The Church-State(s) Problem: The Holy See in the International Theoretical (or theological) Marketplace.

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Abstract

Blink, and one might miss the Holy See on the international plane, although it hides in plain sight. With accredited diplomatic representatives from 180 countries, the Holy See enjoys widespread recognition of its perhaps idiosyncratic sovereignty claims. These claims are the jump-off point for this paper; the tangled legal skein they represent notwithstanding, there is no compelling argument to exclude Holy See from the International System.

In parsing the well-rehearsed arguments against Holy See sovereignty (i.e. its capacity to conduct international relations at all) we find that, rather, it is more the case of competing meta-narratives with at least equally questionable sets of assumptions. In the blue corner, the historically contingent reality of the 'Westphalian' secular world order; and in the red corner, the historically subversive Kingdom of God.

It is a matter of reclaiming the term 'subversive', of course – it is heavily leaden by the 'is-ought' problem. Students of International Relations [IR] are subjected frequently to an account of the development of International Society which situates the 'secular breakwater' in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in post-Reformation Germany.

Religion abided, and did not 'resurge' after September 11th 2001. Religion, in fact, had been, and continued to be instrumentalised by the same state-system that claimed to deprecate religion as inherently destabilising. Colonial contexts were rife with Protestant providentialism married to laissez-faire Capitalism after a Weberian fashion. Catholicism, likewise, was instrumentalised against Communism there and in Europe after 1848.

This paper has a two-step conclusion. a.) that, for all the foregoing reasons, legalistic 'existentialism' to remove the Holy See as an object of study is a scholarly dead-end and b.) we ought therefore to concentrate on what has happened when the Holy See has forayed into International Relations. The Holy See's sovereignty should be a basis for demanding accountability; rather than hand-wringing that it be denied or otherwise written out of existence.

Keywords: 1648 (Myth of); Holy See; International Relations; Liberal Capitalism; Montevideo Convention; Papacy; Religion; Roman Catholic Church; Secularism; Sovereignty; Statehood; Vatican City State; Westphalia.
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Introduction

The Holy See, the Vatican City State, or the papacy? An itemisation of 'subjects of Public international law' will include, straightforwardly, 'the states' but then, extraordinarily, 'The Holy See', almost as a *sui generis* category unto itself. That represents the essential truth – The Holy See is a sovereign office, having a unique capacity to engage in International Relations. The Catholic papacy thus *is* the Holy See, and especially in the medieval sense of how sovereignty *de jure* lay in a crown (or in this instance, three crowns),† rather than control of a *de facto* territory.

The Vatican City State, thus, is *not* The Holy See. The Vatican City State *is* a territorial tract ceded to the Holy See (again presuming the latter's capacity to be a high-contracting party, i.e. a sovereign) in 1929, by the Kingdom of Italy within the terms of the Lateran Treaty.² Before the Holy See is accredited to the United Nations in 1964, as a 'permanent non-member state observer' (my emphasis), its delegation is at pains to emphasise to the UN Secretary General that it be seated in the General Assembly as "The Holy See" and not "The Vatican City State" for the reason that "this would unduly stress the *temporal* aspects of the Holy See's sovereignty"³ (my emphasis).

We labour this point at the outset because of how much heat, rather than light, the 'temporal' aspects of the Holy See's sovereignty generate. Particularly in Ireland, in light of the country’s recently fraught diplomatic relations with the Holy See,⁴ a strain of commentary has arisen that fundamentally questions whether "the Vatican is a 'real' country" and therefore if the Holy See is an entity we should exchange credentials with. These really should be dissociated questions.

Factually addled accounts emanate from the self-styled 'rationalist' and 'secularist' lobby-group, *Atheist Ireland*, who claim that the Holy See is 'only' treated as a state because it started to issue stamps for worldwide postage in 1929.⁵ This strange tale is repeated by none other than public intellectual Eamonn McCann, in Ireland's leading broadsheet newspaper, the *Irish Times*, seemingly without attribution.⁶ It is with some irony then that this may as well be a description
of a parallel universe, delivered with all the methodological rigour of a bartender.

Legally, that is to say in our reality, the Holy See was already adjudged to have sovereignty and legal standing such that it could sign international instruments in the 1920s. Overtures were made to the Holy See to join The League of Nations, before Mussolini ever came to power (but it declined these) while it also signed twenty-nine treaties with other states between 1870 and 1923 (before the Vatican City State ever came in to existence.)\textsuperscript{7} It was not a reverse-procedure whereby a prior non-governmental organisation could achieve sovereignty by attaching itself to as pettifogging and mundane a convention as one on an Universal Postal Union\textsuperscript{8}

And that term, non-governmental organisation (NGO), or sometimes 'non-state actor', is one frequently misapplied by those who set out to describe the Catholic Church in its global setting. David Ryall enlarges on this in an edited volume of essays itself misleadingly titled \textit{Non-State Actors in World Politics}:

'It is more accurate to talk about Catholic NGOs rather than the Church as a whole conforming to that category since the Holy See is a state, albeit the \textit{world's smallest}, and exhibits \textit{all the characteristics of a state} within an anarchical environment.' (my emphases)\textsuperscript{9}

As Pope Francis put it bluntly only nine months ago: 'The Church is not an NGO.'\textsuperscript{10} Branches of 'interpretivist' International Law scholarship, which largely harmonise with 'Liberal' International Relations theory across the disciplinary divide,\textsuperscript{11} do challenge whether the Holy See can be considered to meet the criteria of a 'true' sovereign. The size of the Vatican City State is most frequently implicated. Though this argumentation is neither as plainly dis-satisfactory, nor nakedly political as the popular perceptions we have instanced, it remains unsatisfying.

This paper first considers the interpretivist arguments and upon finding them incapable of being meaningfully generalised, proposes, secondly, that the elephant in the room is a \textit{general} bias in International Relations which always comes down against religion as 'undesirable' because it is a variable that is \textit{per se} generative of 'international anarchy'.\textsuperscript{12} This argument for the status-quo takes for granted the present coherence and basic 'goodness' of the international system. Such
assumptions seem to rest on just as much wishful, and 'is-ought' thinking as the formal theologies that are deprecated. Such assumptions also take succour from an anachronistic understanding of the Treaty of Westphalia, concluded in 1648.

Finally, we contend that keeping the Holy See enmeshed within the International Order as a subject of Public International Law would confer more advantages than not, if it must come down to a question of relative gains.

1.1 – Why a Vatican at all?

It is notable that this year marks the 20th anniversary of the UN Population Conference at Cairo, in 1994. We are thus, in the parlance of the UN, at 'Cairo +20' and overdue a new plenary session. These are normally staggered at 10 year intervals, but in this case the opportunity was passed over in 2004; and the United Nations Population Fund Agency (UNFPA) regards the Cairo Accords as a steering document (a mandate renewed in 2011 by vote of the General Assembly). While it is thus unclear if a general summit will be convened this year, it is revealing that the discernible moment at which scholarship began to interrogate the Holy See’s statehood was the occasion of the 1994 conference.

The Holy See, as we have mentioned, is seated as a non-member, state observer in the UN General Assembly. This does not give it voting rights as such, because it has not ratified the UN Charter (particularly Chapter VII, inst.); but within conferences of the UN agencies, the emergence of a consensus preference permits the Holy See to exercise effective veto over final 'outcome' documents. Holy See delegates thus frustrated the work of the Cairo conference at the instruction of Pope John Paul II, in 1994, over concerns that an 'internationalisation' of access to abortion was afoot. The Holy See was able to obstruct the conference’s progress for three days, prompting howls of diplomatic protest, and the intervention of a liberal Catholic reproductive rights group, 'Catholics for a Free Choice' who circulated a petition afterwards asking 'Should the Roman Catholic Church continue to be treated as a state?'.

5
We might remark that the 'well was poisoned' from the outset for any academic enquiry by these normative considerations. Nevertheless, the argument presented by Yasmin Abdullah in the Columbia Law Review two years afterwards (1996) has proved enduring, and is widely imitated,\textsuperscript{17} so that it ought to be given a hearing in good faith. That argument is simply recounted: the Holy See is in fact an NGO, and not a state, because it is 'fundamentally a religious entity.'\textsuperscript{18} We take careful note of this syllogism, but will explore its implications below (see 1.2).

In specific, Abdullah determines that the Montevideo Convention of 1933, on the Rights and Duties of States, carries customary weight within International Law.\textsuperscript{19} Abdullah accepts that the Holy See was a 'traditional sovereign' until 1870, and the loss of the Papal States, but is adamant that when it acquired the Vatican City State in 1929 '[its] claim to statehood [became] based on some relationship of the two entities.'\textsuperscript{20} Thereby Abdullah inveigles the size of the Vatican City State into the argument, and try to show incompatibility with the Montevideo Convention

She concedes the popularity of the 'theory' that the Vatican City State is the 'vassal' of a sovereign Holy See.\textsuperscript{21} If it is mere 'theory', then Abdullah has difficulty in explaining how the Holy See carried on International Relations and exchanged ambassadors with nations other than Italy between 1870 and 1929, such that it could ratify International instruments (see above.)

Certainly, if the Montevideo Convention comprises a 'test' of statehood, then the Holy See/Vatican City State might score poorly:

'\textit{The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a.) a permanent population, b.) a defined territory, c.) government and d.) capacity to enter into relations with other states.}'\textsuperscript{22}

Abdullah identifies the problems as follows: for a.), the Vatican City State's population is not permanent in the sense of being self-renewing,\textsuperscript{23} (this is true); while with b.), its defined territory is too small (109 acres)\textsuperscript{24} – although Montevideo specifies no calculus, Abdullah considers the obligation here to be read together with d.), how 'capacity' to enter into relations with other states presumes sufficiency, or an independence of some kind.\textsuperscript{25} The Holy See is indicted for
compelling Italy to supply it with water, gas, electricity and waste disposal free of charge under
the Lateran Treaty. Finally, c.), and again, we note this for our later attention, Abdullah contends
that the 'government' of a transnational religion cannot also, simultaneously, be one of
a sovereign state (see 1.2 below.)

Abdullah acknowledges that she holds a 'declaratory' view of statehood, where legal positivists
(she is an interpretivist) would sooner hold the 'constitutive' view of statehood, i.e. when a state
enjoys recognition from a vast majority of other states, it may be safely considered one. The
Holy See easily satisfies this definition (180 states recognise it.) But Abdullah misleads in
suggesting that the 'constitutive' view, although an invitation to capricious behaviour, is
anything other than the prevailing reality (or perhaps, in concession, haze) of International Law.
It is Abdullah's position (i.e. 'declaratory') which is at odds with current practice.

If Abdullah's position were a majority one, then it would be impossible for the International
Order to disbar Palestine, Taiwan (Republic of China), Western Sahara, Transnistria, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia or, most recently, Crimea. They all vault clear of Montevideo's rubric. Yet, the
break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992 was fuelled by recognitions of its break-away constituent states
(such as of Croatia by Germany), and even to depict an independent Kosovo on a map today is a
distinctly political act when it is not recognised by every country even amongst the European
Union's membership.

States which Abdullah neglects to instance, and which are far less controversial, would seem to
'fail' the test of statehood too, and so the implications of her thesis are wider than for the Holy
See alone. Monaco, Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein, et al. might be considered to lack a
proper 'capacity' to engage in relations with other states owing to their puny territorial size.
Neither does any of these enjoy the singular privilege which the Holy See does to have taxes
collected for it, from Catholics, by both the German and Italian governments.
Andorra, furthermore, is ruled jointly by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Urgell and the President of France, so does it fail criterion c), of 'government'? Further afield, does Iran's supreme political leader, an Ayatollah (i.e. high priest, or teacher) of Shi'ite Islam, deny it access to the community of nations? Iran's enemies are certainly apt to marginalise it within a touted 'axis of evil', but such a sentiment lacks any legal sensibility.

Finally, and perhaps fatally, Abdullah cannot even assume that Montevideo carries customary weight of International Law – why else would there be competing 'declaratory' and 'constitutive' views of statehood when Article 3 of the convention pertains to be definitive on that question?

To assume even then that it is customary: Montevideo cannot be considered, by the enumeration of states' rights and obligations, to thus dissolve or revoke the privileges and recognition granted before it entered into force, and which were between non-signatories anyway. Montevideo was drafted, as we have said, in 1933. The Vatican City State of 1929 cannot be impugned in this ex-post-facto way – and the Convention does not even claim it may be interpreted as doing so. In the event, the signatories to the Montevideo convention all recognise the Holy See (they are mainly Latin American, i.e. Catholic, nation-states.) The United Nations also reaffirmed that it adheres to an interpretation which recognises the Holy See's sovereignty, in 2004.

1.2 – Legalistic Existentialism

We can clearly see that what is doing the most work in Yasmin Abdullah's paper is her claim that statehood, or sovereignty, is incompatible with being a religious organisation, and especially a transnational religious organisation at that (see 1.1, variously, above.) As Ivan Vallier remarked long ago, 'in no way can the Vatican state be characterized as a nation-state' (my emphasis). He did not consider this to be any serious impediment to sovereignty or state-hood: 'The papacy stands, in all but a token way, differentiated from temporal or territorial bases of power' – it is mistaken to focus on the Vatican City State, or the 'token' entity, at all.
We suppose that Abdullah is only representative of a widely-held and resilient fable that the current state-system, undergirded by Public International Law, is nation-based 'by intention' stemming from the notional dawn of International Relations at Westphalia, in 1648. Abdullah herself cites the UN Charter (1945), where it proclaims the UN as a forum for bringing about pacific resolution to the disputes of nations (which can exist without states) and between nation-states.\(^{41}\)

This amounts to a form of what we coin as legalistic 'existentialism'; whose criteria and tests seem as prone to arbitrariness as the present model of 'constitutive' recognition of states by other states. We suspect that the weakness of the premises and turns of the 'declaratory' argument against the Holy See's status derives from a single conviction no stronger than this: that religions do not belong fully in IR because they ought not to. This exalts the conduct of nation-states above that of transnational religions as a question of basic legitimacy, with reference to their respective truth claims and mandates. This does not seem entirely wise given how nationhood, and even statehood itself, are just as figmentary. To live by such a sword would be to die by it too. Bound up with the general pretension of the superiority of the nation-states is a presumption of greater 'rationality' too – which we give in-depth consideration to next.

\textbf{2.1 – The Westphalian Presumption}

International Relations has been, is, and will probably continue to get it wrong about the Wars of Religion in Germany between 1523 and 1648. The 'Westphalian Presumption', i.e. the year 1648 marking the formation of the 'modern' state-system; or that 1648 was even 'Year Zero' of Public International Law, is rightly countered as mere 'mythos' by historians.\(^{42}\) However could a treaty settlement internal to the Holy Roman Empire, and separate from the treaties concluded individually between the Emperor and France, Sweden and the Netherlands, enjoy such significance? Myth, however, always serves some purpose. In this case the intellectual short-hand provided by the treaty done at Westphalia obscures the contingent, ramshackle nature of the 'secular politics' supposedly ushered in then.
The Treaty of Westphalia itself is denounced by Pope Innocent X (Giovanni Battista Pamphilj) contemporaneously; an indication perhaps of the feeling of a loss of Catholic power. However, the treaty assumes paradigmatic significance only much later - in the 19th century. That is to say, after the innovations of a post-Napoleonic European 'Concert System', and the first conscious acts of Public International Law (e.g. The Geneva Conventions). Westphalia is sought out, anachronistically, as a legal and moral antecedent for the behaviour of the European empires since.

After all the sectarian blood-letting of the Thirty Years' War a more 'enlightened' age allegedly had its fons et origo at Westphalia. International politics was going to be ever incrementally more 'rational' and 'stable' now, as a strict calculation of material interests and that of a 'balance of power' between competing European empires against 'hegemony'. How jolly a soldier might have felt then that he was dying for an altogether more high-minded cause: such as to prevent a Bourbon from inheriting the Spanish throne, between 1701 and 1713.

The frankly innumerable, internecine wars waged after Westphalia, and their steadily progressive indices of lethality, should make the point served by facetiousness even more apparent. 'Secular' and 'Rational' are the touchstones of what is merely self-aggrandising political theology. We choose that term for two reasons: a.) to demonstrate the lacklustre quality of its assumptions, and b.) because of how religion did not disappear into an ether of 'state interests' after 1648.

We give the former argument, [(a)] in further detail at 2.3, below. To make the latter argument [(b)] first: it is instead the case that the Protestant Reformation is precisely the moment at which religion more fully begins to serve the state and vice versa. The shock and response to the initial 'anarchy' let loose by Luther's rejection of papal authority (e.g. The Peasant's War) saw the man himself go to punt for even tighter religious control in the jurisdictions of the Protestant princes. This served both the respective religious confession and the state, by creating much prized 'stability of rule'. It was axiomatic that loyal subjects were invariably devout Christians;
so 'stability' (or conformity, obeisance etc.) was rather a function of religious belief and scarcely its absence. Westphalia, in this respect, is merely The Peace of Augsburg (1555) for slow-learners.50

Others such as the French reformer Jean Calvin can only turn Geneva into a 'model' city, in both a spiritual and an administrative sense, after this intellectual breakthrough; namely that the Prince can assume responsibility for religion as a local affair without appeal to a transnational authority in Rome.51 Likewise, Thomas Hobbes' seminal 'realist' text, Leviathan, contending for the power of an almighty sovereign the better to save the realm from religious and civil discord, can only be written in the context of Oliver Cromwell's puritanical Commonwealth of England.52

What we might understand, then, is how counter-intuitive the implications of Westphalia, and preceding religious warfare, really are. This is not helped by the Protestant affectation that a truly Christian Church is one located 'above' or 'outside' politics (whether domestic or international).53 It is an affectation just because of how, as mentioned, it was honoured in the breach more frequently than not. The Catholic Counter-Reformation was more intellectually honest for all of that by seeing its business as one of bringing about a 'Kingdom of God' on earth as a prelude to the one in heaven.54 The distinction, in short, between Luther's doctrine of Sola Fide obviating earthly 'works' to enter heaven after death, and the Catholic emphasis to the contrary.

The Catholic Church, and its papacy, do not see any politics, let alone international politics, as a vacuum of moral authority.55 Jesus Christ may have instructed the Jewish Pharisees, who were goading him, to 'render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's' but this only precluded violent insurrection in the then Roman province of Judaea.56 It did not proscribe 'persuading', 'negotiating', 'manipulating' or otherwise 'coming to terms' with Caesar.57 Politics is never as narrow as the question of coercion. Religious conversion, certainly as the Catholic Church
understands it by this stage, should be far from a coercive matter, as much as it is obviously political (in how it is achieved as a political matter, and has political, i.e. moral, content.)\textsuperscript{58}

Indeed, the Protestant 'image' to the contrary carries through in the writing of Hans J. Morgenthau or George F. Kennan, the 'realist' doyens of the post-war Pax Americana, with statements such as 'we cannot apply moral criteria to politics.'\textsuperscript{59} As Dennis J. Dunn put it: if this were true then how could one account for the Holy See at all today?\textsuperscript{60} Neither did Reinhold Niebuhr help the case of 'Christian Realism' at that time by essentially throwing his hands up at any attempt to reconcile religion with politics; considering the latter to be an 'amoral' plane.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{2.2 – The Catholic response to Westphalia}

The Catholic response to the challenge of the Reformation was not without contradiction and a measure of imitation, of course. The 'absolutist' monarchy of Catholic France, which reaps its own infamy by 1789, is only made possible by some diminution of papal authority (even though The Edict of Nantes is revoked.)\textsuperscript{62} The Pope relinquishes his absolute prerogative over the consecration of bishops in France. Then too, there was the phenomenon of the 'Crown Cardinal', \textit{jus exclusivae}, who is nominated by a Catholic sovereign and empowered with a veto to use during papal conclaves (and thereby shut-out popes that savour too much of Italian nationalism against all other nationalities.)\textsuperscript{63} At some distance from Westphalia, right up until the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, sovereigns still sought to hem in the Catholic Church in this way and harness papal power for their own benefit. \textsuperscript{64}

In France's colonies, and Spain's too, Catholic missionary work was a direct adjunct to respective imperial projects; as it was with centuries, since Charlemagne was given the title of Holy Roman Emperor by Leo III in AD800 (and a pretext, therein, to subjugate pagan Saxony and Muslim Iberia.)\textsuperscript{65} Catholicism would benefit from converts, tithes and benefices – while governors of New Spain or New France enjoyed the submission of the natives thereby generated.\textsuperscript{66}
Meanwhile, hither in the Old World, the papacy would acquiesce to suppressing the entire Jesuit Order (i.e. The Society of Jesus – that of Pope Francis) during the 18th century in order to appease sovereigns who feared the Jesuits as too much resembling agents and spies of a transnational government. Ironically, the Jesuits were freest under the Enlightened Despotism of the likes of Frederick the Great, in Protestant Prussia. The Jesuits too were the chief exponents of a 'Natural Law' tradition in Catholic International Relations that came down against the enslavement and dispossession of 'pagans' encountered in the Americas – a factor to be weighted in their earlier expulsion from Portugal’s colonies. We recall that Jeremy Bentham, writing at the rise of the Pax Britannica in the 18th century, declared natural law to be 'nonsense on stilts'; the papacy of the same time counter-blasted that Grotian International Law was a 'mere Protestant Science.'

Indeed, for all of that, the Holy See never permitted itself to be instrumentalised by the state nearly as much as Protestantism did. This was by dint of protectiveness of its own sovereignty, or independence, and authority. Thus do Lutheran pastors of Germany 'bless' the coming war in 1914 while, by contrast, Pope Benedict XV writes the 'Peace Notes' of 1915. An exception probably was the relationship of Napoléon and Pius VII between 1804 and 1814 (achieved by kidnapping, and annexation of Rome), but the mainly Protestant victors of the Coalition Wars still restored the Catholic papacy to what it had been before. They lacked any compelling Realpolitik to contrive this situation; so it seems the representations of the Holy See's delegate-plenipotentiary to Vienna in 1814-15, Cardinal Salvi, proved indispensable.

So, if we must pick 'winners' from the longue durée of the Wars of Religion, Catholicism presently enjoys 1.1 billion adherents worldwide in communion with a single head at Rome. Protestantism, on the other hand, is ecumenical of necessity – with hundreds of sects, both evangelical and no, and between 600 and 800 million followers thus segmented worldwide. Above all else, no Protestant bishop is anywhere a sovereign, or has diplomatic representatives.
David Ryall captured the complexity of the Holy See's political evolution well enough by describing it as a status-quo inclined, and yet ultimately subversive international actor. We mean subversive in this sense: that the Holy See's continuity of existence across a historical variety of systems of International Order and (dis-)Organisation constitutes an anomaly which destabilises International Relations Theory. In large part this too is because the Catholic Church is working through or despite the International system to repeatedly achieve what academic gatekeepers say it should not be able to (see Section 1.2, above).

Again, it is counter-intuitive, but no less adroit for it, to conclude that Westphalia eventually benefited the Holy See both from the standpoint of international politics and its own internal governance. Ultramontane, meaning literally 'from beyond the mountains', was (before Westphalia) largely a term of German derogation towards a papacy that claimed supremacy in all fields of law whether civil or ecclesiastical. The Reformation conveniently 'vented' most of the dissenting voices in Northern Europe from the Church, leaving it in a position where 'Ultramontane' began to be taken seriously as a descriptor for a devout Catholic's political programme (by the 18th century).

Historically, yes, Protestantism puts the power and might of the Anglo-American world beyond Rome’s pale. Yet in what state is that power, of financial capital, today? Pope Francis seems better placed than many other international leaders in plain right of the Church's huge reservoir of human capital in Latin America and Africa; won through the historical accident of the Church's influence holding firm in Southern Europe. Research latterly in the field of what is called 'Biopolitics', postulates that from the time of Council of Trent (1538 onwards) the Catholic Church’s decisive turn towards policing sexual mores is motivated by a race to 'make up the numbers' and thus augment a political power base. As the ability to influence rulers and governments directly wanes, the Church responds reflexively and adopts an oblique approach by reaching beyond the state and down to the state's constituent 'family units'.
2.3 - 'Theologies'

That brings us neatly onto the second, scarcely often as imputed, collaboration of religion in International Politics – namely with the forces of imperial capitalism (born of the industrial revolution) in the 19th and 20th centuries. Neither does it want for company! The internal contradictions of capitalism are savoured of too by such an Anglo-American political science as is International Relations [hereafter 'IR']. The assumptions of 'rationality', 'efficiency', 'stability' (in opposition to 'anarchy') and of a 'self-regulating system' (as a corollary) are shared by both.\(^{77}\)

The architecture of the global political economy, likewise, is still that of the Bretton Woods institutions from the close of the Second World War. Liberal IR theorists of 'interdependence' assume the innate virtue of this capitalist globalisation in a.) making the world 'safe' for democracy and b.) dis-incentivising warfare.\(^{78}\) The obliviousness to how capitalism presumes infinite growth of capital in a finite landscape of resources precludes Liberal theorists from too-severe dissonance; such as grappling with the question of whom will have to be eventually dispossessed as 'less worthy'.\(^{79}\)

When this shared set of assumptions has been confronted or otherwise 'corrected' by reality (sometimes too politely it is referred to as 'a miscalculation')\(^{80}\) disastrous consequences have ensued. Not least of these is death and destruction. The contradictory, knavish character of U.S. foreign policy itself (i.e. it is a democracy frequently at war, often covertly, with both democracies and non-democracies), and U.S. Stock Market fluctuations, have exacted a heavy toll from the time of two world wars that bequeathed it hegemony in victory.\(^{81}\)

IR did not escape History, either as a force or a discipline,\(^{82}\) and by that we mean a scholarly study of state power not only spoke to it (with the aim of describing it accurately) but also spoke, too often, from a position of such power. Niccolo Machiavelli might be considered a cause célèbre.\(^{83}\) Hence, why Westphalia was taken up and transformed into a dogma of sorts by academics of the era of Lords Castlereagh (who pioneered the 'Concert' system after Vienna, in
1815) and Palmerston. The latter being something of a personification of the later-identified military-industrial complex, and infamous for dicta such as "there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests." Palmerston too deployed the gunboats of the British Navy to open a 'free market' for raw heroin in China in the 1840s (from whence comes the term 'Gunboat Diplomacy').

The more intriguing probematique lies within one of Britain’s 'Home Nations', Ireland, at that time. Though Max Weber would only later identify the affinity of Protestantism for capitalism (and vice versa), in 1905, Ireland was a crucible much earlier for how laissez-faire policies and an Established (i.e. State-run) Church could work in tandem to achieve common aims. Ireland was England's first colony at all, and had been conceptualised since the 12th century AD in such terms. It should be recalled too that the colonisation of much of the African continent (and the 'Middle-East') was yet to take place, meaning that much portends for IR in the Irish case in the 1840s.

Ireland's was a traditional case then, as colonial contexts go, and the response of the British government to the catastrophic failure of the potato crop between 1845 and 1848 (a monoculture deliberately encouraged by exploitative land and tenancy law) was, if an unfeeling one, still armed with plenty of justification from a 'providential' Protestant theology. Catholicism had 'encouraged' or otherwise 'indulged' the supposed idleness and lack of thrift of the Irish. Combined with a Malthusian (not Smithian) view of economics, and a Presbyterian sensibility that outcomes are 'fated' (and can be retributive), it did not shock when the government refused to put in place food-price controls.

Instead government assistance to the Irish population was conditional as if operating on the basis of 'spare the rod, and spoil the child'. Government workhouses distributed food and provided shelter to those who agreed to tender their labour building roads to nowhere. It was imperative to those organising relief schemes that the moral hazard of a 'culture of dependency' was avoided. Railroad magnates in Ireland benefited too from the devaluation of the labour market,
such that meagre wages were not as often the cause of worker unrest as the perception 'outsiders' to a locality were being employed first on projects. Soup kitchens established by certain Protestant congregations were likewise opportunistic, and proselytised unto Catholics whom they held captive by an empty stomach (without marked success to judge from the 1861 census).

Though it is debatable how concerted and conscious the combined actions of (Protestant) Church and State were during the Irish Famine (strong 'intentionalists' have suggested its inclusion within the canons of genocide), both certainly benefited in plain right of the death of 1 million Catholics by malnutrition or starvation, and the emigration of a further 1 million in the immediate decade afterwards. The restless demography of the 'congested districts' was now so dampened as to delay armed insurrection until the next century. Prime Minister Gladstone's later attempts to 'pacify Ireland' benefited from a much lower ratio of (relatively wealthier) tenants to available acreage when he embarked on land redistribution and 'buy-back' in the 1860s.

Catholicism’s synonymity with the nationalism of rural Irish smallholders took strongest root for the want of timelier British intervention (a 'Catholic Revival', or Irish Ultramontanism' is generally dated to 1850 and the era of Cardinal Paul Cullen). Most literally, the the papacy won footsoldiers, when as many as 8,000 Irishmen would later volunteer for the Papal Army during the Italian Wars of Unification, between 1869 and 1870.

How this is significant for wider world politics should be obvious: throughout the 'third world' latterly subjected to the colonial depredations of (White) European rule, Catholicism has benefited from being a 'voice for the marginalised' or 'option for the poor'. Catholic 'Corporatism', distilled from Catholic Social Teaching by Pius XI between the world wars, offered a 'third-way' to strike a balance between workers’ rights and that of (whom would remain) the private owner-employer. More radical Liberation Theology which was suffused with an implicit Marxist critique of Latin American politics (though certainly not containing as much Marxist praxis as the Holy See feared) likewise thrived from the 1960s onward.
We should caution that it is obviously not always so. Where the autocrats, generalissimos, kleptocrats and oligarchs have been dutiful Catholics by appointment of the Monroe Doctrine, the Holy See's criticism (if not that of its local hierarchy) has been tempered, and even muted. The Philippines, Argentina and Chile between the 1970s and 1980s stand witness to a Church 'hedging bets' for fear of a Communist takeover in those countries, however unlikely.  

To take Ireland as exemplary again: the country's post-colonial vacuum of authority was amply filled through Catholic holy orders' provision of social services (such as schools, sanatoria, asylums and hospitals) to a fledgling state otherwise unable to afford it. Thereby, the Catholic hierarchy of Ireland came to fashion a state which collaborated with it from the inside-out after 1922, in one of the most comprehensive counter-revolutions achieved in Europe since 1849.

It must further be heeded how the vaunted, self-regarding 'Protestant work ethic' gives lie to what was touted, even in the 19th century, as an age witness to the 'disenchantment of the world.' Capitalism is arguably such a long-lasting, though deeply exploitative, means of economic organisation because of its capacity for hybridisation and re-invention. In this case it integrated a politics of self-interest and a Christianity of control (over non-elites) and self-righteousness. We therefore must remain suspicious of theoretical approaches in IR which trace their intellectual history to the foreign policy practice of 19th century empires. Religion abides but, on the contrary, a sneering disregard for the 'superstition' or 'backward' religion of the colonised buttresses core assumptions of superiority and either 'advancement' or 'progress'.

A dotted line might thus be drawn placing such a colonial chauvinism at the root of exalted notions about a 'post-religious' world order, in the latter IR practice of the 20th century. Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* (1992) is infamous for its risible, even racist, central premonition, and it is clearly a call-to-arms, that the nation-states (sh-)would club together along confessional lines once more at the close of the Cold War. 'Christendom versus Islamic Ummah' was the centre-ring fight merely interrupted by the ideological clash of communism and
Frankly, to suggest a particular sect is the basis of as mediated, nebulous and cynical a concept as 'civilisation' is to rehearse libels as old as the Roman Empire with its conflation of Romanitas and Christianitas.

George W. Bush advisor Robert Kagan in a slim pre-Iraq war pamphlet, *Paradise and Power* (2002), was more honest (though unintentionally so). He suggested that the European Union and United States, as a respective apotheoses of liberal, capitalist democracy, must be guarded (with force) against 'savages' whose only rule is 'the law of the jungle'. Perhaps not Christendom (i.e. 'The West') against The Rest then, but rather 'Capitalism versus its Discontents and Dispossessed' is, was, and will remain the true clash of our age.

Global politics too is more properly 'secular' now than it ever was, which would hardly be difficult. And still it would be mistaken to assume religion had either been the main culprit or biggest obstacle to crafting a 'rational' or 'stable' global politics. We should sooner implicate nationalism, racism, religiosity *and* capitalism (frequently all four at once; with the former three at the altar of the latter) than naively imagining some future idyll on the international plane which is 'free' of only religious, and not systemic violence.

Prevailing discourse has been distinctly unhelpful thus far with its supposition that 'militant Islam' is responsible for the 'resurgence' of the religion in IR in the 21st century. It ought to be asked, a.) when 'Islam', or indeed *any other* religion, ever departed the international plane, as is implied, and, b.) what is the relation of the conduct of both U.S. *and* British foreign policy, to 'irrational' Islamic actions that are set against it? Too quickly we assume the colonial chauvinism of an earlier age is a buried hatchet, so that it seems churlish to suggest it persists (even subtly) for both 'actors' and 'practitioners' in IR. A materialist account of the rights and wrongs in how global society is ruled (and ruined) is similarly derided as too 'leftist' to be taken seriously by IR's Anglo-American milieu (the 'realist' wing of which usually responds to cries of injustice by rehearsing Thucydides' Melian dialogue.)
Conclusions

We have demonstrated that the Holy See is enmeshed the International System, albeit because of historically contingent and thus legally convoluted processes. Even if it were not, we conclude that it would be better to keep it so interwoven, at least for now. If we were to address both nation-states and transnational religious organisations in colloquy we might say, making sure to direct our gaze towards the nation-states especially, 'You are at least as bad as one another.'

When popes have come to address the United Nations General Assembly with lofty words, fine aspirations and bountiful platitudes, their credibility deficit is no more yawning than when the President of the United States or Prime Minister of Japan has likewise done so. To wit, what sense is there in excluding the government, and leader, of the world's largest religion from either the obligations of International Law or the good offices of diplomacy? The 'plenitude of papal power', as it was once more grandly announced, is still greater than that of many nation-states combined and should be closely observed and carefully engaged with.

Pope Francis last year transposed UN instruments on the protection of the child into the Vatican's criminal law, which may be a route to greater accountability than canon law will ever afford, if the Holy See can be hoist on that petard. At the Cairo conference twenty years hence, the Holy See forged a 'coalition' of sorts with Islamic states just as ferociously opposed to the expansion of international reproductive health rights. Perhaps, rather than hue and cry, closer attention might have been paid to the potential for such a constellation of forces to emerge, the better to strategically counter it?

Everywhere the 'Westphalian' state succumbs to the increasing granularity of supranational organisation and globalisation so that it hardly seems appropriate to cast out the world's oldest 'global' body for the sake of a Platonic form. Opportunities beckon in the break-down, which is only the latest in a long-line for the Holy See: an institution the British Foreign Office knew to 'think in terms of centuries.' Many states will not be long for passing in what is but a twinkle in the languid eyes of Rome. These states could learn from the Holy See how to fail better.
• **Appendices**

A. What's your preferential view of the 'generative causes' of anarchy?

"Yes, the planet got destroyed. But for a beautiful moment in time we created a lot of value for shareholders."
B – Distribution of Christians Worldwide and Schematic of Christian Schism

Fig. 1 Catholicism Worldwide

Fig. 2 Protestantism Worldwide (Darkest Red: ≥90% of population)

Fig. 3 – Schism in Christianity
• Endnotes

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4 e.g. Paddy Agnew, 'Church officials welcome plan to reopen Irish Vatican Embassy' in The Irish Times, (January 21st, 2014) - 'At the time of the 2011 closure, many commentators argued it marked an unprecedentedly low ebb in Ireland-Vatican relations."

5 e.g. Michael Nugent [i.e. the head of the Atheist Ireland organisation], 'The pretend Vatican state at the UN' at michaelnugent.com - http://www.michaelnugent.com/best/the-toy-vatican-state-at-the-un/ (accessed: 20/03/2014) 'And so today, because the toy Vatican State can issue stamps, the Catholic Church is the only religion in the world that can attend and vote at UN conferences.'

6 Eamon McCann, 'How did the Holy See get recognition as a state? It just did’ in The Irish Times, (January 23rd, 2014) - 'It was the post office in the Vatican that earned the Holy See its first stamp of approval as a sovereign state'


11 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid, (New York, 1995), p. 15 - Klotz cites Friedrich Kratochwil as a leading example of an IR scholar at the intersection of these schools of thought, e.g. F. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, (Cambridge, 1989)

12 cf. Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations, (London, 2003), pp. 23 – ‘According to this conventional account ... the discourse of raison d’etat secularised international relations, by underlining religion as a mode of legitimacy, by curtailing the universalising ambitions of the Roman Catholic Church’; M. Barnett, ‘Another Great Awakening? International Relations Theory and Religion’ in J. Snyder (ed.), Religion and International Relations Theory, (London, 2012), pp. 94-96 ‘Martin Wight and Hedley Bull [of the English School in IR], were quite cognizant of the power of religion in war affairs throughout international history. They were also quite aware of the secularizing trends in global society ... They considered this historical evolution a positive development because it stabilised international order around rationalised principles ... They assumed religion was inherently destabilising, and in part because they allowed their normative conclusions to influence their theoretical framework.’ (my emphasis)

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14 cf. Edward C. Luck, 'Principal Organs' in T.G. Weiss and S. Dawes (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, (Oxford, 2007), p. 658 - 'too often too vague to be of much use for affecting either policy decisions in capitals or public opinion ... this has been encouraged by the largely successful drive over the past two decades to take as many ... decisions as possible by consensus.'

15 e.g. Barbara Crossette, 'Vatican holds up abortion debate at talks in Cairo' in *New York Times*, (8th September, 1994); Hans Kung, 'Lonely Power of Vatican City' in *The Guardian*, (16th September, 1994); John Hooper, 'Protest at Vatican abortion block' in *The Guardian*, (8th September, 1994); Kim Murphy, 'Abortion accord unravels at talks' in *Los Angeles Times*, (8th September, 1994) – 'there are charges that the Vatican has 'hijacked' the Cairo conference'; Ramon G. McLeod, 'Harsh criticism for Vatican's abortion stand: Egypt leads counterattack' in *San Francisco Chronicle*, (8th September, 1994), etc.


17 Y. Abdullah, supra n16; cf. James Fantau, 'Rethinking the Sovereign Status of the Holy See: towards a greater equality of states and greater protection of citizens in United States courts' in *Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law*, vol. 19, no. 2 (Spring, 2011); e.g. in the ICD's own conference programme there is reliance on her argument ex *Montevideo*, as examined below – Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, 'Vatican City State’ at ipahp.org - http://www.ipahp.org/index.php?en_vatican-city-state (accessed: 20/03/2014) - 'the question regarding its status still remained as the Vatican City did and still does not possess all the characteristics of a proper State recognized by International Law (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States); the Holy See does not have a permanent population apart from the Church functionaries'; cf. E. McCann, *The Irish Times*, ibid. - 'All Vatican citizenship is temporary. On this last ground alone, the absence of a permanent citizen population, Vatican City fails to qualify as a state' – he invokes the Montevideo Convention knowingly without mentioning it.

18 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1836

19 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1860 – 'the criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention are traditionally accepted.'

20 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1858

21 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1857


23 Y. Abdullah, ibid., pp. 1861-63

24 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1863

25 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1866

26 Ibid.

27 Y. Abdullah, ibid., pp. 1864-65 – 'There is no clear delineation between the government of the Roman Catholic Church and that of the Vatican City State ... The Holy See ... does not constitute a government in the traditional sense.' (my emphasis) - this complaint can be adequately responded to with all the force of 'So what?'

28 Y. Abdullah, pp. 1858-59


30 Y. Abdullah, p. 1859 – '[the] difficulty is the doctrine's relativism: a state's legal existence is dependent on its relations with other states ... [it] does not explain the legal status of a state that is recognised by some states but not by others.' – in truth, International Law still has no good answers as to the status of many disputed territories (see n31, infra)

31 Undoubtedly all of the above have ample territory (implying a degree of self-sufficiency), a self-renewing population with a 'national' identity, self-government, armed forces and even varying degrees of recognition quantifying a 'capacity to enter into relations with other states' (Kosovo leading the ensemble, with Palestine coming a distant second). However, in spite of meeting Montevidean criteria, their efforts to join the UN, and
even local supranational bodies (such as the African Union [OAU] in Western Sahara’s case) have been fruitless. What perhaps distinguishes all of these states too is that their right to exist is disputed by neighbours who view the ‘states’ as either illegal secessions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia have this problem with Georgia, as does Western Sahara with Morocco, Kosovo with Serbia, and Transnistria with Moldova) or threats to their own sovereignty claims (Israel and Palestine; The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China). The Holy See’s relations with Italy are much more cordial and (obviously) juridically governed by the Lateran Treaty of 1929 – cf. ‘The Montevideo Convention’, Article 3 - ‘The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.’ (my emphases)

32 Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia: a political failure in search of a scholarly explanation, (Leiden, 2000), pp. 125–129
33 The European Commission, ‘Enlargement – Kosovo*’ at ec.europa.eu - http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/kosovo/ (accessed: 20/03/2014) - *This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.’ – 5 member-states, including Greece and Spain, do not recognise Kosovo.
34 For Germany: cf. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, (1949), Article 140; and Italy: AAS (Acta Apostolicae Sedis [Acts of the Holy See]), vol. 77, (1985), pp. 521-546 – the latter is the record of the revision to the Lateran Treaty (1929), concluded between Italy and the Holy See in 1984, to provide for Church Tax. Both Germany and Italy operate an ‘eight per thousand’ scheme of Church Tax, i.e. a rate of 0.8% of tax taken is reimbursed to the religion of the taxpayer’s choice (e.g. if tax payable was €10,000 in a given year, the Catholic Church would receive €800).
36 n31, supra
37 In a further twist, most of the signatories to Montevideo were states which recognised the Holy See in the immediate decade after it lost control of the Papal States in 1870, e.g. Argentina established an embassy to the Holy See in 1878, cf. ‘Bilateral Relations of the Holy See’ at vatican.va (n29, supra)
40 Ibid.
41 Y. Abdullah, ibid., p. 1838, cit. United Nations Charter, (1945) Article 1, Par. 2 - 'To develop friendly relations among nations'; Par. 4 - 'To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends' (my emphases).
42 B. Tesche, The Myth of 1648; Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’ in International Organizations, (2001) vol. 55, pp. 251-287; Jeremy Larkin, From Hierarchy to Anarchy: Territory and Politics before Westphalia, (New York, 2010), pp. 4-5; cf. Walter Ullmann, Medieval Papalism: The Political Theories of the Medieval Papacy, (Cambridge, 1949), p. 8 – ‘political science was wholly indistinguishable from legal science [of the Church] ... Empire versus Papacy was a constitutional quarrel’; contra Daniel Philpott and Timothy Shah, ‘The Fall and Rise of Religion’ in J. Snyder (ed.), Religion and IR, p. 25, ‘the transition from medieval Europe to the modern system of sovereign states that was consolidated around the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ... the secular character of these events became ensconced in International Relations thought’ – Philpott and Shah take it as given that ‘these events’ had a ‘secular character’.
43 Catholic princes of the Holy Roman Empire paid no heed to Innocent X’s threat of excommunication for abiding by the provisions of Westphalia, contained in his Bull, Zel Domus (1650), cf. John M. Owen and J. Judd
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44 A. Osiander, ibid., p. 251 – ‘Westphalia – shorthand for a narrative purportedly about the seventeenth century – is really a product of the nineteenth and twentieth-century fixation on the concept of sovereignty.’

45 Ibid.

46 A. Osiander, ibid., p. 252 – ‘according to the standard view The Thirty Years’ War was a struggle between two main parties ... ‘universalist’ actors: [who] asserted their right, and that of the pope, to control Christendom ... their opponents were the ‘particularist’ actors: [who] rejected imperial overlordship and the authority of the pope, upholding instead the right of all states to independence (sovereignty) ... this interpretation is dubious. [...]. None of the actors fighting the Habsburgs went to war for defensive purposes.’; p. 260ff. cit. Kalevi J. Holsti (1991) – ‘the peace legitimised the ideas of sovereignty ... It created a framework that would sustain the political fragmentation of Europe’; Hans Morgenthau (1948;1985) – ‘the rules of international law were securely established in 1648’, Michael Sheehan (1996) – ‘[Westphalia] formally recognised the concept of state sovereignty’ – as Osiander adds, sharply, none of these authors appears to have read the actual treaty which contains nothing of this 19th century legal substance.

47 e.g. The First and Second World Wars are incontestably the most destructive and murderous episodes of recorded human history, and could only be considered ‘religious’ in the most peripheral sense. Both the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1799) and the U.S. Civil War (1861-65) are particularly interesting cases to consider in this light too. Both are considered, and particularly the latter, to be the bloodiest episodes in the history of warfare at their respective dates. However, both also take place within a highly secularising (or secularised) framework with a formal separation of Church and State. Secular creeds, namely those of nationalism and/or self-determination in both these cases, prove just as generative of ‘instability’ or ‘anarchy’ as religious enmity. Revolutionary France’s confrontation with Prussia & Ors. at Valmy (1792) is a balance of power action by those other powers to preserve Christian Monarchism, no less, from the proclaimed threat of France to export revolution to the rest of Europe. Napoléon would later accomplish this.


49 Ibid. – It is notable, indeed, how Luther’s tracts consistently address themselves less to the faithful and more to the nobility and princes of the Holy Roman Empire, e.g. To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520); cf. On the Jews and Their Lies (1543) – a viciously anti-Semitic tract where Luther proposes systematic, political-level persecution of Jews by the princes. He is thankfully ignored.

50 cf. B. Teschke, The Myth of 1648, p. 240 – ‘If anything 1555 points to the non-separation of politics and religion in the 16th century: the state was not even secular’.

51 David F. Wright, ‘Calvin in Church History’ in Donald K. McKim (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 277ff. - ‘it was his achievement, far more than anyone else’s, that promoted Geneva to a city of European stature.’


53 Martin Luther, On Secular Authority, (1523), ‘We are to be subject to governmental power and do what it bids, as long as it does not bind our conscience but legislates only concerning outward matters...But if it invades the spiritual domain and constrains the conscience, over which God only must preside and rule, we should not obey it at all but rather lose our necks. Temporal authority and government extend no further than to matters which are external and corporeal.’ – reproduced in Hans Höpfl (ed.), Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority, (Cambridge, 1991), p. 3ff.; cf. ‘Introduction’, p. x – ‘On Secular Authority, then, shows Luther at his most hostile to secular authority: true religion is presented here as being more divorced from the civil life of the community than in an earlier or later account, as more private or personal ....G. the text contains no intimation of the idea that public, political measures might be taken against an ungodly ruler.’ (my emphases)

54 The Church had, since the 12th and 13th centuries, branded Manichaeism a heresy; i.e. the idea that the material world was inherently evil and irreconcilable with Christianity. The Occitan Cathars were persecuted on this basis. Likewise the vow of ‘apostolic poverty’ of the Franciscan Order led to the ascetic Fraticelli heresy, which was condemned for fear that such extreme formulations impugned the right of the Church to hold property at
all, cf. John XXII, Sancta Romana, (1317); Ad conditorem canonum (1322); Cum inter nonnullos (1323); cf. Francis X. Murphy, 'Vatican Politics: Structure and Function' in World Politics, vol. 26, no. 4, (July, 1974), pp. 542-559, p. 559 – 'a universal Christian presence in the world as a prelude to the achievement of the polis theos, or Kingdom of God toward whose realisation on earth the Church is striving.'

55 e.g. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus: Reflections after Five Years, (Vatican City, 1997), §57 - 'As far as the Church is concerned, the social message of the Gospel must not be considered a theory, but above all else a basis and a motivation for action'; Pope Francis, cit. in Francis X. Rocca, 'Pope Francis tells diplomats: moral relativism threatens peace' at Catholic Herald - http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2013/03/22/pope-francis-tells-diplomats-moralrelativism-threatens-peace/ (accessed: 23/05/2013); - '[I lament the] spiritual poverty of our time, which afflict the so-called richer countries particularly seriously. It is what my much-loved predecessor, Benedict XVI, called the 'dictatorship of relativism', which makes everyone his own criterion and endangers the co-existence of peoples.'


57 Pope John Paul II, cit. in David Ryall, ibid., p. 41 – 'it goes without saying that the Apostolic See has no thought or intention of failing to give due respect to the sovereign prerogatives of any state.' (my emphasis)

58 cf. Dignitatis Humanae – Declaration on Religious Freedom of the Second Vatican Council, (7th December, 1965) at vatican.va - http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html (accessed: 21/03/2014), §4 - 'Religious communities also have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith ... However, in spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy, especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action would have to be considered an abuse of one’s right and a violation of the right of others. In addition, it comes within the meaning of religious freedom that religious communities should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of their doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the inspiration of the whole of human activity.’ (my emphases)

59 George F. Kennan cit. in Dennis J. Dunn, 'Global Reach' in The Wilson Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4, (Autumn, 1982), pp. 113-123, p. 123

60 D.J. Dunn, ibid.


62 Musée Virtuel du Protestantisme Francais, 'The Edict of Fontainebleau (1685)' at museeprotestant.org - http://www.museeprotestant.org/Pages/Notices.php?noticeid=650&scatid=130&lev=1&l=get=EN (accessed: 22/03/2014) – the Edict, and subsequent revisions, banned Protestant worship, but also provided for the separation of children from Protestant parents and their subsequent indoctrination with the Catholic Catechism. Henry IV, Louis' ancestor, had been compelled by adverse circumstances to concede toleration of Protestantism in the Edict of Nantes (1598). Louis' revocation therefore was as much a vain exercise of his own power to show the contrast; but the benefits accrued mainly to the Church.


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not that religion does not inspire violence, but rather that it is more frequently a function of the political context in which a religion is set – in this case to perform colonial repression for nation-states. That is also a mutually beneficial arrangement rather than one of co-option.


68 Ibid.; cf. John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations, (London, 1935), p. 265, cit. Francisco Suarez, De Legibus ac de Deo Legislatore (1580), book 2, chapter 19, §9: 'The reason for the Law of Nations [Ius Gentium], under this aspect, is that the human race, though divided into no matter how many different peoples ... has for all that a certain unity, a unity not merely physical, but also in a sense political ... and moral. This is shown by the natural precept of love and mercy, which extends to all men, including foreigners of every way of thinking'.

69 D. Philpott, 'The Challenge of September 11', p. 74


72 See Appendix B – Maps and Diagrams


76 Ibid., p. 140ff.

77 Timothy Fitzgerald, Religion and Politics in International Relations: The Modern Myth, (New York, 2011), p. 5 – 'In the language of IR specialists ... religion 'returns from exile' or 'resurges' irrationally and fanatically and threatens the calm, rational and only reluctantly violent liberal state'; pp. 10-11 - 'The invention of 'religions' has facilitated the invention of 'natural reason' that transforms modern rhetorical constructs like the rationality and inevitability of capitalism and 'politics' into common sense [...] Capitalism is generally assumed to be part of the 'natural' order of things, and secular scientific economists would see what they do as essentially different from what theologians do.' (my emphasis)

78 Oliver Richmond, cit. Immanuel Wallerstein in Peace in International Relations, (Oxford, 2008), p. 65 – 'the whole edifice of an epistemic community [IR], founded upon liberal democracy and capitalism, is essentially viewed as producing a limited, perhaps even realist version of peace, at the expense of the proletarian classes on a global scale who have little chance of betterment ... realist and liberal approaches combine to dress up inequality in an institutional guise that bears a strong resemblance to a feudal order, but is now projected globally ... this is an inherently unstable system' (my emphasis).

79 Ibid.

80 e.g. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War – the nature of International crisis, (Baltimore, 1981) – Lebow’s central thesis is that wars occur primarily due to ‘miscalculation’ of ‘relative gains’ (that is, the perceived ratio of cost to benefit of a military response.)

81 cf. John M. Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace: who says democracies don’t fight?’ in Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no.6, (November/December 2005); Ethan Cramer-Flood, ‘Good Theory, Bad Policy: a study of the democratic peace theory and its implications for the war on terror’ in Perspectives on Global Affairs, vol. 3, issue 1, (Fall, 2008), pp. 6-17, p. 9 - 'On the other side, realists like to mention the U.S. overturning democratically elected governments in both the Dominican Republic and Chile – non-military engagements that liberal studies would never include. Though shots were not fired, realists claim with some validity that these examples prove democracies are capable of aggressive behavior toward one another.'

82 A. Osiander, ibid., p. 283 - 'IR theory, and its still-dominant paradigm realism, thus developed against the
background of what may be called the ideology of sovereignty. It was not realized that, far from being traditional, this ideology had its roots only in the transient nineteenth-century geyday of state autonomy. Its emotive appeal has made sure that its adherents are still numerous despite the fact that the process of industrialization, with its inexorable dynamic, is now destroying the very autonomy that it at first gave the nineteenth-century's state' (my emphasis); p. 240 - 'Unaware of its roots in nineteenth-century historiography, but still very much under the normative influence of the concept of the nation-state underlying that literature, twentieth-century IR scholars have been among the most eager continuators of the old propaganda image of the war. The notion that the peace enshrined a new, anti-hegemonial order goes back to this image.' (my emphasis) – Osiander mainly implicates Leo Gross (writing in 1948) for his reliance on older (i.e. 19th century), and then mainly legal, authorities about Westphalia without reading the treaty himself. Gross' work assumed canonical status in IR.

83 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (1513, trans. W.K. Marriott), 'Dedication', at Project Gutenberg - http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm#link2H_4_0006 (accessed: 22/03/2014) - 'To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici: Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious ...' (etc.)


86 i.e. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, (1904/5; London, 1930)


88 cf. Charles E. Curran, 'Providence and Responsibility: The divine and the human in History from the perspective of moral theology' in *Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings*, vol. 44 (1989), pp. 43-64, p. 44 – 'Protestant thought has often accused Catholic moral theology of not giving enough importance to the divine ... The Catholic temptation has been ... to downplay the divine role in human action.'

89 Ciara Boylan, 'Review: Robin Haines, *Charles Trevelyan and the great Irish Famine* in *History Ireland*, vol. 13, no. 1, (Jan/Feb 2005); R.N. Lebow, ibid., pp. 61-62; cf. Tomás O'Riordan, 'Charles Edward Trevelyan' at CELT: Multitext Project in History (UCC) - http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/Charles_Edward_Trevelyan (accessed: 23/03/2014) - 'He saw the Famine as a 'mechanism for reducing surplus population'. But it was more: 'The judgement of God sent the calamity to teach the Irish a lesson, that calamity must not be too much mitigated ...The real evil with which we have to contend is not the physical evil of the Famine, but the moral evil of the selfish, perverse and turbulent character of the people'.

90 Christine Kinealy, 'Ireland: Politics and Administration, 1815-1870' at CELT: Multitext Project in History (UCC), http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/Ireland_politics_and_administration_1815ndash1870#9GovernmentresponsestotheFamine (accessed: 23/03/2014)

91 Ibid. - 'Following the harvest of 1847, the British Government announced that the Famine was over and that any future relief would be provided by the Poor Law. For the British Government, one advantage of moving to this system of relief was that it was funded from locally raised taxation in Ireland [...] the various relief policies that increasingly shifted the burden to Irish taxpayers, demonstrated that even at a period of crisis, Ireland was left to her own resources, though an integral part of the United Kingdom.' (my emphasis)

92 cf. Brian MacAongusa, 'William Dargan: Great Railway Builder and Patriot' in *Irish Railway Record Society*, vol. 24, no. 171, (February, 2010), pp. 4-17 - 'in early 1850, [t]rouble broke out near Moate among unemployed labourers in the district who were complaining that Dargan was giving undue preference to strangers crowding into the area to get work on building the Midland Great Western Railway mainline to Galway. Dargan explained to them that men acquainted with preparing land for a railway would be employed by him initially, together with paupers from the workhouse in Mullingar. Dargan said he hoped to have an abundance of employment for the local people later, but his explanations were not well received and the police had to be called to restore peace.'

93 Bryan Fanning, *Racism and Social Change in the Republic of Ireland*, (Manchester, 2002), p. 52; Brian Ó Cuiv, 'Irish Language and Literature, 1845-1921' in W.E. Vaughan (ed.), *A New History of Ireland: Ireland Under the*
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94 I borrow here from schools of thought on the genesis of the later Holocaust, as famously sketched by Timothy Mason (1981); e.g. Tim Pat Coogan, The Famine Plot: England’s role in Ireland’s greatest tragedy, (Dublin, 2012) – ‘one of the earliest cases of ethnic cleansing’ – with the title suggesting connivance in any case.
98 Angel F. Mendez Montoya, ‘Latin America’ in James J. Buckley et al. (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Catholicism, (London, 2005), pp. 182-183; cf. Leonardo Boff, ‘The New Envangelisation: New Life Burst In’ in Concilium, (1990), pp. 130-140, p. 137 – ‘the popular church, the church of the poor … Christianity which is ecumenical, democratic, militant in the struggle for a new society’ – Boff was excommunicated by Pope John Paul II.
99 cf. Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, (1931) cit. in Sabina P. Ramet, Catholicism and politics in communist societies, (Durham, NC, 1990) pp. 33-34 – ‘Pius insisted on the principle of subsidiarity … “[A]s it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private industry and enterprise can accomplish so, too, it is an injustice … for a larger and higher organisation to arrogate itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies” … the underlying ideas of corporatism … [include] workers sharing in ownership and some decision-making […] [T]he misuse of corporatist ideas by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany brought the term into disrepute’.
100 cf. Benedict XVI (as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger), Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 'Instruction on certain aspects of the “Theology of Liberation.”', (6th August, 1984) at vatican.va - http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19840806_theology-liberation_en.html (accessed: 23/04/2014) - ‘§X.5 - The mistake here is not in bringing attention to a political dimension of the readings of Scripture, but in making of this one dimension the principal or exclusive component. … §X.12 - An exclusively political interpretation is thus given to the death of Christ. In this way, its value for salvation and the whole economy of redemption is denied.’
101 e.g. for Chile cf. Lester A. Sobel, Chile and Allende, (New York, 1974), p. 123 – cit. (Chilean) Christian Democratic Party, '[Allende is] seeking the totality of power, which means Communist tyranny disguised as the dictatorship of the proletariat'; for Argentina cf. General Jorge Videla: 'A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb but also someone who spreads ideas which are contrary to Western and Christian civilization', cit. in Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin (eds.), Broken Promises? The Argentine crisis and Argentine democracy, (Lanham, MD., 2006), p. 185
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106 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ in The Clash of Civilizations? - The Debate, (New York, 1996), pp. 1-26, p. 18ff. - Huntington cites Turkey as an example of a ‘cross-roads’ country, torn between Christendom and its ‘enlightenment’ and Islamism in the east. He also reduces the Balkans (p. 11ff.) to a flashpoint in this inter-religious tension which seems to be giving too much credence to the racist and sectarian politics of Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic. Sarajevo had one of the highest rates of inter-faith marriage in the known world prior to the 1990s. Claims by Radovan Karadzic that ‘Serbs need to land to live on, Muslims can live stacked on top of each other’ were justifications which he offered for his bloody re-drawing of Sarajevo into confessionised ‘sectors’ alright – but he didn’t succeed in that endeavour and was an elite suiting himself by dressing up a Serbian myth of national superiority in the clothes of religious war. Huntington’s theory therefore is dangerously close to being a self-fulfilling one if read earnestly by policy-makers.
107 Ibid.
110 cf. W.T. Cavanaugh, ibid., pp. 4-5 - ‘In the West, revulsion towards killing and dying in the name of one’s religion is the principal means by which we become convinced that killing and dying in the name of the nation-state is laudable and proper ... it provides secular social orders with a stock character, the religious fanatic, to serve as enemy ... What I challenge as incoherent is the argument that there is something called religion – a genus of which Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and so on are species – which is necessarily more inclined toward violence than are ideologies and institutions that are identified as secular.’
111 e.g. Iran is often demonised for holding forth anti-American antipathy in plain right of religious fanaticism – rarely does the discussion encompass Operation Ajax, conducted jointly by the CIA and MI6, to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh in a wrangle over oil revenue from Anglo-Iranian Petroleum, in 1953, cf. Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 Coup in Iran’ in Science and Society, vol. 65, no. 2, (Summer, 2001), pp. 182-215
112 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, §5.89 - ‘Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’
113 T. Fitzgerald, ibid., p. 11 - ‘liberal capitalism and its theorization by liberal economists is itself very similar to what is widely thought of as ... a religious ideology. Liberal capitalism and liberal economic theory are rarely referred to as a religion, but on the contrary are hardly seen as an ideology at all.’
114 Vatican Radio, ‘Pope Francis publishes Motu Proprio on criminal law matters in Vatican’ at en.radiovaticana.va - http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2013/07/11/pope_francis_issues_motu_proprio_on_criminal_law_matters_in_vatican/en1-709480 (accessed: 23/03/2014) - ‘These laws, however, have a broader scope, since they incorporate into the Vatican legal system the provisions of numerous international conventions including: the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, on the conduct of war and war crimes; the 1965 Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination; the 1984 Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the 1989 Convention on the rights of the child and its optional protocols of 2000.’