Rethinking Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria

A thesis submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for a Master of Arts Degree

in Peace and Conflict Studies
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DECLARATION

I, Samson Eyituoyo Liolio declare that the work presented here as a thesis for a Master of Arts degree at the EPU is my own. Any part of this work which has been obtained from other authors has been duly acknowledged.

I also declare that this work has never been presented anywhere for the award of any degree.

Signed: Samson Eyituoyo Liolio

February 17, 2013.
Abstract

The issue of Boko Haram in Nigeria has become a threat to both internal and international security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces, civilians, churches, media houses as well as international bodies such as the United Nations. With the increased numbers of cadres, improved and sophisticated weaponry, suicide bombing and well-organised guerrilla tactics, Boko Haram’s challenge to the Nigerian state now also stretches across the entire 36 states of Nigeria, thus affecting its economic and social-political growth.

With an aim of finding a solution that could lead to success in fending off the Boko Haram insurgency, this thesis explores the economic and political-cum-military forces at play between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram. It tries to investigate the apparatus of counterinsurgency earlier employed by the Nigerian state, thus also seeking to explain the possible counterproductive result or failure of counterinsurgency.

The conclusion of this thesis offers framework for rethinking counterinsurgency, thus arguing that counterinsurgency has the propensity of leading to a classical state of terrorism. It is also suggested that avoiding situations that could lead to insurgency is better than trying to counter one. This thesis thus suggests social-political and economic reforms as well as amnesty programmes as measures if heavily invested in, to help curb Boko Haram as well as insurgency in general.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the entire staff and management of the European Peace University for their excellent guidance throughout my course of study. In particular, the extensive guidance and insight of my supervisors, Professor Paul Scott and Dr Laszlo Farkas who both were indispensable toward the completion of my thesis. Special thanks to Veronika Heidinger, one of the kindest persons I met in Haus International.
Greetings to all EPU students of class 2011/2012 of which I had the privilege to learn from and with. To Dr CBN Ogbogbo, the difference you made in my life is nothing short of legendary. And to Alexandra Niederhammer, thanks for your understanding and love. Sincere appreciation also goes to my parents, Mr and Mrs John Liolio for their loving supports. Finally, an honourable mention and thanks is due to God Almighty.

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**Abbreviations**

CCTV - Closed Circuit Television Camera

COIN – Counterinsurgency

GTD- Global Terrorism Database

FM 3-24 - Field Manual No.3-24


EFCC- The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (of Nigeria)
CHAPTER ONE

1.0. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

For the past three years, developments and operations in Nigeria have forcibly rekindled the need to rethink the best possible ways to fight insurgencies, thus finding a strategy to address these emerging threats. At the onset, it is important to note that similar counterinsurgency strategies applied by the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq have not yielded the desired and predicted results. Put differently, there are even more cases of insurgencies and terrorism after the US (alongside the United Kingdom) 2001 declaration of ‘war on terror.’ To borrow the words of Lauren B. O’Brien, intelligence analyst in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Analysis Section;

“Approximately 10 years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States faces a more diverse, yet no less formidable, terrorist threat than that of 2001. In this increasingly complex and dynamic threat environment, not only does Pakistan-based al Qaeda possess the ability to project itself across the globe to stage attacks against the West but so do groups based in Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq. In many ways, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses as serious a threat to the nation as core al Qaeda, with two attempted attacks against the U.S. homeland in the past 2 years.”

The above quote is instrumental and applicable to the Nigerian situation where a similar counterinsurgency approach was adopted by the Nigerian state against Boko Haram and as we shall see in the Chapter Three of this thesis, there are even strong connections between Boko Haram and al Qaeda as well as Al Shabaab of Somalia.

Socioeconomic inequalities, injustice, corruption, ethnic intolerance and religious extremism are some of the vices which have culminated and metamorphosed into fanatical movements demanding radical change. Insurgencies, and the terrorism that accompanies

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them, have become the order of the day thus posing complex challenges threatening political and social stability and defying military attempts to suppress or defeat them.

Worse still, these insurgencies when wrongly countered by the State can grow into full terrorism. It needs be emphasised that insurgency is not same as terrorism. Haviland Smith, retired CIA station chief noted that, “Terrorism shouldn’t be confused with insurgency”\(^2\) and Chapter Three and Chapter Four of this thesis points out the differences.

If the conceptual confusion arising from the several debates with regards to counterinsurgency is anything to go by, then we seem to have forgotten the past while attempting to reinvent and restructure the future. We also seem to have forgotten that there are more insurgencies and cases of terrorism after the US declared the ‘war on terror’ which is often seen as the milestone of terrorism. The lack of an integrated and multi-dimensional approach to these new threats too often leads to confusion and disjointed responses and acrimonious debates not only over what needs to be done, but who—military or civilian—should do it. In the absence of an overarching strategic and operational understanding of the problem, military and civilian planners default to their own experiences and ideas, and, in many cases, grasp prevailing assumptions and accord them the status of historical truths.

To many, the new threats we face pose unprecedented challenges. Transnational conflict and weapons proliferation, religious and ethnic extremism, and mushrooming urbanization have changed the landscape on which insurgencies are being fought. The media and modern telecommunications greatly expand conflict zones; what might have been viewed as local problems just few years ago now assume regional and even international significance. Seemingly unrelated insurgent and terrorist groups cooperate together, even if only in the virtual world, to provide support, exchange ideas and methods, and spread their violence. Consequently, insurgents who once fought under charismatic leaders from remote bases using

captured, externally supplied, or manufactured weapons to free their countries, now fight as loosely organized networks with the latest technologies gained from the open market, operate from urban hideouts, and strike at regional and international perceptions. Suicide terrorism also now crosses borders and oceans with relative ease while the threat of weapons of mass destruction provides small groups with powers once preserved exclusively for nations. The case of Nigeria is not different as it has grown from being twice awarded as a country with the world happiest people\(^3\) into the seventh most terrorised country in the world\(^4\) according to the latest ranking of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). In this order even the smallest of insurgencies or even insurgency in a distant country cannot be ignored as inconsequential and be left to fester.

Irrespective of these nascent realities, the fundamental nature of counterinsurgency remains remarkably consistent, and can be discerned through heedful scrutiny and consideration of the past; thus giving rise to new multi-dimensional approaches. As earlier noted, this thesis would try to investigate what the counterinsurgency earlier adopted by the Nigerian state meant for the second phase of Boko Haram. While not disregarding the purpose and effectiveness of counterinsurgency as a model, Chapter Three would intensively look into insurgency and counterinsurgency. Chapter Four would look into the group called Boko Haram. Chapter Two is an overview of Nigeria. Chapter Five takes an analysis based on the findings herewith presented. And Chapter Six concludes as well as propose certain recommendations.

### 1.2. Significance of the Study

This study is timely because it provides measures to tackle or avoid insurgency, which is still an on-going challenge for Nigeria as well as other countries of the world. Similarly, this

\(^3\) [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3157570.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3157570.stm)  
thesis presents facts about the possible counterproductive outcome of countering an insurgency. Drawing from this, it provides an opportunity for governments of all countries to invest heavily in human development and eradicate societal vices as poverty, illiteracy or unemployment as measures to help avert insurgency and terrorism. Admittedly, the collective responsibility espoused in this thesis is not just for the security of Nigerians but also for the wellbeing of all humans regardless of their respective country. So if various governments become very much aware that the prevalence of insurgencies and terrorism in various parts of the world is heavily connected to governmental lapses or bad governance and work tirelessly to adopt some of the measures suggested in this thesis, the scourge of insurgencies and terrorism would be immensely reduced. In this order, this study provides insight with the realisation that countering an insurgency, which is often done with brutality, only helps to institutionalise insurgencies and take it to the level of wider terrorism.

1.3. Statement of Problem and Scope of study

In a bid to countering insurgency, over two thousand civilians have died from government operations.5 The Nigerian military for instance has been accused of killing and torturing innocent civilians6 in a bid to defeating Boko Haram and only on October 2012, thirty (unarmed) civilians were shot dead by the Nigerian military in pursuit of Boko Haram in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri.7 Three weeks later, the Nigerian military carried out another operation in Maiduguri that killed seventy people whose connection with Boko Haram were not established.8 In this order, the notion of a "war" on terrorists or countering insurgency has somewhat been over-exploited by the Nigerian state, thus reducing civil liberties as well as infringing upon fundamental human rights issues. It is thus unlikely that Boko Haram or any

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5 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/world/africa/nigeria-forces-kill-dozens-in-night-assault.html?_r=0
6 Ibid.
other international terrorism can be brought to an end by military means. Looking at the actual origin of Boko Haram which is deep rooted in the early 1990s, the scope of this study would then be to investigate and identify the actual factor which triggered the group into its present form or phase. Accordingly, this study seeks to answer the following questions:

1) What is Boko Haram or the Nigerian state before and after the Nigerian government’s crackdown?
2) What factors necessitated the change in Boko Haram’s operation?
   2a) what are the psychological implications with regards to revenge?
3) What is the nexus between poverty, education, bad governance and the emergence of Boko Haram?
4) How can Boko Haram threat be addressed in a country like Nigeria?

1.4. Conceptual and theoretical framework

1.4.1 Research Methodology

The findings herewith presented were based on a desk research with heavy reliance on books; you tube clips, online news outfits, articles, online data sources, journals, and reports. This thesis employs a very high degree of comparative case analysis and thus by comparing Boko Haram before and after the Nigerian government crackdown (counterinsurgency), the author seeks to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis. Being a qualitative research, emphasis is also hinged on content analysis.

Although the comparative base approach of this thesis draws credence from Alexander George’s method of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2004: 67); it does not however claim to follow it in whole. This method however allows for a systematic
comparison of case studies by asking the same questions for each case study, which is intended to answer the research questions.

Another part of the research questions was also answered in line with the theoretical framework of Bert Brown (1968) who in the 1960s conducted a research to see the connection between “shame” and “revenge.” This is discussed in the Chapter Five of this thesis.

1.4.2. Hypothesis

**Prime Hypothesis:** “Counterinsurgency has a great propensity of leading to classical terrorism.”

**Explanatory Hypothesis**
Further explanation of Hypothesis (Diagram above)

As noted above, counterinsurgency has a higher tendency of leading to a standardised way of terrorism which leads to the destruction of properties and loss of civilian lives in high magnitude. In the same vein, counterinsurgency as well as insurgency also leads to the destruction of properties as well as the loss of civilian lives, often not in same degree as in the case of terrorism.

On the other hand, the root causes of insurgency are deep rooted in bad or poor governance or one characterised with chronic corruption and this often leads to poverty and illiteracy of a greater number of the population, making them easily giving off when the chance of an insurgency arises.

Lastly, countering an insurgency especially militarily as it is often the case, has the likelihood of giving more motivations and inspiration to the insurgents. If it is a religious group, they probably would take it up as a fight against their supposed descendants and this would create a room for the master-minders to successfully recruit more members and continue fighting and increasing their tactics, leading also to classical terrorism.

1.5. Limitations and Future research

The main limitation for this research rests on my inability to have real and first-hand interviews with current or even former members of Boko Haram. This is because Boko Haram is still an on-going threat and as such even going to the Northern part of Nigeria remains a risk. Another basic limitation rests on the collection and availability of data especially with regards to Boko Haram attacks. While some of the sites are locked and others have some earlier information removed, there was also the grave limitation posed by inaccuracy by different sources (news outfits) with regards to an attack or the number of dead
or injured. This shortcoming was however reduced by comparing what, at least, four sources reported on an issue.

Future researchers should however coin out modalities in order to see through the eyes of insurgents and terrorists. By this I mean, having interviews with insurgents to personally hear why they do what they do.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NIGERIA

2.1. Introduction

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a federal constitutional republic comprising 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), and is grouped into six geopolitical regions: North-east, Northwest, North-central, South-east, South-South and South-west (See figure 8). There are also 774 constitutionally recognised Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the country which lies between 4º16' and 13º53’ north latitude and between 2º40' and 14º41’ east longitude. Located in the West of Africa, Nigeria has an area of 923,768 square kilometres (fourth largest in Africa), and shares borders with Niger (1,497 kilometers) in the North, Chad (87 kilometres) and Cameroon (1,690 kilometres) in the east and the Republic of Benin (773 kilometres) in the west9 (See figure 9). To the south, its coast totalling 853 kilometres lies10 on the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean. She also claims a territorial sea of 12

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9 [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf)
10 Ibid.
nautical miles, which is an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles, and a continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters or to the depth of exploitation.\textsuperscript{11}

Before 1914, there was no country called "Nigeria", the people in what is known as "Nigeria" consisted of 4 different 'empires', some of them stretching into parts that are not part of current-day Nigeria, like parts of present-day Ghana, and present-day Cameroon. The present day Nigeria had four major political entities in the past and they were:

**The Northern Empire** which was composed of the Borno Empire, some Hausa states such as Birori, Daura, Zazzau, Kano, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, and others as Nupe, Yelwa, Gwari, and Kebbi.

**The Calabar Kingdom** which is perhaps the oldest kingdom which also had the oldest contact with early Europeans as well as the oldest church dating back to 1850. It is believed to have been founded around 1000 A.D. It stretched into parts of current-day Cameroon. Much of this Kingdom is in the present day Niger-delta region.

**The Yoruba Empire** which consisted basically of two main groups. One of these groups was the indigenous people, whose central religious and cultural centre was Ile-Ife and presently make up the Yoruba people in present Nigeria. The Berbers, who were the second group, eventually established the Borno and Hausa states. The area is in present day Western Nigeria.

**The Benin Empire** was also powerful, and extended as far as some parts of present-day Ghana. It was very famous for its African arts and sculptures. Benin is in present day Niger-Delta region.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
With the scramble and subsequent partition of Africa by the Europeans in the later part of the 19th century, these empires were destroyed. And in 1914, Lord Lugard, the then British High Commissioner, amalgamated the Southern and Northern Protectorates to form what his wife, Flora Shaw, named Nigeria.

Gaining independence on October 1st 1960 and becoming a republic in 1963, Nigeria in most parts of its existence has been ruled by military dictators specifically from the Northern part of the Country. In 1999 however, the country returned to democracy after years of military rule that was only altered by a democratic rule which lasted from 1979 to 1983. Since 1999, the country has been ruled under democracy.

2.2. Demographics

2.2.1. Ethno-linguistic groups and population

Although, the official population count of each of Nigeria's ethnicities has always remained controversial and disputed as members of different ethnic groups believe the censuses are often rigged to give a particular group (usually believed to be the northern groups) numerical superiority (Lewis, 2007: 132). The fact still however remains that Nigeria is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups with varying languages and customs, creating rich ethnic diversity. Although a 2003 survey claimed there are about 374 identifiable ethnic groups in Nigeria (Nigeria National Population Commission and ORC Macro, 2004: 1; Otite, 1990). Of these ethnic groups however, the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo (Ibo) are the three most populous and politically influential. Thus: Hausa/Fulani 29 %, Yoruba 21%; and Igbo (Ibo) 18% (Paden, 2008). Other notable ethnic groups are Ijaws 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio

3.5% and Tiv 2.5%. The other 12% are dissevered among groups like the Edo, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Nupe, Idoma, Jukun, Gwari and other minorities.

There is also no concise account of the Nigerian total population as of November 2012. According to a 2011 report by the World Bank, the total population of Nigeria is estimated at 162,470,737. The CIA as at July 2012 also estimated Nigeria’s population at 170,123,740. The official population of Nigeria was however last reported after the 2006 census by the National Population Commission and this was fixed at 140,431,790. Although in a July 2012 statement to mark the World Population Day, Senator Maina Ma’aji Lawan, Chairman of the Nigerian Senate Committee on Population remarked, “Today, the world is 7 billion people. In like manner, Nigeria is 167 million...With a population of 167 million, Nigeria alone accounts for 2.4 per cent of the world’s population.” In line with the official account of Nigeria’s population however, one out of every four Africans is a Nigerian and one in every 44 people on the planet is a resident of Nigeria, thus sharing 2.29 per cent of the world’s total population. Nigeria also holds the record of the most populous country in Africa (accounting for over 18% of the continent’s total population), currently the seventh most populous country in the world, and the most populous country in the world in which the majority of the population are black (Library of Congress- Federal Research Division, 2008: 9). By the United Nations projections, Nigeria is one of eight countries expected to account collectively for half of the world's total population increase from 2005–2050. The UN also estimated that by 2100, Nigerian population will be between 505 million and 1.03

13 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
billion people (middle estimate: 730 million).\textsuperscript{21} This might be close to facts especially when one realises that as at 1950, Nigeria only had 32.8 million people (Kent and Carl, 2005). A problem of insecurity in Nigeria is thus of concern at the international scene.

\subsection*{2.2.2. Religion}

Nigeria is undoubtedly home to a variety of religions which tend to vary regionally. This situation intensifies regional and ethnic distinctions and has often been seen as a source of sectarian conflict amongst the population (Osita, 2004: 6). Various surveys however give slightly differing figures for the size of religious groups in Nigeria, which by 2010 appears to be roughly split half and half between Muslims and Christians with a very small minority who practice traditional religion. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) has also noted that, of these three religious identities in Nigeria – Muslim, Christian and Traditional, the latter is the least politically active; numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups, kin groups, clans and villages; and, involving the worship of several gods and goddesses alike.

According to a 2003 Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey which interviewed a nationally representative sample of 7,620 women (aged between 15 and 59) and 2,346 men (aged 15 and 49), 50.4\% of Nigeria’s population are Muslims, 48.2\% are Christians and 1.4\% adheres to other religions (Nigeria National Population Commission and ORC Macro, 2004). Few years later, these figures seem not to change much as a 2009 National Religious Survey on Nigerian Christians reported 15\% Protestants, 13.7\% Catholics, and 19.6\% other Christian denominations. Similarly, a 2009 survey by Pew on Nigerian Muslim population still claimed 50.4\%.\textsuperscript{22} By 2010 however, numerical figures seem to favour the Christian population as a 2011 study conducted by same Pew saw an increase in Christian population at 50.8\%.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. \textsuperscript{22} www.pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf
(80,510,000), 23 while the total number of Muslim was reported at 75,728 000 (Pew Forum &
Public Affairs, 2011) as against its 2003 population of 78,056,000 making up the earlier
50.4% of Nigeria’s total population. The majority of Nigerian Muslims are Sunni,24 though a
significant Shia primarily located in the north-western state of Sokoto (Nigeria National
Population Commission and ORC Macro, 2004) and a Sufi minority exists alongside a small
minority of Ahmadiyya. It needs be added that other minority religious and spiritual groups
in Nigeria include Judaism, Hinduism, The Rosicrucian Order, Freemasonry,25 Grail
Movement,26 Hare Krishnas (Ebonugwo Mike, 2004), Eckankar,27 The Bahá’í Faith, and
Chrislam which is a syncretic faith melding elements of Christianity and Islam (McConnell,
2009) aimed at controlling feuds among Nigerians.

With regards to religious affiliations, Nigeria is also divided along the line of region and
ethnicity. While for instance the Hausa ethnic group in the North is 95% Muslims and 5%
Christians, the West which is the Yoruba tribe is 60% Christians and 30% Muslims with 10%
adhering to other traditional African religions while the Igbo in the south-east and the Ijaws
in the South are 98% Christians (mostly Catholics) and 2% African traditional religions. The
middle belt region sometimes referred to as the north-central zone and home of the minority
are mostly Christians and traditionalists with few Muslim coverts (National Population
Commission (NPC) [Nigeria], 2009). It was perhaps for this unique and conspicuous
religious divide that Archbishop Onaiyekan (2008) described Nigeria as “the greatest Islamo-
Christian nation in the world” by which he meant that Nigeria is the largest country in the
world with an evenly split population of Christians and Muslims, and thus “really the test
case of the ‘clash of civilizations,” (Paden, 2007). Christianity and Islam, the most popular

26 http://thegrailmovementnigeria.com/grailmessage.html
27 http://www.eckankarnigeria.com/
religions in Nigeria, are not native to the country, and yet their influences affect the core and the essence of the country, from economic development to health.

The subject of religion has always been an important part of Nigeria and her politics (Enwerem, 1995), influencing core aspects from economic development to health. “The intensity of religious identity in Nigeria is regarded as one of the highest in the world” (Paden, 2008). This argument is hinged on the fact that Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of religion than any other identity. According to a 2006 survey on “Religion and Public Life” conducted by Pew; 76% of Christians say that religion is more important to them than their Nigerian or African identities, or even as members of a particular ethnic group. Among Muslims, the number naming religion as the most important factor is even higher (91%). In effect, Christian and Muslim identities have been the mainstay of religious differentiation and conflict, with Muslims in Nigeria much more likely to evince or articulate a religious identity than Christians (Lewis and Bratton 2000; Lewis, 2007). Spotting such religious identity plays out in the deep distrust between the Muslims and Christians. A Pew Survey noted that most of the country’s Christians (62%) trust people from other religions only a little or not at all. On the other hand, Nigeria’s Muslims (61%) say they trust people of other religions little or not at all (Ruby and Shah, 2007). Similarly, religion is also reflected in the Nigerian legal and judicial system which contains three codes of law: customary law, Nigerian statute law (following English law), and Sharīʿah (Islamic law). Customary laws are most times administered in native or customary courts. The cases which often centred on generally family problems are usually presided over by traditional rulers. Kadis (judges) apply Sharīʿah based on the Maliki Islamic code. Since 1999, several states have also instituted Sharīʿah law. Although these states claim that the law applies only to the Muslim population, other non-Muslim minority in the North claimed they are affected as well.
and part of Boko haram objective as we shall see is the Islamization of the entire Nigeria, at least this was visible after 2009.

The above analysis is important in pointing out the role of ethnicity and religion with regards to the present security challenges facing Nigeria. These two factors interact alongside other variables such as region in a complex and sometimes conflicting way. In fact it is in realization of this that the term ethno-religious identity was coined to capture the tendency for the boundary between ethnicity and religion to coalesce during moments of conflict and violence (Egwu, 2001)

2.2.3. Language

Nigeria's linguistic diversity is a microcosm of Africa as a whole, covering basically three main African languages families: the Niger-Congo, Nilo-Saharan and Afro-Asiatic. The excerpt below further and better explains these languages families:

“The huge Niger-Congo group is further subdivided into nine major branches, including the Kwa subgroup, spoken in the extreme southwestern corner of the country; the Ijoid branch, spoken in the Niger Delta region; the Atlantic subgroup, which most notably includes Fula; the extensive Benue-Congo subgroup, which includes Tiv, Jukun, Edo, Igbo, Igalala, Idoma, Nupe, Gwari, Yoruba, and several languages of the Cross River basin such as Efik, Ibibio, Anang, and Eko; and the Adamawa-Ubangi languages, such as Awak, Waja, Waka, and Tula, spoken in northern Nigeria. The Nilo-Saharan group is represented in Nigeria principally by Kanuri, although speakers of Bagirmi and Zerma are also present in the country. Afro-Asiatic is a much larger linguistic group and comprises Hausa, Margi, and Bade, among others. Some peoples (such as the Fulani and the Tiv) are relatively recent immigrants, but, on the basis of modern linguistic research, it is thought that the great majority of Nigerian languages—specifically the Kwa subgroup—have been spoken in roughly the same locations for some 4,000 years.” Udo and Falola28

According to Gordon (2005), there are 521 languages in Nigeria and of these languages 510 are living languages, 2 are second languages without mother-tongue speakers, and 9 are

28 http://www.all-history.org/01un125.html
extinct. The official language of Nigeria, which is English adopted from her British colonial authority, was chosen to ease the cultural and linguistic unity of the country. Major languages spoken however include Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Fulfulde (Fula), Kanuri, Ibibio and English Creole (pidgin). Those in the rural area basically speak these national languages. Many of the other languages only exist in written form as English still remains the language widely used especially by urban elite for education, business transactions and other official purposes. Specific languages are also associated with the various major ethnic groups. While for instance the Yoruba speak Yoruba, the Igbo speak Igbo and the Hausa speak Hausa.

2.3. Economy and poverty rate

With a variety of both renewable and non-renewable resources, Nigeria has one of the largest economies in Africa, and it is classified as a mixed economy emerging market with a lower middle income status (World Bank, July 2012). Prior to 1956 when crude oil was discovered, the Nigerian economy was heavily hinged on Agriculture (Ake, 1996: 48). In fact at one time, Nigeria was the world's largest exporter of palm oil, cocoa, groundnuts and a substantial producer of cassava, sugar cane, pearl millet, coconuts, yams, maize and citrus fruits. Since the late 1950s however, petroleum has overtaken and played monumental roles in Nigeria’s economy, accounting for about 95% of exports and 95% of its total foreign exchange earnings. Petroleum also contribute about 80% of the Nigerian’s government revenue and thus moving from the generation of about 5,100 bpd in 1958, Nigeria has emerged the “10th largest oil producer in the world,” the 3rd largest in Africa and the most prolific oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. She now has a crude oil production of 2.51 million barrels per day and thus shares 2.95% of the world production. She also has a daily

29 Ibid.
30 http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/economy_profile.html
31 http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/economy_profile.html
32 http://www.cnbc.com/id/41887743/The_World_s_15_Biggest_Oil_Producers?slide=7
crude export of 1.02 million barrels to the US alone, and proven reserves of 37.20 billion barrels. According to OGI, as at the end of 2011, Nigeria also had an estimated 180 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, making her the ninth largest natural gas reserve holder in the world and the largest in Africa. Although, despite holding a top 10 position for proven natural gas reserves, Nigeria produced about 1 Tcf of dry natural gas in 2011 and ranked as the world's 25th largest natural gas producer. Her oil wealth (and natural gas) still makes her most attractive to the major multinational oil companies such as Chevron, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, Chevron and Agip amongst others.

Another important sector of the Nigeria’s economy is telecommunication where she has overtaken South Africa to become the continent’s largest mobile market with close to a 100 million subscribers, and yet market penetration stands at only around 60% in early 2012. This is commendable when one realises that the telecommunication markets was only introduced to the Country in 2001. Much of the remaining addressable market is in the country’s rural areas where network rollouts and operations are expensive. The Nigerian government has also recently begun expanding this infrastructure to space based communications and Nigeria now has a space satellite which is monitored at the Nigerian National Space Research and Development Agency Headquarters in Abuja.

Nigeria also has a manufacturing industry which includes leather and textiles (centred Kano, Abeokuta, Onitsha, and Lagos), steel mills (Ajaokuta and Aladja), pulp and paper mills (Oku Iboku and Iwopin), petrochemical plants (Kaduna, Port Harcourt and Abuja), aluminium smelter (Ikot Abasi) and a car manufacturing (for the French car

33 Ibid.
35 www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?ips=NI
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
manufacturer Peugeot as well as for the English truck manufacturer Bedford, now a subsidiary of General Motors), t-shirts, plastics and processed food.

Traditional industries carried out in homes or in makeshift workshops include the making of iron implements such as hoes and hatchets, bolts, dane guns\(^{39}\) and door hinges. Additionally, there were traditional soap- and salt-making industries in large numbers after the near collapse of the Nigerian economy in 1983, when most wage earners could not afford factory-made soap or imported table salt. Although these industries which later included pottery and wood carving continued after the later economic recovery, they were however concentrated in the rural areas.

With regards to GDP (PPP), at $413.402 Nigeria ranks 30\(^{th}\) in the world (International Monetary Fund, October, 2012), and has a stock exchange (the Nigerian Stock Exchange) that is the second largest in Africa. Currently, Nigeria is the 50th-largest importer of U.S. goods and the 14th-largest exporter of goods to the U.S. The country thus has a highly developed financial services sector, with a blend of both local and international banks, private equity funds, insurance companies and brokers, investment banks, asset management companies and brokerage houses (Lewis, 2007: 168).

In spite of these however, about 60\% of Nigerians work in the agricultural sector, though Nigeria still has vast areas of underutilized arable land (Levy, 2004: 14). Thus for instance southern states supply cassava, fruits, plantains, and kola nuts to the northern states, which also supply livestock, beans, tomatoes and onions to the southern states. In addition Nigeria has a wide array of underexploited or untapped mineral resources which include bauxite, tantalite, gold, tin, iron ore, limestone, kaolin, rock salt, topazes, barite, sapphires, phosphates, coal, aquamarines, niobium, lead, zinc, natural gas and a host of others.

\(^{39}\) Dane guns are basically firearms of obsolete design. They are originally of European manufacture.
According to Peter Onwualu, Director General of The Raw Material Research Development Council of Nigeria (RMRDC), “the country has over 9000 natural resources that are yet to be tapped by the manufacturing sector as raw materials for finished products”\(^{40}\) and thus the mining industry in the country is still in its infancy. Solar energy, probably the most extensive of the underutilized renewable resources, will remain unutilised for a while. Similarly, the vast reserves of natural gas produced with crude oil are yet to be fully exploited. But these are not the major problem.

Even as Nigeria’s economy is projected to continue growing, poverty continues to grow as the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen. According to Dr Yemi Kale, Statistician General of the Federation, ”it remains a paradox...that despite the fact that the Nigerian economy is growing, the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty is increasing every year.”\(^{41}\) The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) also noted that as at 2010, the percentage of Nigerians living in absolute poverty — those who can afford only the bare essentials of food, shelter and clothing — rose to 60.9 per cent (99.284 million), compared with 54.7 per cent in 2004.\(^{42}\) The data also showed that 61.2 per cent of Nigerians lived on less than $1 per day in 2010,\(^{43}\) compared to 51.6 per cent in 2004.\(^{44}\) Similarly, relative poverty (NBS best poverty measurement) increased from 54.4 per cent in 2004 to 69 per cent or 112.518 million Nigerians in 2010.\(^{45}\) The subjective poverty measure (those who described themselves as poor), another form of measurement used for the survey puts the poverty level at 93.9 per cent compared to 75.5 per cent in 2004. Although the World Bank standard is now US$1.25 per day, the old reference of US$1 per day was the standard used during this survey.

\(^{40}\) http://allafrica.com/stories/201208280450.html

\(^{42}\) Ibid.
\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/08/budgets-fg-spends-n32-24-trillion-in-8-years/
The statistics also showed that relative poverty is more in the North-West (77.7%) and North-East (76.3%) of Nigeria, where the Boko Haram sect originated. The South-West (59.1%), which includes the thriving commercial hub Lagos, had the lowest levels of poverty. Dr. Yemi also estimated that using the relative, absolute and dollar-per-day measurements, poverty in Nigeria might have increased slightly to about 71.5 per cent, 61.9 per cent and 62.8 per cent respectively in 2011; though a 2011 survey is yet to be conducted. See figure 2 below.

**Figure 2: Different poverty measurements for the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria**

![Image of poverty measurements for Nigeria](image.png)


### 2.3.1. Health and welfare


47 Ibid.
Health care and general living conditions in Nigeria are poor as life expectancy is 47 years (average male/female) and total infant mortality is 74.36 deaths per 1000 live births (79.44 males and 68.97 female) (CIA World Factbook, 2012). The fact that people are concentrated in the cities has created enormous sanitary problems, particularly improper sewage disposal, water shortages, poor drainage and just over half the population has access to potable water. To put it straight in the words of Udo and Falola;

“...domestic water supplies are obtained from wells that are often polluted by seepage from pit latrines...Some villagers have to walk as far as 6 miles (10 km) to the nearest water point—usually a stream. Because people wash clothes, bathe, and fish (sometimes using fish poison) in the same streams, the water drawn by people in villages farther downstream is often polluted. During the rainy season, wayside pits containing rainwater, often dug close to residential areas, are the main source of domestic water supplies. Cattle are often watered in the shallower pools, and this contributes to the high incidence of intestinal diseases and guinea worm in many rural areas.”

Similarly, large heaps of domestic refuse spill across narrow streets, causing traffic delays, while the dumping of garbage along streambeds constitutes a major health hazard and has contributed to the floods that have often plagued some Northern and Southern cities during the rainy season. At 3.3 million also, people living with HIV/AIDS are lower compared to countries like South Africa or Kenya, however Nigeria suffers from periodic outbreaks of cholera, malaria, sleeping sickness and remains the only Africa country yet eradicated polio.

The medical and health services which are basically controlled by the states and federal governments are in deplorable conditions, whereas the private hospitals, clinics, and maternity centres are often too expensive for the average Nigerians. There is also no nationwide health insurance scheme or social welfare system. The bulk of factories and commercial firms only provide free medical services for their employees and maybe

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49 http://all-history.org/01un125.html
51 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-20493540
employees’ immediate families. Although, civil servants are entitled to free medical care in government-financed hospitals, services in such hospitals are often ineffective. A greater number of elderly Nigerians and the unemployed depend on the extended family, serving as the traditional social welfare scheme. What about other social infrastructures?

Nigeria is also plagued with epileptic power supply as millions across Nigeria have spent decades in darkness. The sounds of generators are often heard in almost every neighbourhood as this seems to be the only reliable source of power. Added to this is the economic impact as most companies also find it difficult to operate as they have to provide their own source of power. Fuel wood (firewood and charcoal) is still thus an important energy source for domestic use. In Nigeria, roads are the most important means of transportation, carrying more than four-fifths of all passengers and freight traffic\(^52\) but then the roads and expressways in Nigeria are generally bad. According to Jonas Agwu, the FRSC education officer, “road accidents increased from 2,235 in the second half of 2011 to 2,717 in 2012. Injured persons also increased from 8,487 to 9,181 but the death toll showed a slight decrease from 2,218 to 1,936” and “looking at the figures for 2012, a total of 1, 936 were killed within the six months period compared to 2, 218 for the same period last year...”\(^53\)

In the same vein, in 2010 there were 5,330 deaths and 18,095 injuries from accidents; in 2011, there were 4,065 deaths and 17,464 injuries. In 2009, 4,120 persons lost their lives, while 20, 975 people were injured, in accidents involving 11,031 vehicles. In 2008, 6,661 deaths occurred, and 27,980 injuries.\(^54\) Although the number of accidents in the country seems to be reducing but this is also a major problem across Nigeria as people who only learn driving for a day can obtain driving licence after giving money to the issuing agency. Moreover, as a result of deteriorating road conditions, a journey from Benin City to Lagos in the early 21st

\(^{52}\) http://all-history.org/01un125.html
\(^{53}\) http://www.channelstv.com/home/2012/07/31/frsc-says-bad-attitudes-habit-responsible-for-increasing-road-accident/
\(^{54}\) http://connectnigeria.com/articles/2012/09/24/frsc-releases-statistics-for-road-accidents/
century took twice as long as it did in 1980.\textsuperscript{55} Railroads basically established during colonial rule and were once the dominant transport system have also proved incapable of transporting large cargoes from North to South or even transport passengers. The waterways are not wholly safe due to the Niger-Delta militants who often attack and kidnap expatriates in a bid to launching their anger with regards to resource control and neglect by the Nigerian state. Nigeria also has a notoriously poor aviation safety record as in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century alone; there have been over 16 different air crashes, \textsuperscript{56} with the very last being on June 3, 2012 where 153 passengers on board were killed.\textsuperscript{57}

2.4. Education

The education system in Nigeria has been described as "dysfunctional" largely because of decaying institutional infrastructure. The literacy rate of males between 15-24 years is 78 per cent, while that of females within the same age bracket is 65 per cent.\textsuperscript{58} For the total population, the literacy level as at July 2012 is estimated at 61.3\%,\textsuperscript{59} thus over 50 million Nigerians are still illiterates\textsuperscript{60} and this number is more in the Northern parts of the country, where Western-style education was earlier prohibited because the religious leaders did not want Christian missionaries interfering with Islam, and Islamic education was provided in traditional Islamic schools.\textsuperscript{61} Another major setback with regards to the Nigerian educational system lies in the shortage of qualified teachers, poor maintenance and the inability of government to pay salaries on time, often leading to strike actions by teachers especially in government owned universities. Presently the county has 36 federal universities,

\textsuperscript{55} http://all-history.org/01un125.html
\textsuperscript{56} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/06/over-2000-lives-lost-in-air-crashes-in-40-years/
\textsuperscript{57} http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57446242/plane-crashes-in-nigeria-all-153-aboard-dead/
\textsuperscript{58} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/09/world-literacy-day-is-education-for-all-feasible-by-2015/
\textsuperscript{60} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/09/world-literacy-day-is-education-for-all-feasible-by-2015/
\textsuperscript{61} http://all-history.org/01un125.html
36 state universities and 45 private universities making a total of 117 universities.\(^{62}\) While the private universities (and schools) are quite expensive and somewhat reserved for wealthy Nigerians, the state and especially federal universities are quite cheaper and welcome Nigerians of all social status, though experience cases of unreasonable increment of tuition fees as well as the aforementioned problems.

### 2.5. Politics and Corruption

These myriads of problem facing Nigeria are deep rooted in two factors: bad leadership and corruption. The various sectors of the Nigerian economy, especially the oil sector are tainted by corruption. In a 2012 report on ‘global corruption’ by Transparency International, Nigeria scored 27 out of a maximum 100 marks to clinch the 139\(^{th}\) position out of 176 countries\(^ {63}\) and by implication the 35th most corrupt country in the world.\(^ {64}\) As a matter of fact, the Nigerian political class has turned the supposed Nigeria’s democracy into money making ventures as this is now the dynamics and motivating factor for politics within the Nigerian polity. The governmental structures are poor and so are holders of political offices are not often accountable. Vying candidates could do anything humanly possible (including murder) just to win election and perhaps become rich overnight. Nigeria since independence has made fortunes worth over $600 Billion,\(^ {65}\) although the Save Nigeria Group claimed that the money made so far is $1 trillion and that $600 billion has been stolen by the Nigeria leaders.\(^ {66}\) But a greater part of this money had been siphoned into the private accounts of those in power. Just in December 2012, the Swiss government returned the sum of $700 million starched in several Swiss banks by late General Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s

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\(^{63}\) [http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA](http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA)


former military ruler. Nigerian politicians are among the richest individuals worldwide. The 109 senators “earn $1.2 million US Dollars a year each, which is three times the annual salary of the president of the United States of America.” Meanwhile the national monthly minimum wage was only recently increased to N18, 000 ($112), but many Nigerians do not earn this, and even leave below the poverty line.

2.6. Conclusion

In spite of the above diversities of ethnicity, language or religion, the truth has always remain that Nigerians have lived as one nation and one people, although between 1967 to 1970, there was a civil war with regards to secession. But this afterwards did not define the relations between the different ethnic groups. For instance there have been millions of Southerners living and doing businesses in the core North without problem. Most southerners even speak the Hausa language and others even married people from the North. This is also same with the Northerners as there are millions of northerners living in the South. The major problem facing Nigeria has always rested on bad governance and political corruption. The political class spend and steal state’s money to the neglect of the poor masses who could not even afford daily meals. For instance, only in January 2013, a former head of the Police Pension Board, Yakubu Yusuf who pleaded guilty to embezzling a whopping sum of 23 billion naira ($146million) police pension money was sentenced by an Abuja High court to two years in prison, with the option to pay a fine of 750,000 ($4,766) as well as the forfeiture of his property valued at 325 million naira ($2million). Of course he paid the fine right away as well as fulfilled the other condition. Although it was alleged that he shared the money with other colleagues, and that his share of the money was 3.3 billion naira ($21million). Even at

67 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/12/abacha-loot-switzerland-has-returned-700m-to-nigeria-swiss-envoy/
69 http://allafrica.com/stories/201302040678.html
that, he would personally be left scot-free with over 2 billion naira; otherwise it would be over 22 billion. A source also claimed that the total amount stolen was 27 billion.\textsuperscript{71}

In a similar development, a 23 year old Mr Adepoju Jamiu was in January 2013 sentenced to three years imprisonment by a Magistrate Court in Ondo state, for stealing a phone worth 17,000 naira ($108).\textsuperscript{72} Interestingly, he was not given an option of fine. It is problems as such that define the Nigeria of today and a major reason for grievances, crimes and the likes.

\section*{CHAPTER THREE}

\subsection*{3.0. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY}

This chapter provides background information on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Indeed, a counterinsurgency only exists in reaction to an insurgency and quoting the Australian Joint Services Glossary, Kilcullen noted that counterinsurgency is “all measures adopted to suppress an insurgency” (Kilcullen, 2006: 112). To understand counterinsurgency therefore, one must understand the dynamics of insurgency. Consequently, I shall first make attempt to examine insurgency, thus prompting the next question of defining what an insurgency is.

\subsection*{3.1. What is insurgency?}

Scholars and theorists have given different definitions of insurgency. While some of these definitions are closely related, others are not so related though contain common elements and this still makes the subject technically difficult. Perhaps insurgency is best understood by first considering what it is not. Insurgency is not terrorism or conventional war\textsuperscript{73} for example, though it shares with them some similarities such as the use of force or guerrilla tactics to achieve an end which is often political. Basically, the difference between

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} http://dailypost.com.ng/2013/01/30/man-bags-3-years-imprisonment-for-stealing-blackberry/
\textsuperscript{73} http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-24-2.pdf
insurgency and terrorism lies in the scope and magnitude of violence. While for instance, terrorism rarely brings about political change on its own, insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms. Similarly, terrorists often apply a wide range of damages when compared to insurgents. On the other hand, while conventional war involves adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment or training, insurgency involves adversaries that are asymmetric, weak, and almost always a sub-state group.

Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert & Gordon 2008: 23). According to Kilcullen, “Insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers” (Kilcullen 2006: 112). Kilcullen also try to draw a line between classical and contemporary insurgencies thus: while the latter seek to replace the existing order, the former sometimes strive for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power vacuum (Kilcullen 2006: 112). Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines insurgency as “an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents.”

The British Army counter-insurgency manual, Army Field Manual (AFM) defined insurgency as:

“The actions of a minority group within a state, who are intent on forcing political change by a means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a change. It is an organised, armed political struggle, the goals of which might be diverse.”

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74 Oxford English Dictionary second edition 1989 “insurgent B. n. One who rises in revolt against constituted authority; a rebel who is not recognized as a belligerent.”

This definition also conform with the US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) which defined insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” (Petraeus & Amos 2006: 1-1).

Apart from the definition by Kilcullen and to an extent that of Oxford dictionary, the author does not totally agree with the other definitions as they fail to reflect the complexities of modern insurgencies especially with regards to their political, economic and social dimensions which Kilcullen simply describe as “struggle.” By implication, the other definitions branded insurgency as a predominantly military problem. However, in what seems to be a replacement of the 2006 FM 3-24 definition of insurgency, the 2009 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, defined insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”

While the author agrees more with this definition by the Joint Publication, he wishes to stress that such definition excludes any insurgency that does not seek to overthrow or change the governing authority. A good example would be separatist insurgencies which aim for secession from within a state or reformist insurgencies which seek to influence government policies by forceful means.

In all, insurgencies connote an internal uprising often outside the confines of state’s laws and it is often characterised by social-economic and political goals as well as military or guerrilla tactics. Put differently, it is a protracted struggle carefully and methodically carried out to achieve certain goals with an eventual aim of replacing the existing power structure. To launch their anger on the state, insurgents often target civilians and infrastructures. However,

other than the violence of insurgency are its political and social-economic dimension, where often lies its causes and effects.

3.1.1. The nature of Insurgency

Basically, insurgents often pursue some common objectives targeted at undermining the legitimacy of the government while increasing their own ties with the population. According to the 2012 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” published by the US Government, insurgencies seek to accomplish the following:77

- Undercut the ability of the government to provide the population security and public services, including utilities, education, and justice. An insurgent group may attempt to supplant the government by providing alternative services to the people, or it may be content to portray the government as impotent.

- Obtain the active or passive support of the population. Not all support has to be—or is likely to be—gained from true sympathizers; fear and intimidation can gain the acquiescence of many people.

- Provoke the government into committing abuses that drive neutral civilians toward the insurgents and solidify the loyalty of insurgent supporters.

- Undermine international support for the government and, if possible, gain international recognition or assistance for the insurgency.

From the above excerpt, insurgencies thus represent a race wherein the loyalty of mostly an uncommitted population or general public is sought by the insurgents on one side and the counterinsurgent on the other. The success of both parties thus lies on their ability to successfully persuade the general public. In what Robert Thompson describes as the “build-up phase of insurgency,” insurgents try to discredit the reigning government by breaking down their ability to provide services and security to the people while also trying to reinstate their own legitimacy and provide service for the people (Thompson, 1966: 19-20).

77 https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:g8T8Xw1bt8AJ:www.hSDL.org/%3Fview%26did%3D713599+%&hl=en&gl=at&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShdGBWZe2ms4aAmDh6tu0qGcFt2FChr0TV4445rSrVzW3dGhDWN2tW1-0J0Vaw8sOxK_xvdCJUE8ZRY4vlgCCBP5KhnUlj0_RZqF4EpQkQ4_XqFBOWaLWcFGWq-N6xi8lh7nKpb8&sig=AHIEbRnBYDOJ21sqBp9Ze5YuuoqG4pacw
A government who has continually failed to provide the population with basic infrastructures has little chances of convincing and winning the hearts and minds of the people. The government must also apply caution with regards to her brutality in fighting the insurgents otherwise she loses supports from the people, and here lies another chance of the population supporting the insurgents (Weinstein, 2007: 37f).

It is also important to note that every insurgency has its specific goal often reflected in its modus operandi though they largely share common features such as being internal and its use of force. Additionally, modern insurgents’ warfare are characterised by a protracted strategy, general lack of front, asymmetric methods and unconventional military tactics such as guerrilla.

3.1.2. Insurgent Typologies

Insurgencies have been categorized in different ways such as by; goal, tactics, size, region, duration, international significance and the character of the regime being challenged (Gompert and Gordon, 2008: 23-24). Many insurgencies also exhibit a combination of these characteristics or such may evolve during the course of the conflict. In line with the base of supporters, John Mackinlay developed the typologies of insurgencies into lumpen, clan, popular and global (Mackinlay, 2002: 43). Drawing the types of insurgencies from their specific goals, the US Government noted the following five typologies:

- **Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.**

- **Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel the government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms.**

- **Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries.**

- **Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to**
withdraw from a given territory.

- Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the wealth.78

Although the above gives a clear picture of the different types of insurgency, it fails to take into account the issue of contemporary global insurgency. In pointing out the extent to which globalization affects the ends, forms and means of insurgency, Gompert and Gordon identified four types of insurgencies thus: local insurgency, local international insurgency, Global-local insurgency and Global insurgency (Gompert & Gordon, 2008: 25-30). They argued that globalization has also increase the danger of global “insurgency by enabling strong bonds to form among members of transnational communities” (Gompert & Gordon, 2008: 29). In the same vein, local insurgencies have greater propensity of being bait to external forces.

The organizational structures and strategies of insurgents also provide answers to its category, be it military, political or otherwise. This is not to say that such structure or strategy is not subject to change in the course of actions. The US Government outlined the organizational structure of insurgents as:

- Politically organized insurgencies which develop a complex political structure and try to consolidate control of territory through the use of shadow governments rather than through military power. Although they also undertake military operations against the government but their military components are subordinate to their political structure.

- Militarily organized insurgencies which emphasize military action against the government over political mobilization of the population. The insurgents calculate that military success and the resulting weakening of the government will cause the population to rally to the insurgents’ cause. Militarily organized

78 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012,” published by the US Government, pg.3 (Available online)
insurgencies begin with small, weak, ill-defined political structures, often dominated by military leaders.

- **Traditionally organized insurgencies** draw on pre-existing tribal, clan, ethnic, or religious affiliations. Established social hierarchies—a system of chiefs and sub-chiefs, for example—often substitute for political and military structures in traditionally organized insurgencies.

- **Urban-cellular insurgencies** develop and are centred in urban areas. These insurgencies lack hierarchical political and military leadership structures, instead organizing around small, semiautonomous cells.79

### 3.1.3. Insurgents Strategy and tactics

Insurgents, whether classical or contemporary, tend to largely but not exclusively draw their strategies from the, *people’s war*, one of the most prominent analysis of revolutionary warfare developed and presented by Chinese Marxist-Leninist revolutionary and political leader, Mao Tse-Tung (1893-1976). The central elements of the *people’s war* are (1) the huge emphasis placed on organizing, institutionalizing, and controlling geographic regions that serve the “extractive” needs of the movement, (2) mobilizing the population and increasing the numbers of active supporters and fighters, and (3) a focus on annihilation of enemy forces as the primary military goal (McCuen, 1966: 50).

The more the struggle develops, the more the insurgents try to concretise relations with the people in order to attract and train recruits, gather resources, build-up force strength, and to provide a new “shadow” administration that benefits the people (O'Neill, 1990: 170-180; Johnson 1973, 118; Mao 2000,: 114-120; Rice, 1988: 186). On strengthening deeper relations and gaining the support of the people, Mao writes:

79 Ibid.pp.3-4.
…If we want to win, we still have to do a great deal of work. Leading the peasants in agrarian struggles and distributing land to them; arousing their labour enthusiasm so as to increase agricultural production; safeguarding the interests of the workers’ establishing co-operatives; developing trade with outside areas; solving the problems that face the masses, problems of clothing, food, and shelter, of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, of health and hygiene, and of marriage. In short, all problems facing the masses in the actual life should claim our attention. If we have these problems at heart and solve them to the satisfaction of the masses, we shall really become the organizers of the life of the masses and they will really rally round us and warmly support us. Comrades, can we then call upon the masses to take part in the revolutionary war? We can, absolutely” (Mao, quoted in McCuen, 1966: 54).

Additionally, base areas undergo expansion, a regionalization of guerrilla forces and leadership occurs, and the more formal dual politico-military organizational hierarchy appears (O’Neill, 1990: 170-180). This is one of the most difficult challenges of insurgencies and Mao’s writings noted that revolutionary struggles are, by their nature, protracted and will entail many hardships and defeats. In his words, “struggle, fail, struggle again, fail again, struggle again, till their victory…that is the logic of the people” (quoted in McCuen 1966: 39). Eventually, a period of strategic stalemate is achieved and victory must occur through mobile warfare and guerrilla tactics that can destroy the regular or government forces. Indeed insurgents often employ tactics characterized by hit-and-run raids and ambushes against local security forces (Petraeus & Amos, 2006: 1-2; Kalyvas 2000: 5). In essence, Mao’s framework put emphasis on protractedness, organisation, recruitment and mobilization of the people thus gaining their supports wherein also lies the possibilities of victory. Protractedness is a key aspect because the longer insurgents remain a threat to government forces, the closer they become to achieving their goals. In this order, guerrilla tactics is employed because it emphasised deception and survivability. Mao also noted that such attacks are only carried out where and when government forces are weak; where the enemy is strong, they refuse battle and run away, a tactic that has to be a specialty of insurgents if they are to survive.

Contemporary insurgencies often hide in populated and urban areas and attack at the slightest opportunity. As a matter of fact, today’s insurgencies draw and plan attacks from a
loosely connected networks, often located outside the conflict zones but in urban residential areas. From such networks they coordinate and garner expertise, equipment, secret funding, as well as ideological supports which often times come from external forces. In view of this point, it becomes clear that insurgencies are not carried out by one or two persons but by a significant amount of persons and this raises the question of why people partake in insurgencies as well as how insurgents succeed in attracting members of the population into their struggle.

3.1.4. Recruitment/ Causes

Mao made it clear that the development of forces capable of executing mobile warfare is ultimate in his struggle. This also means that many committed and trained hands are required. He argues that multiplying both the quantity and quality of guerrilla fighters is instrumental in conducting a successful guerrilla campaign at all times (Mao, 1969: 107). But to successfully recruit people into such a violent struggle also takes the power of oratory, conviction as well as capitalising on a pressing issue. First insurgents gain members by claiming their struggle is for the people and that they would provide basic necessity for the people if supported. They may succeed if there were actually repairable issues which could range from poverty, political ineptitude, corruption, discrimination to modernization and globalization. Thomas Barnett for instance talks about the destabilizing effects of states who fail to take advantage of the economic and political benefits of globalization.80 Similarly, Samuel Huntington pointed the destructive effects of competing cultures often embedded in religions and ethno-nationalism as currently exemplified by Islamist radicalism to which Boko Haram is not exempted.81 While this could be a cause, it is also a way by which insurgents attract supporters and recruit more members, thus by appealing to shared religious

heritage and other ethnic identities, insurgents could win more members to their movements (Weinstein 2007: 88). Religious groups such as Boko haram often resort to citations from the Quran wherein also lies a great source of persuasion to intending members. In modern times, insurgents also recruit members through intimidation and forceful abduction of basically children, a method which Mao totally frowns (Mao, 2000: 114-120). In the same vein, unlike in the past, today’s insurgencies often employ asymmetric methods to achieving their objectives.

On a final note, it needs be said that the underlying causes of insurgencies are not momentary but often the result of a long and cloudy set of problems culminating into uncontrolled grievances and exploding into sustained violence. And as noted, such problems are often social-political and economic. This also account for the reason insurgencies are likely to be more in underdeveloped countries or countries characterised by corrupt regime, ethnicity, social prejudices, religion and disparities in the distribution of resources or even the lack of it.

3.2. What is a Counterinsurgency?

Counterinsurgency -frequently referred to by the acronym COIN- is just the opposite of insurgency. To put it differently, it involves a combination of measures undertaken by the legitimate government of a country to curb or suppress an insurgency taken up against it. So while insurgents for instance try to erase or overthrow the existing political authority in order to establish theirs, the counter-insurgent forces try to reinstate the existing political structures as well as reduce or annihilate the usurping authority of the insurgents.

In the main, counterinsurgents hold monopoly of violence, legitimacy as well as other material resources often exclusively reserved for states. These factors also emphasise the need for counterinsurgents to uphold law and order, something that technically limits their
potential action in the fight against insurgencies. On the other hand, insurgents are characterised by lack of resources or power as well as a general lack of responsibility in destroying state properties while launching their grievances. They are consequently much freer to violate state laws or the social norms, target civilians as well as decide where and when the conflict begins.

For pinpoint accuracy, quoting an earlier version of the Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency operations, the US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) defined counterinsurgency as a “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”(Petraeus & Amos, 2006: 1-2). Like the case of insurgency, this definition of counterinsurgency has also witnessed slight moderation or changes. The 2009 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations thus defines COIN as a “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” Furthermore, it noted that “COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one.” While this new definition included a key point of addressing core insurgents’ grievances, it fails to reflect the different facets of COIN operations. To borrow the words of the US Government then, “effective counterinsurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while bolstering the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.”

3.2.1. Approaches to counterinsurgency

There are basically two approaches to COIN strategy. The first approach is:

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83 Ibid.
84 See page 1 of The 2012 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency” published by the US Government (Available Online)
1. The enemy-centric approach\textsuperscript{85}

This approach conceives COIN as a contest with an organized enemy, and thus emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary objective, while viewing other mechanisms as secondary. In other words, the focus here is on the complete annihilation of the insurgents or their guerrilla formations and cadres while minimising the significance of nation-building as well as measures to gain popular support. There are also “many variants within this approach, including “soft” vs. “hard,” direct vs. indirect, violent vs. non-violent, and decapitation vs. marginalization strategies.”\textsuperscript{86} This approach can be summarized as “first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.”\textsuperscript{87} In modern times, this approach is often not discussed but it is applied in COIN operations. It has also been said that if this approach is applied to its fullest, it “might work against incipient insurgencies that are led or centrally controlled by a particularly charismatic or powerful individual.”\textsuperscript{88}

The second approach is:

2. The population-centric approach\textsuperscript{89}

Unlike the first approach, the population-centric approach focuses on protecting the population and maintaining or winning its support. Although direct military confrontation might be needed in defeating the insurgents, it is not seen here as the primary objective which is to win the supports of the population. This approach can be summarized as “first protect and support the population, and all else will follow.”\textsuperscript{90} There are more theorists supporting the population-centric approach than they are with the enemy-centric approach. The U.S. style of COIN embedded in the 2006 FM 3-24 also follows this approach to whose credits

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
dates back to early counterinsurgency theorists as we shall see in the next subheading.

Although the people-centric approach presents a good model to tackling insurgent organisations, the reality still remains that “COIN campaigns will rarely be purely enemy-centric or population-centric, but will generally include elements of both, with the relative balance changing over time.”\(^9\) In the same vein, while the second approach is essentially or theoretically ‘population-centric,’ it allows for “offensive, defensive, and stability operations” (Petraeus & Amos, 2006: Figure 1-1, 1-19) with assorted magnitude depending on the local circumstances. During an initial phase for instance, counterinsurgents could conduct offensive operations in a bid to clearing possible areas of insurgents. By the same token, the “hold phase” could be dominated by defense and stability operations. Even in the “build” and “transition” phases, military training might dominate key humanitarian activities or other reconstruction plans embedded in stability operations- such as military training, reconstruction, humanitarian activities, might dominate the counterinsurgent's agenda.\(^9\)

### 3.3. Counterinsurgency theories by different theorists

#### 3.3.1. Alvaro de Navia Osorio, marques de Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732)

Spanish diplomat, general, author and third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Alvaro was perhaps the earliest author to give systemic attention to the subject of counter-insurgency. His work ‘Reflexiones Militares,’ published between 1726 and 1730 discussed how to identify signs of an early insurgency, prevent and counter them. In what seems to be the connection between the emergence of insurgencies being hinged on grievances arising from bad governance, Alvaro also noted that "a state rarely rises up without the fault of its governors." In the light of this, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love" (Heuser, 2010: pp. 124-146).

\(^9\) Ibid.

3.3.2. David Galula (1919-1967)

Although the British military like to think that the origin of counterinsurgency is deep rooted in Britain's colonial independence struggles in places like Malaya in the 1950s. But the Petraeus team in 2006 thought differently when in the foreword to their study, called "FM 3-24 – Counterinsurgency," they remarked “Of the many books that were influential in the writing of FM 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula's 'Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice'." David Galula was a French military officer and scholar who gained his practical experience in counter-insurgency as a French officer during the Algerian War. Alongside his military experiences in China, Greece and Southeast Asia, Galula provided a “compass” for the counterinsurgent, much as Mao did for the revolutionary. Rather than being primarily military, Galula’s theory is a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. His “compass” which Adam Curtis called the “Bible of counterinsurgency,” comprised of the laws and principals of counterinsurgency warfare, and corresponding strategy and tactics.

a) The “Laws”

According to Galula there are four "laws" of counterinsurgency thus:

1. The first law is that the population is paramount. That is, the support of the people is the primary objective of a counterinsurgency campaign. Without the support of the population, it is impossible to root out all the insurgents and stop further recruitment.
2. Such support is most readily obtained from an active minority. Those willing to actively support a counterinsurgency operation should be supported in their efforts to rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority.

93 http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/06/how_to_kill_a_rational_peasant.html
94 http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/06/how_to_kill_a_rational_peasant.html
95 http://www.crinfo.org/booksummary/10672/
3. Having attained the support of the population it is imperative to remember that this support is conditional. Support of the population may be lost if your actions are unfavourable to the population. Hence the population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4. The fourth and final law of counterinsurgency regards the "intensity of effort and vastness of means." Because counterinsurgency requires a large concentration of effort, resources, and personnel, it is unlikely that it can be pursued effectively everywhere at once. Rather, action should be taken in select areas, and resources moved as needed. Thus, according to the laws of counterinsurgency, it is important to continuously make efforts at gaining and maintaining the support of the populace in distinct areas by leveraging an active minority.

b) Counterinsurgency "in the Cold"

Galula also opined that as long as an insurgency's activities dwell "on the whole legal and nonviolent," (Galula, 1964: 43) the insurgency is referred to as "cold". In a case of this magnitude, the fundamental problem for the counterinsurgency is that the "actual danger will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the demands made by an adequate response" (Galula, 1964: 4). This means that the required measures for annihilating the insurgency would likely be interpreted by the general population as excessive or blown out of proportion. The consequence of this is that the counterinsurgents are left with which four options (which are not mutually exclusive) thus:

1. They can act directly on the insurgent leaders,
2. they can act indirectly on the conditions that are propitious to an insurgency,
3. they can infiltrate the insurgent movement,
4. or they can reinforce their own "Political Machine."96

In view of modern democracy however, it is no doubt that acting directly on insurgent leaders (such as arresting) would be difficult and consequential as this might be seen as contravening

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96 Ibid.
human rights. It is thus suggested that should the insurgent’s cause be unpopular (only if), the counterinsurgent has the legal authority to act directly; however significant publicity of such action should be prevented.\textsuperscript{97} Since a successful insurgency requires a viable cause to rally support, the indirect action consists of either co-opting the insurgent's cause, or addressing the weaknesses of the state. The latter is however achievable only when such cause does not undermine state authority. If such causes however undermine state power (as with most cases), indirect action can be taken to ensure that the judicial, police, and military institutions are strong (thus discouraging insurgent action).\textsuperscript{98} While the infiltration of an insurgency is quite effective as it seeks to destroy it from within by turning it against itself, such action can backfire and anger the general population. The last option which sought to strengthen the "political machine" of the state encompasses the conviction of the population in buying state's legitimacy and moral authority. While important in "cold" insurgencies, this is the primary activity of counterinsurgents in "hot" insurgencies.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{c) Counterinsurgency "in the Heat"}

Galula argues that the counterinsurgent achieves a position of strength when his power is enclosed in a political organization issuing from, and strongly supported by the population (Galula, 1964: 54-56). Insurgent’s activities are considered “hot” when they become openly illegal and violent and this helps a counterinsurgency to be more decisive because the "moral fog" surrounding the insurgents dissipates. However being decisive does not really mean military action. And like Galula puts it, "Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population"(Galula, 1964: 63).

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
With strict adherence to his political ideals and laws of counterinsurgency, Galula coined out a military and political strategy for embarking on an operation under full insurgent control (or hot insurgencies). This strategy is divided into eight steps:

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population and control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents; give full support of the active leaders. Organize self-defence units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants (Galula, 1964: 54-56).

Galula also noted that the above steps are only operational in specific area. Consequently some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by the government. In his words, “Like every similar concept, this one may be sound in theory but dangerous when applied rigidly to a specific case” (Galula, 1964: 56). He thus summed up the essence of counterinsurgency warfare as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward" (Galula, 1964: 95).

d) Galula's Counterinsurgency Tactics

Although Galula acknowledged the importance of conventional military tactics with regards to counterinsurgency, he however concentrate on building an effective "political machine" capable of capturing the people’s support. Thus he posited that the development and success
of the counterinsurgency cause should be hinged on the heart of the “political machine” which also needs political programs targeted at pacifying the insurgent's base. The counterinsurgents should also effectively coordinate efforts at such programs as this is a major requirement. And like he noted, this coordination can be achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies however, "more than anything else, a doctrine appears to be the practical answer to the problem of how to channel efforts in a single direction" (Galula, 1964: 65). Knowing what the population really want is also a prerequisite for achieving this goal which should first be tested in a selected location and depending on its success or lessons learned, be then applied to subsequent areas.

In view of the foregoing, Galula thus provided a “compass” for counterinsurgency operations giving them laws as well as defining the corresponding strategy and tactics. His central idea was the development of a “political machine” capable of capturing public support for the state thus emphasising the fact that the success of a counterinsurgency operation is hinged on the population. Put differently, as long as popular support is on their side, an insurgency can hold out indefinitely, consolidating its control and replenishing its ranks, until their opponents simply leave.

3.3.3. Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson (1916-1992)

Robert Thompson was a British military officer and counterinsurgency expert who “was widely regarded on both sides of the Atlantic as the world's leading expert on countering the Mao Tse-tung technique of rural guerrilla insurgency.” Designated one of the primary architects of British counter-insurgency success in Malaya, Robert once served as the Secretary of Defence of the Federation of Malaya as well as headed the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam (BRIAM) in the early years of the Vietnam War.

100 http://www.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/Vietnam/Obituaries/thompson.htm
In the Chapter Four of his book titled, “Defeating Communist Insurgency;” Robert (1966) argued that proactive measures must be applied by the counterinsurgents in defeating the insurgents. He opined that victory over guerrilla groups requires more than just numerical military superiority. He thus proposed five basic principles for a successful counter-insurgency operation:

1. The government must have a clear, long-term political aim to support the people. This includes any corrections of government weaknesses or problems like corruption, ineffectiveness, etc.

2. The government must function in accordance with the law. Maintaining the moral high ground is essential in order to maintain the support of its populace or allies. This applies to all activities: to include detention, military operations, etc.

3. The government must have an overall plan. This plan should include the roles and preservation of the following functions: security, military, political, social, economics, administration, police, and any other measures having bearing on the insurgency. The roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined to avoid duplication of effort and ensure no gaps in government actions.

4. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion of the insurgency, not the guerrillas. This includes an intelligence focus on the people who must cross from the insurgent cells (A-level units) to the others (district committees, B&C-level units, and insurgent leadership). The intent is to eliminate the support, thus starving out resistance units.

5. In the guerrilla phases of an insurgency, phase I and beginning of phase II, the government must secure its base area first. Very quickly, the government must also start protecting developed areas in order to gain security and instill confidence in the people. The population must also be prepared for a long COIN effort (Thompson, 1966: 52-57).
In the light of the above, rather than killing insurgents, Robert focuses on the utility of winning legitimacy as key to counterinsurgency success. Such legitimacy however rests on the people since both the counterinsurgents and the insurgents strive to win the support of the population. In this order, Thompson pointed out that the counterinsurgents must work to gain the support of the people, thus the military must make extra efforts to be good to its citizens. Although Robert Thompson’s pragmatic recognition of the overtly political nature of insurgencies and the need for legitimacy in operations offers a new path for the currently inchoate problem of insurgencies, his principles still does not provide all answers to the COIN conundrum. He thus admitted that his five basic principles of Counterinsurgency emerged from ‘a process of trial and error rather than a conscious decision.’

3.3.4. Dr David John Kilcullen

![Kilcullen’s Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485613)

Born in 1967, Dr David Kilcullen is an Australian COIN and counterterrorism theorist. In his "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", shown in the diagram above, Kilcullen, who was the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information as he also noted that:

“This is a framework, not a template. It helps people see where their efforts fit into a campaign, rather than telling them what to do in a given situation. It provides a basis for measuring progress and is an aid to collaboration rather than an operational plan” (Kilcullen, 2006: 4).

David also noted that his above position rest in the fact that:

“...perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment.”

To Kilcullen, the three pillars are of equal importance and a campaign would be unbalanced if they are developed in parallel: for instance, too much security assistance without political consensus would strengthen armed groups. In the same vein, too much economic assistance without adequate security would simply create an avalanche of soft targets for the insurgents. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest).

According to this model, the overall goal “is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective and legitimate institutions.” While Kilcullen presented a brilliant strategy on how to counter insurgency, it remains a fact that his theory does not answer all there is to counterinsurgency. Accordingly, he concluded by saying his “thoughts are tentative; they need a large amount of work. The “three pillars” model is clearly incorrect — all models are, in that they are systematic oversimplifications of reality. But this, or something like it, might be a basis for further development” (Kilcullen, 2006: 7).

3.3.5. Martin van Creveld (Born 5 March 1946)

Israeli military historian and theorist, Martin van Creveld, is another author who wrote on counterinsurgency. He opined that “the first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 per cent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter-guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value (van Creveld, 2008: 268). Illustrating the failure of counterinsurgencies by the metaphor of killing a child, van Creveld noted that;

"by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents - let alone the civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support - will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available - not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice" (van Creveld, 2008: 226).

While the above passage may be true and somewhat a good consideration, van Creveld’s proposal on how to fight insurgency appears to be at variance with this initial position. For instance, while noting also the importance of “time” in counterinsurgency, van Creveld coined out measures to counter insurgencies by relying on lessons from basically two

105 Ibid.
previous counterinsurgencies namely: the efforts of the British during the Troubles of Northern Ireland which started in the 1960s into the late 1990s (Holland, 1999: 221) and the 1982 Hama massacre by the government of Syrian to quell an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood. In both cases van Creveld argues that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and thus outlines two distinct methods (van Creveld, 2008: 269). His first method is dependent on super intelligence which should be provided by people who have knowledge of the physical and social environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. As soon as such superior intelligence is achieved, the counterinsurgents must be trained to employ a high degree of professionalism and discipline in order to exercise discrimination and restraint. Such discrimination and restraint enable the counterinsurgents to sever members of the populace from the insurgents, while also delaying the time when the counterinsurgents become nauseated and unnerved by their own actions. If the essentials for the first method - exemplary intelligence, well-trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avert being provoked into lashing out - are lacking, van Creveld postulates that an indomitable counterinsurgents must use the second method which he exemplified by the 1982 Hama massacre.

The Hama massacre was a reaction by the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad over a counterattack by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hafez al-Assad sent a division under his brother Rifaat to Hama designated as the centre of the resistance. With heavy artillery and sophisticated weaponry, Rifaat pulverise the city of Hama, killing between ten to thirty thousand people,\textsuperscript{106} including many children and women. Furthermore, Hafez al-Assad promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks and razed and replaced Hama's greatest mosque with a parking lot. These actions disorganised the Muslim

Brotherhood instilling obedience or fear of further action against the regime and van Creveld consequently argues that the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war.

Perhaps drawing credence from al-Assad and also noting they could have been easily written by Niccolò Machiavelli (van Creveld, 2008: 235), van Creveld put forward five rules for his second method on defeating an insurgency:

1. There are situations in which cruelty is necessary, and refusing to apply necessary cruelty is a betrayal of the people who put you into power. When pressed to cruelty, never threaten your opponent but disguise your intention and feign weakness until you strike.
2. Once you decide to strike, it is better to kill too many than not enough. If another strike is needed, it reduces the impact of the first strike. Repeated strikes will also endanger the morale of the counterinsurgent troops; soldiers forced to commit repeated atrocities will likely begin to resort to alcohol or drugs to force themselves to carry out orders and will inevitably lose their military edge, eventually turning into a danger to their commanders.
3. Act as soon as possible. More lives will be saved by decisive action early, than by prolonging the insurgency. The longer you wait, the more inured the population will be to bloodshed, and the more barbaric your action will have to be to make an impression.
4. Strike openly. Do not apologize, make excuses about "collateral damage", express regret, or promise investigations. Afterwards, make sure that as many people as possible know of your strike; media is useful for this purpose, but be careful not to let them interview survivors and arouse sympathy.
5. Do not command the strike yourself, in case it doesn't work for some reason and you need to disown your commander and try another strategy. If it does work, present your commander to the world, explain what you have done and make certain that everyone understands that you are ready to strike again (van Creveld, 2008: 241-245).

3.3.6. Stanley Allen McChrystal (born August 14, 1954)

Although his work has not yet been published, but retired US Army General, Stanley McChrystal who last served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) has given some important and first hand insights into counterinsurgency through his 8 imperatives of COIN.
McChrystal 8 Imperatives of COIN

Part 1 of 8: Imperatives of COIN

McChrystal started here by noting that counterinsurgency is a mission whose main objective is people. Counterinsurgency effort is “an argument for the support of the people.” In this order, both the insurgents and the government try to gain support from the people in pursuit of their different objectives. He thus identifies credibility, legitimacy and capability as key factors to gaining support from the people. McChrystal describe the insurgent as a person with history, family, and motivation why he does things and things he wants in life. He also described the counterinsurgents as persons with virtually same human characteristics like the insurgents and this must be taken into consideration while dealing with insurgency. Similarly, McChrystal noted that some members of the insurgency might have joined due to grievances possibly resulting from the death of a loved one.

Part 2 of 8: Protecting and Partnering with the People

Here McChrystal highlighted the need for the counterinsurgents to protect the people from all forms of direct and indirect threats pose by the insurgents. In the same vein, he noted the need for the counterinsurgents to apply caution while threating the people in a bid to fetching out the insurgents as this might have the consequences of some of the people becoming parts of the insurgency when mistreated by government forces or the counterinsurgents. In this order, the counterinsurgents must be willing to partner with the people, convincing and talking to them without intimidation of some sorts and this can prevent the people from wanting to join the insurgency. Like he noted, “it is very difficult to hate somebody that you

107 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3APTOKZ9Vc
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vw6rLeeqCPA
spend time talking to...”\textsuperscript{111} Similarly, “it is difficult to hate the insurgents when you get to know them personally.”\textsuperscript{112}

**Part 3 of 8: Conducting a Comprehensive COIN Campaign\textsuperscript{113}**

McChrystal opined that side by side with the above two points is the need to conduct a comprehensive COIN campaign and this include Security, Governance and Development. While security is pretty obvious, the government must also be one that is free from corruption, meeting the yearnings and aspirations of the people. If this is lacking then it becomes difficult for the people to believe in the state and this might be a setback to countering an insurgency. Development in all ramifications also plays a great role here.

**Part 4 of 8: Understand the Environment\textsuperscript{114}**

To do all these requires understanding the environment. This takes into consideration the different cultural factors and the need to respect them.

**Part 5 of 8: Ensuring that Values Underpin our Effort\textsuperscript{115}**

“How we act also has to be built on our values”\textsuperscript{116} because judgment are made by the people from such acts. Such values must also be based not only on what the counterinsurgents think is right but on what the people also think is right. The place of religion is also a major consideration here. The counterinsurgents must exude disposition that the people will admire.

**Part 6 of 8: Listen Closely - Speak Clearly\textsuperscript{117}**

Here McChrystal noted the importance of communication in counterinsurgency. Accordingly, he opined that listening closely and speaking clearly are the two keys for successful

\begin{footnotes}
\item[111] Ibid.
\item[112] Ibid.
\item[113] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwz0MRSa4u0
\item[114] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xgBRc7lIE0
\item[115] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzwBxW5zk2I
\item[116] Ibid.
\item[117] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbKiE2AYcn8
\end{footnotes}
communication. It is important to listen to the people to know what they really want as well as if they support the insurgency. Similarly, it is important to listen to them as well as speak clearly as this also show respect to the people, thus also gaining their confidence and support. He also noted that counterinsurgents must be willing to speak clearly in situations where wrong targets leading to civilian casualties are made.

**Part 7 of 8: Act as One Team**\(^{118}\)

The insurgents must act and work as one team. Members of a coalition must have unity of effort without working across purposes. Unity of efforts, he noted, gives strength to the goals of the counterinsurgents.

**Part 8 of 8: Constantly Adapt**

Due to the complex situation of insurgency, the counterinsurgent must constantly adapt to changing situations. He also noted that adapting here is not restricted to changes in weaponry, tactics or technology of the insurgents but it also means adapting to the situation and environment.

**3.3.7. Lorenzo Zambernardi**

Italian political scientist and sociologist, Dr Lorenzo Zambernardi also gave some insights into counterinsurgency operations. Zambernardi argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice a counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three.\(^{119}\)

Drawing credence from economic literatures, Zambernardi calls these goals the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency by which he suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously

\(^{118}\) [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPEVT8GwIP8](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPEVT8GwIP8)

achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents.\textsuperscript{120}

\textbf{Figure 4: The Impossible Trilemma of Counterinsurgency}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{The Impossible Trilemma of Counterinsurgency (Zambernardi, 2010: 22)}
\end{figure}

Essentially his argument is that a counterinsurgent cannot pursue any of these three goals without ignoring the third or at least some portion of it. Specifically he argues that “a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans, Italians, and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe, respectively.”\textsuperscript{121} On the other hand, a state “can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning the objective of destroying the insurgents...”\textsuperscript{122}

Zambernardi concludes by saying that “a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, as the

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
Rethinking counterinsurgency: A case study of Boko Haram

United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did in Afghanistan under the leadership of Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Zambernardi’s theory thus postulates that in counterinsurgency, it is almost impossible to do force protection, distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and eliminate the enemy all at the same time. Consequently, counterinsurgents must strictly adhere to two out of the three goals and coin out a strategy to successfully accomplish them, while sacrificing the third goal.

3.4. Discussion

From the above theories by different counterinsurgency theorists, it is clear that multidimensional approaches must be strictly adhered to when dealing with issues of insurgency. While some of these theories highlight important strategies for countering an insurgency, others like the second method of Martin van Creveld can best be described as not fit for modern times or rather too brutal from a state to a people whom she is meant to protect. But then almost all the other theories have one connecting feature and that is winning the support of the people; protecting the people; reassuring and gaining the confidence of the people. For example, while Galula noted that the aim of the war or counterinsurgency is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory,\textsuperscript{123} Thompson also opined that both the insurgents and counter-insurgents fight for the support of the people (Thompson, 1966: 63). Similarly, Zambernardi’s theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent’s military forces must be sacrificed. The various counterinsurgency theorists agreed that people are the subject matter in counterinsurgency.

\textsuperscript{123} http://www.crinfo.org/booksummary/10672/
While population support is important in the success of counterinsurgency, the problem of distinguishing between insurgents and the civilian population presents a complete setback to counterinsurgency effort since insurgents often camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Similarly, there is often the very possibility of members of the population joining the insurgents’ cause and like McChrystal noted; this might be due to one form of grievances or the other. This problem of distinguishing civilian population from the insurgents is perhaps the most difficult challenge facing counterinsurgency. Similarly, if the law of armed conflict which is also accepted by all disciplined militaries is anything to go by, then to use force, "combatants" must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians.

Added to the problem of fetching out insurgents from the civilian population is the modus operandi of insurgents. In modern times, insurgents don’t operate from one location. Often times they are dispersed and decentralised within their country of operation and this is also one aspect of their strength. From these different locations, they strike and disappear, leaving government forces reeling and paralysed. Consequently, the conflict is protracted and this is another strategy often used by insurgents. They tend to continually strike their enemy until victory is attained. In his Primer for Revolt, Dang Xuan Khu, second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam, wrote:

“The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics ... and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory” (van Creveld, 2008: 229-230).

124 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3APTOKZ9Vc
Members of Boko Haram are known to be experts at striking and disappearing, thus prolonging the war as well as intimidating government forces, wherein as earlier noted also lays their strength.

In view of these difficulties posed by insurgency and countering it, it can be argued that preventing an insurgency is far better than attempting to cure one. In the same vein, the root causes of insurgencies can be avoided or addressed by reigning governments and often times, such causes are traceable to the social-cum-political and economic atmospheres of the designated country. Galula whose theory presents one of the best strategies to deal with insurgencies recognised this. For instance, he cautions that the lessons of his book do not guarantee success and that, "as long as the revolutionary situation exists, even in a dormant form, as long as the problem that gave rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the danger persists" (Galula, 1964: 96). Alvaro de Navia Osorio also realised when he advocated clemency and good governance towards the people as remedy to insurgency. This supports the author’s claim (hypothesis of this work) that often times the reason for insurgency is deep rooted in bad governance. Insurgents often see themselves as freedom fighters or liberators and this sometimes make them garner supports and popularity from a considerable amount of the population. And so long as the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. On the other hand, if the counterinsurgents win-over the occupied territory's population, the rebellion will be deprived of its supplies, shelter, and, more importantly, its moral legitimacy. Unless the hearts and minds of the public can be separated from the insurgency, such occupation is however doomed to fail.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0. BOKO HARAM

4.1. What is Boko Haram?

Officially, Boko Haram is called Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad which in Arabic means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.”\(^\text{125}\) The group which is better known by its Hausa name ‘Boko Haram’ was a local radical Salafist group which transformed into a Salafi-jihadist\(^\text{126}\) terrorist organisation after 2009. It is based in the northeast of Nigeria, in the areas predominated by the Kanuri people. Loosely translated from the local Hausa language, Boko Haram means, ‘Western education or civilization is forbidden.’ Put differently, ‘Western education or civilization is a sin.’\(^\text{127}\)

4.1.1. The origin of Boko Haram

The Nigerian Islamic sect now ‘Boko Haram,’ is believed to have started in far back 1995 with the name ‘Sahaba’ and it was led by one Abubakar Lawan.\(^\text{128}\) But then Abubakar Lawan was later said to have travelled for study at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, consequently leaving the old clerics to concede the group’s leadership to a self-proclaimed Nigerian spiritual leader named, Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf was said to have abandoned the old cleric doctrines thus reorganising and coming up with what became, Boko Haram in 2002 at the Northern city of Maiduguri, wherein was its headquarters. In Maiduguri, Yusuf established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Northern Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their


\(^{128}\) Ibid.
children. The centre had ulterior political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for future jihadists to fight the state. The group thus includes members who come from neighbouring Chad and Niger and speak only Arabic. At the same time, Yusuf succeeded in entrenching his hold in Northern states such as Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Katsina and Yobe. And in 2004 the complex was relocated to Yusuf's home town called Kanamma in Yobe state near the Nigerian-Niger border. In Kanamma, a militant base called “Afghanistan” was created.

4.1.2. Ideology and belief

As noted above, Boko Haram is an indigenous Salafist group which only turned itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009. Paul Lubeck of the University of California noted that Yusuf was also a trained salafist (a school of thought often associated with jihad) and was heavily influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, a fourteenth century legal scholar remarkable for Islamic fundamentalism and considered a “major theorist” for radical groups in the Middle East. Boko Haram propagates that not only interaction with the Western World is forbidden, but it is also against the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria, the latter of which they accuse of political corruption and weak judicial structure. To sanitise this, they initially fought for the establishment of a Shari'a government in Borno State under

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130 Ibid.


133 Ibid.


the then Governor Ali Modu Sheriff, but after 2009, their aim was directed to the Islamization of the entire Nigeria. Boko Haram school of thought considers anything western as completely unislamic, and as such the basis for religious weakness. According to one AbdulMumuni Ibrahim Muhammad, a leader of a group of 33 members Boko Haram factions, “we are fighting westernization to protect adulteration of Islam.” For this reason Boko Haram thus adopted a ‘non-western’ lifestyle by wearing non-western clothes, eating basic foods, and worshiping in their own mosque in Maiduguri, all of which also separate them from other Muslims in the North. In fact, its members do not interact with the local Muslim population and have even carried out assassinations in the past on anyone who criticises it, including Muslim clerics. The group publicly extols its ideology despite the fact that its founder and former leader Muhammad Yusuf was himself a highly educated man who lived a lavish life and drove a Mercedes Benz.

During a 2009 interview conducted by BBC, the late Muhammad Yusuf rejected scientific explanation for natural phenomena, such as the sun evaporating water being the cause of rain, Darwinian evolution, and the Earth being a sphere “if it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah.” Before his death, Yusuf also reiterated the group's objective of changing the current education system and rejecting democracy.

4.1.3. Symbols

The group as at the time of writing this thesis has no symbol of identification.
4.1.4. Organizational and political Structures

The group, at least before 2009 had no clear organizational or political structure and consequently little or nothing was known of its command and control system. However, by 2011 and 2012 it became somewhat clear that members of Boko Haram are organised in complex cell structures from where they operate both locally and internationally. These cells which are about 26 are headed by regional commanders who in turn take commands from Abubakar Shekau, their current number one leader, a situation which makes it difficult for the Nigerian security forces to fish out and dismantle the group. The group also has a sophisticated leadership structure comprising departments headed by highly trained personnel whereupon designated assignments are effectively executed. Such departments also include bomb manufacturing, suicide bombers, intelligence, research, welfare/healthcare and other logistics needed for proper execution of their goals. It has also been said that the highest decision making body of Boko Haram is called the “Shura Council.” The picture below by Scott Firsing also throws some lights about Boko Haram structure. Figure 5:

The “Loose” Structure of Boko Haram

Mohammed Yusaf, founder of Boko Haram, killed in 2009

Abubakar Shekau, current leader of Boko Haram. Shekau is in charge of a series of regional leaders or commanders and doesn’t communicate with foot soldiers. He is said to wield power from only a few select cell leaders, but contact is minimal.

Commanders oversee upwards of 26 different operational cells within Nigeria. Some cells are interlinked, but generally take directive from one commander.

Mamman Nur, mastermind of UN bombing, known as #3 in charge when Yusaf was alive. Born of Chadian parents, some members feel his exposure to Somali training and contacts means he should be the leader of Boko Haram.

146 Ibid.
4.15. Area of operation

The group specifically enjoys popular supports in the predominantly Muslim northern states and regions of Nigeria. Such states include Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Katsina, Yobe and Borno. Most of its early attacks have been in the city of Maiduguri which is the Capital of Borno state. However, after 2009, they extended their attacks to virtually any part of Nigeria where they have the slightest opportunity, including the Nigerian Federal capital territory, Abuja. Additionally Boko Haram now boasts of about 540,000 members to which included militants from neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon.  

4.1.6. Strategy/Tactics

In order to reach an internet savvy audience, Boko Haram operates a blog at http://yusufislamicbrothers.blogspot.com/ wherein they extols their virtues of jihads. They also maintain an email at; nigjihadist@yahoo.com to communicate with intending members. The sect’s clandestine public relation department is saddled with the responsibilities of outside communication such as the internet as well as making videos and uploading them on youtube.

Like the insurgents’ guerrilla tactics discussed in Chapter Two, Boko Haram before 2009 were mainly involved in attacks with clubs, machetes, Molotov cocktails as well as drive-by and ride-by assassinations, often with small arms. They sometimes shot sporadically at their targets (who might be civilians or police officers drinking alcohol in beer parlours) before running into hiding. This however changed after 2009 as the group started using bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on strategic places. Their tactics now also

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includes suicide bombings and the August 26, 2011 suicide car-bombing became the first and successful suicide bombing in Boko Haram history. Currently Boko Haram conducts bombs operations with flexibility and maximum effectiveness and has claimed responsibility for over twenty bombings in Nigeria. Its arsenal now also boasts of Ak-47 style rifles, grenades, rocket propelled grenades, automatic rifles, surface-to air- missiles, vehicle mounted anti-aircraft machine guns, machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, and explosives such as Semtex, all of which might have been smuggled into the Sahel from Libya during its 2011 war.  

4.1.7. Targets/Opponents

The group has primarily targeted the Nigerian policemen. It has shown no compunctions, killing traditional leaders who they considered informants. Its blog has triumphantly praised attacks on Nigerians who have visited drinking bars and those who publicly criticise it. More recently, Boko Haram has channelled its attacks on Christians in the North and in this order; churches have been their latest target. And also, with the bombing of the UN building in Abuja, Nigeria, it is now clear they might be targeting foreign or international organisations.

4.1.8. Classification/Group Type

The classification herein referred to is as to whether Boko Haram is a terrorist group or perhaps a mere insurgent group. While insurgency has been explained in Chapter Two, attempt would be made here to throw more light on terrorism thus prompting the following question:

4.1.8.1. What is terrorism?

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Although there is yet not a universally agreeable definition of terrorism, a factor giving rise to different interpretations depending on the political demands,\textsuperscript{150} common definitions however refer only to those violent acts which are intended to create fear (terror), are perpetrated for a religious, political or, ideological goal; and deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants (civilians).

According to Dr Ekaterina, “terrorism is the form of violence that most closely integrates one-sided violence against civilians with asymmetrical violent confrontation against a stronger opponent, be it a state or a group of states.”\textsuperscript{151} Similarly, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) gave three basic criteria for an act to be described as terrorist and these include:

I. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.

II. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.

III. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\textsuperscript{152}

According to Title 22, Chapter 38 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), terrorism “is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”\textsuperscript{153} In the same vein, the 2004 United Nations Security Council Resolution\textsuperscript{1566} described and condemned terrorist acts as:


\textsuperscript{151} Ibid. p.2.

\textsuperscript{152} See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/

\textsuperscript{155} http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.”

Considering the above definitions as well as the modus operandi of Boko Haram after 2009, it is no doubt that the group is now a terrorist organisation, though the US perhaps for political reasons have failed to brand the entire organisation as one, listing only three of its leaders as ‘foreign terrorists’.\(^{154}\)

### 4.1.9. Group Affiliations/Training

Many experts on Boko haram noted that the group’s suicide bombing on 26 August 2011 that destroyed the UN building in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, reveals a link with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Before the attack, an internal Nigerian intelligence document had discussed possible links between Boko haram and AQIM. General Carter Ham, the general in front of United States African Command (AFRICOM) speculated that Boko Haram might want to establish partnership with the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabaab, in addition to AQIM. In January 2010, the leader of AQIM, Abd al-Malik Droukdal, released a statement offering to provide training and material assistance to Boko Haram. These connections notwithstanding, as of September 2011, several experts doubt the actualised alliance between the two groups, noting the lack of public hard evidence linking Boko Haram and AQIM. However, the Republic of Niger’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Bazoum, on 25\(^{th}\) January 2011 said Boko Haram received training and weapons from Al-Qaeda’s North African wing. Bazoum, who spoke at a regional security summit in Mauritania’s capital, Nouakchott, said

members of the sect received training in camps in the Sahel region of West Africa as well as explosives from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.\textsuperscript{155} In his words, “there is no doubt that there is confirmed information that shows a link between Boko Haram and AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and it consists primarily of the training given to elements of Boko Haram. One group has been received in AQIM bases here in the Sahel and another group got training, based on information we’ve gotten, with the al-Shabaabs in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{156}

It is important to state here that a press statement dated August 09, 2009 and signed by the then acting leader of the group, Mallam Sanni Umaru, had confirmed Boko Haram ties with al-Qaeda. In his words,” Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised which is according to the wish of Allah.”\textsuperscript{157} In the same vein, Boko Haram’s spokesman, Abu Qaqa while speaking via phone to a handful of reporters on November 2011 noted, “We are together with al Qaeda…they are promoting the cause of Islam, just as we are doing. Therefore they help us in our struggle and we help them, too.”\textsuperscript{158} Only recently too, it has been alleged that Boko Haram has training base in the north of Mali as well as strong ties with the Tuaregs of Mali.\textsuperscript{159}

4.1.10. Finance/Funding

Not much is presently known of the annual budget of Boko haram. At its early stage, Boko Haram was financially supported by wealthy members from Borno and Yobe States.\textsuperscript{160} The

\textsuperscript{155} http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-received-weapons-training-from-al-qaeda-niger/
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/
\textsuperscript{158} http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSTRE80U0L20120131
\textsuperscript{159} http://sunnewsonline.com/new/cover/uncovered-boko-haram-base-traced-to-mali-%E2%80%A2intelligence-report-identifies-training-operational-base/
\textsuperscript{160} http://newsdiaryonline.com/shehu_boko_haram.htm
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group has also financed its operations by robbing a lot of banks in the North\(^\text{161}\) as well as sending threatening text messages to top members of the society to deposit certain amount of money into specific accounts.\(^\text{162}\) It has also been reported that Boko Haram was paid millions of Nigerian naira on monthly basis by some Governors of Northern Nigeria,\(^\text{163}\) especially those of Kano and Bauchi states. Such payments are deep rooted in an agreement to which Boko Haram was not to attack the respective governors’ states.\(^\text{164}\) It was alleged that the group receive huge financial supports from strong Nigerian politicians as well as former Nigerian heads of state.\(^\text{165}\) Even some members of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) have been named as sponsors.\(^\text{166}\) There are also indications that the group receive funds from external forces such as al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. But there is no hard evidence to buttress this claim yet.

4.1.11. Recruitment

Boko Haram recruits members from Northern Nigeria as well as militants from neighbouring Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Their targets are usually youth between the ages of 17 to 30 who are often passionate and excessively enthusiastic for Islamic knowledge. The bulk of these youth, (especially those who execute their operations) are illiterate, poor, frustrated and jobless.\(^\text{167}\) This thus paves the way for successful recruitment based on “indoctrination.”\(^\text{168}\) The leaders persuade these youth by quoting verses from the Quran. Their former leader, Yusuf for instance, technically implants the group with extremist ideology often contrary to westernization and backed by passages from the Quran, a reason which also made many

youths dropped out of school to join his supposed cause. A good example of such passages is Chapter 5, verse 47 of the Quran which reads, “Let the followers of the Gospel judge by what Allah has revealed therein, and those who do not judge by what Allah has revealed are the transgressors.” Additionally, the late Yusuf argued that western education or “boko” had brought but poverty, suffering, political corruption and injustice to the region and for these reasons, it is tabooed, or “haram,” in Islam. And like Eric Guttschuss, Human Rights Watch researcher opined, Yusuf gained supporters “by speaking out against police and political corruption.”

Consequent upon these factors, which are true of the Nigerian polity, more members were recruited and some even had to sell their belongings in order to financially contribute to the cause of delivering Islam from the supposed shackles of westernization as well as sanitising the Nigerian polity which they believed can only be done through sharia laws. As time passes by, more educated people such as bankers, university students, lawyers, doctors and uniformed men were recruited and like conflict resolution expert, Rev. Oladimeji Ladi Thompson noted, Boko Haram have strong ties with some top government officials as well as other powerful members of the society. In order to also maintain their loyalty and commitment especially from the illiterate and poor members, Boko haram gives rewards in money and material gains. Lastly, Boko Haram recruits members by breaking into prisons and setting prisoners free. In return, most of these prisoners become part of the group.

4.2. Boko Haram/Nigeria before government crackdown

170 http://www.islamicstudies.info/tahieem.php?sura=5&verse=44&to=50 (These links are so as of February 11, 2013)
171 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501
172 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-libya-un-arms-USTRE80P1QS20120126
173 http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/p25739
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
As noted, Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence.\(^\text{177}\) Prior to July 2009 when the sect’s notoriety waxed strong, its members had been involved in dastardly incidents in Yobe in 2003 and in Kano in 2004. I shall now consider Boko Haram attacks before Yusuf’s death.

- **December 23-31, 2003:** Members of Boko Haram attacked police stations in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam in Yobe State, leaving police and about 18 militants dead.\(^\text{178}\)
- **January 7, 2004:** About 7 Boko Haram members who had guns in their possession were killed and 3 others arrested by a team of local vigilantes close to the town of Damboa, Borno State, near border with Chad.
- **June 2004:** Four members of Boko Haram were shot and killed by prison guards in a foiled jail break in Damaturu, Yobe State.
- **September 23, 2004:** Police stations in the Gwoza and Bama, both towns in Borno State were attacked by member of Boko Haram, leaving 4 policemen and 2 civilians dead. In a follow up attack, 27 sect members were further killed by the Nigerian military while escaping.
- **October 10, 2004:** A convoy of 60 policemen were ambushed near the town of Kala-Balge on the Nigerian border with Chad by a splinter group of Boko Haram. About 12 policemen were taken hostage and no death was reported.

In April 2007, 10 policemen and a divisional commander’s wife were killed in an attack on the police headquarters in Kano. On 13 November 2008, Yusuf was arrested following an attack on a police station in Maiduguri, in which, 17 of his followers were killed. On January 20, 2009, an Abuja high court granted him bail.

In the first two weeks of July 2009, it was gathered that members of the group were on their way to bury some of their dead members when they were stopped by the Nigerian security forces.

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\(^{177}\) Op.cit. Cook, David

forces. The reason for the stop being the group’s failure to “follow a motor-bike helmet law,” and this led to a conflict that left some members of Boko Haram dead.

Consequently, on July 26, 2009, Boko Haram launched mass uprising with attack on the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi and thus starting a five-day uprising that spread to Maiduguri and elsewhere. This attack referred to as the ‘2009 Nigerian sectarian violence’ was a conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces during which the sect leader was also killed.

4.3. Boko Haram/Nigeria after government crackdown

A week after government crackdown, members of the sect appear to have been defeated as nothing was heard from them. However, in a statement dated August 9, 2009 and made available to Vanguard newspaper, the sect declared that their leader Yusuf, who was killed in controversial circumstances during the crisis, lives forever. In what seems like a declaration of war on the rest of the nation, the then acting leader, Mallam Sanni Umaru noted that the sect will unleash terror in Southern Nigeria beginning with the bombing of Lagos, Ibadan, Port Harcourt and Enugu.

Vanguard reproduces the statement below as issued by Boko Haram:

**WE SPEAK AS BOKO HARAM**

For the first time since the Killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, our leader, we hereby make the following statements.

1) First of all that Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western Education is a sin’ as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means Western

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181 Ibid.
Civilisation is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our believe in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education.

In this case we are talking of Western Ways of life which include; constitutional provision as if relates to, for instance the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexuality, lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilisation.

2) That the Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised which is according to the wish of Allah.

3) That Mallam Yusuf has not died in vain and he is a martyr. His ideas will live for ever.

4) That Boko Haram lost over 1000 of our Marty members killed by the wicked Nigerian army and police mostly of Southern Nigeria extraction. That the Southern states, especially the infidel Yoruba, Igbon and Ijaw infidels will be our immediate target.

5) That the killing of our leaders in a callous, wicked and malicious manner will not in any way deter us. They have lost their lives in the struggle for Allah.

Having made the following statement we hereby reinstate our demands:

1) That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamise Nigeria and ensures the rule of the majority Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one.

2) That from the Month of August, we shall carry out series of bombing in Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt.
The bombing will not stop until Sharia and Western Civilisation is wiped off from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities are tuned into ashes.

3) That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished.

4) We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas which is the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilisation into the shores of Nigeria.

5) We call on all Northerners in the Islamic States to quit the followership of the wicked political parties leading the country, the corrupt, irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership, and join the struggle for Islamic Society that will be corruption free, Sodom free, where security will be guaranteed and there will be peace under Islam.

6) That very soon, we shall stir Lagos, the evil city and Nigeria South West and South East, in a way no one has ever done before. Al Hakubarah

IT’S EITHER YOU ARE FOR US OR AGAINST US
Mallam Sanni Umaru
Acting Leader Boko Haram
Signed: August 09, 2009
(Source: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/)

Well the group actually kept to the above publication that many, including the Nigerian government, thought was only a threat. The latter part of 2009, did not really witnessed Boko Haram attacks, perhaps this was a period when the group decided to go back to the drawing board and re-strategize modalities to terrorise the Nigerian state in the years to come. For instance the group sent out some six members to Algeria to learn the making of
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).\textsuperscript{182} Events in the following year clearly shows the students learnt well. For pin-point accuracy, the series of Boko haram attacks after the death of Yusuf has been put in chronological order below;

- On January 2010, the group launched its first terrorist attack after the death of its leader, Yusuf. The attack which took place at the Dala Alenderi ward in Maiduguri, Borno State, resulted in the killing of four people.\textsuperscript{183}

- On September 7, 2010, the group freed about 721 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State and threatened reprisals against those they accused of persecuting their members.\textsuperscript{184}

- October 6, 2010: Gunmen assassinated two security guards outside a politician’s home and, several hours later, ANPP leader Awana Ngala was assassinated in Maiduguri.\textsuperscript{185}

- October 9, 2010: Gunmen assassinated Muslim cleric Bashir Kashara and one of his students in Maiduguri. Separately, gunmen assassinated a police officer in Maiduguri.\textsuperscript{186}

- October 11, 2010: Bombing/gun attack on a police station in Maiduguri destroys the station and injures three.\textsuperscript{187}

- December 24 and 27, 2010: A series of attacks claimed by Boko Haram and reprisals in the central city of Jos and Maiduguri in the northeast of the country killed at least 86 people.\textsuperscript{188}

- December 28, 2010: Boko Haram claims responsibility for the Christmas Eve bombing in Jos that killed 38, but police are sceptical; Boko Haram also tied to an attack on churches in Maiduguri.\textsuperscript{189}

- December 29, 2010: Islamists suspected of belonging to the sect killed eight people in Maiduguri.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{182} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/man-of-the-year-2011-the-scourge-of-boko-haram/
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} http://allafrica.com/stories/201009090034.html
\textsuperscript{185} http://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/01/incomplete-list-of-boko-haram-attacks-in-nigeria/
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{187} http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11523131
\textsuperscript{188} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/catalogue-of-attacks-blamed-on-boko-haram/
\textsuperscript{189} http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/20101228123525363633.html
\textsuperscript{190}
• December 31, 2010, there was a bomb attack on a barracks on the outskirts of Abuja, the Federal capital territory. Four people were killed, including a pregnant woman, and 26 were injured; according to defense minister Adetokunbo Kayode, all of the dead were civilians, as were most of the injured. The attack was the second in Abuja in three months, and was the first near a barracks in the country since its return to democracy in 1999.\footnote{Ibid. Many dead in Nigeria market blast - Africa - Al Jazeera English \url{http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/man-of-the-year-2011-the-scourge-of-boko-haram/}} That same month, the police arrested 92 members of Boko Haram after a market bombing.\footnote{http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/03/nigeria-violence-idUKLDE7020TK20110103}


• Friday January 28, 2011: the sect kills Borno State governorship candidate of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), Mr Modu Fannami Gubio, his brother Alhaji Goni Sheriff, four police officers and a 12-year old boy.\footnote{http://writezakama.wordpress.com/2012/01/23/boko-harams-long-trail-of-sorrow-tears-and-blood/} Gubio was executed at his family residence in Maiduguri, after performing Friday Juma’at prayer.

• February 15, 2011: Gunmen attacked a church in Maiduguri, no casualties confirmed.\footnote{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/13/AR2011031302923.html}


• March 3, 2011: Three people were killed and 21 injured by an explosive device thrown from a car at an election rally near Nigeria’s capital, Abuja.\footnote{http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/man-of-the-year-2011-the-scourge-of-boko-haram/}


• April 1, 2011: Sect attacked a police station in Bauchi.\footnote{http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/man-of-the-year-2011-the-scourge-of-boko-haram/}
• April 7, 2011: An explosion hits a polling booth at Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri, Borno State injuring more than 10 people.²⁰²

• April 8, 2011: Bomb explosion at the Independent Electoral Commission office in Suleja, kills 11.²⁰³

• April 9, 2011: A polling centre in Maiduguri was bombed.²⁰⁴

• April 15, 2011: The Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission was bombed, and several people were shot in a separate incident on the same day.²⁰⁵

• April 20, 2011: Boko Haram killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri.²⁰⁶

• April 21, 2011: Two suspected bomb makers die in a blast in Kaduna.²⁰⁷

• April 22, 2011: Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State.²⁰⁸

• April 24, 25, 2011: Four bomb blasts rip through a hotel and a motor park in Maiduguri killing at least three persons. Two blasts went off at a hotel and one at a transport hub on Sunday night. There was a fourth blast at a cattle market on Monday morning.²⁰⁹

• May 17, 2011: Gunmen killed a policeman in Maiduguri.²¹⁰

• May 29, 2011: Boko Haram blamed for a series of bombings in northern Nigeria that killed 15 persons.²¹¹

• June 6, 2011: Gunmen assassinated Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti in Maiduguri.²¹²

²⁰² Ibid.
²⁰³ Ibid.
²⁰⁴ Ibid.
²⁰⁵ Ibid.
²⁰⁶ Ibid.
²⁰⁷ Ibid.
²⁰⁹ http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-raids-yola-prison-frees-14/90140/
²¹⁰ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13185667
²¹¹ http://allafrica.com/stories/201105190665.html
• June 7, 2011: Teams of gunmen launched parallel attacks with guns and bombs on a church and police stations in Maiduguri, killing five.\(^{213}\)

• June 16, 2011: The group’s suicide bomber bombed a portion of the police headquarters in Abuja. Over thirty cars were destroyed and at least two persons reported dead and several others injured.\(^{214}\) Though casualty reports, vary.

• June 26, 2011: The sect bombed a beer garden in Maiduguri, killing about 25 people.\(^{215}\)

• June 27, 2011: Another bombing in Maiduguri attributed to the group left at least two girls dead and three customs officials in critical conditions.\(^{216}\)

• July 3, 2011: Another bombing in a beer garden in Maiduguri killed about 20 people.\(^{217}\)

• July 10, 2011: A bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State.\(^{218}\)

• July 11, 2011: The University of Maiduguri temporary closes down its campus citing security concerns\(^{219}\) related to Boko Haram threats.

• August 12, 2011: Liman Bana, a famous Muslim Cleric was shot dead by Boko Haram.\(^{220}\)

• August 26, 2011: The groups conducted a suicide car bombing at the UN headquarters in Abuja, leaving at least 21 dead and dozens more injured.\(^{221}\)

• October 16, 2011: Top politician, Modu Bintube was shot and killed at his Maiduguri home by the group.\(^{222}\)

• October 22, 2011: Boko Haram slew Alhaji Zakariya Isa, a Nigerian Television Authority journalist, claiming that he was a government informant.\(^{223}\)

\(^{212}\) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13679234
\(^{213}\) http://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/01/incomplete-list-of-boko-haram-attacks-in-nigeria/
\(^{215}\) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13920980
\(^{217}\) Ibid.
\(^{218}\) Ibid.
\(^{219}\) Ibid.
\(^{220}\) http://saharareporters.com/news-page/university-maiduguri-shut-down-boko-haram-linked-killings-increase
\(^{222}\) Ibid.
\(^{223}\) Ibid.
November 4, 2011: A series of coordinated attacks in Borno and Yobe states, primarily around Damaturu, killed at least 67 people, leaving a new police headquarters in ruins, and government offices burned. This figure later increased to over a 100.

November 11, 2011: Explosion in Bauchi left five people injured.

December 8, 2011: Bomb blast at a market in Kaduna claim 15.

December 25, 2011: A series of explosions claimed by Boko Haram targeted at St. Theresa Church, Madalla, Niger State during Christmas day services left at least 40 people dead. There were also bomb blasts and shootings in Jos, Gadaka, and Damaturu.

January 1, 2012: Boko Haram issues an ultimatum to Christians in the country’s north to leave within three days and threatens government troops in the areas where a state of emergency had been declared.

January 4, 2012: Three bomb blasts hit the northern Nigerian cities of Maiduguri and Damaturu.

January 5 and 6, 2012: A series of assaults on Christian churches and businesses occurred in north-eastern Nigeria. It was followed by attacks on police stations and government offices in the north. This led to hundreds of Igbo people and other tribes fleeing the North. Then on January 6, 2012, Gunmen fired on Christian mourners in the north-eastern town of Mubi, killing 17 people.

January 20, 2012: 20 blasts rock the city of Kano; over 150 lives were lost including Channels TV reporter (one of the independent news stations in Nigeria), Eneche Akogwu.

Ibid.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15605041
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/catalogue-of-attacks-blamed-on-boko-haram/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16328940
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/catalogue-of-attacks-blamed-on-boko-haram/
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/catalogue-of-attacks-blamed-on-boko-haram/
http://www.mrctv.org/node/109326
This is about the biggest attacks in the history of Boko Haram. In fact, the death toll was later said to increase to 211\textsuperscript{235} or more.

- January 28, 2012: A gun battle between the Nigerian army and members of Boko Haram left 11 of the sect members dead.\textsuperscript{236}

- February 8, 2012: A man wearing a military uniform blew himself up outside the army headquarters in Kaduna (barracks) - one of Nigeria's most fortified complexes. A spokesperson for the Boko Haram group also claimed responsibility for an attempted attack on an air force base.\textsuperscript{237}

- February 13, 2012: The Nigerian Army killed 12 suspected fighters of the Boko Haram Islamists during a raid in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, the group’s base.\textsuperscript{238}

- April 8, 2012: A car bomb targeted at a church in Kaduna exploded, killing at least 16 people.\textsuperscript{239} CBS reported that the total dead were 38.\textsuperscript{240}

- April 8, 2012: An explosion hit central town of Jos.\textsuperscript{241}

- April 26, 2012: The offices of ThisDay, a newspaper outfit were bombed in Kaduna and Abuja by members of Boko Haram who videoed, and put it online on youtube. At least 3 people were confirmed dead: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efE7aaafYAk

- April 29, 2012: A group of student worshippers were attacked with bomb at the Bayero State University, leaving at least 16 dead.\textsuperscript{243} The death toll later rose to 21.\textsuperscript{244}

- April 30, 2012: A bomb blast hits a police chief convoy killing at least 11 and leaving 22 others seriously injured.\textsuperscript{245}

\textsuperscript{235} http://odili.net/news/source/2012/jan/25/334.html
\textsuperscript{236} http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/28/us-nigeria-violence-idUSTRE80R0H420120128
\textsuperscript{237} http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16942694
\textsuperscript{238} http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/army-kill-12-suspected-boko-haram-members/
\textsuperscript{239} http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/uk-nigeria-bomb-idUKBRE83705P20120408
\textsuperscript{240} http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/04/08/nigeria-blast.html
\textsuperscript{241} http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/nigeria-explosion-idAF13682F80PC20120408
\textsuperscript{242} http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/26/uk-nigeria-bomb-idUKBRE83P0O120120426
\textsuperscript{243} http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17886143
\textsuperscript{244} http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/04/29/nigeria-.html
• June 3, 2012: A Boko Haram suicide bomber attacked a church in Bauchi, killing at least 12 and injured 40. Another source fixes the number of dead at 21 and 45 injured.

• June 8, 2012: A bomb blast at the entrance of the police headquarters in Borno state killed an unconfirmed number of people, especially police.

• June 10, 2012: A suicide bomber blasted himself inside a church in Jos, leaving 8 dead and 48 injured.

• June 17, 2012: Boko Haram bombed three churches in Nigeria's north-western Kaduna state, killing over 100 people. CNN however put the number of dead at 50.

• June 23, 2012: A bomb exploded at an expensive nightclub in Abuja with no casualty.

• June 24, 2012: Boko Haram stormed a prison in Yobe state, and freed 40 inmates.

• July 13, 2012: A suicide bomber targeted a mosque in Maiduguri, killing 5.

• July 30, 2012: The Kaduna state home of the Vice President Namadi Sambo was attacked leaving 5 dead.

• August 9, 2012: Suspected Boko Haram killed a banker in Maiduguri.

• August 12, 2012: Twenty Boko Haram members were killed in a shootout with the Joint Task Force.

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245 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/30/uk-nigeria-explosion-idUKBRE83T0CS20120430
246 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/03/uk-nigeria-violence-idUKBRE85204D20120603
249 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/08/uk-nigeria-violence-idUKBRE8570NS20120608
251 http://post.jagran.com/nigerian-church-attacks-kill-nearly100-1340429043
253 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/06/23/nigeria-bomb-idUKL5E8HN0FN20120623
255 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18834387

August 14, 2012: Bomb accidentally exploded in the hands of two men who were travelling with it on two motorcycles in Kaduna, killing 4 people including those carrying it.\(^{259}\)

August 28, 2012: A remotely controlled bomb planted at the West End roundabout in Maiduguri, Borno state exploded, injuring several members of the Joint Task Force.\(^{260}\)

September 5, 2012: Suspected Boko Haram members set the office of telecoms operator, MTN, ablaze, while also setting ablaze nine telecommunications masts and killing four persons in Maiduguri.\(^{261}\) On the same day, similar event was recorded in Kano when suspected Boko Haram on motorbikes destroyed MTN and Airtel mobile phone masts.\(^{262}\)

September 12, 2012: The Nigerian security forces arrested 11 Boko Haram suspects at the Waka-Biu region of Borno state recovering sophisticated guns and bombs from them.\(^{263}\)

September 23, 2012: A suicide bomber blasted himself at a church in Bauchi, killing 2 others and injuring 46.\(^{264}\)

October 2, 2012: Suspected gunmen attacked polytechnic students in Mubi, Adamawa state, killing at least 25.\(^{265}\)

October 28, 2012: A suicide bomber attacked a church in Kaduna, leaving at least 10 dead and 145 injured.\(^{266}\)

October 28, 2012: Another suicide bombing at the Living Faith Church in Yelwa, a suburb of Bauchi Metropolis was averted when armed soldiers took proactive measures and apprehended the suicide bomber.\(^{267}\)

November 5, 2012: A blast outside an outdoor bar in Jalingo, Taraba state left one dead and 11 injured.\(^{268}\)

\(^{258}\) [Source: http://www.channelstv.com/home/2012/08/12/jtf-kills-20-boko-haram-members-in-maiduguri/]
\(^{259}\) [Source: http://www.channelstv.com/home/2012/08/14/4-feared-dead-in-kadunas-bomb-explosion/]
\(^{260}\) [Source: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/08/explosion-rocks-maiduguri-injures-jtf-members/]
\(^{262}\) [Source: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-12/business/sns-rt-nigeria-bokoharam15e8kcjo2-20120912_1_boko-haram-ibrahim-mishelizza-nigeria-arrests]
\(^{263}\) [Source: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/23/uk-nigeria-violence-idUKBRE88M03Y20120923]
\(^{265}\) [Source: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/10/dead-in-kaduna-church-bombing-attacks/]
\(^{266}\) [Source: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/10/security-nab-suicide-bomber-in-bauchi/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter]
• November 6, 2012: A blast close to the Taraba state television left 8 people injured.269

• November 8, 2012: The Nigerian military opened fire in retaliation to a bomb blast on their convoy. At least 35 people were said to have died.270

• November 25, 2012: Twin bomb explosions hit a church inside the barracks of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji which is close to Kaduna, leaving 11 dead and 30 others injured.271

• November 28, 2012: A suicide bomber drove a jeep full of explosives into a Catholic church in Kaduna, wherein morning mass was going on. The explosives left 8 dead and over 100 injured.272

• January 19, 2013: The convoy of the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero was attacked by unknown gunmen, killing four of his palace guards.273

• January 21, 2013: Eighteen people were killed at an attack by Boko Haram in a local market in Borno state.274

• January 23, 2013: Five people were beheaded in Maiduguri by the group.275

• January 27, 2013: Eight people were killed with some of their throats slit at the village of Gajiganna, Borno state.276

• January 29, 2013:277 At a meeting in Maiduguri, Sheikh Abu Mohammad Abdulazeez Ibn Idris a commander of Boko Haram in-charge of North and Central Borno, said “after due consultation with the leader of the sect, Shiekh Abubakar Shekau, as well as intervention and pleadings from respected individuals and groups in the state, we “have all come to terms and

269 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/04/uk-nigeria-violence-idUKBRE8931PY20121004
269 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/06/us-nigeria-violence-idUKBRE89504X20121006
270 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/uk-nigeria-violence-shooting-idUKBRE89713W20121008
272 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/28/uk-nigeria-violence-idUKBRE89R06M20121028
274 http://saharareporters.com/news-page/18-killed-borno-market-attack-ap
275 http://www.channelstv.com/home/2013/01/24/5-people-beheaded-in-maiduguri/
276 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/terrorists-slit-throats-in-embattled-borno/
277 http://www.channelstv.com/home/2013/01/28/splinter-boko-haram-group-declares-ceasefire/
agreed to lay down our arms.” Meaning they were ceasing fire, after giving certain conditions to the governments.

• January 29, 2013: There was a press release from one Mujahedeen Muhammad Marwana who claimed to be Boko Haram second-in-command denouncing any form of cease fire agreement with the governments.

• January 30 – 31, 2013: The Nigeria Joint Task Force (JTF) alongside the Nigerian Air Force conducted operations on two hidden training camps of Boko Haram in Borno state. The operations which saw the retaliation of members of the sect left 17 of them dead alongside one officer of JTF.

• January 31, 2013: Gunmen (terrorists) invaded Birnin Gwari Township in Kaduna state bombing a police station, some banks and other public places. Millions of Nigerian naira (currency) was stolen by the terrorists.

• February 2, 2013: Boko Haram demanded a compensation of 26 billion naira (over $165 million) for ceasefire.

• February 8, 2013: Suspected Boko Haram terrorist killed at least 9 polio vaccinators on duty in Kano.

• February 8, 2013: Over 30 suspected Boko Haram members attacked a police station in Kano at about 8:30pm but they were successfully repelled by the police without casualty though another source claimed one of the sect members was killed in the battle.

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278 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/why-were-sheathing-our-sword-boko-haram-commander/
284 http://thestreetjournal.org/2013/02/ceasefire-agreement-boko-haram-demands-n-26-billion-compensation/
286 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/08/nigeria-polio-vaccine-workers-killed_n_2647539.html
287 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/over-30-gunmen-attack-police-station-in-kano/
February 10, 2013: Three North Korean doctors were killed in Potiskum, Yobe state by suspected Boko Haram members. Two of them had their throats slit while the third was beheaded.

• February 10, 2013: Seven suicide bombers including one female were caught by the security forces in Kaduna. They had been on their way to their targets.

• February 17, 2013: One security guard shot dead and six Setraco construction workers including two foreigners kidnapped in Bauchi state.

• February 18, 2013: Suspected Boko Haram members concurrently carried out two separate attacks in Konduga and Askira-Uba Local Government Area, both of Borno state, killing a Police inspector, a vigilante and a civilian. A Divisional Police Headquarters as well as vehicles parked within the premises were also razed down.

The list seems endless and recent killings, claims and counterclaims by members of the sect indicate that Boko Haram is still a major threat as far as Nigeria is concerned. For pinpoint accuracy however, the author has put the above attacks into tabular form. See table below.

Table 1: Boko Haram attacks from 2002 to February 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1 attack leaving 18 Boko Haram dead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3 attacks, 44 dead of which 38 were militants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>No attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1 attack leaving 10 policemen dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1 attack leaving 17 militants dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26-30, 2009</td>
<td>1 attack leading to Government crackdown, leaving over 700 militants executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9 major attacks killing close to 150 people, mostly civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>35 major attacks leaving over 260 people dead, mostly civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Over 40 major attacks leaving over 600 people dead, mostly civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>Over 10 major attacks leaving ore than 60 dead, mostly civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

290 Ibid.
293 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/gunmen-burn-down-police-station-kill-inspector-two-others/
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

At the inception of this thesis, the author came up with a hypothesis as well as raised certain questions with regards to Boko Haram and the Nigerian polity. Answering these questions is important for testing the hypothesis. To draw a final conclusion therefore, this chapter will analyse the main findings and thus bringing me to the very first research question.

1) What is Boko Haram or the Nigerian state before and after the Nigerian government’s crackdown?

From the above data presented in Chapter Four, it can be said that from 2002 to July 2009, Boko Haram carried out less than ten major attacks and these attacks were more or less peacefully, at least when compared afterwards. However between 2010 to February 18, 2013, the group carried out close to a hundred major attacks. In a 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism by the U.S. Department of state, Africa experienced 978 attacks of over 10,000 attacks worldwide.294 Of these 978 attacks, Boko Haram alone was alleged to have conducted 136 attacks as against a record of 31 attacks conducted in 2010295 or even a less than 10 attacks conducted from 2002 to 2009. Similarly in 2011 alone, the report noted that there were 590 fatalities resulting from Boko Haram attacks.296 As there are often conflicting results from different sources, the chart297 below recorded from 2003 to 2011 by Senator Chris Coons may not totally conform to the 2011 report by the U.S. Department of state or even totally with my findings on Boko Haram activities before 2009, it however shows some interesting and close lights.

295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
Although the figure above did not take 2012 into consideration, it however shows a huge increase and development with regards to attacks by Boko Haram. Such developments are with their use of more sophisticated weapons such as IEDs. Similarly this closely agrees with my account on Boko Haram activities until 2009 or even thereafter. The total of 154 Boko Haram attacks in 2011 shown in the chart above is also close to the 136 attacks recorded by the U.S. Department of State. Apart from the loss of lives, properties and damages to the Nigerian economy, these attacks have also created an intense feeling of ethnicity as well as a purported disintegration of Nigeria. It needs be pointed out once more that those in the South as well as Christians have been the major targets of Boko Haram since 2010. In June 2012 alone, the sect carried out several attacks basically on churches and killing over a hundred worshippers. With all these, Boko Haram and likewise the Nigeria state changed dramatically. And as noted in Chapter One, Nigeria is now one of the most terrorised countries of the world. It is thus very important to consider the Nigerian government strategy...
of countering the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising and thus bringing me to the second research question.

2) What factors necessitated the change of Boko Haram’s operation?

Basically the Nigerian forces adopted the second method of counterinsurgency postulated by Martin van Creveld. As noted in Chapter Three, this method which was exemplified by the 1982 Hama massacre in Syria calls for the total military elimination of insurgents and the Nigerian forces attempted to do just that.

At first when the July 2009 conflict broke out, the Nigeria Police Force responded with its own retaliation and a curfew fell on the area. The attacks spread and by the next day corpses were located at police stations, people fleeing their homes and some were being pulled out from their cars to be shot dead as police stations burned to the ground.

On July 28, 2009, Mohammed Yusuf’s Maiduguri home was surrounded by the Nigerian forces wherein were also hidden some of its followers. By July 30, 2009, Mohammed Yusuf, the then leader of Boko Haram, was captured by Nigerian security forces and was shot dead while in police custody. Just like the fourth rule of Martin van Creveld’s five rules, the Nigerian authority made a national broadcast with live pictures of the dead Boko Haram leader. In fact, prior to his death, he was interviewed by his captors all of whom were military officers making videos of the scene with their phones in order to possibly upload it on social media.

This violence from July 26 to 30, 2009 also resulted in the Nigerian government execution of over 700 Boko Haram members across four cities in north east Nigeria. The Red Cross later noted that 780 bodies were taken from the streets of the city and buried in mass

299 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePpUvFLXY7w
300 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedback/8642086
and Umar also noted that those killed from the July 2009 sectarian violence were more than a 1000 (Umar, 2011: 12). In any case, over 700 suspected Boko Haram members were executed. The Nigerian forces conducted house to house search, assembled in groups and shot all suspected to be members of Boko Haram. They destroyed their places of worship, including their headquarters. Even innocent civilians were assembled and killed publicly by government forces. See an online link to a 5 minutes video by Aljazeera where the Nigerian military forces were shooting and executing suspected members of the group, some of which are presumed to be innocent civilians. This is what led to the second and more deadly phase of the group from 2010.

2a) what are the psychological implications with regards to revenge?

To clear the air, revenge connotes retaliation, retribution or vengeance often for something earlier received. It is retaliation against a person or group in response to a grievance; it may be characterized as a form of justice, outside the confines of the legal system. According to Austin O’Malley, “revenge is often like biting a dog because the dog bit you.” Francis Bacon noted that revenge “is a kind of wild justice; which the more man's nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out.” To put it differently, revenge is the “infliction of harm in righteous response to perceived harm or injustice” (Stuckless & Goranson, 1994: 803). In the same vein, Frans De Waal writes:

“Systems of justice... for example, can be regarded as the successful transformation of a deep-seated urge for revenge – euphemized as retribution – which keeps the urge within acceptable boundaries” (De Waal, 1996: 194).

Basically revenge permeates the human culture because it also permeates the human nature, perhaps humans unconsciously realise this. Man’s society for instance is coordinated by man

303 http://www.notable-quotes.com/r/revenge_quotes.html
304 http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts/revenge/revenge.html
himself through certain laws by which if disobeyed carries certain consequences or punishments. Revenge is thus deep rooted in man’s unconscious fantasies especially when he feels humiliated, angry and frustrated. Even the traumatic insult of a child could stirrup the urge to physically hit or verbally throw out sarcasm and curses on the opponent. Lot of teens who faced bullying in schools have sometimes reacted this way. In most cases, such urges to get revenge could break out of the ordinary or limits and become too calamitous and terroristic. In most cases, when those who are hurt hit their targets in a much more destructive way than they were hurt, they feel some degree of justice and satisfaction, perhaps for a short time. It can therefore be said that the popular unconscious response to humiliation or insult is revenge. Studies have also confirmed this. In the 1960s for instance, Bert Brown conducted a research by which he hoped to ascertain the conditions under which people were to put up an attitude of vengeance, in spite of substantial costs to themselves. For the research, Bert studied sixty male teenagers who were from the New York City public high schools. Drawing a conclusion from his findings, Bert discovered an existing and close relationship between shame and revenge (Brown, 1968: 107-122). The boys were more likely to retaliate at all costs when they believed they looked foolish (Brown, 1968: 107-122). The study demonstrates that an emotional abuse evoking shame will also evoke retaliatory revenge (Brown, 1968: 107-122).

People also seem to morally justify revenge especially when they believe they were wilfully harmed by the perpetrator. This is more so if such harm includes harm to one’s self-esteem, sense of respect, value system and to one’s feelings being misunderstood (Bies & Tripp, 1996). Although human beings are not fundamentally evil, the motivation for revenge when hurt, is part of the innate survival mechanics of a complex social species. So let’s see how this plays out in the Boko Haram scenario.
The July 2009 crackdown on Boko Haram created an avenue for the group to justify their further actions. The motivation for revenge was greatly increased with the execution of over 700 of their members, their leader as well as the destruction of their places of worship. In the same vein, this incident gave members of the group the avenue to successfully recruit thousands of more followers. Boko Haram method of persuasion now rested on religion. In this other fellow Muslims now join the movement because they were made to believe that the July 2009 crackdown was an attack on Islam and this became a source of more inspiration, wherein members were now more ready to die for Islam and thus the later and newer phase characterised by suicide bombing. This is also exemplified in the fact that Boko haram now always refer to the July 2009 crackdown as a reason for their incessant and massive attacks.

3) What is the nexus between poverty, education, bad governance and the emergence of Boko Haram?

As noted in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, the Nigerian polity is grossly saddled with poverty, illiteracy and worse of it, bad and unaccountable government. As also shown in the chart in Chapter Two, the Northern parts of Nigeria are the worse hit with regards to poverty as well as illiteracy. Although an earlier decision by Northerners not to be taught via western education (English) could have also contributed to the high rate of illiteracy experienced in the region. But then, people who are poor can hardly afford education which in the Nigerian case is very expensive, perhaps also same for other countries. Similarly people living below the poverty line are likely to spend their time thinking of what to eat on daily basis than of getting education. For a country like Nigeria where the government does not care about the citizens’ welfare, frustrated people could easily fall victims of being recruited into an insurgency especially when the recruiter capitalises on the loopholes in governance. The fact that Boko Haram are also said to pay their members some money are factors therein
frustrated and jobless youth could join for survival. As noted in Chapter Four, members of Boko Haram also rob banks and threaten wealthy Nigerians for money. As also noted in Chapter Four, the group allegedly demanded the sum of 26 billion naira ($165 million), for a ceasefire agreement.\footnote{http://thestreetjournal.org/2013/02/ceasefire-agreement-boko-haram-demands-n-26-billion-compensation/} This rekindles the fact that it is not all about religion as thought by many or as projected by the media. The point also need be made that the Nigerian media adopt a great deal of framing with regards to news about Boko Haram, and the fight against bad governance which is also part of Boko Haram’s insistence for an Islamic state is often not reported. What the Nigerian media often project is that, the group is against westernization and wants an Islamic state, possibly to gain external military support. This however is not to make a case for the group but then the issue of corruption is very endemic in Nigeria and this is often shown in the fact that Nigerian leaders often siphon billions of naira into private accounts with total disregards for the welfare of the masses, leaving them poor, frustrated and unable to afford education. As also noted in Chapter Two, statistics showed that poverty is more in the North-East and North-West of Nigeria, where the Boko Haram sect originated.\footnote{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17015873} 

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Conclusion

The account of Boko Haram activities before and after the government crack-down as well as the killing of their leader is instrumental in understanding and dealing with the new phase of the group characterised by more sophisticated strategy and weaponry. In fact as bomb and gun attacks in the north-eastern Yobe and Borno states and the earlier explosions
in the capital, Abuja, have shown, Boko Haram - once a small religious sect - is now a flexible dynamic organisation capable of changing tactics and targets. Obviously, the Nigerian government’s effort at defeating Boko Haram in 2009 was a complete fiasco which has rather metamorphosed into a source of strength and inspiration for the group, a situation which has also led to the deaths of thousands of civilians since 2009, with over 600 being killed in 2012 alone. The sect has now infiltrated the Nigerian government and the current Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, also admitted that Boko Haram sympathisers are in his government and security agencies, hence making the scenario even more complex.\footnote{http://zeenews.india.com/news/exclusive/boko-haram-no-longer-a-purely-nigerian-problem_752678.html}

Worse still is Boko Haram’s established links with foreign extremist groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Sheba in Somalia, all of which have influenced Boko Haram with both tactical knowledge and ideological influence. These all indicate the possible consequences of counterinsurgency, whatever way it is applied, be it Galula’s, Thompson or van Creveld. And as noted in Chapter Two, even the people-centric approach of counterinsurgency cannot be carried out without military supports and often times, innocent civilians fall victims. The author would like to reaffirm that this thesis is not to make a case for Boko Haram sect but to look into the effects of counterinsurgency or the use of force by the government against a group or an insurgency.

My argument and final conclusion therefore, is that the root cause of insurgency is traceable to bad leadership as one or two or even ten persons cannot successfully conduct insurgency. It is a collective of many who are often given almost cogent reasons why they have to join, and if they are already frustrated by bad leadership, they easily become victims. On the other hand, counterinsurgency as a state apparatus has the effects of not just destroying the state, or leading to the death of innocent civilians, but that it has a higher possibility of ‘almost
justifiably’ leading a mere insurgency into a classical state of terrorism and for this reason, it is better to avoid any situation that can lead to insurgency than attempting to counter one.

6.2. Recommendations

It is now very obvious that neither the Nigerian government nor Boko Haram will accept that it is losing a ‘war’ which is bringing unprecedented levels of fear, pain and deprivation to civilians and the entire nation. The group has also repeatedly claimed that its increase in a campaign of terror is in response to the arrests, killings and detentions of its members in Maiduguri, Kano and Kaduna, among other areas. It is of course not possible to resurrect the dead, but it is possible to refine the living. If members of the group are so capable of conducting successful attacks, then they can be refined to convert such capability into state’s usefulness or developments. On that note my first recommendation would be to propose an amnesty plan for the group.

6.2.1. The Amnesty Programme

Basically the terms of the amnesty should include the willingness and readiness of Boko Haram members to surrender their arms, unconditionally renounce terrorism and sign an undertaking to this effect. In return, the Nigerian government must pledge its commitment to institute and adhere strictly to programs that would assist their disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation as well as reintegration. This program should have a minimum target of 30,000 Boko Haram members from basically Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Kaduna, and Yobe states, not leaving out other Northern states as well. While the goal of the amnesty should be to stabilise security within the Nigerian polity through the disarmament, demobilization/rehabilitation and sustainable reintegration of ex-Boko Haram as a precondition for medium and long term development, its motto should simply be: ‘One Nigeria.’
Rethinking counterinsurgency: A case study of Boko Haram

Former Boko Haram members should exit the program at the completion of the final stage. The table below shows the different stages and programmes of the amnesty that can make a difference in the lives of former Boko Haram members.

**Table 2: Structures and Initiatives of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration Agenda of Boko Haram Amnesty Programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISARMAMENT</th>
<th>DEMOBILIZATION/ REHABILITATION</th>
<th>REINTEGRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong> 6 months</td>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong> 1 to 2 Years</td>
<td><strong>Duration:</strong> Up to 5 Years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Activities**
- Collection of Arms and Ammunition, explosives, and other deadly weapons from Boko Haram members.
- Documentation and Biometrics

**Key Activities**
- Ex-insurgents Report to Camp
- Verification and Documentation
- Transformational Training (Games)
- Birthday celebrations
- Peace building & conflict resolution/non-violent communication courses/Peace potentials through world religions.
- Counseling
- Family planning
- Career Guidance
- Wellness Assessment
- Reintegration classification
- Education and Vocational placement
- Graduation & Demobilization

**Key Activities**
- Knowledge and Skills Acquisition
- Financial Empowerment
- Placement Programs
- Micro-credit
- Education
- Reconciliation with local community
- Conflict Resolution Framework/Mechanism
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Exit of Amnesty

**Key Facilitators**
- Disarmament Camps
- Massive Campaign

**Key Facilitators**
- Transformational Training Centres
- Rehabilitation Camps

**Key Facilitators**
- Partnering Government Agencies, NGOs and Private Organizations.
The whole idea is that at the reintegration phase and the final exist of the programme, former Boko Haram members must have been transformed such that they become much more instrumental to the state or their immediate society. Also while the programme is on, a monthly allowance should be given to them by the government. The key partners, facilitators or trainers during the amnesty programme must be people trained and certified in their various fields as well as in the heart of human relations or human psychology.

6.2.2. Redefining the Nigerian polity through reforms

Table 3:

**Social-cum-political and economic Reforms**

Although an attempt has been made in table 2 above to explain what an ideal Nigeria should strive at, it need be stated again that Nigeria’s main problem still centres on bad leadership and corruption. And so governments at all level must adopt measures to standardise the
leadership of Nigeria as well as eliminate corruption which heavily includes election malpractices. The legislature, executive and judiciary must work together to ensure that corruption is wiped out, at least to the barest minimum. Working together does not however mean cooperating selfishly together to the detriment of the citizenry but that they must also act as watchdogs amongst themselves because checks and balances which is the key aspect of separation of power are targeted at efficiency. There must also be constitutional reforms to take out obsolete sections of the laws and these laws must apply to all.

6.2.2.1. Agricultural Investment

The government should also work towards improving the Nigeria economy, create jobs and to do this, there must be massive investments in agriculture. As noted in Chapter Two, Nigeria has lots of resources yet to be tapped, maybe some even unknown. So the ministry of agriculture must work in this regards as this will create employment for a whole lots of unemployed youths or those who might want to venture into agriculture. The North for instance has lots of minerals as well as lots of arable lands.

6.2.2.2. Education

The government should also invest heavily in education. In the first case, a ministry not the ministry of education, should be set up to take care of unemployed graduates or at least pay them a monthly salary to keep body and soul together pending when they get jobs. The issue of unemployed graduates some of whom even have masters’ degrees is endemic in Nigeria and this is also accounting for lack of interests in education. This may also accounts for why some people had to drop out of the university to join Boko Haram. If such ministry is established, then people would be much more encouraged to go to school. Free education
should also be given especially to those in the rural areas as such people are likely to fall prey to insurgents’ recruitment.

In the same vein, schools and universities at all levels should include courses such as ‘peace education’ and ‘the peace potentials in world religions.’ While for instance, peace education put much emphasis on communication skills as well as on the need to live in harmony with oneself, with others, and with the natural environment, courses such as the potentials in world religions, point out the similarities in different religion and this is geared towards love and peaceful co-existence. This would also help the Christian-Muslim divides.

6.2.2.3. Family Planning

The Nigerian government also need to invest heavily in family planning and this should be concentrated more in the rural areas where people are often poor, illiterate and with lots of children to which they cannot cater for. It is common in the North or in any rural community in Nigeria to see an unemployed man living with ten children together with the wife, in a single and very small room. Children from such home have little possibility of education because their parents obviously can’t afford it and may not even care. The effect is that some of those kids would turn out to criminals or even become victims of recruitment of some sort, perhaps to earn a living, after all the government does not care either. So family planning and laws that allows parents to cater for their children until certain age (maybe 18) should be greatly encouraged. Child support laws should also be enacted.

6.2.2.4. The Nigerian Police Force

The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) plays an important role with regards to law and order as well as other security issues. But then the police force is also very corrupt, a reason connected with very low salaries especially for those of lower ranks who are also the field
workers. This has also accounted for the reason Boko Haram is able to infiltrate a considerable portion of the Nigeria government, making it also difficult to track them down. In this order, the Nigerian government should take up well-grounded reforms in the police force as well as increase the salaries of police. Proper training must also be conducted, ethics improved and inculcated, and the use of CCTV cameras as well as other security apparatus encouraged. Although, the police most need such reforms, it needs be added that other security forces like the Nigerian Army and the Nigerian Navy also need similar reforms especially with regards to ethics as the Nigerian army and to an extent, the Nigerian Navy are also corrupt. Prisons as well as prison facilities should also be improved in order to contain the freedom of those who go contrary to the laws, be it members of Boko Haram or any other Nigeria citizen.

6.2.3. International cooperation and Border tightening

As noted in Chapter Four, the bulk of Boko Haram members are from neighbouring Chad, Cameroon, Niger and even as far as Mali, hence this is no longer a purely Nigerian problem. At the very least, it is a regional problem that also requires response from Nigeria’s international partners including the US and its allies. The Nigerian government together with the governments of other countries where some members of Boko Haram are said to be recruited should work out effective modalities to tighten up border security. The fact that the United Nations building in Abuja was also bombed by the group signifies that the international community should be prepared to assist it as necessary. They should assist especially with improving border security.

6.2.4. The role of religious leaders
Top Muslim Imams and all other religious figures in the North also have a great role to play in solving this problem. One truth is that the bulk of Boko Haram members are destitute without any form of education and are easily hoodwinked and lured into terrorist or suicidal acts. Importantly, Boko Haram is operating in an environment which gives all Muslims the comfort that if they are murdered, Allah ‘Subhanahu Wa Taala’ (Glorious is He and He is exalted) 308 will visit their sins on their murderers, and they, in turn, are assured of Al jannah Firdausi (Koran 18 vs. 107), 309 while their killers will be condemned to hell. This ideology has also been the more reason many Boko Haram members are willing to commit suicide. Leaders of Boko Haram also persuade their followers with Koran 9:29 which says:

Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled. 310

Respected Ulama, Imams and other religious leaders should therefore make strong efforts to teach the larger Muslim population that Islam does not support the killing of one person by another. Such verses should be interpreted properly after all Koran 17:33 says, “Nor take life - which Allah has made sacred - except for just cause. And if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir authority (to demand qisas or to forgive); but let him nor exceed bounds in the matter of taking life; for he is helped (by the Law)” 311(See also Koran 25:68). Christian leaders should also preach against reprisal attacks by Christians and both Christian and Muslim leaders should work hand and hand, preaching more on love, peaceful coexistence as well as the similarities in both religions.

Concurrently, a blend of diplomacy and negotiation, police strategies, intelligence

308 http://islamic-dictionary.com/index.php?word=subhanahu+wa+taala
309 Koran 18 vs. 107 says, “Indeed, those who have believed and done righteous deeds - they will have the Gardens of Paradise as a lodging.”
310 http://quran.com/9/29
311 http://www.muslimaccess.com/quraan/arabic/017.asp
work and infrastructural developments should be used to counter, contain or co-opt Boko Haram.

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Figure 7: A map of Nigeria showing its 36 states and the Federal capital territory, Abuja.

Source: http://wpcontent.answcdn.com/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/Nigeria_political.png
Figure 8: A map of Nigeria showing the six geopolitical zones and the 36 states.

(Source: Dineen et al. BMC Ophthalmology 2008 8:17)
Figure 9: A map of the African continent showing Nigeria’s position and her neighbouring countries

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