampered by newspaper editors and factious busybodies in all his efforts at arrangement. Some of these spoke with authority, and for the first time used the cant expression of supplying the Danes with a moral assistance. Such idle talk contributed to England's unpopularity abroad; it also discredited the responsible directors of her policy. In this way Lord John Russell found himself prejudiced with both the disputants when he proposed an eminently sensible compromise; this was the partition of Schleswig between Denmark and Germany by the dividing line of the languages spoken in the two sections. Unhappily the head of the English Foreign Office did not show an equal wisdom in regard to other matters; he fell into the same mistake himself of which he had accused others; he now established the closest relations with *The Times*. The newspaper in fact began to reflect his views; it even used the exact language inspired by him. In September 1863 *The Times*, quoting and amplifying words which Russell himself may
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not have uttered, but for which, as Cabinet minister, he was responsible, declared that the meditated dismemberment of Denmark would raise up champions for her in every quarter. Such opinions on the part of the Foreign Secretary conflicted as directly with the undoubted views of the sovereign as anything done or said by Palmerston in his most undisciplined mood.

On the 9th of November 1863, the Queen received Napoleon III.'s invitation to a congress for discussing the Danish, and it might be also the Polish, question. The last of these subjects brought our Foreign Office at this period more than one snub from Gortschakoff, who, asked by Downing Street to treat Poland according to English rather than Russian ideas, replied that if England wished to play the champion of oppressed nationalities, she might as well begin with Ireland.

Our diplomacy, by rejecting this offer, renounced the one condition, that of French co-operation, on which England could have helped Denmark. As it was, the Russell-Palmerston policy not only sacrificed Denmark, it left an abiding bitterness between France and England; it also inspired Prussia with a feeling that Great Britain, had she felt herself free, would have drawn the sword for Danish independence, and that the British branch of the Teutonic family, so far from wishing Prussia well in her national mission, at heart resented the Prince Consort's past attempts to cement the friendship between his native and his adopted country. All this legacy of international mischief and animosity arose from the fact that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were straining the strings of diplomacy in two different directions. Russell, with official responsibility, urged
timely concessions to Denmark; Palmerston, playing to the gallery, was assuring the Danes that if they stood out, they would not find themselves alone. Instead, therefore, of a congress, which would at any rate have pleased the one Power, France, whose interests crossed the pathway of England in every part of the world, and whose good-will at any cost we should have secured, our Foreign Office sent the then Lord Wodehouse, afterwards Lord Kimberley, on a special mission to Copenhagen.

No documents officially relating to this errand have been published. Lord Kimberley, however, as I have heard from his own lips, returned to London with two chief impressions stamped on his clear and dispassionate mind. The first was that Napoleon III. had been from the first the exciting spirit of the whole storm. During the fifties Napoleon III. was secretly scheming for a Franco-Prussian alliance. To promote this, he and no other first suggested at Berlin the seizure of the duchies. “Of this fact,” were Lord Kimberley’s own words, “I brought back conclusive evidence from Copenhagen in 1863.” Before the Danish trouble, Napoleon III. had noted the universal indignation of Englishmen, indifferently of class or party, against Russia for her absorption of the poor remnant of Poland and her barbarities practised on the Polish patriots who stood out for independence. Of this feeling Louis Napoleon took advantage by proposing to the English Government co-operation for the Polish cause against Russia, possibly against Austria and Prussia too, the two latter Powers being then the objects of an English detestation only, if at all, less than that excited by Russia. Not that Louis Napoleon
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really cared more for the Poles whom the Czar was doing slowly to death than he did for the crowds with whose blood he had dyed Paris in 1851. All this time, indeed, he was secretly instigating the monarchies of Eastern Europe to deeds of violence against their disaffected subjects at home. Thus he counted on the popular liberal opinion of England to forbid any union between Great Britain and the courts of Eastern Europe. Palmerston may have been deceived by the Turk; he thoroughly saw through the French emperor. It was the astute determination not to be his cat's-paw or dupe that hardened Palmerston against all overtures from the Tuileries and, so far as appearances went, made him a devout convert to the Manchester evangel of non-intervention. In the case of Poland, Palmerston had to resist real society pressure; for the Pole was then a drawing-room favourite. The French ambassador in London, to whom Palmerston had approved the coup d'état of 1851, Count Walewski, was himself of Polish extraction, had been very popular in Belgravia and Mayfair since he was first known there, a handsome young man, the natural son and a pleasing likeness of the great Napoleon. Introduced by his first wife, a daughter of Lord Sandwich, into the English peerage, he found a second wife in a Florentine of great beauty and social tact, who made the French Embassy in London the most charming resort of the diplomatic body. As has been shown above, Palmerston's acquiescence in Napoleon's project of a congress might have strengthened his hands in Denmark and need not have weakened them elsewhere. The general French plea for philanthropic interference in Poland's relations
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with the Powers, had for its real motive the sowing of mischief between England and her Allies. The French suggestion of a congress was in form plausible and diplomatically "correct." The troubles caused by an earlier congress might be healed by a later. The Prusso-Danish complications arising out of the duchies were really rooted in the Vienna settlements in 1815. The disturbance of these had begun when the principle of nationality was recognised by the separation of Belgium from Holland in 1830. Surely, therefore, it would be only reasonable now for Europe, in the collective capacity as Louis Napoleon proposed, to revise the Vienna arrangements by the light of what had happened since, and in accordance with the new ideas of nationality. With that latter consideration Palmerston had no more sympathy than had Metternich himself. "When," said to me some years ago the late Lord Kimberley, apropos of his Copenhagen mission in 1863, "I was set to work, our own Foreign Office, like others, underrated the political force of that national sentiment which inspired the claim of Prussia to the duchies, and which, it was already becoming plain, would increase in momentum till Berlin became the capital of a united Germany." The collision between Danish and Prussian interest in the duchies had been going on since 1845. In its earlier stages, the Prince Consort's preference for Prussian over the Danish claims had caused more than one sharp difference between himself and Palmerston; these differences had also elicited from the queen a reprimand which preceded by a year Palmerston's dismissal of 1851. The vehemence of Palmerston's language afterwards, suggests that the memories of the dispute were still dangerously fresh.
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Lord John had become Earl Russell before the Schleswig-Holstein episode had entered upon its acutest phase. Something may be said about the other movements of our diplomacy during his second term at the Foreign Office. Four years after the re-settlement of the Near East by the Treaty of Paris, the fitness of Turkey for imperial independence was seen in the Syrian outbreak originating in the quarrels between the Maronites and the Druses, rival sects of degenerate Christians and degenerate Mohammedans.* In the retrospect of to-day this incident derives its chief interest and importance from its having afforded the earliest great opportunity for the display of his rare gifts as diplomatist and administrator to one of the brightest, most impressive and interesting figures in the diplomatic story of the Victorian age. The disturbance raised by the hill tribes of rural Syria spread to the towns. Moslem fanaticism wrecked European consulates, the Porte must be shown what to do, a convention of the Powers entrusted to France and England the restoration of order, on the basis of a protocol that no state sought territorial advantage or exclusive influence for itself. The British commissioner, Lord Dufferin, whose début in diplomacy had been made when he accompanied Russell to the Vienna Conference, in 1855, heard from Lord Palmerston at his farewell interview the private opinion that the entire disturbance had been got up by the Emperor of the French in revenge for

* The religious faiths held by the insurrectionaries are obscure and debatable, what is alone certain about the Druses, according to one expert, being that they were *not* Mussulmans. It seems equally certain that the Maronites were highly heterodox Christians.
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Palmerston's extinction of Mehemet Ali, and of the French designs upon Syria in 1840. "It is also," said Palmerston, "meant as a kind of retrospective justification of the congress of the other day with which I would have nothing to do." Lord Dufferin accomplished his task with admirable spirit, judgment and success. The fact and the circumstances of his despatch constituted an admission that the nominal independence of the Porte, as secured by the treaty of 1856, had ceased to exist. The Sultan had indeed consented to this act of intervention; when, however, asked for his acquiescence, he had been told that whether he said yes or no, the Powers meant to manage it in their own way.

The most serious events of Lord Russell's second Secretaryship happened on the other side of the Atlantic. The damages to Federal property done by Confederate privateers built, like the Alabama, in England, gave rise to the prolonged and threatening controversy between Washington and Whitehall which was only settled by the Geneva arbitration of 1870. Of the war itself there need be recalled here only so much as will make its politics intelligible. The secession of the Southern States from the Union began with South Carolina, whose efforts resulted, on 4th February 1861, in a meeting of Southern delegates at Montgomery in Alabama for the purpose of forming, under the presidency of Jefferson Davis, a constitution of their own. At its commencement the consideration of slavery did not enter into the quarrel; the Federal president, Abraham Lincoln, emphasised this fact; nor did he, as has been supposed, introduce the word into the negotiations for a friendly dissolution of partnership by which it was attempted to avert actual
hostilities. Lincoln’s call, on 16th April, for armed volunteers to re-establish the Federal authority over the rebel states, drew from the rival president Davis a declaration that he would issue letters of marque. President Lincoln then declared the Southern ports under blockade. On 8th May 1861, Lord John Russell told the House of Commons that, as advised by the law officers of the Crown, the Government would recognise the Confederates for belligerents. Five days later appeared the neutrality proclamation, warning English subjects against, by their persons, their property or their arms, assisting either of the parties to the conflict. Here began the first offence taken against England by the North. There was at this time on his way to London a fresh representative of the United States, Adams; before treating the rebel states on an equality with their opponents, it would, said the Washington diplomatists, have been only courteous and just to hear what the new envoy had to say, after he had presented his credentials. This complaint was unreasonable, because the Northern proclamation of a blockade, a traditional mode of international war, implied that the proclaimer was trying conclusions with one who was as much an enemy as if he were a foreigner. The British Government withstood the most pressing suggestions from the Vatican, as from the Tuileries, of foreign help in an organised effort by breaking the blockade to assist the South. The most authoritative and philosophic diplomatist of the day, De Tocqueville, who knew America as well as he did France, regarded a Confederate triumph as a foregone conclusion. In London, society, *The Times*, and most of the press, except *The Spectator*
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were dead against the Union. For years past the preponderating influence in the United States Government had been that of the now rebellious Southerners. Shortly before the war broke out there had been an Anglo-American difficulty concerning a runaway United States slave, Anderson, who had taken refuge in Canada.

For the purpose of these pages nothing more is wanted than the shortest summary of the circumstances which accompanied the opening between the Washington Foreign Office under Seward, and the London Foreign Office under Russell, of the epistolary wrangle which in some of its many weary stages continued during the greater part of ten years. Had not, the Confederate managers asked themselves, the heir to a Whig dukedom,* himself one of the pillars of his party in the Lower House, during a pleasure trip in the great republic of the West, symbolised his sympathy with the South by transferring to his own coat-lapel the Confederate colours worn by his partner in an American ballroom? Even though informally, it must be high time for Jefferson Davis to be represented both in London and in Paris. The first step was to despatch across the Atlantic the most plausible and fervent advocate of the Southern political claim, W. L. Yancey. The British and the French capitals as well as other points of international interest and importance were to be included in his European tour. This diplomatic reconnaissance was promising enough to encourage the further despatch of regularly accredited Southern representatives to London and Paris; for the British capital was destined James Murray Mason; for the French a southern lawyer

* The eighth Duke of Devonshire, then Marquis of Hartington.
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and politician, Slidell. Late in the October or early in the November of 1861, these two envoys embarked at Havana on the British mail steamer Trent. During their passage they were violently intercepted by the American man-of-war, San Jacinto, commanded by Captain Wilkes; they were then seized and shut up in one of the forts of Boston harbour. On 27th November the Trent reached Southampton. Lord John Russell lost not a moment in demanding from the American Government full reparation for a gross breach of international law and wanton affront to the British flag.

Napoleon III., it has been seen, had already vainly appealed to England to make common cause with him against the North. All the European Powers now supported Great Britain in demanding the liberation of the envoys, and full apology for the outrage. There now came from the Washington Foreign Office an assurance that the commander of the San Jacinto’s action was unauthorised, and that the whole matter had the President’s grave consideration. This was the last occasion on which Queen Victoria’s husband took an active concern in English diplomacy. The public heard almost simultaneously of the Prince’s death and the arrangement of the dispute. The next international charge brought against England by the North was that British shipping-yards were being made the naval base of the Confederacy. The navy which Mr Gladstone complimented Jefferson Davis on making, was built by British constructors. The most famous of several privateers, the Alabama, was practically an English vessel, the handiwork of the Lairds of Birkenhead, paid for with money borrowed from English lenders; under the British flag it lured Federal crafts
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to their destruction; its guns had formerly belonged
to the English navy. Before it issued from the river
Mersey, the American Foreign Secretary Adams
demanded its detention by the British Government;
so sound an English lawyer as Sir Robert Collier
supported the demand. John Bright raised the ques-
tion in the House of Commons. Palmerston, who in
1858 had brought in the Conspiracy to Murder Bill to
propitiate Napoleon, and had been turned out upon
it, now haughtily said it was not the English habit
to alter laws to please a foreigner. Meanwhile, the
British equipment of Confederate warships and rams
went on so briskly, and for the Northern cause so
disastrously, that in one of his many protests to Russell,
Adams remarked, "it would be superfluous to point
out that this is war." The request of the Washington
Foreign Office was, however, not for an embargo on
all the Confederate vessels now being prepared in the
Liverpool dockyards, but for their detention till the
law of neutrality professed by England could be
exactly defined. During the years through which
this diplomatic discussion continued, there were intro-
duced into it other subjects, such as Confederate raids
from Canada into the States, and Fenian raids from
the States into Canada. In the course of 1862,
Russell declared the correspondence at an end; he
also point-blank refused any responsibility for whatever
destruction Confederate cruisers, wherever built, had
wrought on Federal shipping. In 1866, the Foreign
Office passed to Lord Stanley. He proposed to the
Washington diplomatists a general arbitration treaty
on the whole subject. Such a convention was actually
signed by Stanley's successor, Clarendon, and Reverdy
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Johnson; it was, however, rejected by the American senate on the ground that it did not clearly enough provide for claims on account of indirect as well as direct injury done by vessels like the Alabama.*

By the time that Lord Granville began his second term at the Foreign Office in 1870, other matters were in dispute between Whitehall and Washington. Granville's suggestion to Gladstone was in a single international act to comprehend the settlement of all controversial points. Eventually this plan fell through; the idea of arbitration was revived in the belief that it would be acceptable at Washington. As a preliminary the negotiators of both sides of the Atlantic prepared to revise the law of nations by new rules, including not only cases such as that of the Alabama, but the Foreign Enlistment Acts (1861-5). The next step was for British commissioners to confer at Washington with an equal number of American commissioners. The British selections were made without regard to party; they included the present Marquis of Ripon, then Lord de Grey, Sir Stafford Northcote, Sir John Macdonald, the Canadian Prime Minister, the Oxford professor of international law, Montague Bernard, and naturally, Sir Edward Thornton, our United States representative. After deliberations lasting over two months, the commissioners in the May of 1871 signed a treaty, the general criticism on which, from the English point of view, was summed up in Lord Russell's objection to judge past conduct by new

* The direct claims were on account of injuries and losses actually caused by privateers. The indirect claims, indefinite and incalculable as they were, included losses from the transfer of American trade to English shipping and the expense of pursuing the Confederate cruisers.
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retrospective rules. Between the American and British representatives, the discussion centred round the United States' claims on account of damages done by Confederate privateers of English build of an indirect as well as a direct kind. "Our friends here," wrote Sir Stafford Northcote from Washington to Lord Granville, 14th April 1871, "are terrible fellows at using every possible opportunity to bring in again and again claims which we have repeatedly shut out. De Grey will never get all the credit he deserves for his strategy, but I hope he will get some for the result of it." This result was the Treaty of Washington, signed 8th May 1871, referring the Alabama and kindred claims to a court of five arbitrators to meet at Geneva, to be chosen by Queen Victoria, by the President of the United States, by the Emperor of Brazil, by the King of Italy, and by the President of the Swiss Confederation.* In reply to the chief criticism on the compact, the making of all the concessions by Great Britain, Lord Granville could reply that the repeated renewals by the American plenipotentiary, Fish, as regards indirect claims, had all been disallowed. The one practical question was not so much the terms as the policy of the removal by Great Britain, probably at a great cost, of a long-standing and vexatious quarrel with her kin beyond seas. The indirect claims, however, were to reappear at Geneva, and to inspire Lord Russell with a threat of blowing into the air the treaty and the Government.

* The names of the arbitrators were these:—Sir Alexander Cockburn (England), Charles Francis Adams (United States), Viscount Itajuba (Brazil), Jacques Staempfli (Switzerland), Count Sclopis, president (Italy). The legal assessors were Lord Tenterden and Roundell Palmer (England), Bancroft Davis and W. M. Evarts (America).

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Then came the presentation before the Geneva tribunal of the American case and the English counter-case. On 15th June the arbitrators had no sooner assembled at Geneva than they unanimously declared against even entertaining the indirect claims. Historical manuals, universally accessible, render it unnecessary to pursue the transaction in all its details and results.

Sir Horace Rumbold, of whose despatches from his embassy at St Petersburg something has already been said, complained in print a few years ago, of Foreign Office ignorance on Lord Granville's second Secretaryship of State. The incoming Foreign Minister, it was said, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, declared the European horizon to be without a cloud. The true facts are these. When, after Clarendon's retirement, 6th July 1870, Granville took over the department, he had an interview with Permanent Under-Secretary Hammond, who remarked that, with the exception of the recent murders of Englishmen at Marathon by Greek brigands, then the subject of diplomatic communications with Athens, he knew nothing likely to engage seriously the incoming minister. As a fact, however, Granville, better informed than the permanent official, not only was already aware of the impending danger between France and Germany, but was actually in communication with our ambassador in Paris, Lord Lyons, in the hope of preventing hostilities. The exact line of English diplomacy after the war had begun is all which it concerns us here to follow. The notion, popular in Prussia, of France being the English favourite, increased the difficulty of the communications between Berlin and London. Bismarck himself had
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openly given out that Great Britain might and ought to have prevented France from entering upon the contest; a Prussian victory, he added, could alone preserve the balance of power in Europe; for that reason it ought to be desired by England. The opening of the campaign coincided with a vague but unfortunate Prussian complaint that by not forbidding the export of arms and coal to France the British Cabinet had shown too clearly its inability to be really impartial. "As for Lord Granville," said Bismarck, "I know him of old."* The first danger against which Lord Granville had to be on his guard was lest either belligerent should violate the treaties guaranteeing Belgium or Luxemburg. The imminence of that contingency revealed itself in a secret document published by The Times, 25th July 1870. The common guarantees of Europe made Belgium an independent nation in 1839; by signing those documents France and Prussia had both solemnly pledged themselves to prevent any violation not only of Belgium herself, but of Luxemburg also. The compact now flashed by the newspaper upon the world showed that in the August of 1866, through Benedetti as representative of Napoleon III., France agreed not to oppose Prussia's retention of her advantages gained in the recent war with Austria. In return France received permission from Prussia in the person of Bismarck

*This I have the authority of Lord Granville himself for characterising as a delusion on the part of the German Chancellor. "I never," said to me in 1886 Lord Granville himself, "saw Bismarck, but once, and then for a few minutes only during my attendance on the queen abroad. It was in a garden; while we were chatting we suddenly heard the cry 'sharp,' the cant word signifying the sovereign's approach. On this Bismarck suddenly disappeared in a shrubbery; after that dive into the bushes I never saw him again."
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to annex Luxemburg and Belgium. This amazing disclosure seemed a scandal to international morality; it was followed by an undignified squabble between the Foreign Offices of Paris and Berlin, to throw upon each other the exclusive blame for the Benedetti-Bismarck perfidy. Lord Granville at once intervened by pointing out that there was no alternative now but for the French emperor and the Prussian king to set their hands to an agreement engaging both of them, during the war and for twelve months afterwards, not to violate either Belgium or Luxemburg.

Obligations to Belgium thus being fulfilled, our diplomacy took steps for circumscribing the area of the Franco-Prussian struggle. The probability of its extension arose from the bitter rivalry of two Continental diplomatists. In 1866-7, Count Beust had just become Austrian Chancellor and Foreign Minister; he notoriously aimed at retaliating on Bismarck for his late humiliation of his country and of himself. French resentment of English neutrality now became as keen as that of Germany. The cause of France, so it was said in Paris, was the cause of peace. British diplomacy, by removing the possibility of union between the courts of St Petersburg and Berlin, might have at once secured the peace of Europe. Our Foreign Office, however, established an understanding between the Powers that none of them would take part in the struggle themselves or renounce their neutrality without due notice to the others.

In September 1870 the Empire fell. Prussian diplomacy favoured its restoration as a help towards international peace. Downing Street insisted that the native French republic would render peace nego-
tations safer and easier than an empire restored by foreign arms. From 4th September 1870 to the actual signature of peace, February 1871, the twofold and consistently pursued aim of English diplomacy was an armistice between the combatants and the creation of such a polity in Paris as would conduce to the close of the war. The difficulties besetting the accomplishment of this object was increased by the fact that, to Lord Granville’s personal grief, the managing men in France, though, like Jules Favre, excellent and even brilliant, were not, as our Paris ambassador put it, accustomed to a Corps Diplomatique. The other trials to Lord Granville’s tact and patience may be summed up in the series of interviews with Thiers in which the French statesman, a friend and admirer of Lord Granville’s father when ambassador in Paris, laboured to convince him that the first object of English policy from a purely selfish point of view, should be to risk a quarrel with united Germany rather than connive at the dismemberment of France. In any narrative of English diplomacy during the actual progress of the war, much space must be given to Adolphe Thiers’ diplomatic pilgrimage through Europe and his series of conversations with his personal friend of long standing, the English Secretary of State. These talks are given with such fulness and animation in such standard volumes as Lord Fitzmaurice’s biography of Granville, that the merest reference to them is alone needed here. In Thiers the diplomatist did not efface the vivacious and patriotic orator; in his warmest moments he remained a polished man of the world. Dealing with another man of the world like
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Granville he found the pill of failure gilded, but his visit bootless. "I had the honour to know, and did my best in my small way to commend myself to your lordship's father when you were a youth and he was British ambassador in Paris; consider how well France behaved to England during the Indian Mutiny in not taking advantage of her weakness to do her a bad turn." Such was the burden of the arguments for intervention with Prussia in favour of France in these interviews between the French and English statesmen. On one occasion Thiers had pleaded his cause with so much fervour as to sink back in his chair exhausted. There he remained perfectly silent and motionless. He showed no signs of breathing. His English host, in his own words to me, "felt no doubt that the 'old man eloquent' had breathed his last." "While," continued Lord Granville, "about to call for help, I thought I should be making a scene for nothing if, after all, Thiers was only asleep. I therefore proceeded as noisily as I could to break a huge piece of coal and banged the fire-irons about. My visitor immediately awoke and, with a placid smile, continued his appeal more fresh than he had begun it." The colloquial, not less than the epistolary, processes of our Foreign Office at this period included the discussion of many proposals for the return of the ex-empress Eugenie to France after her arrival in England. Why should she not, as a de facto monarch during the time of transition, negotiate through her ministers peace terms with Bismarck? As regards the exertion of British influence with Prussia to moderate her terms, Lord Fitzmaurice has conclusively established this never to have been in question. "Palmer-
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ston," said Granville, "wasted the strength of England by brag; it is not for me fruitlessly to spend any moral influence we may have by laying down general principles to which nobody will attend. Above all (was the exact remark I heard from Lord Granville), I had to abstain from anything which would only aggravate Germany and encourage France to hold out."
CHAPTER XIV

OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMATISTS


The various domiciles and migrations of the Foreign Office, down to its settlement in Downing Street, have been described in an earlier chapter, with the help of the fuller information to be found in Sir Edward Hertslet's authoritative work on the subject.* The movements and the managers of English diplomacy during sixty-eight years of the foregoing survey (1793 to 1861) are all comprised in the Downing Street period. During Russell's second Secretaryship, the department migrated, in the August of 1861, to two houses, Nos. 7 and 8, in Whitehall Gardens. The plans for the group of buildings to-day containing both the Foreign, the Colonial, and the India Offices were approved, among others, by Lord Palmerston; he did not live to witness the concentra-

* Recollections of the Old Foreign Office (John Murray, 1901.)
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tion of the three Imperial departments beneath a single roof in the July of 1868. The increase in Foreign Office work, had, even in Palmerston's time, necessitated additions to the staff. Changes of that kind had of course begun before his day. At the end of the eighteenth century one Under-Secretary sufficed. Soon after that, assistant Under-Secretaries were called for. Before the next century had closed the chief Under-Secretary had been supplemented by two assistant Under-Secretaries; in 1898 an additional Under-Secretary was appointed. To-day, therefore, there are one chief Under-Secretary and three assistants. The absolute and responsible head of the department is the "Parliamentary" Secretary of State. He it is who in theory conducts the interviews and the correspondence of the department, communicates alike with foreign diplomatists, government offices and private individuals. The organisation over which he presides is divided into various sections, such as "Eastern," "Western," "China," "Treaty," "Commercial," and so forth. These sections are arranged in groups, supervised by the various Assistant Under-Secretaries. They in turn are responsible to the Permanent Under-Secretary (the non-Parliamentary minister), who comes directly next to the Secretary of State. The operation of the system may thus be compared to that of a graduated series of sieves. One of the Office's divisional controllers will send any important papers there may be to his supervising Assistant Under-Secretary; this functionary will, if he thinks it necessary, refer to the Permanent Under-Secretary who, in his turn, if it be of sufficient importance, will submit the matter to the Secretary of State.
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Thus, to illustrate the routine by purely hypothetical figures, out of every hundred papers received at the Foreign Office, ten may be seen by the Assistant Under-Secretary, five by the Permanent Under-Secretary, two by the Secretary of State.

An opportunity of some personal remarks on the leading members of the Foreign Office staff has presented itself in an earlier part of this work. An accurate and exhaustive account of the interior economy of the department would show the influence on the current diplomacy of the time of a permanent official like the late Lord Hammond (Permanent Under-Secretary from 1854 to 1873) to have been not less than was that of the late Sir Robert Herbert on the administration of our dependencies during his long term at the Colonial Office, or of his illustrious predecessors, Sir Henry Taylor, Sir Frederick Rogers, Lord Blachford, Herman Merivale. Was, by way of example, Lord Clarendon considering the best man for a special mission abroad, Hammond’s suggestions were always invited; if his initiative found less scope under other chiefs of the office, it was because his last chief, Granville, like Palmerston and Malmesbury, actively kept up the exceptional acquaintance given them by social accidents with the rising talent that adorned their province.

Hammond’s excellence as a public servant was impaired by a single defect, and that the result of his ability and zeal: he insisted on doing all the work of the office himself; his colleagues thus became simple copyists. As a consequence, he left behind him scarcely any thoroughly trained clerks; it was therefore reserved for those who came after him gradually to make good the deficiency. Hammond, however, had an admirable
successor in the third Lord Tenterden. Quite first-rate as an official, intellectually keen, clever as a man, Tenterden was followed by Sir Julian, afterwards Lord Pauncefote, who died as our representative at Washington, but who was of a material which supplies rather great administrators than Under-Secretaries perfectly at home in their department. The grip of Colonial questions secured by Pauncefote during his years at the Colonial Office before going to the Foreign Office, made him invaluable at a time when our German relations in Africa caused Colonial and purely foreign questions to overlap each other. On New Guinea and its international relations, Pauncefote spoke with the authority of a Cabinet minister. This was admitted by Gladstone, who (6th March 1885) called the Pauncefote settlement the only way not only of dealing with the South African matter, but of removing the bar to Egyptian settlement.* Pauncefote's successor, the brilliant, if rather flighty, worker and thoroughly trained man-of-the-world who died Lord Currie, presented a complete contrast to Pauncefote himself. Combining the socially exclusive prejudices of aristocratic Whiggism, a maternal heritage from the Wodehouses, with the strong, clear business instinct of the middle-class, he remained, till he started as an ambassador in 1894, a personification of the Foreign Office genius and tradition, especially in their relations with the society in which he shone and the press whose occasional usefulness to his department he appreciated. "Gladstone," Lord Granville used to say, "on these subjects has no knowledge. I have not the art of pretending to give bread and giving

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only a stone. Consequently the newspaper writers who must have early information about foreign affairs or write as if they had it, do not like us as well as, if we managed a little better, they might." Here Currie's address, tact and insight into journalistic human nature proved invaluable. He seemed superficially the most communicative of men, but never told a State secret. His successor's, Lord Sanderson's peerage, formed a fit reward for the long and industrious career during which that official had successively scaled the whole length of the Foreign Office ladder; the last rung was reached when, on Currie's going to Constantinople, Lord Sanderson naturally stepped into the vacant place. The chief change since then witnessed in the Secretariate has been the selection of the former ambassador at St Petersburg, Sir Charles Hardinge, as Lord Sanderson's successor. Of that appointment it may be noticed that it united the whole Foreign Office Staff and diplomatic body in its praise.

The amalgamation of the Foreign Office and diplomacy, illustrated or implied in several of the instances already given, was carried out in 1891, under the recommendation of the Royal Commission of 1890. To the category of Whitehall officials successfully converted into foreign diplomatists belonged also Sir Michael Henry Herbert, Sidney Herbert's son, the thirteenth Earl of Pembroke's brother, who eventually reaching our Washington Embassy, so completely won the affection of the occupant of the White House, that President Roosevelt unconsciously fell into the habit of addressing him by his pet name of "Mungo." To these names should be added our present minister at Brussels, Sir Arthur Hardinge, originally trans-
ferred from the Office at home to Zanzibar. In other capacities the same principle of interchange has been exemplified in the cases of the second Lord Dufferin, Lord Hugh Grosvenor, Cecil Spring-Rice and Conway Thornton. The cosmopolitan influences of several famous Englishmen had long been exerted in favour of this fusion. The late Lord Acton, the first Lord Houghton, and specially the late Sir M. E. Grant-Duff, had long periodically cited foreign precedents that fully justified the scheme. In Germany, the Bunsen family supplied more than one proof of its success. In France the argument was strengthened by the famous name of Jusserand. English experience has not proved less favourable. Generally, it may be said, the fusion tends to prevent officials abroad losing touch with home feeling, or from drifting into a state of decorative indolence. On the other hand it keeps the Whitehall men from crystallising into bureaucrats with an horizon limited by the desk at which they write. Too sweepingly or hastily carried out, the process might embarrass the permanent heads of the Foreign Office. During the first six years foreign employment should clearly be optional, to avoid the risk of the transfer coming before the Whitehall men were receiving salaries equal to its cost. A democratised diplomacy, or Foreign Office, is not only an impossibility in itself; it has never yet had a place in the enlightened projects of the most extreme reformer. Sheer ignorance and incapacity are excluded from the service by the searching examinational ordeal, which for more than half a century has barred entrance to it, and mitigated, if not entirely abolished, the old favouritism that
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introduced into the department young men whose only qualifications were the good manners that belong to birth and breeding.

The Order in Council of 1855, establishing the Civil Service Commissioners, made itself felt at the Foreign Office the next year. The first recipient of a Foreign Office nomination, conditional on satisfying the commissioners, was Victor Buckley; nominated in December 1856, duly examined by the Civil Service Commission, he received a certificate dated 12th January 1857. At this examination there was no competition. Mr Buckley's happy and easy experience has seldom, if ever, been repeated since. To-day the Secretary of State's nomination for what is still practically a close office, will not be of much good to its possessor, unless he is generally up to the mark of success in the Indian Civil, or the struggle for an entrance scholarship at a good Oxford or Cambridge college. At Oxford, by the by, unless the statutes should absolutely forbid such a course, there may be nothing legally to prevent college fellows from electing the candidate who promises to be the most agreeable member of their society, rather than the man whose paper-work is best. Practically by its strong repro- bation the public opinion of the place renders such an abuse impossible. In the same way a Secretary of State theoretically may have it in his power to bring into his department someone who has not submitted himself to the Civil Service Commission. Practically the thing will never be done. None the less, the Foreign Office and diplomacy will preserve the tradition of social prestige, and will run in families. The British ambassador in 1907, is
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lineally descended from a sixteenth-century Bertie, who filled the same position in the same capital during the reign of Queen Elizabeth. On the other hand the most recent among our very greatest ambassadors, as well as the most versatile, the first Marquis of Dufferin, reached the Paris embassy without any training in regular diplomacy or at the Foreign Office.* Having pacified Syria, he not only created Canada, but taught the Canadians to believe in their country and themselves. Even diplomatists of this calibre, if again forthcoming, will not render entirely obsolete Mr T. G. Bowles’ definition of the ambassador à la mode as a clerk in gold lace at the end of a telegraph wire, only acting on orders from Whitehall, and daily reporting to the Foreign Secretary. Formerly questions were seldom asked at Westminster about treaty-making till the process was complete. To-day the Secretary of State, or his representative, is liable to interrogatories at each new state of a pending negotiation. At the same time, social position and diplomatic accomplishments have ceased to be the only qualifications necessary to our representatives abroad. Every year sees our foreign relations charged increasingly with commercial issues. Our consuls, if they are to do their work properly, must have the knowledge of trade experts. Our ambassadors will be the better up to their work if they have been trained in commerce and finance as well as in Imperialism, like Lord Cromer. They must, for other reasons than their personal authority, have

* This probably makes the case unique; Mr James Bryce, now our representative at Washington, having been Foreign Under-Secretary in 1886.
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the confidence of the trading classes, and so act not less as the fiduciaries of English enterprise than as the plenipotentiaries of their sovereign.

The details of the organisation controlled by the Secretary of State at home have been already given. Something may now be said about the surroundings of an ambassador. First, as to his attachés from the Admiralty or the War Office. Early in the nineteenth century isolated officers of the army and navy were sent on special missions to various courts. This was done under the authority of the king himself or of the Secretary for War. Nor are any such missions mentioned in the Foreign Office archives. The earliest appointment of a military attaché which can be traced belongs to 1858. The War Office records show no salary to have been paid to a military attaché before 1865. At that date a British naval attaché had existed for five years at Paris. In 1865, too, the struggle between North and South led to the appointment of a second naval attaché at Washington; simultaneously with this, the naval post at Paris was abolished, or, more accurately, the permanent naval attaché in France was replaced by a travelling attaché. In 1882, a second European naval attaché was accredited the courts of the Maritime Powers generally. This officer moved so rapidly between Europe and America, that for some time he must have been considered equal to the duties of both hemispheres. Gradually, however, the institution of two naval attachés, one for the European, another for the American side of the Atlantic, seems to have established itself. As time went on these numbers have since increased, till at the present time the military
attachés reach a total of twelve, of whom one is allotted to the whole American continent, and the rest to Europe. So, too, with the six naval attachés now existing; one is transatlantic, the remaining five European. There are, too, commercial attachés, five in all, all stationed in Europe.

In theory, of course, every British embassy abroad and its precincts stand on British soil. Self-sufficiency, as well as inviolability, was one of the ideas associated with the residence of England's representative in capitals beyond sea. Hence the sanctuary rights which soon grew up round the embassy; the gross abuse of these afterwards called for their curtailment before their abolition. In early days, beneath the ambassador's roof there were accumulated stores of all the necessities of daily life. The embassy, in fact, was not only a house, but a settlement, self-contained so completely that its inmates seldom needed to supply their wants from local traders. Spiritual and physical needs were both provided for. To-day the embassy doctor is generally confined to Oriental posts such as Constantinople, Teheran and Tokio, where a medical man is paid by the State to attend the mission. In all other cases embassy doctors are purely honorary. The embassy chaplain as a State servant is a Church of England clergyman. Should the ambassador belong to any other communion, he would, at his own charge, find a minister of his particular faith. The diplomatic posts now equipped with chaplains are Athens, Berne, Christiania, Copenhagen, Constantinople, The Hague, Madrid, Munich, Paris, Stockholm, Tokio, Vienna.
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Unofficial diplomacy has from time to time, as regards activity and influence, competed not unsuccess-fully with the agencies controlled by our Foreign Office. In some cases, too, it has provided itself with an organisation of its own as elaborate perhaps and as effective as that of Whitehall. Such international agencies, uncontrolled by and occasionally pitting themselves against the Secretary of State, have often been extra-parliamentary in their operation; during the fifties they were strenuously personified in Richard Cobden and David Urquhart. Cobden's mission was to counterwork Palmerston's Turco-philism; Urquhart's to stimulate it and expose a veiled and venal subserviency to Russia. To-day Urquhart's most practical monument is the Turkish-bath, where stands his bust in Jermyn Street. This place reproduces as nearly as may be that part of Urquhart's house at Watford always kept at a temperature of from 160 to 180 degrees and doing duty as a waiting-room for visitors. Urquhart himself was only five years in the House of Commons, when member for Stafford, from 1847 to 1852. His great authority as the apostle of Russophobias was exercised through provincial channels. A small, loosely-knit man, with a strikingly intelligent expression, a purely Anglo-Saxon fairness of complexion and lightness of hair strangely contrasting with his Oriental habits, he showed his taste in costume by an unobtrusiveness which won him, from some of the "dandies" his contemporaries, the compliment of being the one well-dressed man outside their set. He spoke, as he wrote, with extreme rapidity; he knew, however, exactly the
temper of those he addressed; he had weighed beforehand every syllable and every gesture. Unlike Palmerston, the object of his lifelong distrust, he never had the ear of St Stephen's. His most successful and characteristic achievement was the formation of the political committees which by leaflets, lectures and personal house-to-house visits, proselytised among the mechanics and artisans of the Northern Midlands. Urquhart had honestly persuaded himself that he faithfully represented the traditional Tory doctrine about Russia as impressed on his followers during the Oczakow episode by the younger Pitt. His vehemence seldom outstripped his knowledge. His speeches and his writings, especially his *Past and Present of Russia* and his best book of all, *The Pillars of Hercules*, are generally free from extravagance of sentiment or expression; they contain little more than a clear reflection of the international ideas current in clubs and drawing-rooms from the days of the Crimean War to those of the Bulgarian troubles. Imperious, intensely aristocratic as well as autocratic, yet gracious and urbane, Urquhart exercised over reactionary republicans, over high Tories, over ultra-democrats, the same kind of personal fascination belonging to most born leaders of men; the last survivor of his disciples, the eloquent and impassioned Joseph Cowen, compared it to that universally recognised in Joseph Mazzini. Urquhart's addresses, periodically delivered in the provinces, ingeniously presented diplomacy as a kind of handmaid to international ethics. This was the modernising of an idea which had been laboured by the Czar Alexander I. in more than one of his despatches belonging to the Tilsit
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period.* To Mr C. Dobson Collett, former editor of Urquhart’s *Diplomatic Review*, I am indebted for many details which show the political machinery that Urquhart used at home to have been effectively copied by the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League. In our own day Urquhart’s organisation supplied the model for the methods of that Primrose League, studied as those methods were and revived by the founders of the later organisation, Sir John Gorst, Sir William Marriott and Lord Randolph Churchill.

Urquhart’s notion of educating the constituencies into a correct appreciation of the real drift and true issues of foreign policy was revived on a smaller scale, and after an interval of several years, by a gifted man whose visionary eccentricities and strange convictions interfered with his doing full justice to his great experience and real skill as an international negotiator. Laurence Oliphant was trained in the Foreign Office under the redoubtable Hammond; as chargé d’affaires at Pekin in 1862, after Lord Elgin’s Chinese mission, to which he had been attached, he used his exceptional opportunities industriously to study the problems of the further East. When member for the Stirling Burghs, he preferred the Press to Parliament as the medium for imparting his knowledge of affairs to the public. Had he possessed the physical vigour and energy of Urquhart he might have afterwards successfully carried out a project, originating in Urquhart’s attempts to instruct the ten-pound house- holders in their Imperial concerns. Oliphant’s plan

* Born in 1805, dying in 1877, he is buried at Naples with, on his tomb, an inscription that reflects his character and career—“Vir invicta constantiā priscœ reverentiæ inter homines restitutor. Juris gentium propugnator,” etc.

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was to supplement the deficiencies of Whitehall with an agency for supplying clubs, newspapers and private individuals with early and exclusive intelligence, which should take them behind the scenes of Eastern politics. Lord Salisbury, before he came to his title, delivered his maiden speech in the Lower House on a domestic question—Lord John Russell's University commission. He first, however, made his mark during the debates on the Vienna negotiations of the Crimean epoch; his criticisms then destined him to be the Foreign Minister of his party in the future. The last half of the nineteenth century developed other notable exponents of foreign policy in the popular Chamber. Lord Henry Lennox was a born orator, who from no want of fitness for the post failed to become Foreign Under-Secretary, in the May of 1863. By a very striking oration, he tried to turn the tables on the Gladstonian denouncers of Bourbon rule in Naples; his method was to detail the sufferings of the Bourbonists themselves in Neapolitan prisons. He was followed by a man whom Disraeli then complimented on the best first speech he had ever heard—H. A. Butler Johnstone. This speaker, more wisely using his advantages of wealth, knowledge, ability, and without his infatuated belief in the Turk, might have left a name in the foreign statesmanship of his time. Sir Arthur Otway, Mr Henry Labouchere and Sir M. E. Grant Duff were others who during the sixties, when mixing in foreign policy debates, spoke not from hearsay but from personal knowledge, and so, each in their very different ways, instructed as well as pleased the Chamber. The House of Lords had of course exceptional advantages for debates on diplomacy. In both places the subject seldom fails to produce at
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least one competent critic in someone often hitherto forgotten or ignored. Such was the late Joseph Cowen, whose elocution was not the less effective because, like that of the fourteenth Lord Derby and of Gladstone himself, it never quite lost the Northern burr. Cowen's impassioned declaration for Disraeli's Eastern policy in the discussions of a generation ago were the effective and unexpected utterances of the last Urquhartite.

Elsewhere than in Parliamentary life one is periodically reminded of the amount of available but entirely unutilised knowledge of foreign affairs and aptitude for diplomatic employment existing in our midst. A case in point is that of Henry Ottiwell Waterfield, formerly connected with the Ottoman Bank in London, who died comparatively few years ago. Captain of the school at Eton, he won “King's” with flying colours. At Cambridge he was much impressed by Kinglake's *Eothen* and Eliot Warburton's *The Crescent and the Cross*. Soon after taking his degree he happened to fall in with William Gifford Palgrave and Percy Smythe, the eighth Lord Strangford; that successor to George Smythe of *Coningsby* associations was the most accomplished among the diplomatic Orientalists of the time. Often in the company of these acquaintances, Waterfield travelled up and down European and Asiatic Turkey, failed to find the longed-for opening in the foreign service of his country, and settled down into a successful schoolmaster.

Diplomatic ambition may exist without diplomatic aptitude. Waterfield's case, however, was only one of several in which definite proof had been given of born and not entirely untrained capacity. It
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might be a wise economy for those who direct international affairs, when such persons are brought to their notice, to consider whether their tastes and energies should not be utilised by the State. Lord Salisbury himself developed into a great Foreign Secretary without having first undergone any particular training for that department. While at the Foreign Office, Lord Salisbury was too much occupied with State affairs to aim at knowing much of its interior economy, personal life, or to cultivate an acquaintance even with the names and faces of his staff, as, during their most anxious periods, had been done even by Clarendon and Aberdeen. In administration he showed the sagacity and greatness inherited from his Elizabethan ancestors; but he had no time to think of making the office a school for diplomatists, though in his earlier days he had used the opportunities of the India Office to educate many who were brought under his eyes into a knowledge of and an interest in our Asiatic Empire. The contrast between the Lord Salisbury of the India Office and of the Foreign Office emphasised itself by the appointment of an infantry officer, with a pleasant manner but no knowledge of the East, Sir Claude Macdonald, to Pekin in 1896. The Secretary of State (1907) at the time these lines are written has at least one advantage over his recent predecessors. The dearth of good officials among the juniors, resulting from Lord Hammond's excess of personal industry, has ceased. Lord Sanderson and his successor in the Under-Secretaryship of State, Sir Charles Hardinge, have together educated the rising talent of the Office into increasing usefulness. The son of the Sir Louis
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Mallet already mentioned in these pages, from an Under-Secretary Assistant has become private secretary to the head of the department. No servants of the department can have been brought up more thoroughly in the right way than Assistant Under-Secretaries Sir Francis Campbell and Mr Walter Langley. Among their colleagues the same praise belongs to the late Sir Joseph Crowe's son, Mr Eyre Crowe, head of the Western (European) department and Secretary of The Hague Conference, where he did so well as to get his C.B. Other members of the staff of whom much may be hoped are Messrs R. F. O. Bridgeman, G. R. Clerk, Charles Tufton, Victor Wellesley.

Of the consular service, something has been done to increase the efficiency. The examinational test recently adopted does not, however, sufficiently exclude sheer incapacity, as at least is done by the intellectual ordeal which bars the entrance to the Foreign Office. The consular salaries, being often those fixed forty or fifty years ago, are uniformly inadequate, and do not constitute a "living-wage." The commercial aspects of our foreign service are still apt to be ignored by Imperial statesmen. They are left to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary who, with a soul above such details, hands them over to his clerks. That we did not fare worse in our Niger negotiations of some years ago was due notoriously, not to the Foreign Office, but to the Board of Trade—which has practically relieved the Foreign Office of much of its mere business work—and to the vigorous action of Mr Chamberlain, then supreme. Belgium and other foreign states give consulships increasingly to men of
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proved aptness in getting commercial concessions from foreign governments. Hence the immense progress of late made, not only in Africa, but in China, by Russia as well as Belgium. We are an Imperial people because we are a trading one. Our agents in distant countries should be businesslike, if not actually commercial men. To secure that, the first requisite is the creation of a new department at Whitehall. In other words, our Foreign Office must be furnished with an Under-Secretary whose special province is to superintend the commercial duties and relationships of Imperial administration. Few departments of State, from the nature of their employments, can be in more need of periodical remodelling than the Foreign Office.

The international postal system, attended as it is by the risk of foreign despatches being opened en route, has not yet quite superseded the Foreign Office Messengers. These, officially styled King's Foreign Service Messengers, are less numerous than formerly, and lack the perquisites that once made their places so valuable. There are to-day only seven of them, all too much occupied and too incessantly locomotive to pervade, as they formerly seemed to do, the pleasure resorts of Continental capitals, and especially Paris. The days have thus gone by when chance customers dropping into Voisins' for lunch found the tables all occupied or bespoken, while a visibly awe-struck waiter apologised for not attending to the casual stranger on the plea of preoccupation with "Messieurs les Ambassadeurs." Nor indeed during those halcyon days of the seventies, vividly painted by Charles Lever in his O'Dowd Papers, could the Mercurys of
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the monarch's Foreign Service personally have suffered from comparison with the Secretaries of State and Councillors whose despatches they con-descended to carry. The embassies themselves have become political workshops, whose industrial economy in its departmental divisions is modelled on that of the office at Whitehall. Not indeed that the social duties of ambassador or ambassadress have become less exacting to some people less attractive or less varied than formerly. On the contrary the unceasing increase in the number of wealthy British subjects pervading Continental capitals and pushing for introductions has greatly added to the social cares of England's representatives abroad. Anglo-Saxon billionaires and millionaires from both sides of the Atlantic are apt to regard "their embassy" much as a house-of-call, where dinner invitations may sometimes be picked up and letters of social credit obtained. Here, then, is scope enough for the exercise of a tact as discriminating and a decision as strong and as courteous as were required when the chief, if not only, social anxiety of the embassy was to avoid offence and to extend influence by the judicious selection of guests to State banquets and entertainments.

The popular and fashionable prestige acquired under the Palmerstonian régime by the Foreign Office at home, and by the work that its servants did abroad, has already been mentioned. London in the sixties was not the only metropolis in which, whatever the place might be, those who were behind the scenes pointed out to one strange-looking men and still stranger-looking women. These, it was whispered, were Palmerston's secret agents. Three of these gentlemen,
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according to their own mysterious hints about themselves, and the traditions circulated by their friends, survived till late in the nineteenth century in the persons of New Yorkers formerly well known in London—the Chevalier Wikoff, W. H. Hurlbert and, above all, Samuel Ward, the last long famous as the prince of gourmets at Delmonico's, the king of the lobby at Washington and a standing dish in his day at London dinner-tables and in fashionable country-houses. Had he flourished in Palmerstonian days, some too lively imaginations might have detected one of Palmerston's disguised legionaries in the nomadically diplomatic, militant citizen of the world, Baron Malortie, who was so often one of the guests at Lord Granville's Walmer Castle parties. These gatherings brought together in the never over-crowded rooms a happy selection of international experts from all countries. Their talk served for an introduction behind the scenes of European politics. At Walmer, during Lord Granville's Wardenship, which began in 1865, might at one time have been seen the most accomplished and unsparing critic of English diplomacy then belonging to the Foreign Service. This was Charles Lever, on furlough from his Spezzia consulship, now exchanging notes on our foreign shortcomings with the Chevalier Blowitz of The Times, and now in a separate corner reproaching A. W. Kinglake for representing the Crimean invasion as a French intrigue, adding, "Your book is no more history than the Balaclava charge was war." Elsewhere, from Lord Arthur Russell of the polished and placid presence, dropped gentle epigrams on the foreign incidents of the hour.

Reunions not less representative were held else-
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where than at Walmer during this period. I have already touched in passing on the memorably pleasant and instructive parties at the Belgian minister’s, M. Van de Weyer, during the last reign. These were to their own period what a little earlier had been the drawing-room and dining-table of Baron Neumann, the Austrian diplomatist who married Lady Augusta Somerset, the Duke of Beaufort’s daughter. Lord Beaconsfield’s *Endymion* contains a sketch from life of the Rothschild hospitalities at Gunnersbury. These collected, more systematically perhaps than had been done before, the men who make and those who write about international politics. Not even under Delane’s later administration and during the day of De Blowitz did *The Times* seem in such intimate touch with the men who pulled the strings of European policy as when its great editor was in weekly intercourse with Palmerston first, Disraeli afterwards, at the Sunday parties in the suburban villa of him whom Disraeli drew as the banker, “Mr Neuchatel.” At Gunnersbury, too, so late as the second half of Delane’s editorship, were arranged by him with his fellow-guests at “Mr Neuchatel’s” many of those closely packed half-columns by responsible diplomatists which so often gave an official *cachet* to the “organ of the City.” Such, especially in 1870, were the *Communiqués* of the resigned Secretary of State, then Mr Otway, about the Black Sea surrender to Russia; such was Sir Robert Meade’s remarkable statement on the same subject which set the diplomatists of Europe speculating as to the identity of “Amicus.” In this connection two more persons may be mentioned—one of them a lady; Madame Novikoff has been too much written about to
call for many descriptive words here. She had made her début in the polite world of these islands during her brilliant girlhood. Retaining much of her beauty and charm, she reappeared in London during the seventies, and became the Egeria who instructed as well as fascinated men of a genius not less widely different than J. A. Froude, A. W. Kinglake and W. E. Gladstone.

The other foreigner now referred to was the London correspondent of the Kolnische Zeitung. Max Schlesinger preceded Sir Mackenzie Wallace in acquainting at first hand with the mainsprings of political action in central Europe those who themselves, by speech or pen, instructed the English public in the subject. Had Schlesinger lived in the days of Pitt or Canning, he would have been taken on by the Foreign Office. As it was, more than one Secretary of State found it useful to talk things over with him; politicians less highly placed, whether of the platform or of the press, readily availed themselves of invitations to meet him at the private houses where he began by being on view, at the Mayfair dinner-tables of Sir W. O. and Lady Priestley, or of Lord Arthur Russell, and at the Portland Place receptions of Sir George H. and Lady Lewis. Schlesinger’s special knowledge was never in such request as when, towards the close of the seventies, clubs, drawing-rooms and street crowds were clamouring for war with Russia. The indigenous Chauvinism with which French statesmanship has always had to reckon, is the simple growth of a national and militant egotism. The British jingoism that drove Lord Derby from the Foreign Office in 1878, by accompanying the six-million credit vote with the moving of the fleet to the Dardanelles,
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was a composite product. Foremost among its constituents was a revival of the popular feeling for our ally and protégé of Crimean memories, the gentlemanly Turk; in smart drawing-rooms children were taught to greet their mothers' visitors with a Moslem salaam; little boys were dressed up as bashi-bazouks; their small sisters were disguised in the flowing drapery of odalisques. Under Jewish ascendancy the City had become as anti-Russian as the West End. Influences more or less intellectual were at work in the same direction. The periodical revival of the old Oxford High Anglican sentiment for reunion with the Greek Church prompted the loyal subjects of the Vatican to range themselves with the Asiatic enemies of the Greek Patriarch. Among the thinkers and agnostics were Comtists whose humanitarian sentiments set them against the Mussulman. Others, however, were attracted to the fashionable side from an idea that Moslemism might act as a counterpoise to a too preponderating Christianity.
CHAPTER XV

NEW VIEWS AND VENTURES

British diplomacy, in spite of personal and party differences, unchanged in its main objects—Diversity of diplomatic opinions regarding Russia—The San Juan Settlement—The European Concert—English and Russian influence in the Near East—The Treaty of San Stefano—The Berlin Congress—England’s secret agreements with Russia and Turkey—The London and St Petersburg Foreign Offices compared—The Danube Conference, 1883—The Barrère Project—Diplomacy influenced by the City and the Press—The King as the head of our Diplomatic System—Supposed unpopularity abroad of Liberal Diplomatists—Connection between the Court and the Foreign Office—The Hague Conference of 1907—Arms superseded by arbitration.

The existing Foreign Office had been built before the popular phenomena analysed in the last chapter. The massive structure with its Parliament Street frontage and St James Park in the rear had, as already described, become in 1868 the headquarters of our external administration. The present narrative will reach its natural end in a retrospect of the chief transactions thus far to be associated with this edifice. The series of negotiations now to be reviewed began in 1871 with the Black Sea Conference, originally suggested by Bismarck,* held

*Apart from a standing wish to embroil England and Russia, the German chancellor at this time found his pleasure in presenting English politicians with accumulated proofs of Louis Napoleon’s repeated overtures to Berlin to make common cause with Prussia against England. “Here,” he would say to the fallen emperor’s British partisans, “is what your French ally has always been at.”
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under the presidency of Lord Granville at London in the March of 1871; this it was found convenient to mention on an earlier page. Here it is proper to point out that the first great act of English diplomacy after the Franco-Prussian War was one of fidelity to the Palmerstonian traditions emphasised at the Paris Congress of 1856. In fact, however much the leading agents of Gladstone's diplomacy may have disapproved the obligations incurred by England at this period, it was never a part of their policy to evade them. Here it may be well to correct a popular exaggeration of the mischievous effects exercised by party politics at home upon statesmanship abroad. As was seen in the first chapter of this work, English dynastic changes, and the new issues raised by political revolutions, if not more common in England than in other countries, have periodically influenced the terms of our intercourse with Continental states. Thus the bias of our foreign policy under an absolute monarchy was at one period French, at another Spanish, at another Austrian.* Amid all fluctuations, however, the maintenance of the European equilibrium to the advantage of English interests remained the consistent object of our statesmanship. English factions and their leaders have often been labelled with international sympathies widely different. Violent solutions of continuity as a result of those differences have for the most part been rare. The rivalries of faction have shown themselves over methods of execution rather

* The notion of a necessary antagonism between the foreign policy of England and France was a tradition from The Hundred Years' War. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries no such opposition existed. On the contrary the conductors of French and English policy co-operated with each other in common resistance to Spain. Queen Elizabeth and Henry IV. worked together. Cromwell acted with Mazarin. The Stuarts, Charles II. and James II. truckled to Louis XIV.
than general objects of policy. The first Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Fox, in comparison with the drastic methods of his department when animated by Pitt's inspiring supervision, may have seemed remiss in forming coalitions against France and in subsidising the armed opponents of European anarchy. But, as has been circumstantially shown in these pages, Great Britain's paramount concern, to prevent French preponderance in the European system, was not maintained more strongly by Pitt than by Fox; while Pitt himself lived to regret and for the future to renounce arrangements by which England was compelled to pay, while those who pocketed her money did just as much or as little in return as seemed to their own interest.

At each successive opportunity of negotiation with the victorious captain who personified the revolutionary force, both the British statesmen were equally ready to receive or to make overtures. So with their successors. The difference between Palmerston on the one hand and Aberdeen or the court of Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort on the other originated in and was confined to details of personal conduct or political procedure. Aberdeen's wish to promote an Anglo-French entente was, whenever he had the chance, Palmerston's idea also. During the first part of the Victorian age Palmerston's Whig sympathy with France as the land of Liberalism did not prevent his making ready to fight her rather than compromise British interests by permitting French ascendancy in Syria and Egypt. Aberdeen's high Tory antecedents formed a strong contrast to Palmerston's early Whig associations. As regards Mehemet Ali, in 1830, Aberdeen began by telling his fellow Oppositionists that Palmerston would
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give a good account of himself; he ended by approving in detail everything that Palmerston had done.

In the case of the Eastern question and the relations into which it has brought England both with Russia and Turkey, personal accidents have sometimes made it more difficult for successive administrations to maintain an unbroken line of statesmanship. Even here the differences long made themselves felt more at the formation of a Cabinet, e.g., between 1840 and 1856, than in the actual work of foreign administration afterwards. The conventional anti-Russian feeling first showed itself at the English court under George II. at the time of the Northern Alliance against England, rendered abortive, as has been seen, by the death of Charles XII. of Sweden. The next attack of Russophobia, in the reign of George III., in connection with Oczakow, was aggravated by the personal jealousy between the younger Pitt and Charles Fox.* Chatham, indeed, we have heard during the Seven Years' War describes himself as getting more and more of a Russian every day. Throughout the European convulsions, beginning in 1814, we acted with Russia; at Vienna, as elsewhere, the Duke of Wellington greatly preferred Russia to any other Power. Wellington's good opinion may be naturally explained by the comparative moderation of the Emperor Alexander in the matter of the terms to be imposed upon France after Leipzig and Waterloo. Whether this moderation was really so signal as Wellington, not merely at the

* Before this a most important English embassy to the Russian Empress Elizabeth had been that of Macartney, who was also the first British Ambassador ever sent to China (1792). In 1764 the renewal of the Anglo-Russian treaty that had expired in 1734 was essential to English diplomacy. Macartney's tact alone finally overcame Elizabeth's repeated refusals.
time but afterwards, thought, may be doubtful; Russia in fact could afford to seem disinterested because she risked nothing; helped by Wellington's good opinion, she was making a cheap investment in moral reputation that was subsequently to pay her well with her British partisans. Even Wellington found reason to modify his first favourable estimate during the negotiations for Hellenic autonomy between the St Petersburg protocol and the Treaty of London. By the time of the Bourbon restoration a second French expedition to Moscow had become inconceivable; Russia, too, was so remote from France as to be free from all anxiety about French action after Napoleon's fall. To trace the whole course of Anglo-Russian relations, even with the minimum of detail necessary to make them intelligible, would be beyond the scope of this work. Those Anglo-Russian developments of our own day that need be mentioned here have marked different stages in the story of the new Foreign Office building. Sir Edward Grey's second year in the control of this department was signalised by the agreement between London and St Petersburg which met with no warmer approval than from Lord Lansdowne, the Conservative predecessor of its English author.*

As a fact the new entente changes nothing, but it helps to keep Europe quiet, is something for the public and the press to discuss, and may conduce to a feeling of English sympathy on the "prolonged period of anarchy" to which the Giant of the North has "fallen a prey."

* The tempers of Lord Palmerston and Sir Edward Grey have little in common. The present Foreign Secretary's proposal (1908) to settle Macedonia by appointing a trustworthy Turk as Governor, is quite in the Palmerstonian spirit.
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Such, in the spring of 1908, has been Russia's last appearance at the new Foreign Office. Its first was the already described Black Sea Conference of 1871. In 1872 the department disposed of another question, that of San Juan; with that Russia's connection was only incidental and secondary. Whether England or the United States was entitled to the island of San Juan ought to have been settled, but was ignored by the Oregon Treaty of 1846. The earliest associations of the new Foreign Office were again destined to be inauspicious. The German emperor, to whom the matter was referred, immediately gave it as strongly in favour of the Americans as had been done by the Geneva arbitrators in the affair of the *Alabama*. The group of subjects chiefly connecting themselves with the new building during the Secretaryships of Granville, Derby and Salisbury, concerned this country and Russia. Here, as had been done before, and was done afterwards, Liberal and Conservative ministers showed the same anxiety to guard against any breach in the policy of their department. The object common to each of them was not so much to suppress Russia, as to insist upon the observance in her Imperial progress of her treaty obligations as a member of the European comity. The degree of success with which British diplomacy did this may have varied. The duty itself was impartially recognised as a principle of English diplomacy, by Aberdeen as by Palmerston, by Gladstone, Disraeli, Granville and Salisbury. In 1856, the fourteenth Lord Derby's Austrian sympathies, rather than any differences about relations with the Czar or the Porte, prevented Gladstone's return to a Conservative Cabinet. On the whole, too, the consistent pressure
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of our Foreign Office under successive chiefs has had the effect of bringing Russia into line with the other Powers. The familiar phrase of our nineteenth and twentieth-century diplomacy, "the European Concert," can be shown not always to have deserved the hard things said about it. Thus, in 1871, the earliest among the collective acts of Europe in council, performed at the London Foreign Office, may have sacrificed some of the objects secured at the Paris Congress of 1856. It maintained the doctrine of Russian submission to the approval of united Europe as recognised by her fifteen years earlier. The Prusso-Russian understanding made, it may be said, the Black Sea Conference a farce. If so, it was essential to the success of the play itself. Again and again has it been shown in these pages that, without previous private agreement between some of the chief delegates, a conference does nothing. The periodical and almost continuous severity of the strain placed by the politics of the Near East upon the Concert coincided in its beginnings with the renewed vigilance of Whitehall in watching Russian movements on the frontiers of British India. The Foreign Secretary of 1876, Lord Derby, after the reopening of the Eastern question in that year, took the initiative in intervening not to prevent but to discourage Servia from going to war with Turkey. At the same time he categorically communicated to both the Czar and the Sultan the general conditions which at a conference Europe would stultify itself were it not to apply to both. That application fulfilled itself afterwards in the substitution by two Conservative ministers of the Treaty of Berlin for that of San Stefano. The terms consented to by Turkey and Russia at Berlin were indeed privately settled.
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before the congress met, by the contracting diplomats. That, as has been seen, was only in accordance with the orthodox tradition. To the Gladstonian Foreign Secretary of 1880 fell the task of insuring the execution of the Berlin conditions that affected Montenegro. The Derby policy of the earlier epoch had been, from one point of view, defined by the Prime Minister, as not dependent on the will of England's neighbours. "Russian aggression and menace," said Disraeli, just before he left the Lower House in 1876, "are to be resisted, not in the interests of Turkey, for whom we are not responsible, but for the purpose of maintaining the Empire of England." As from Pitt and Canning to Aberdeen and Palmerston so under Disraeli the main object of our Foreign Office was to secure the inviolability of the route to India. British diplomacy could not prevent the Russian support of Servia; it did, however, effectually neutralise the Russian suggestion to Austria of a joint occupation of Turkey and the advance of the fleets into the Bosphorus. The Constantinople Conference of 1877 failed; the Russian representative, General Ignatieff, closed the door on its sittings with a threat. British statesmanship persevered in preserving the Concert; it secured Gortschakoff's signature in London (31st March 1877) of a protocol pledging the Powers to reforms in European Turkey. The diplomatic blunder vitiating the London protocol of 1877 was the failure to include in it the Porte itself as one of the signatories to the 1856 treaty. In 1878 came the war which left victorious Russia as it seemed with Constantinople at her feet. The first objection to the Treaty of San Stefano proceeded before the Berlin Congress from Derby. As an attempt, he said,
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to settle the Eastern question without the consent of Europe, this instrument could not be accepted.

The Salisbury Circular, which followed Derby's resignation, restated with a literary skill and political vehemence that were all its own, the objections already taken by the out-going minister. The fundamental difference between the London and St Petersburg Foreign Offices, revealed by the Salisbury Circular, must, it was said by the unsophisticated observers, render it impossible for any arrangement to be reached by the assemblage of diplomatists at the Russian capital. The experts knew better. Everything had, in fact, been arranged between England, with the Czar on the one hand and the Sultan on the other, before the plenipotentiaries went to Berlin. Correcting Mr W. S. Blunt's narrative in his recent work on Egypt, Mr H. W. Lucy, in the Westminster Gazette, during August 1907, accurately recalled the true facts. The congress, which replaced the Treaty of San Stefano with the Treaty of Berlin, met on 13th June 1878. During the previous May outstanding differences between London and St Petersburg had been removed by the Anglo-Russian Convention specifying the terms on which the two nations would amicably co-operate at Berlin. The transfer of Cyprus to England was arranged in a later and an entirely different document. This was the Anglo-Turkish Convention, signed 4th June 1878, not communicated to Parliament till 8th July. It was the Anglo-Russian Convention which a casual Foreign Office hand sold to the Globe newspaper, and which Lord Salisbury contradicted. The agreement with the Porte was indeed the subject of a similar démenti, but that, of course, came later. In
thus removing all dangers to an impending negotiation, the English Foreign Secretary of the day was acting not only according to the illustrious British precedent of ages, but in strict consistency with what, at that very moment, was being done by all the European Powers concerned. Lord Beaconsfield had not studied Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke, for nothing. The clandestine compact with the Czar exactly reproduced the secret understanding with France, signed and sealed by Bolingbroke, before the Utrecht conferences. Meanwhile, in 1878, our diplomacy only followed the Continental suite. If Lord Salisbury was called to account for his behind-the-scenes deal with Russia, the Italian prime minister, Count Corti, had in exactly the same way to defend himself for having sold Italian interest in Tunis to France. The Franco-Italian-Tunisian incident illustrates, it may be said in passing, the continuity under different parties of our external relations. Lord Salisbury himself rather reluctantly stomached the arrangement. The French and English official accounts since published show it to have been even less acceptable to Salisbury's successors. Gladstone and Granville, however, while deploring and even condemning it, made no attempt to reverse the policy. Of the other mutual obligations by which, before going to Berlin, the Powers bound themselves hand and foot, the most famous secured for Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a counterpoise to Panslavism. With regard to our own acquisition of the isle of Venus, entirely untrustworthy as their lordships were assured such a rumour to be, it was a stroke of commercial far more than military diplomacy. The first which many people knew of
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The business, was the announcement of Truefit, the Bond Street hairdresser, that he had opened a branch establishment at Nicosia and the playing of cricket matches at Larnaca or Limassol. The British plenipotentiaries on their return from Berlin were welcomed at the Guildhall. The harmony of the proceedings was marred for a moment by a morbidly scrupulous spectator shouting—"Traitors to the Constitution!" But the crowd generally recognised that no violence had been done to any diplomatic usage. It was less a question of high treason than of high comedy. No section of English opinion was in the slightest degree scandalised. The public feeling had been truly reflected in Tenniel's Punch cartoon—Disraeli as St George drinking a pot of porter, with the Dragon Russia behind the scenes. I have already had occasion to mention the great acquisitions of Lord Henry Lennox. His brother, the Duke of Richmond, the most absolutely frank and honest of men, at once saved his conscience and helped his friends by describing the prematurely disclosed agreements, not after the ministerial fashion, as false, but inaccurate because incomplete. Had the national honour been indeed betrayed or foully besmirched by the English authors of these compacts, their successors might have yielded to domestic and perhaps foreign pressure so far as to remodel them. By not proposing to do anything of the sort, Gladstone and Granville gave another proof that party changes operate less unfavourably to our international consistency than is sometimes supposed. The charge, indeed, to which our diplomacy seems chiefly open is not lack of unity consequent on the vicissitudes of our political system, but a habit of
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living from hand to mouth. Questions are dealt with singly as they arise, from day to day, with too little of systematic foresight. In Russia, on the contrary, the traditional will of Peter the Great, with its often quoted political injunctions, may be no more authentic than the forged decretals of the Western Church. Russia, indeed, knows little of those changes of government which, in constitutional states, are regarded as inconsistent with unity of diplomatic purpose. She suffers, however, periodically from other internal convulsions scarcely less disquieting; while she is ever confronted by perplexing ethnic problems unknown in Western Europe. The Czar may at times seem the creature of his bureaucracy; but the indefinitely far-reaching will of an autocrat, who is the embodiment of great traditions, secures consistency and immutability in the administration of the St Petersburg Foreign Office.

Our Egyptian connection requires rather a volume than a paragraph, and could not be treated here without retreading ground already instructively occupied by many recent writers. It is now just a quarter of a century since England became paramount in the valley of the Nile. During that time there have been ten changes in the control of our Foreign Office. In 1908, our position, work and purposes in the land of the Pharaohs are what they were on the morrow after Arabi’s rising in 1882. Cabinets have been made and unmade, entirely new domestic forces have made themselves felt in our affairs. The details of our earliest intervention in the country attested the wish at once to respect Turkish integrity and the European concert. In 1882, Granville pressed on Gambetta Arabi’s suppression by the Sultan as the Khedive’s
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sovereign lord.* This was in the Palmerstonian line. Tunisian affairs had, however, strained French relations with the Porte. It was thus the French objection practically to recognise the Sultan's prerogative that compelled England to waive a diplomatic point, and herself do the tranquillising work. In the hands of successive ministers of varying calibre and of personally different ideas, the Concert has proved a diplomatic instrument of appreciable efficacy. Its failures have been caused not only by contradictory councils in Whitehall, but by the disturbing and paralysing influences of popular passion. Like other delicate agencies, it requires skill in using as well as congenial conditions for its success. Thus, in 1897, the point of impatience to which the Greek mind had been worked up by the newspaper writers and agitation-mongers of Athens, Paris and London, forced the pace, kindled the Greco-Turkish War, and so prevented the bloodless cession then in course of arrangement by co-operation between the chanceries of London, Paris and St Petersburg. The same pressure from without and not any diplomatic hitch frustrated Lord Kimberley's endeavours to unite the Powers in protecting the Porte's Christian subjects. The test to which the Salisbury diplomacy seemed least equal was that applied in Europe rather than in Asia. It came in 1892, and consisted of the Heligo-

* In 1881, the then unprecedentedly democratic Gladstonian Government, with Granville at the Foreign Office, was about to coerce Turkey by a naval demonstration into the cession of Montenegro. In the September of 1881, Lord Salisbury prophesied just as much success for the expedient as if six washing-tubs with the flags of the different nations had been sent to the Adriatic. On the 26th of the next November, Dervish Pasha evacuated Dulcigno, into which he had fought his way, and the demonstration had done its work.
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land cession to Germany; that coincided with the great advantages also gained by the same Power in East Africa and Zanzibar. The Anglo-American Venezuela dispute of 1896, presently to be mentioned, was preceded in 1892 by the recurrence of friction with the United States concerning the seal-fishery in the Behring Straits. In this matter Lord Salisbury's third Foreign Secretaryship defeated the claim of Russia, and disposed by arbitration that of the United States.

Meanwhile, during Lord Granville's third Secretaryship, the Foreign Office had, in 1883, received the European plenipotentiaries for a purpose which reminded the world that a limited adhesion to the principles of non-intervention was consistent with as real a concern as formerly in whatever makes for prosperity, peace and equilibrium throughout Europe. Such an occasion came in the Danube Conference of 1883. So far as possible, I have tried in this work to avoid restating familiar details except when their mention has been necessary to make the context intelligible, and have dwelt for choice upon the new material I have been fortunate enough to collect. In his biography of Lord Granville, Lord Fitzmaurice, to whom I am under so many obligations in preparing the present work, had no occasion to go at any length into the European meeting presided over by Granville in 1883 concerning Danubian affairs. I may therefore supply the omitted particulars from information not as yet printed.* The Paris treaty of 1856 ending the Crimean War, provided for the nationalisation of the stream, which, after a course

* Supplied me by the good offices of the French Commissioner, now French ambassador at Rome.
of 1,740 miles, mingles its waters with the Black Sea. Called into existence to promote the Riverain clauses, the Danube Commission contained representatives of Powers whose names the Treaty of Paris bore. Subsequently a Roumanian member was added. Thus composed, the Commission from the first had, and still possesses, sovereign rights over the waterway. The Berlin Conference of 1878 laid before the commissioners a plan for extending the navigation works up to the point of the Iron Gates. A further suggestion of new regulations for that portion of the river gave rise to a long and delicate discussion, chiefly centring round the Austrian claims to exclusive supervision. The refusal of those demands must, said the Vienna diplomatists, involve Austria's withdrawal from the Commission. That must have meant the dissolution of this highly useful body. Politically, as well as commercially, the consequence would have been a serious loss to every European state. The commissioner whose tact averted this misfortune was not indeed an Englishman; he possessed, however, and still possesses, a more perfect and practical command of our language than has perhaps belonged to any other foreign politician of his day; M. Camille Barrère, now, as mentioned above, representing the French Republic at the Quirinal, shares with his contemporaries, M.M. Pallain and Joseph Reinach, the distinction of having belonged to Gambetta's most intimate circle; by that shrewd reader of character he was chosen as French delegate at the London Danube Conference. To him, supported by the president's approval,* was due the compromise which now

* It is a mistake to suppose, as I have seen said, that M. Barrère's chief English supporter was Sir Charles Rivers Wilson. On the contrary he
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averted collapse. The Barrère project, as in international law it is still called, having been approved by the delegates assembled under Lord Granville's presidency at Whitehall, supplied the basis of the Danube Treaty of London in 1883. The essence of the Barrère arrangement was a sub-commission for the Upper Danube. The new body, formed exclusively by the Riverain states, was to be under the presidency of Austria, subject to specified conditions of international control. At the same time the chief Commission, instead of being provisional and temporary, was to become permanent. The result has abundantly justified the line taken by the English minister and his assistant experts towards the new proposals ratified during the second decade of our Foreign Office's occupation of its present building. Thirteen years later (1896) was performed the sub-commission's special task in making the river between Braila and the Iron Gates navigable by ships of large calibre. Austria has co-operated loyally with its neighbours. There is a great and growing increase of European, and especially English, trade on the river. Among the less known monuments of Granville's third Foreign Office term is none more significant in itself or appropriate to these pages than the Franco-English policy of consolidating the two separate Danube Commissions. The permanence thus amicably secured to the principle of international supervision may be described to-day as embodying the one portion still surviving of the Paris treaty of 1856.

at the time was, together with Sir Julian Pauncefote, engaged on the Suez Canal International Commission, over which M. Barrère presided. With the Danube Commission, I am assured by Sir Charles Rivers Wilson himself, he never had anything to do.
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Canning indeed exercised a moderating influence in the opposite direction. But up to the date of the Treaty of Paris, British statesmanship, Whig or Tory, Liberal or Conservative, had on the whole inclined towards the practical belief that it was the business of our diplomacy to interfere in the affairs of other countries. In the case of foreign states, agitated by domestic troubles or threatened by external attacks, without any solicitation and upon the slightest pretext, Palmerston could not easily be kept from proffering advice, to be supplemented if there seemed any excuse for it, with something in the nature of material assistance to the side which had his good wishes. In his eagerness to score "off his own bat," he consistently ignored the greatest European growth of his time, the principle of nationality. His chief difference with the Prince Consort arose from the persistent contempt of Prussia. Here he was backed by The Times. Yet Prussia was not only to unite all Germany, but to affect every calculation and enterprise of our Foreign Office. Not so the sober and more far-seeing among his contemporaries. When Cobden and Mallet returned to England from their Paris journey in 1859, they found means of conveying even to Whitehall their presentiment of approaching Continental transformation scenes and their significance to our statesmanship beyond seas. These warnings and their lessons cut deep into the minds of the masses. English diplomacy indeed had first shown itself accessible to the new notions when, in 1851, Granville, on succeeding Palmerston at the Foreign Office, as already related, gave a diplomatic status to the word "non-intervention."
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The Newfoundland fishery regulations and the commercial or industrial resources and temptations of South Africa have given rise to questions whose handling has taxed the skill of two recent heads of the Foreign Office respectively, Lord Rosebery and Lord Salisbury. But for the miners and capitalists of the Rand and the "new diplomacy" associated with them, some have doubted whether the twentieth century would have opened with the Transvaal operations. The City, however, may be less of an embarrassment to Whitehall than Fleet Street and Paternoster Row. "The courts and foreign offices of the world, would work together in peace and harmony but for the embittering influences of a press that is dominated by business bosses." So, in the last year of his life, said a recently departed diplomatist who before making that remark had combined several branches of journalism with politics, who knew therefore thoroughly what he was talking about, and who was constitutionally incapable of prejudice.

"In fifty years there will not be a legitimate sovereign in Europe; from Russia to Sicily I foresee nothing but military despotisms." This remark was made about the year 1815 by the French diplomatist Chateaubriand to the American Ticknor. Yet Chateaubriand himself before he became French ambassador in London (1822-4) had seen George III, venerated as a symbol of Anglo-Saxon unity on both sides of the Atlantic. Rather less than a century after that king's death, his great-grandson and successor more than impersonates the attributes and functions of which his ancestor was a type. To the entire satisfaction of his subjects King Edward has informally become the head of our diplomatic system.
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In 1896 the Venezuela incident formed one of the subjects with which Lord Salisbury had to deal. It belonged to a class of questions periodically agitating between Whitehall and Washington. The Venezuela and British Guiana frontier became debatable immediately after the cession of Guiana to England by the 1814 treaty with Holland. In and subsequently to 1836, the controversy was complicated by the Monroe Doctrine, which, as has already incidentally been seen, was largely due to Canning's suggestion to the United States president. The experiences of 1896 confirmed Lord Salisbury's conviction that we could never fight the United States. Moreover, there is to-day a pretty general assumption that since the conclusion of those international arrangements from which by name Germany had been omitted, England has become involved in a half promise to back France against the consequences, and this half promise would, in case of need, be kept as though it were a real one. Here the attitude of the Foreign Office under a Liberal Secretary of State is the same as under a Conservative. Sir Edward Grey himself spoke of crowning the policy of Lord Lansdowne by an understanding with Russia and with Spain. The patriots of Persia may complain of their country being divided into English and Russian spheres of influence, as well as of their efforts after constitutional rule being discouraged by statesmen who themselves belong to the "Mother of Parliaments." The Egyptian reformers used the same sort of language five-and-forty years ago. Then, as now, foreign censures were impartially distributed between both our political parties and their leaders. Periodi-
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cally the accession of a Liberal ministry is accompanied by rumours of the universal distrust with which Liberal diplomacy inspires Continental chanceries. That of course can never be otherwise than a fiction. To-day it is in exceptionally glaring contradiction to the known facts. "Votre roi," remarked the other day a foreign diplomatist of the highest rank, "a la maîtrise de l'Europe." In the eighth year of the present reign the foreign public and even foreign diplomatists see the one responsible author of British policy in the king, who does, they think, make an excellent Minister for Foreign Affairs. In passing, it may be observed that the alleged unpopularity of Liberal diplomatists associates itself with a small diplomatic incident which happened in London about the beginning of Lord Granville's third Secretaryship. The incoming Prime Minister, Gladstone, had said one could put the finger on no point on the map at which Austria's influence was not exerted for evil. Journalistic and personal agencies sedulously aggravated the offence taken at these words by the Austrian Embassy in London and by the Imperial court at Vienna. Lord Granville had no difficulty in showing Gladstone's words about Austria to be mild in comparison with Salisbury's attacks on Russia. Through Granville's mediation the affair ended by the British premier disclaiming any idea of personal reflection upon the house of Hapsburg.

The close and practical connection between our Foreign Office and our court has been mentioned. The novelty consists not in the fact, but in the cordiality of its recognition and in the universal satisfaction caused by the results attributed to it. William III. was indeed

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the last sovereign personally to superintend foreign affairs as a department of the palace. All the successors of his own sex claimed and generally exercised over external relations a control different from that which satisfied them in home affairs. Despatches from abroad were forwarded to the palace immediately on their reaching England. Communications with foreign courts were submitted to the Crown before the Secretary of State signed them; they were often added to and altered by the monarch. Enough has been already said about the relations between Queen Victoria and the Foreign Office. The royal supervision necessarily included in some cases the control of our foreign relations. As practised by the queen and the Prince Consort it really placed the sovereign at the head of the foreign department. If therefore the continental view of the king's diplomatic duties to-day is to be accepted, no fresh precedent would be established; only the traditional practice of the dynasty would be continued. That is not all. The transactions with which the popular mind most closely connects King Edward's diplomatic activities are those centring round the French entente; this was officially negotiated by Lord Lansdowne, and continued, as well as praised, by Sir Edward Grey. The conjunction of these two names in the foreign department itself seems like a guarantee that no party or political mutations, however violent or sudden, will involve a dangerously novel departure in our diplomacy. The Anglo-French cordiality upon certain conditions was, as has been already shown, the aim not less of Palmerston than of Aberdeen. It has been for some half a century the policy of the English court. Palmerston's dislike of Prussia continually threw him out of favour
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at the palace. Never on that account for a moment did Prince Albert drop his purpose of securing Louis Philippe's friendship. The tradition of this amicable intercourse lasted throughout several years of Napoleon III. To the queen the French emperor may have been a source of amiable perplexity. The queen's husband in equal degrees distrusted his character and disliked his entourage. Through it all, the good understanding between the two nations remained much what it was when initiated in the forties at the Chateau d'Eu. So far as any hypothetical event can be spoken about positively, it is absolutely certain that the English court, swayed by influence like that of Prince Albert, would have prevented the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. For that struggle France had been preparing quite as long by a search after foreign alliances as Prussia had been doing by accoutrements and arms. Even the latest instalment of Queen Victoria's correspondence may contain no reference to the fact, but during the Prince Consort's lifetime Napoleon III. expended much diplomatic ingenuity and perseverance in the attempt to prepare a Franco-Austrian understanding to be used against Prussia, as, if there had been the opportunity, he might have used a Franco-Prussian understanding against England. A like friendly consideration for France was shown after the prince's death by Queen Victoria. It was never much of a diplomatic secret that in 1875 Bismarck, disgusted at her speedy recovery after the overthrow of five years earlier, wished to attack France. The opening move against him was planned at Windsor; the queen at once communicated with the Czar and with the aged German Emperor. The great chancellor thus received
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checkmate. Such has been the tendency to ignore or underrate the Victorian tradition of French and English goodwill that some have seen in Russia's Black Sea demands of more than a generation since the inspiration of France in revenge for British indifference to her troubles in 1870. That is pure imagination; for as a fact France had very little feeling on the Black Sea question. Among his own subjects King Edward's employment of his great personal as well as inherited international knowledge and of his great intellectual powers upon foreign politics is the more welcome because his chief work, the French entente, manifestly has not proved inconsistent with a cordiality with Germany which is welcomed as warmly in France as in England. No ordinary official could do much to neutralise the mischief systematically promoted by some representatives of the new journalism whose headquarters are the Stock Exchange rather than Fleet Street. The sovereign, as the unofficial head of the department, has already, by a few well-judged words of courtesy and social acts of kindly wisdom, undone the potential evil contained in newspaper paragraphs and columns.

Professional diplomacy may express itself in the language of resignation rather than of hope about the pacific organisation which has for its centre The Hague, formerly so prominent and fruitful as a school for the foreign politicians of Western Europe. The delegates at the last Hague Conference were of course strictly bound by their instructions. Consequently there was no room for much initiative. France and the United States, as well as most of the smaller Powers, with regard to arbitration took the pacific and humanitarian
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side. In opposition to this were Germany and Austria. Both Italy and Russia shrunk from opposing Germany; they were, however, not unfriendly to England. Germany cannot disarm, and does not wish to forego any advantage accruing to her from the present state of international law. At The Hague, therefore, while assenting in principle to peaceful solutions, she ruled them all out as impracticable. Nevertheless the latest conference of the friends of international amity in the Dutch capital took one real step in advance. This was the international court of prizes. As yet, indeed, this has only an inchoate existence. The next thing must be an agreement on the rules of maritime law which the new court can apply. In the settlement of these English diplomacy will of course take a leading part. On these subjects Japan, though not accepting all the English proposals, did not withhold from us her general co-operation. Finally, in view of earlier maritime disagreements already mentioned at their proper place in these pages, it is satisfactory to know that most of the South American States were very friendly to the English proposals; they insisted, however, on the absolute equality of all Powers, a principle which in practice leads to complications. They are also in favour of reducing the rights of belligerents in the interests of neutrals. One thing is certain; if The Hague discussions have not effected more towards preventing war than was done years ago by some suggestions on the subject drawn up by the ex-Foreign Secretary Lord Malmesbury and his friend Sir Henry Drummond Wolff in The Times, they have marked an epoch in the evolution of international law. Students
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of this science will find in the minutes of the Conference not only invaluable material, but reason for believing that, in the new period on which it is now entering, diplomacy will increasingly discover opportunities of substituting arbitration for recourse to arms. The collective efforts already made in this direction may be explained in a few concluding words. The Brussels discussion in 1874 prepared the way for the peace conferences of 1899 and 1907. The former was a purely diplomatic agency. Its proposals were made in answer to a popular cry which diplomacy desired to direct. It pretended to no legislative authority. It ruled out the limitation of armaments by sea and land. It did, however, for the first time, promote international arbitration by providing a court. It nominated judges. It indicated the modus operandi generally to be pursued. The 1907 conference had been preceded by no diplomatic preparations. It was above all things popular both in its personal composition and its methods. Its deliberations were conducted generally on the go-as-you-please principle. Thus the imparting of fresh vigour and organisation to diplomacy by the personal work and example of King Edward has almost coincided with a disposition to assert the popular will on international procedure. This tendency was favoured by Mr Chamberlain's diplomatic methods before the Transvaal war. It has expressed itself since in the proposal that popular committees of the various nations superintend the doings of their respective Foreign Offices.
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