Aigerim Raimzhanova, Ph.D Candidate

Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest

December 2015

POWER IN IR: HARD, SOFT, AND SMART

INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, the world is undergoing a critical transformation, with nation-states facing serious political and socio-economic issues. The challenges are global in their nature and affect the policies of many countries. A prevalent trend in today's global context is the individual nation-states' concern over their power and influence. This is especially significant in light of the growing geopolitical tensions, as well as the diffusion of power among global actors.

One can differentiate between hard and soft power tools in international relations. Traditionally, the states opted for hard power tools in the framework of *realpolitik* thinking. Meanwhile, the scholars and practitioners start to recognize that the world is in need of a shift from old assumptions and rigid distinctions about 'hard' and 'soft' power since the economic and political challenges can no longer be simply resolved by military power or policy innovation (Bound, et al. 2007: 13). However, the concept of soft power, initially introduced by Joseph Nye (1990), is still in its theorization process and requires further studies. Hence, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the concept of power, with specific reference to Nye's frames: hard, soft, and smart. The research objectives are three-fold; first, to provide an brief overview of the concept of power in international relations, second, to evaluate some of the key issues pertaining to the concept of soft power and, third, to assess education as a tool of power. This paper is based on the on-going research for the author's Ph.D. dissertation.

I. THE CONCEPT OF POWER

The subject of power has been an interest of social scientists for many decades, if not centuries, if one were to go back to writings of Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli. Despite such great deal of attention, however, there are still notable academic debates over power's specific definition and its features, which lead to the topic's complexity and ambiguity.

In discussing power, it is important to note whose power one is referring to. For instance, Arendt (1970: 44) defined power not as the property of an individual, but rather

argued that it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. Meanwhile, Dahl (1957: 203) proposed to call the objects in the relationship of power as actors. The term actor is inclusive and may refer to individuals, groups, roles, offices, governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates.

One of the most influential definitions of power in the field of social science belongs to Max Weber (1947: 152) who defined it as the probability of one actor within a social relationship to be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance. According to Weber, power is a zero-sum game and is an attribute that derives from the qualities, resources and capabilities of one subject. However, the Weberian definition attracted a number of criticisms. Martin (1971: 243) pointed out that Weber did not define power, but rather provided the basis for a comparison between the attributes of actors. Moreover, the author argued that, by building the element of conflict into his definition and viewing power solely in zero-sum terms, Weber disregarded the possibility of mutually convenient power relations (Martin, 1971: 243).

In contrast, Talcott Parsons (1967) offered a conceptualization of power, which did not define it in terms of conflict, but rather views it as a system resource. Parsons (1967: 208) argued that power is a capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization, when obligations are legitimized with reference to the collective goals, and where in case of recalcitrance, there is a presumption of negative sanctions. In this regard, Anthony Giddens (1968: 264) stated that, among other things, the Parsonian definition does not take into account that power is exercised over someone and by treating power as necessarily legitimate and assuming a consensus between power holders, Parsons ignores the hierarchical character of power.

To sum up, the two major threads in this discussion about power, the Weberian and the Parsonian, both suffer from major problems of definition (Martin, 1971: 244). These are just two instances of how power discussion attracts intense debates and disagreements. The purpose of this short discussion is to emphasize that power is one of the most central and problematic concepts in social science. Despite widespread use, there is little agreement upon basic definitions, with individual theorists proposing their own idiosyncratic terminologies of power (Bierstedt, 1950). Gallie (1956) confirms that due to the existence of competing theories and meanings, power is essentially a contested subject.

II. POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Power remains one of the critical subjects in political science, including the sphere of international relations. The discipline of International Relations incorporates a number of competing schools of thought, but for the long time, the discipline has treated power as the exclusive prerogative of realism. In fact, there is still a tendency among scholars and

practitioners to view power predominantly through the realist lens. To reiterate, the five basic assumptions of realists about the international system are that it is anarchic; all great powers possess some offensive military capability; states can never be certain about the intentions of other states; survival is the primary goal of states; and states are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30-31). The realists view the nation-states as the key actors in the international system.

Hans Morgenthau (1954: 25) famously proclaimed that international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power and 'whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim'. According to the author, the 'ubiquity of the struggle for power in all social relations on all levels of social organization' made the arena of international politics a necessity of power politics (Morgenthau, 1954: 31). Carr (1964: 102) was in agreement with Morgenthau and asserted that politics, at its heart, is power politics. For all realists, calculations about power lie at the core of how states perceive the world around them (Mearsheimer, 2001: 12).

While realists are in agreement that power is a key determinant in political relations, there is there is a variation in how individual realists understand the concept. For instance, classical realists posit that the permanent struggle for power stems from the fundamental human drive for power (Morgenthau, 1954). In contrast, for structural or neo-realists, it is the architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power and maximize their power position (Mearsheimer, 2001; Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2013).

Furthermore, there are disagreements as to how the power should be conceived and measured (Walt, 2002). There are two dominant traditions of power analysis in IR: the 'elements of the national power approach', which depicts power as property of states, and the relational power approach, which depicts power as an actual or potential relationship (Baldwin, 2012: 2). In other words, some realists define power in terms of resources, while others define it in a relational manner as the ability to exercise influence over other actors.

Proponents of the elements of the national power approach associate power with the possession of specific resources. All of the important resources that a state possesses are typically combined to determine its overall aggregate power. The resources that are indicators of national power are the level of military expenditure, size of the armed forces, gross national product, size of territory, and population. In line with this tradition, Morgenthau (1954) equated power with the possession of identifiable and measurable resources and listed geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military, and population as stable power elements of a nation. Carr (1946: 109) argued that military power was the most important form of power in international politics, as it serves as both a means and an end in itself.

However, one of the difficulties with the elements of the national power approach is the issue of power conversion; that is 'the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others' (Nye, 1990b:

178). It is not the mere possession of power resources that matters, but the ability to convert these into actual influence. Hart (1976) argued that, with the control over resources approach, it not always certain that actors will be able to use resources which are nominally under their control; some types of resources are extremely difficult to measure; and, finally, the focus on national power precludes the consideration of the role of non-state actors and the issues of interdependence, coalitions, and collective action.

The relational power approach that was championed by behavioural oriented political scientists as an alternative to the national power approach (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). Fundamental to the relational conception of power is the ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes. Despite these developments, the elements-of-national-power approach is still deeply embedded in the international relations literature (Mearsheimer, 2001). Moreover, Nye (1990c: 26, 2011: 240) suggests that the relational power approach is likely to seem too ephemeral to politicians and leaders. The idea of power as possession of resources, the author argues, holds more appeal for policy-makers because it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable than does the relational definition.

Another way to conceptualize and 'measure' power in International Relations is through the power cycle framework. Power cycle theory asserts that the ability of a state to influence international politics and play a principal role is determined in large part by its of stage of evolution, which involves a generalized, cyclical pattern of ascent, maturation and descent (Hebron, James, and Rudy, 2007: 3). The power cycle theorists claim that the conception of power, as expressed in power cycle theory, can account for and explain conflict in the international system or sub-system. According to Doran (2000), who started writing in the 1980s, the power cycle framework allows reflecting at the changing structure of the system and the state's rise and decline as a great power.

Although useful and influential, it is important to note that power cycle theory was, in large, a product of its time and may have methodological weaknesses in evaluating the states post-Cold War and post-20th century. For instance, Doran's power cycle theory does not account for innovation in technology, nor does it include significant non-state actors, such as international institutions, alliances and supranational bodies, in its calculations of relative power. The classical theory relies on quantitative analysis of national material capabilities and, thus, the 'soft' aspects of power remain excluded (Kissane, 2005: 12).

Despite the variations in the understanding of power among scholars, the concept has for a long time been treated as the exclusive prerogative of realism and thus has been associated within its framework. This has partially occurred because other schools of thought did not fundamentally attend to the issue of power and its variables in their theories. Rivals to realism typically distanced themselves from 'power' considerations and did not include the 'power' variables in their explanation of empirical outcomes.

Neoliberals, such as Keohane, have argued how states with convergent interests create international institutions and arrangements that effectively tame state power, highlighting processes of social choice (Keohane and Martin, 1995). Scholars of the liberal international relations theory typically stress that many important international outcomes cannot be adequately explained with reference to power and are better understood by the concepts of democracy, particular configurations of domestic interests, liberal values, economic interdependence or international institutions (Moravcsik, 1997). Meanwhile, mainstream constructivists discuss the causal significance of normative structures and processes of learning and persuasion (Risse, 2001; Checkel, 2001). Wendt (1995: 73), a famous constructivist, has stressed the link between power and knowledge and emphasized the significance of the social relationships and social structures (knowledge, material resources, and practice) in the international system. The goal here is not to judge which paradigm understands the world of politics in the most appropriate manner, but to emphasize that power has had a more significant place in the realist school of thought.

As argued Barnett and Duvall (2005), precisely this belongingness of power to the realist tradition, has generated a limit for the concept. The authors pointedly state that it is difficult to rely on one concept of power, since no single concept can capture all of its forms. To this end, the authors have generated the 'taxonomy of four types of power", which incorporates Compulsory, Institutional, Structural, and Productive types of power, thus, encouraging scholars to see its multiple forms (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 39-75). According to Baldwin (2012: 18), power analysis is simultaneously one of the oldest, but also one of the most promising approaches to study world politics for the years ahead.

III. NYE'S FRAMES OF POWER

As the discipline of international relations was evolving, the rigid interpretation of power slowly started to change. In particular, Joseph Nye (1990: 167) argued that that the changing nature of international framework has re-emphasized the use of intangible forms of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions. The growing social mobilization make the factors of technology, education, and economic growth as, if not more, significant as geography, population, and resources. Conversely, Baldwin (2012: 15) argued that the importance of military force has been previously exaggerated, while the role of nonmilitary forms of power has been underestimated.

Nye splits power into two forms: hard and soft. For the purposes of this paper, the author is going to adopt Nye's definition of power: as an ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes one wants (1990:154). Moreover, this paper adopts Nye's forms of power as a framework for the analysis. Hard and soft power can be considered two pure forms of power.

POWER

HARD   **SOFT**

Hard or command power is the oldest form of power; it is connected to the idea of an anarchic international system, where countries do not recognize any superior authority and thus have to focus on power politics. Hard power is defined as an ability to reach one's goals through coercive actions or threats, the so-called 'carrots' and 'sticks' of international politics. Historically, hard power has been measured by such criteria as population size, territory, geography, natural resources, military force, and economic strength.

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others, without the use of force, coercion or violence, but through intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority (Nye, 2008: 95). Legitimacy is central for soft power.

One of the roots of soft power could be traced to Steven Lukes' argument on the third face of power (Lukes, 1974). The first face of power was associated with Dahl (1961), who stated that an actor who wins the argument or an issue has the power. Alternatively, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argued that Dahl's approach neglected a second 'face' of power represented by the suppression of some issues, thus, in effect, keeping them from being considered. In other words, the second face refers to the ability to set the agenda (Baldwin, 2012: 5). Lukes (1974) introduced the third face of power; illustrating the ability of an actor A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do is to affect B's preferences, desires or thoughts. The first two faces of power describe how power can be used to get someone to do what you want them to, even if it against their own will. Conversely, the third face of power described how power could manipulate by changing what they want.

In another example, one could trace the roots soft power in Carr's (1946: 108) writings when he equated divided power into three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion. Military and economic powers are obviously the attributes of hard power, while the power over opinion could be viewed as the variant of Nye's soft power.

To reiterate, legitimacy is central soft power. When a state is able to sincerely attract and convince other with use of its values and set of practices, the country is considered to

have an effective soft power. For instance, the Fulbright program is an influential and aspect of American educational soft power. In another example, Hollywood and Broadway are significant aspects of American cultural soft power.

Although the co-optive power and soft power resources – cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions – are not new (Nye, 1990a: 167), it is only now that soft power is growing in its theoretical and practical recognition; thus the theory is in urgent need of a comprehensive research.

IV. ISSUES OF SOFT POWER

The debates over soft power often suffer from not addressing its conceptual, institutional, and practical implications. This paper will outline some of these issues.

Conceptual Ambiguity

One of the key problems associated with the theory of soft power is the ambiguity with regards to its resources. There are discrepancies with regards to defining resources of soft power. This issue is addressed in this section.

To reiterate, the resources of hard power are straightforward and simple. Historically, hard power has been measured by such criteria as population size, territory, natural resources, military force, and social stability (Nye and Armitage, 2007: 6).


In contrast, soft power resources are more complex, both in categorization and in nature. In behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction (Nye, 2008).

According to Nye (2008: 96), soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its **culture** (in places where it is attractive to others), **its political values** (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its **foreign policies** (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority):

1) Culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations.

2) Government policies at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power. Similarly, foreign policies strongly affect soft power. Government policies can reinforce or diminish a country's soft power.

3) Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical and indifferent to the opinion of others or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power (Pallaver, 2011: 95).

```
                    Soft power (Nye)

        Culture      Political        Foreign
                      values          policies
```

In evaluating soft power components, Jonathan McClory (2011: 10) expanded on Nye's pillars and assessed the soft power of countries according to five categories: **Government** (political values of the country), **Culture** (set of practices that created meaning for the society), **Diplomacy** (foreign policy), **Education**, and **Business/Innovation**. McClory (2011: 11) took Education outside of the cultural resource category because he felt that a number of references to higher education's impact on soft power warranted a separate sub-index. The author further added the Business/Innovation sub-index to capture the relative attractiveness of a country's economic model in terms of its openness and capacity for innovation.

```
                    Soft power (McClory)

  Government   Culture   Diplomacy   Education   Business/
                                                 Innovation
```

McClory's research proposes an updated categorization of soft power resources. However, one could disagree with McClory's conceptualization as his five pillars might be regarded as not equivalent in the analytical sense. Calling the sub-indexes 'Government' and 'Business' is a potential source of confusion; it is unclear whether they represent the vehicles

or the agents of soft power. Business/Innovation index could refer to the business as the agent of soft power or the specific business policies, implement by the state or other actors. Furthermore, today the resources of soft power are numerous: history, culture, arts, education, business environment, sport achievements, tourism industry and more.

It is important to clearly and coherently view the soft power resources and distinguish between the vehicles and the agents (implementers) of soft power. In an attempt to address these issues, I propose the following framework.

The Pyramid of Soft Power Resources

In the presented pyramid, one can visualize the following categorization of resources:

1. **The AGENTS** -> this addresses the persons/organization that create and implement the soft power initiatives? (MNEs; NGOs; Private sector; Individuals; Networks; Civil society; Hybrids, etc).

2. **The PILLARS** -> this refers to the spheres where soft power is created? (Foreign politics; Domestic politics; Culture & History; Education & Science; Business; Creative industries; Technologies; Tourism; Sport; Environment, etc).

3. **The INSTRUMENTS** -> This addresses the specific instruments/vehicles through which the soft power is activated/instrumentalized? Laws and policies; Agreements (domestic, regional, int'l); Programs (e.g. in foreign exchanges, cultural diplomacy, nation-branding, etc) Events, conferences, exhibitions, concerts, symposia; publications; etc.

The pyramid consists of three levels. The order of the levels has a logical nuance to it, however the pyramid can be read from top-down, as well as the other way round. It is

important to note that this model does not examine the goals of soft power. The key idea is the examination of the pillar/resources of soft power, how and where it is activated.

Let's consider the following examples. If one looks at the American Fulbright program, it is a **state** initiative in the sphere of **education**, which is realized through the instrument of **exchange programs.** Alternatively, one can look at the activity of the British Council. This organization represents a **hybrid** of a state and non-state organization, which is active in the spheres of **culture, creative industries and education**, and completes its initiatives through various **programs, publications** and organization of **events**. The presented model is a variation of the conceptualization of soft power, further development is both possible and necessary. It is necessary to note that this model is *work in progress*.

Soft power actors

One of the key ideas of the pyramid is to emphasize the changing nature of soft power actors. To understand soft power in the current global context, a methodological change is required. In particular, one of the theoretical ambiguities stems from the notion of who are its agents/implementers. The model proposed in the thesis emphasizes the following agents of soft power: States, NGOs, Civil society, MNEs and network of actors.

Nation-states The traditional actor of soft power is the state, which implements initiatives through various state agencies. However, the state is no longer the only actor able to build and mobilize soft power. The new global context requires governments to integrate other agents in its decision-making process (Bolewski, 2008). Many non-traditional actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations, civil society groups and individuals are becoming significant power players.

NGOs With the proliferation of media technologies, the credibility of national government today is often suspect; hence, one could argue that the political control should be removed from soft power initiatives (Mark, 2009). The 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer ranked NGOs as the world's most trusted institution − the seventh year in a row that they have come out on top of business, media and governments (Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014: 2). NGOs can be defined as professionalized independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level (Martens, 2002: 277). As stated before, legitimacy is central to soft power (Nye and Armitage, 2007: 6) and NGOs can provide the objectivity and transparency. Unlike state and market institutions, which are driven by the need for social control and profit, NGOs are interested, primarily in building communities. They are generally smaller in size than the states, not as bureaucratic in their management styles, and have gained legitimacy as a result of their effectiveness and accountability. Indeed, NGOs are often viewed as powerful and legitimate players because of their organizational priorities and grassroots foundation. However, the bottom-up initiatives

are often indirectly dependent on the top-down institutions and inevitably there is some level of connection with the political actors (Sanyal, 1998). Moreover, as argued by Nye and Armitage (2007: 49), certain elements of public diplomacy will always remain in the government's purview since it is linked to the national interest and policy objectives.

In view of such issues, perhaps the responsibility for soft power needs to be transferred to independent entities such as British Council (Mark, 2009: 34), whose arm's length connection with the government is highly acclaimed for its success (Bound, et al. 2007). An alternative model to the British Council is to establish an independent entity within a foreign service, accountable to an independent board (Mark, 2007: 34).

MNEs Multinational corporations are another source of co-optive power (Nye, 1990: 168). On many issues, private actors and small states have become more powerful than states. The following has contributed to this diffusion of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues, as well as modernization, urbanization, and increased communication in developing countries (Nye, 1990: 160-162).

In the recent years, businesses across the world started to actively pursue corporate social responsibility and thus have an incentive to support soft power strategies. Companies are embedding corporate social responsibility into their policies and processes based on the conviction that the environmental, economic and social sustainability of communities are part of ensuring long-term business sustainability (UNAC and UNGC, 2010). Using private organizations to conduct public diplomacy can be advantageous. However, there are weaknesses such as lack of controlled over transmitted message and the difficulty of taking relationships outside the private sector (Buckle, 2012: 16). There is also the question of for-profit versus non-for-profit imperative. Finally, it might be difficult to control where the private sector chooses to invest. Nevertheless, private sector is potentially a powerful player that could aid in building and sustaining soft power.

Cooperation In view of the various issues and shortcomings of the state, NGOs and MNEs, one could argue for the constructive cooperation among the global actors. This refers to both the networks including several countries, as well as the alliance of the principally different global actors. Although the triple alliance between the state, market, and civil society are rare (Sanyal, 1998), the collective action problem makes it more likely to occur. In fact, there is evidence that in the current global framework, the establishment of networks is a key point in establishing or sustaining power and influence. The networks are becoming important and the positioning in current international network is an important power resource (Nye, 2011b: 17). So the power will likely to shift towards multifaceted networks and coalitions in a multipolar world (Nat'l Intelligence Council, 2012). In sum, the ambiguity of the actors of soft power is one of the concept's complex areas.

Inadequate institutional support

Another issues that complicates the promotion of soft power is the inadequate institutional support for its research and activities. Bureaucratic structures are often a barrier towards an efficient and effective production of soft power. A significant challenge of soft power programs is that they lack integration and coordination. In the U.S., for instance, the programs that promote American soft power are fractured and spread across many agencies and departments (Nye and Armitage, 2007: 7). The gross asymmetries between the institutional landscape of hard and soft power point to the necessity of revision of the existing institutional support for different forms of power. In the real world of public policy, the powers to coerce and the powers to persuade are spread across a variety of agencies. The allies of hard power are much more numerous, visible, and powerful than soft power counterparts. The proponents of soft power and its wider introduction into foreign policy making exist as s public intellectuals in various think tanks and universities, or the occasional consulting group (Wilson, 2008: 119).

The institutional reality is that the soft power institutions are in a subordinate position, lacking the resources and clout of their hard power counterparts (Wilson, 2008: 117). Hence, soft power requires more advocates and better financial and institutional support. A significant barrier is the mentality of the policy-makers and practitioners. Many support soft power initiatives in principle, but tend to give it a low priority in practice, since have to deal with a wider range of issues, within a shorter timeframe and on tighter budgets (Mark, 2009: 3). Meanwhile, to affect change, it is not enough to have a few proponents of soft power; the ideas need to be accepted and followed on the institutional and policy levels. In sum, the challenges of soft power agencies in budget, clout, and organizational effectiveness must be redressed as a serious matter (Wilson, 2008: 121).

Sustainability issues

Inadequate institutional framework for soft power ultimately leads to the sustainability issues. Long-term and substantive change in public diplomacy outcomes is also one of the most difficult to achieve (Banks, 2001: 31). The problem with public or cultural diplomacy initiatives is that they end up becoming one-time events. For example, instead of sending local artists for one concert in another country, it is more effective to set-up an exchange program for few artists to allow the continuous transfer of skills and experience.

Estimation difficulties

One of the key reasons why soft power is not widely acknowledged is not because it is difficult for practitioners who see the immediate results of investing into it. Due to the fact that hard power manifests in a very practical and concrete way, its effects are easier to see and

measure (Pallaver, 2011: 81). In contrast, the results of soft power initiatives are often intangible, with benefits not being visible until many years after the implementation of the programs. This, however, does not mean that it is not worth the investments; one the contrary, while the effects of soft power might takes months or years to see, it may be more satisfying and efficient than hard power. Soft power looks at the long-term goals and vision. Building soft power often requires a sustained effort spanning years, if not decades (McClory, 2011: 23).

Since no metric exists, qualitative measurements such as interviews and polls will most likely serve as the best feedback for the soft power initiatives. Whether a particular asset is an attractive soft power resource can be measured through polls or focus groups (Nye, 2008: 95). It is also worth noting that the difficulties of measuring the inputs versus the outcomes of initiatives are not unique to soft power, but occur with all forms of power (Nye, 2008: 95). However, since soft power is more complex than hard power, it requires a more sophisticated set of expertise and skills (Pallaver, 2011: 96). The lack of appropriate skills is often attributed to the fact that soft power does not have an adequate institutional support from the side of the government. This results in initiatives being hard to measure, lacking financial support, and not being sustainable.

V. HOLISTIC APPROACH: SMART POWER

In view of all the issues with soft power, one should not be hasty in abandoning other types of power. Evidently, soft power can be derived from a broad range of sources, but successfully leveraging it can only be achieved through a careful and balanced approach. The governments need to understand their soft power assets, see whether they can be mobilized by the state, and, if so, where and how they might be deployed (McClory, 2011: 5). The new global paradigm makes renegotiation of international relations and reshaping of policies are very important (Bound et al, 2007). However, ultimately, one needs to realize that soft power cannot be a remedy recipe for all the cases. Some foreign policy objectives are better suited to soft power strategies, while others are not and, therefore, the specialists must establish clear objectives. An important consideration is to ask what the initiatives and power is used for (Nye, 1990: 160). Any power decision requires a careful assessment of different factors. Pallaver (2011: 97-99) rationalizes the decision-making process and the choice of power frames in four-steps: understanding the context, appropriate power choice, the effectiveness of power solution for the outcomes, and the successful implementation of agenda.

Wergin (2014) of the New York Times argues that, in case of the U.S., for instance, soft power cannot replace hard power. According to him, soft power is merely a complementary foreign policy tool that can yield results only when it is backed up by real might. This brings up a question, whether you need soft power at all, if you have a strong

hard power. The intuition - in current global climate - would be yes, since becoming influential in the international relations of the 21st century will require shaping narratives, setting international norms and mobilizing transnational networks. The credibility and the maintenance of international support is the essence of soft power (Nye, 2004: 8-9).

The currently reality of the international relations demonstrates that it is necessary to approach soft and hard power together, rather than separately. In fact, the classic distinction between realpolitik and liberalism becomes blurred; hard power and soft power often interact and reinforce each other (Nye, 1990; Nye, 2004). Both are ultimately related because they both represent the ability to achieve a desired goal by affecting the behavior of others and, thus, are inextricably intertwined (Nye, 2004).

The ability to skilfully combine hard and soft power for the development of integrated strategies is called smart power (Nye and Armitage, 2007: 7). In other words, smart power is the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that the actor's goals are advanced effectively and efficiently (Wilson, 2008: 115). Soft power alone may not be sufficient, but its relative strategic importance compared to hard power will continue to increase (McClory, 2011: 24). Smart power advocates need to articulate the advantages of hard power, such as strong military, in combination with investing in alliances, partnerships and institutions. If hard power is 'push' and soft power is 'pull', the combination allows leveraging maximum results in a legitimate way (Nye, 2011b: 19). As an approach that goes further hard and soft, it fits well into the current realm of international relations.

Smart power can take on different forms. What has been called smart power is in fact a combination of diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural tools, and the European Union could be regarded as one of the best examples of this (Pallaver, 2011: 20). Manners (2000) defines EU's power as normative power because of its ability to shape international norms in its own image. The EU, like many political actors, has the economic tools and military power, but the author suggests that these are secondary to its ability to shape what passes for normal in international relations, and which undoubtedly has utilitarian, social, moral, and narrative dimensions to it (Manners, 2000: 31).

Given the complexity of the conceptual, institutional, political, and cultural issues, smart power will not be easy to achieve in the short term (Wilson, 2008: 122). First and foremost, however, smart power is the recognition of the different forms of power and the instruments it can employ. As a newly discovered concept, smart power requires further studies. However, one can logically propose that, if hard and soft power has its resources, so does smart power. This paper will look at smart through its resources, not as an ability or combine hard and soft power resources. The author accepts that smart power is an ability to combine two forms or power; however, also views smart power through its resources. Hence, in the context of this paper, smart power resource is defined as a tool that can attribute to both

hard and soft power. In the next section, the researcher is going to refer to her PhD materials and briefly illustrate how education potentially represents a tool of smart power.

VI. EDUCATION: A SMART POWER TOOL

Soft power resource

Education is an effective resource of soft power. For instance, the attractiveness of the American higher education system contributes to the country's soft power. Furthermore, the exchange programs such as Fulbright and Humphrey allow the potential enrichment of both host and home countries in various areas. The exchange programs have extremely useful in creating favorable impressions (Finn, 2003). Educational programs shape opinion and create goodwill among its participants. The exchanges also trigger beneficial 'ripple effects' on indirect participants, meaning that the influence is wider than anticipated (Olberding, J. and Olberding, 2010). For instance, a thesis by Medalis (2011) reveals that Fulbright program has largely contributed to the qualitative development of the Hungarian higher education system through its graduates. Not all of the soft power investments create equal outcomes, and there is a hierarchy of outcomes depending on the issues of time (sustainability) and scale (of change) (Banks, 2011: 30). Education is arguably one of the more effective forms of soft power and cultural diplomacy.

Hard power resource

However, apart from contributing to soft power, education has also the ability to affect hard power, specifically, the state's economic strength through the development human capital. Human capital is defined as a productive wealth embodied in labour, skills and knowledge (United Nations, 1997) or, alternatively, as 'the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic activity (OECD, 1998:9). As it generally refers to acquisition of skills and know-how through education; hence, the majority of studies use education-related proxies to determine the quality of human capital.

From studies on income growth, it became increasingly evident that less tangible resources, such as the knowledge, play a larger role than formerly believed (Becker, 1962: 9). Many studies on the human capital focus on the economic behaviour of individuals, especially on the way their accumulation of knowledge and skills enables them to increase their productivity and their earnings and in so doing, to increase the productivity of the societies they live in. Numerous scholars have found positive correlations between education and economic growth, among them Barro (1991), Mankiw (1977), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Barro and Lee (1993), Krueger and Lindahl (2001). The implication of a human capital perspective is that investment in knowledge and skills brings economic returns, individually and therefore collectively (Schuller, 2001: 5).

Naturally, the relationship between education and growth is not simple or linear. Furthermore, several studies reveal little correlation between education and growth (Basu and Bhattarai, 2012). In example, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (1996) come to this conclusion for a large sample of countries. Merely increasing the stock of human capital in any given society will not ensure social or economic progress (Schuller, 2001: 10). However, the literature review has revealed that the discrepancies in the existing studies are mainly attributed to various estimation methods and employed variables. The results over the relationship between human capital and growth may be biased due to the measurement error in the study, and that education positively correlates with economic growth when the measurement error in considered for (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). Hence, one can argue for the positive relationship between human capital investments and economic growth, given appropriate tools and context. This makes education a potentially 'smart' power resource, as it contributes both to soft and hard power of the country.

CONCLUSION

This paper has provided an evaluation of some of the key issues pertaining to the forms of power in international relations. The value of soft power is rising in today's climate; however, numerous issues prevent its appropriate recognition and deployment, including conceptual ambiguity, estimation difficulties, inadequate institutional support, and sustainability issues. The paper also outlined the topicality of a smart power frame, which leverages assets in a skillful combination of hard and soft power. Finally, a key question today is no longer whether soft and smart powers matter, but how and when. Hence, education was presented as a form of 'smart' power. It was argued that education represents not only a 'soft' power tool, but also a 'hard' power instrument, as educational investments are able to impact economic growth through the proliferation of human capital. The issue of education as a tool of 'smart' power is in need of further theoretical and empirical studies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arendt, H., 1970. *On Violence*. Harvest Books. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S., 1962. Two Faces of Power. *American Political Science Review,* 56: 947-52.

Baldwin, D. A. 2012. *Power and International Relations*, in Handbook of International Relations. [online] Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20(2012)%20Power%20and%20International%20Relations.pdf) [accessed on 25 January 2016]

Banks, R., 2011. *A resource guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation.* Los Angeles: Figueora Press [pdf]

Barnett, M. and Duvall, R., 2005. Power in International Politics. *International Organization*, 59(1) [pdf]

Barro R., 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106(2) [pdf]

Barro, R. J., and Lee, J., 1993. International Comparisons of Educational Attainment. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 32(3), [pdf].

Basu, P. and Bhattarai, K., 2012. Government Bias in Education, Schooling Attainment, and Long-Run Growth. *Southern Economic Journal*, 79(1): 127-143.

Becker, G.S., 1962. Investment in Human Capital: A theoretical analysis. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 70(5), [pdf]

Benhabib, J. and Spiegel, M., 1994. The role of human capital in economic development. Evidence from aggregate cross-countries data. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 34: 143–173.

Bierstedt, R., 1950. An Analysis of Social Power. *American Sociological Review*, 15(6).

Bolewski, W., 2008. Diplomatic Processes and Cultural Variations: The Relevance of Culture in Diplomacy. *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* [pdf]

Bound, K., Briggs, R., Holden, J., & Jones, S., 2007. *Culture is a central component of international relations. It's time to unlock its full potential*. London: Demos [pdf]

Buckle, A. E., 2012. The New Diplomacy: Devising a Relational Model of Public Diplomacy. *The University of Tennessee*, [online] Available at: http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit/vol3/iss2/3/ [accessed on 5 May 2014]

Carr, H. E., 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations*. New York: Harper and Row.

Checkel, J., 2001. Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change. *International Organization*, 55(3), [pdf]

Dahl, R., 1957. The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2: 201–215.

Dahl, R., 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, R., 1968. "Power", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12,* New York: Collier-Macmillan.

Dahl, R. A. 1979. A Review of "Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined". *Social Science Quarterly,* 60: 144-151.

Dauvergne, P. and LeBaron, G., 2014. Corporatizing activism. *Open Democracy*, 14 March 2014. An article from www.eurozine.com, [pdf]

Doran, C. F., 2000. Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle: Changing Systems Structure, Expectations, and War. In *Handbook of War Studies Volume II*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. University of Michigan Press.

Doran, C.F., 2003. Economics, Philosophy of History, and the "Single Dynamic" of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft. *International Political Science Review,* 24(1): 13–49

Doran, C. F. and Parsons, W., 1980. War and the Cycle of Relative Power. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(4): 947-965.

Dunne, T., Kurki, M., and Smith, S., 2013. *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity.* Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finn, H.K., 2003. The Case for Cultural Diplomacy. *Foreign Affairs*, 82(6), [pdf]

Gallie, W. B., 1956. Essentially Contested Concepts. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *New Series*, 56, pp. 167- 198

Giddens, A., 1968. Power in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons, *Sociology*, 2.

Hart, J., 1976. Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations, *International Organization*, 30(2).

Hebron, L., James, P., Rudy, M., 2007. Testing Dynamic Theories of Conflict: Power Cycles, Power Transitions, Foreign Policy Crises and Militarized Interstate Disputes. *International Interactions*, 33(1).

Keohane, R., and Martin, L., 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. *International Security*, 20(1) [pdf]

Kissane, D., 2005. *Curves, Conflict and Critical Points: Rethinking Power Cycle Theory for the Twenty-First Century*. Thesis. University of South Australia, [pdf].

Krueger, A. and Lindahl, M., 2001. Education for growth: why and for whom? *Journal of Economic Literature XXXIX*: 1101–36.

Lasswell, H. D. and Kaplan, A. (1950) *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lukes, S. 1974. *Power: A Radical View, second ed.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mankiw, N., 1997. Comment on 'The Neoclassical Revival in growth Economics: Has it gone too far?' NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, 1997.

Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D. and Weil, D. N., 1992. A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107.

Manners, I., 2000. Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms? *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute*, Working Paper 38 [pdf].

Mark, S., 2009. A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy, paper. *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, Clingendael [pdf].

Martens, K., 2002. Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations*, 13(3): 271-285.

Martin, R., 1971, The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 22(3).

McClory, J., 2011. The New Persuaders II. A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power. *Institute for Government* [pdf]

Mearsheimer, J., 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Medalis, C., 2011. American Cultural Diplomacy, the Fulbright Program, and U.S.-Hungarian higher education relations in the twentieth century. Ph.D. Columbia University [pdf]

Moravcsik, A., 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), [pdf].

Morgenthau, J. H., 1954. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

National Intelligence Council, 2012. *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* [pdf]

Nye, J. S Jr., 1990. Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*, 80 [pdf]

Nye, J.S. Jr., 1990b. The changing nature of world power. *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2): 177-192.

Nye, Joseph S. (1990c) *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.

Nye, J. S. Jr., 2004, *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, Public Affairs: New York.

Nye, J. S. Jr., 2008. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 616(94) [pdf]

Nye, Joseph S. (2011) *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs.

Nye, J. S. Jr., 2011b. Power and foreign policy, *Journal of Political Power*. 4(1)

Nye, J.S. Jr. and Armitage, R.L., 2007. CSIS Commission on Smart Power. A smarter, more secure America *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* Washington [pdf]

OECD, 1998. *Human Capital Investment: An International* Comparison. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Centre for Educational Research and Innovation).

Olberding, J. and Olberding, D., 2010. Ripple Effects in Youth Peacebuilding and Exchange Programs: Measuring Impacts Beyond Direct Participants. *International Studies Perspectives*, 11.

Pallaver, M., 2011. *Power and its Forms: Hard, Soft, Smart*. MPhil. London School of Economics [pdf]

Parsons, T., 1967. *On the Concept of Political Power*, in T. Parsons (ed.), Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: The Free Press

Pritchett, L. 2001: Where has all the education gone? World Bank Economic Review 15, 367–91.

Risse, T., 2001. Let's Argue: Communicative Action in International Relations. *International Organization*, 54(1) [pdf]

Ross, C., 2002. Public Diplomacy Comes of Age. *The Washington Quarterly*, 25(2)

Sabadie, J.A. and Johansen, J., 2010. How Do National Economic Competitiveness Indices View Human Capital? *European Journal of Education* 45(2) [pdf]

Sanyal, B., 1998. The Myth of Development from below. MIT [online], Available at: http://web.mit.edu/sanyal/www/articles/Myth%20of%20Dev.pdf [accessed on 5 May 2014]

United Nations, 1997. *Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in Methods*, Series F, No. 67. New York: UN.

UNAC and UNGC, 2010/05. Joint report. *Doing Business in a Multicultural World: Challenges and Opportunities*. UN Alliance of Civilizations and the UN Global Compact Office. [pdf]

Walt, M. S., 2002. The Enduring Relevance of the Realist tradition. In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W.W. Norton

Weber, M., 1947, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. By A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons*. Glencoe: The Free Press.

Wendt, A., 1995. Constructing International Politics. *International Security*, 20(1)

Wergin, C., 2014. Is Obama's Foreign Policy too European? *The New York Times*, [online], Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/opinion/clemens-wergin-is-obamas-foreign-policy-too-european.html?_r=0 [accessed 28 January 2015]

Wilson, E.J, III, 2008. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 [pdf]